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ABSTRACT 
 
 
 
Since the introduction of the petroleum Production Sharing Contract (PSC) 
system by the Indonesian government in the 1960s, this system has been considered 
a model for other petroleum-producing nations to emulate. Unfortunately, with the 
continual decline in performance displayed by this partnership, its capability as an 
attractive partnership system has been questioned. This thesis proposes three main 
factors contributing towards the dismal performance of the Indonesian PSC 
arrangement: the commercial viability of the petroleum Exploration & Production 
(E&P) industry, the PSC as a system and the negative perception of the investment 
climate in Indonesia itself. Employing the cash flow analysis and the risk analyses 
using the Monte Carlo simulation technique and Analytic Hierarchy Process (AHP) 
in the Benefit-Cost-Risk framework, the research concludes that the commercial 
capability and productivity of the Indonesian PSC have declined in recent years. The 
Monte Carlo simulation shows that the tax consolidation approach proposed for the 
frontier areas has not contributed effectively in consolidating the production 
partnership system, whilst enhancement of several PSC variables as incentives are 
required and should be offered based on its production rate profile. The result of 
AHP analysis points to the need to consider the application of the Modern Royalty 
and Tax system as an alternative to the PSC system. This study strongly suggests the 
role of foreign direct investment climate in Indonesia as the critical factor in 
improving the Indonesian PSC system as an attractive mode in managing Indonesia’s 
growing petroleum E&P industry.  
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ABSTRAK 
 
 
 
Sejak pelaksanaan sistem Perkongsian Kontrak Pengeluaran (PSC) petroleum 
oleh kerajaan Indonesia dalam tahun 1960an, ia telah dianggap sebagai suatu model 
perkongsian pengeluaran minyak yang wajar dicontohi oleh negara-negara pengeluar 
minyak lain. Namun, sejak kebelakangan ini dengan kemerosotan yang berterusan 
yang dialami dalam pencapaian sistem perkongsian ini, telah timbul keraguan 
terhadap kemampuannya untuk terus bertahan sebagai satu sistem perkongsian yang 
menarik. Kajian ini telah mencadangkan tiga punca utama yang membawa kepada  
kemerosotan dalam sistem perkongsian ini: daya maju komersial industri carigali dan 
pengeluaran petroleum (E&P), PSC sebagai satu sistem dan persepsi negatif terhadap 
suasana pelaburan asing di Indonesia. Melalui analisis aliran tunai dan analisis risiko 
mengguna teknik simulasi Monte Carlo dan analisis Proses Hirarki Analitik (AHP) 
dalam kerangka faedah-kos-risiko, kajian ini merumuskan bahawa kemampuan 
komersial dan produktiviti PSC Indonesia telah merosot beberapa tahun terakhir ini. 
Analisis Monte Carlo menunjukkan bahawa cadangan untuk memperketatkan usaha 
pencukaian untuk kawasan yang belum diteroka tidak dapat membantu 
memperkukuhkan sistem perkongsian pengeluaran, sedangkan pembaikan beberapa 
pembolehubah PSC saiz sebagai insentif diperlukan dan sewajarnya diberikan 
berdasarkan profil pengeluaran. Analisis AHP merumuskan bahawa  pendekatan 
Sistem Royalti dan Cukai Baru (RAT) perlu dipertimbangkan untuk menggantikan 
sistem PSC. Kajian ini mencadangkan peranan iklim pelaburan asing langsung di 
Indonesia sebagai faktor utama bagi memperbaiki sistem PSC sebagai pendekatan 
yang baik bagi mengurus industri carigali petroleum yang semakin berkembang di 
Indonesia. 
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CHAPTER 1 
 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 
 
Mankind has known petroleum, which has come to the surface of the earth 
through natural forces, for thousands of years. In 1859 Colonel Drake drilled the first 
well in Titusville Pennsylvania USA for the specific purpose of bringing liquid 
petroleum to the surface (Pertamina, 1994:3). The discovery touched off an oil boom. 
Hundreds of wells were drilled in Pennsylvania, followed by discoveries in other 
states and countries, including Indonesia. 
 
In many petroleum-producing countries, petroleum has dominated the 
country’s economy. Countries with petroleum resources have been very careful in 
managing their wealth. However, the outcome of upstream oil and gas exploration 
and production (E&P) activity has considerable uncertainties and risks, including 
technical (geological and technology) as well as economic (cost, market and price) 
and country (contractual, fiscal and political) risks respectively. In addition to 
requiring large capital outlay and technology, the upstream petroleum activity is also 
characterised by long lead times for exploration, development and production. 
Therefore, this venture needs higher risk premium compared to other business and 
the decision to invest in oil and gas venture must be taken in full consideration, 
taking into account the above risks and uncertainties.  
 
The financial burden and high risks of venturing in petroleum E&P business 
appear to be just too large to be shouldered alone by a developing country that has 
many other priorities. Therefore developing countries have invited oil companies to 
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share the risks by providing the risk capital for petroleum E&P in exchange of direct 
shares of potential profit governed under types of petroleum contractual arrangement.  
 
There are two parties in common petroleum contract; they are the government 
(in some cases delegated to national oil company or government agency) as the first 
party and private petroleum company as the second party. The petroleum company 
objectives are to build equity and to maximise wealth by finding and producing 
reserves at the lowest possible costs and at the highest possible profit margin in the 
shortest possible time. On the other hand the objectives of the host government 
entering into petroleum contract are to optimise the wealth from its natural resources, 
to maintain an optimal level of exploration for sustaining the growing of the industry 
and to minimise administrative costs through improvement in efficiency. In this case 
it is important to emphasize the word to optimise rather than to maximise. Higher 
government’s revenues can be achieved by lower contractor production sharing split 
and higher taxes, but such judgment may result in decreasing level of activity and 
investment. Therefore the government’s revenues will not be optimised; any system 
must provide an appropriate balance (Marcotte, 2001:1-2).  
 
Moreover in most cases there are significant differences in the abilities of the 
parties to bear the risks involved. These are the reasons why petroleum contracts are 
potentially unstable and the parties may want to renegotiate at some point in time. In 
some cases, although in general the projects are economically attractive, the projects 
probably may not be developed. Uncertainties over risk and reward sharing prevent 
one or both parties to continue with the venture.  
 
Johnston (1994:21-27) categorised petroleum contracts into three main types 
of contract arrangements; they are Concessionary or Royalty and Tax (RAT), 
Production Sharing Contract (PSC) and Risk Service Contract (RSC). The basic 
difference between them is their attitude towards the ownership of the petroleum 
resources. In concessionary system the ownership of petroleum resources is 
transferred to the petroleum company, while in the other two systems the host 
government retains ownership of petroleum resources. 
 
In Concessionary or RAT system the petroleum resources may be privately 
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owned through government licensing. The host government only sets up the rules for 
licensing, such as establishing a fee for land use and degradation, imposing royalty 
and production taxes without being involved with the operation of the industry itself. 
Hence all risks are borne by the petroleum company at any phases of the operation. 
The host government main revenues come from royalties before production and taxes 
after production. Therefore this system is also called Royalty and Tax system (RAT).  
 
In RSC system, the host government still keep the ownership of resources; 
the petroleum company serves as a contractor, to explore at its sole risk. In the case 
of no commercial discovery, the contractor does not get fee; while in the case of 
commercial discovery, it develops and produces the resource. The contractor covers 
its expenditures for exploration, development and production. As payment for their 
services the contractor gets fee in cash.    
 
The PSC system was introduced in the mid 1960’s by Indonesia, as a 
reflection of Indonesian nationalism following its declaration of independence in 
1945. Article 33 of the 1945 Indonesian Constitution states that branches of 
production important to the state and which affect the life of most people shall be 
under the jurisdiction of the state and that the land and water and natural riches 
contained therein shall be under the jurisdiction of the State and utilised for the 
greatest welfare of the people. 
 
The concept was adopted from the sharing of the harvest between landowner 
and tenant. The keys of the PSC system are the state ownership and the sharing of 
production. The petroleum company serves as a contractor, to explore at its sole risk.  
The contractor will recover its expenditures for E&P activities only from the 
petroleum produced in the case of commercial discovery. The remainder of 
production, named the profit oil, is shared between the host country and the 
contractor, and can be regarded as payment or compensation for the risks taken and 
the service provided.  The contractor has to pay income tax on its share of profit. If 
no oil or gas is found the petroleum company receives no compensation. 
 
Although the rules of PSC can be interpreted as being strict by some 
investors, the concept provides foreign investor with an attractive opportunity for 
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profitable operation; thereby it has been used as a model in various countries 
throughout the world. The data set of empirical economic analysis of the PSC system 
that had done by Bindemann’s (1999:47) showed that during 1966 to 1998 period 
there were 268 PSCs signed by 74 countries around the world.  
 
 
 
1.1. Background Issues  
 
In 21st century oil and gas is still important as vital energy. The requirement 
of oil and gas will continue as long as there is no other viable alternative. The 
countries which posses these resources understand their preciouses reserves, and 
wish to maximise their wealth by actively participating in their development.  
 
In the era of intense global competition in the 21st century, the market for 
E&P capital and technology is extremely competitive and sophisticated. The 
competing variables include geological potential; contract system, terms and 
variables; costs; risks; investment climate and others. Many countries are re-
evaluating their competitive position. Therefore more lenient terms for fields in 
remote, high cost areas and marginal fields are expected. 
 
Moreover, the recent trend of mergers, consolidation and acquisitions within 
the oil and gas industry place the exploration budget in fewer hand, thereby the 
number of players seeking for exploration rights is likely to lessen (Hasan, 2001:11). 
Through acquisitions, a petroleum company may get good new work areas not only 
with lower capital investments, but also with lower risks and shorter lead-times.   
 
To summarise, the need for petroleum risk capital investment continues and 
increases, especially in developing countries, and these countries realise that they 
have to compete for scarce fund. As Machmud said: 
 
“Willingness to put real money at risk in the midst of risk capital 
scarcity can no longer be taken for granted and must be made 
attractive, therefore, also needs to be balanced over time, since a deal 
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that balanced to day can easily become unbalanced in the future” 
(Machmud, 2000:1) 
 
Therefore the oil producing countries shall continue to offer attractive contract terms 
that balancing between risk and reward.  
 
Indonesia is no exception; like many petroleum producing countries 
Indonesia’s petroleum revenues have dominated the country’s economy. Oil and gas 
are critical resources which fuel the development of Indonesia’s economy and their 
importance will continue into the 21st century. The large deposits of oil and gas 
resources would provide a huge potential in support of the development aspirations 
of the country.  
 
Figure 1.1 shows total Indonesia’s oil reserves as of January 2004 were 
reported to be approximately 9,131 million barrels oil (MMBO), in which 4,7278 
MMBO were proven and 4,403 MMBO were potential (BP Migas, 2004). Although 
showing a declining tendency in production rate from 1.25 million barrels oil per day 
(MMBOPD) in 2002 to 1.01 MMBOPD in 2003 (approximately 1.8% of the world’s 
production), Indonesia ranked seventeenth among world oil producers (US Embassy, 
2004:1).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note: Dark green: proven and Light green: potential 
Figure 1.1:  Indonesia’s Oil Reserves 1980 – 2004 (BP Migas, 2004) 
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Embassy, 2004:1). Figure 1.2 shows Indonesia had bountiful natural gas reserves of 
over 178 trillion cubic feet (TCF), in which 91 TCF were proven and 87 TCF 
potential (BP Migas, 2004). On contrary to oil production, there was an increasing 
tendency on the gas production, from 3.04 TCF of gas in 2002 to around 3.06 TCF in 
2003. Indonesia also remains the world’s largest exporter of liquefied natural gas 
(LNG) in 2002 at 26.2 million metric tons. Although it enjoyed as 22.9% world 
market share, this dominance was under threat from newer producers in Qatar, 
Australia and Russia (US Embassy, 2004:1). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1.2:  Indonesia’s Gas Reserves 1980 – 2003 (BP Migas, 2004) 
 
The result of survey by PriceWaterhouseCooper (2002:5-9) in 2002 involving 
the CEOs of petroleum E&P companies operating in Indonesia showed that 
Indonesia’s geological potential had been the most attractive feature supporting 
foreign investment; Indonesia remained attractive, in terms of petroleum geological 
potential. Moreover, cross-comparison of geological potential among some South 
East Asia countries concluded that Indonesia was categorised as one of the top three 
countries with geological potential of oil and gas in South East Asia (Usman, 2000: 
18 – 29). The ranking parameters included current production, reserves size, total 
reserve addition; remaining discovered reserves; reserve/production ratio; finding 
rate including geological success ratio, reserves addition per well, drilling density; 
size of discoveries and licensing activity. A similar result was also obtained in 
analysing the oil and gas potential by the use of Analytic Hierarchy Process (AHP) 
method. AHP result showed that geological potential of natural gas in Indonesia was 
still the highest among the South East Asia countries, while for oil Indonesia was 
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more attractive than Malaysia and Vietnam, although it had assumed a decreasing of 
finding rate by 10% (Usman, Irjianto and Kasmungin, 2003: 45 - 54). 
 
Figure 1.3 shows the map of Indonesia oil and gas resources, which are 
buried underneath sixty tertiary sedimentary basins, covering an area of more than 
two millions square kilometres. However, only 25% of the area or 15 basins are 
producing, largely are located in the western-part of Indonesia. The remaining 75% 
or 45 basins have either been proven to contain hydrocarbon but have not been 
produced, drilled but no discoveries have been made, or have not been drilled at all. 
They are mostly located in the eastern-part of Indonesia, in deep water or in remote 
areas known as frontier areas. Note that approximately 30% of the offshore basins in 
the western part and 80% of the basins in the eastern part of Indonesia are classified 
as deep-sea basin. These facts indicate that in order to increase its petroleum 
reserves, raising the exploration investment level particularly in deep water and 
frontier areas in the eastern part of Indonesia is needed. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   
Figure 1.3: The Indonesia’s Hydrocarbon Basins (Sudibyo, 2004; and BP Migas, 
2004) 
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companies to share the risks by providing the risk capital for petroleum E&P 
investment in exchange of direct shares of potential profit under some types of 
contractual arrangement. Through the years the agreement under which petroleum 
companies operate in Indonesia has changed considerably. 
 
Up to 1963, Indonesia’s petroleum industry was operated under the RAT 
system. In 1960, The Petroleum Law No. 44 Prp of 1960, which was based on the 
government’s exclusive right to exploit oil resources, was introduced. The law 
consisted of enlisting the services of private foreign companies to conduct oil 
operations as a contractor to the national petroleum companies. As a result, three 
foreign oil companies holding oil concessions at that time surrendered their 
concessions and signed a contract of work (COW) with three national petroleum 
companies existed in 1963 (Pertamin, Permina and Permigan). It was an important 
step taken towards direct participation in exploration and development of Indonesia’s 
natural resources. To effectively use manpower and capital, in 1969 these three 
national petroleum companies were merged into single entity, Pertamina. 
 
A new momentum was given to the Indonesia’s petroleum industry when the 
first PSC contract was signed between IIAPCO and Permina, covering a block in the 
western part of offshore Java Sea on August 1966. After that the PSC system and its 
variant were the only contract’s system applied in Indonesia.   
 
Indonesian PSC system was based on two legal frameworks. The first one 
was the Article 33 of the 1945 Indonesian Constitution, which stated that the land 
and water and natural riches contained therein shall be under the jurisdiction of the 
state and utilized for the greatest welfare of the people. The second one was Foreign 
Investment Law Number 1 of 1967, which states that the term of foreign capital 
investment pursuant to Article 1 of the Law 1/1967 refers to direct foreign 
investment, in which the capital owner will bear the risk from such investment.   
 
Some main variables of the Indonesian PSC system are the first tranche 
petroleum, investment credit, cost recovery, depreciation method to recover the 
capital expenditures as well as contractor production sharing split, domestic market 
obligation (DMO), price of the DMO, length of DMO price holiday and the tax rate 
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respectively.  These variables will be discussed thoroughly in Chapter 2. 
 
Petroleum contracts are designed to govern a long-term relationship, 
negotiated on the basis of existing conditions and assumed factors that will not 
confirmed for many years to come. Therefore, when the conditions and assumed 
factors changed, pressure for changing unsatisfactory terms of the contract could not 
be avoided.  Indonesia case is no exception; over the time the financial terms have 
changed. For example, over the years Indonesia has made several revisions or 
amendments in the original PSC contract. The first revision was made following the 
drastic increased in crude oil prices in 1973, increasing the production sharing split 
to 85/15 for oil and 70/30 for gas in favour of GOI. Subsequent revisions involved 
providing additional economic incentives to meet the industry's plight for improved 
terms. As a result, there have been three generations and five economic incentives 
packages investment in the development of the Indonesian PSC; they were PSC first 
generation (PSC1) to third generation (PSC3) and incentives package 1 (IP1) to 
incentives package 5 (IP5). Terms, variables and conditions of each Indonesia’s PSC 
type and incentive package are discussed in Chapter 2. 
 
Since 1966 the PSC system has dominated the petroleum contracts signed in 
Indonesia. Up to the end of 2003, a total of 347 petroleum contracts had been signed. 
Out of all those contracts, 257 contracts or 74% were PSC contracts, in which 105 
were still active. Out of the 105 active contracts, 32 contracts (12.5% of total 257 
PSC contracts) were presently producing, while the remaining contracts were in the 
exploration phase. A total of 152 PSC contracts had been relinquished and 
terminated. 
 
To date the petroleum activities have focused mainly on the western-part of 
archipelago; 84% of PSC producing contractors operate in the western-part of 
Indonesia, the remaining 16% operate in the eastern-part of Indonesia. All 32 
producing PSC contracts operate in developed areas, not one in frontier area. Most of 
the E&P activities to date have been conducted in the developed areas. Out of the 
347 petroleum contracts, only 20 contractors are working in the so-called frontier 
areas. These areas are generally more remote which require new-sophisticated 
technologies needed to cope with increasingly hostile environments and greater 
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water depths. E&P costs in the frontier areas are high, adding to longer lead-time 
before an actual production can commence. As an example, in US Gulf of Mexico 
deepwater environment, a single well can cost 70 – 100 million USD, and some 
wells have gone far beyond that figure (Marcotte, 2001:2). Therefore, enhancing the 
attractiveness of these areas needs more lenient contract terms and more attractive 
incentives. 
 
Moreover, Indonesia is moving toward eventual net importer status. 
Indonesia’s forthcoming change from net oil exporter to net importer has been 
forecasted since at least early 1970’s. It had been postponed to date, due to new 
discoveries and technological advances, such as enhanced oil recovery and deep-
water exploitation. However, increasing consumption and a steady decline in 
production, coupled with lower exploration investment levels in the last few years, 
means Indonesia now likely to become a net oil importer. At about 1.01 million 
barrels of oil per day (MMBOPD) Indonesia’s production by the end of 2003 of oil 
continued a gradual decline from its peak of 1.7 MMBOPD in 1977. Fuel 
consumption continued to increase to nearly 60 million kiloliters (KL) or 1.0 
MMBOPD in 2003 (US Embassy, 2004:24). In 2003 Indonesia imported about 340 
thousand barrels a day (MBOPD) of crude oil and 300 MBOPD of petroleum 
products (US Embassy, 2004:app.8.2).   
 
To maintain its net exporter position, it is necessary for Indonesia to improve 
its oil reserves and production capacity from both mature and frontier areas. In 
mature fields, the 85/15 production sharing splits for oil and 70/30 for gas in favour 
of GOI of the PSC system are no longer accepted as attractive and need to be 
improved. At the same time, the balance between risk and reward for frontier areas, 
with production split 60/40 for oil and 65/35 for gas, were generally viewed as 
insufficient to attract major investor, due to small reserve accumulations and high 
infrastructure costs (US Embassy, 2004:16). 
 
The results of the Indonesia’s petroleum E&P activities had given significant 
contributions to the GOI in terms of GOI revenues. As late as 1980’s oil and gas was 
still the biggest single export commodity, contributing to about 49% of the 
Indonesia’s export earnings (US Embassy, 2004:1). However investment levels in 
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the 1990’s have not been sufficient to prevent the decline of productive capacity and 
exploration activity. In 2002 Indonesia’s oil and gas revenues were 74.2 trillions 
IDR; they were around 25% of the Indonesia’s domestic revenues, declining from 
31% in 2001. The value of oil and gas export earnings also declined to 21.2 % in 
2002, compared with 22.4% in 2001 (Table 1.1). Thus, additional risk capital is 
needed to further increase the level of petroleum E&P activities.  
 
To do so, to attract new investment, GOI should offer policies that improve 
the Indonesian PSC contract terms to make it more competitive; improve GOI inter 
and intra ministry coordination to maximise efficiency and streamline new 
investment; tax consolidation application; and reinforcement of contract sanctity by 
honouring existing contracts, including LNG sales contracts, tax terms and refund 
value added tax (US Embassy, 2004:16 - 17). 
 
Also as illustrated in Table 1.1, the Indonesian PSC has become less 
competitive; although there was an increasing tendency on oil price in the last few 
years, total new petroleum contracts signed declined from its peak 29 contracts in 
1997 to only one contract in 2002. Due to commencement of new incentive package 
(IP5) in 2003, the contract signed increased to 16 contracts in 2003, but the 
exploration activities levels were still low. 
  
An overview of worldwide petroleum activities showed Indonesia’s 
competitive position has been deteriorating steadily for the past two decades. Table 
1.1 shows declining trend of exploration activities, from 145 wells in 1998 to 75 
wells in 2002 and to 41 wells in 2003. Also, as shown by Hasan (2001:20-22), 
Indonesia’s E&P activities share among a group of 15 petroleum producers 
(Columbia, Trinidad, Norway, UK, Angola, Cameron, Egypt, Nigeria, Tunisia, 
Malaysia, Pakistan, Thailand, Australia and New Zealand) had continued to decline 
since the end of 1970’s.  
 
According to Hasan (2001:23-26), the declining trend of Indonesia’s 
competitive position was clearly not attributable to oil market conditions, the amount 
of available risk capital for worldwide oil industry and Indonesia’s geological 
potential and political condition, but was due to deteriorating investment climate 
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associated with increased bureaucracy, excessive involvement of Pertamina in 
exercising its management prerogative, the procurement procedure of goods and 
service and others.  
 
Table 1.1: Indonesia's Exploration and Production Activities 1993-2003 (BP Migas, 
2004; and US Embassy, 2004 and 1999) 
 
Year Oil Contract Seismic Exploration Oil Prod. Gas prod. O&G Rev/ O&G Rev/ 
  Price Signed 000km Well Barrel/day TCF/year GOI Dom.Rev. GOI Export 
1993 16.64 11 188 114 1,534 2.181 31.4% 26.5% 
1994 16.08 4 68 75 1,611 2.319 22.3% 24.2% 
1995 17.23 20 63 80 1,625 2.573 20.4% 23.0% 
1996 20.42 15 61 100 1,575 2.524 22.0% 23.5% 
1997 19.10 29 469* 100 1,556 2.547 25.7% 21.8% 
1998 13.38 22 307* 145 1,537 2.489 32.7% 16.1% 
1999 17.72 6 175* 89 1,515 2.708 26.3% 20.1% 
2000 28.00 5 166 76 1,299 2.676 31.2% 23.1% 
2001 24.01 10 284 96 1,222 2.734 31.3% 22.4% 
2002 25.04 1 NA 75 1,252 2.900 24.6% 21.2% 
2003 28.68 16 NA 41 1,156 3.300 20.8%+ NA 
* Data include 2-D and 3-D seismic activities 
+  Budget 
 
Partowidagdo (1993); Yuwono (1998); as well as Dharmadji and 
Parlindungan (2002) made comparisons on fiscal regimes on some Asia Pacific 
countries involving cash flow analysis. These studies showed that Indonesian PSC 
system for conventional area was the least attractive, compared to China and 
Malaysia.  However for the frontier areas Indonesian PSC offered better terms than 
those two countries (Yuwono, 1998: 57-59). The studies suggested that GOI needed 
to develop more competitive contract terms; including, among others, decreasing the 
amount of the DMO obligation, increasing the DMO price, improving the contractor 
production sharing split, and additional exploration incentives by allowing limited 
tax consolidation or removal of the ring-fence of the PSC especially in frontier areas.  
 
World Bank (2000: 21-24) in 2000 conducted a study, which concluded that 
the recent structure of Indonesian PSC was becoming more complex; some areas 
were often contradicting, due to the addition of various provisions to the original 
structure in order to keep the terms competitive over time. Some provisions of PSC 
terms were not sufficiently progressive. The simulation with data field model 
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showed, under existing PSC variables, the GOI share of profit oil for less profitable 
ventures when oil prices were low, was just as high as its share for highly profitable 
ventures when oil prices were high. This aspect causes strong disincentives for 
investment at low-oil prices conditions. To increase investment in the low-oil prices 
conditions, redesigning some variables of PSC are needed. The World Bank 
recommended GOI to retain the basic principles of the PSC system; redesigning 
terms including reducing the FTP rate for both oil and gas, increasing the DMO price 
to export price, application of investment credit to all areas and linking GOI profit 
share directly to a measure of achieved cash flow. 
 
Furthermore, as Machmud study’s (2000:183, 189-190) showed that although 
Indonesia offering better terms for frontier areas as compared to Malaysia and China, 
but a closer examination behind the contract revealed that the investment climate, 
opposed to Malaysia and China, Indonesia was known to have x factor in which 
makes it difficult for investor to calculate the actual cost. Such a situation proved 
extremely damaging to petroleum Indonesia’s attractiveness. To increase the 
production capacity, it was recommended that climate for petroleum investment 
should be improved, including strict observance of the contract terms, limiting 
Pertamina’s involvement in PSC affairs to approval of work program and budget, 
and exercising its management prerogative through post auditing. Machmud also 
suggested that a forum be created to review periodically the contract terms, as 
condition may change from time to time beyond the control of either party. 
 
In the macroeconomics, favourable and unfavourable conditions originating 
within Indonesia has emerged unexpectedly during the last several years. Indonesia’s 
economic collapsed in 1997, and GOI was forced to turn to the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF) for an emergency debt-relief package totalling to $43 billion. 
This condition made the financial strength of the GOI decreased significantly. 
Moreover the Indonesia’s people power forced the government to do political 
reformation process and Suharto was forced out from office and was replaced by 
B.J.Habibie as president of Indonesia in May 1998. Political changes rapidly 
evolved; B.J.Habibie initiated a genuine democratic process to elect parliament and a 
president in the June 1999 election. The full parliament then elected Abdurrahman 
Wahid as president, but later in July 2001 he was impeached by the parliament and 
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replaced by Megawati. Democratic, peaceful and smooth Indonesia’s parliamentary 
elections as well as first and second rounds of presidential election were successfully 
conducted in April, July, and September 2004. As the result, Susilo Bambang 
Yudhoyono replaced President Megawati. The new government and parliament give 
strong promising points on business investment climate in Indonesia.  
 
As part of implementing the process of reformation in Indonesia and 
enhancing national unity, in 1999 the GOI promulgated the Law number 22 and 25 
and the Oil and Gas Law Number 22/2001. The Law number 22/1999 provided the 
provincial government with greater authority to manage their internal affairs, except 
in certain areas. The Law number 25/1999 addressed that the sharing or allocation of 
revenue between the central and regional governments. While the Oil and Gas Law 
Number 22/2001 replaces Petroleum Law No. 44/1960 and Law of Pertamina No. 
8/1971. This new law eliminated Pertamina’s monopoly over the upstream and 
downstream sectors and transferring Pertamina’s responsibility for administering 
cooperation contracts to a new Implementation Agency, named Badan Pelaksana 
Kegiatan Usaha Hulu Minyak dan Gas Bumi (BP Migas). By the Government 
Regulation number 31/2002; the BP Migas was put into action in August 2002.  
 
Security remained a major concern for investors, particularly following the 
terrorist bombing attack in Bali in October 2002, Hotel J.W. Marriott Jakarta in 
2004, Australia’s Embassy in Jakarta on 9 September 2004; and other part of 
Indonesia. Renewed military operations in Aceh, separatism, communal violence in 
Papua and others continued to challenge national unity. These conditions reduced the 
attractiveness of petroleum E&P business in Indonesia. 
 
To summarise, Indonesia had been successful in shifting the contractual 
equilibrium towards greater benefit to the state. The PSC system not only had 
become, over the last 30 years, probably the most dominant form of granting access 
to petroleum E&P to petroleum international companies in developing countries; but 
also had been successful in inviting the risk capital for petroleum venture E&P in 
Indonesia that resulted in significant contribution to GOI revenues, especially during 
1970s. However the success had been declining since then. Although the Indonesia’s 
petroleum geological potential was valued still remained attractive, but under the 
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influence of outside and domestic pressures, the Indonesian PSC system generally 
viewed as insufficient to attract investment both for conventional and frontier areas. 
The problem issues could be categorised into three aspects: commercial performance 
attractiveness, the PSC system attractiveness itself and the investment climate 
aspects. In commercial attractiveness, the Indonesian PSC was valued insufficient to 
attract investment, due to the risks and rewards sharing and the division of benefits 
between parties of the PSC contract did not give enough profit to the petroleum 
company. While in the second and third aspects, under current Indonesia’s condition 
(geological potential, economic, social and political) the attractiveness of the 
Indonesian PSC system itself was decreased and the current Indonesia’s investment 
climate was not conducive to do business.  
 
Indonesia should increase its oil reserves and production capacity in order to 
maintain its net exporter position. As the prospects and the pace of petroleum 
development would depend on the successful efforts to attract the needed capital. 
Meanwhile risk capital is mobile and the willingness to put real money at risk in the 
midst of risk capital scarcity must be made under the attractive terms. This in essence 
suggests that GOI must offer more attractive petroleum contract system, offer better 
incentives and resolve all the problems faced by the petroleum industry today. 
Therefore the problem issues mentioned above need to be analysed and to be solved. 
 
 
 
1.2. Problem Statement 
 
With the foregoing background, the problems that are identified in this study 
involve the following issues: 
1) Looking back over the past four decades since 1966, how were the commercial 
performances of the Indonesian PSCs? Did they fulfil sufficient profitability for 
the contractors and income for GOI? 
2) Which variables of the Indonesian PSC must be considered and enhanced as 
incentives in order to increase the attractiveness of the petroleum E&P venture 
in Indonesia and still give sufficient incomes to the GOI? 
3) Given recent Indonesia’s geological potential as well as the economic, social 
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and political conditions, is the existing Indonesia’s PSC still efficient to attract 
investors in engaging Indonesia’s E&P investments? Or should it be changed to 
other contract types? 
4) Which aspects of the Indonesia’s petroleum investment climate need to be 
improved? 
 
 
 
1. 3.   The Objective, Scope and Importance   
 
The study is concerned primarily on the commercial attractiveness of the 
Indonesian PSC system. Given, profitability is the petroleum company’s main 
concern to do business and the government net income is the GOI main concern; 
therefore revenues from the petroleum E&P venture should generate sufficient 
amount to cover both, profit for the contractor and net income for the GOI. These 
two sides should be balanced.  
 
Another business principle underlying the study relates to the phenomena 
inherent in the nature and development of petroleum venture. The upstream 
petroleum E&P venture is capital intensive and high-risk industry. In addition, the 
petroleum contract such as PSC links host government (owner of the petroleum 
resources) and private multinational companies which contribute capital, technology 
and equipment necessary for petroleum E&P activities in a sector where the stakes 
and risks as well as the possible profit margins can be very high. Their relationship 
has often changed due to the difference in their objectives and given the long-term 
nature of the agreement, the position of the two parties may change and the balance 
of power may shift from one party to the other. Furthermore, the relationship is 
vulnerable, subject to various external factors such as changes in oil prices, national 
and international politics, and other events. 
 
The petroleum contract is complex legal document designed to govern a long-
term relationship, negotiated on the basis of existing conditions and with 
assumptions of factors that will not be confirmed for many years to come.  
Therefore, the framework surrounding the petroleum E&P venture can be considered 
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as part of a dynamic process, in which the change in the pattern of relationship 
between the government and company could shifty bargaining positions of the 
parties and dissatisfaction on the contract terms & conditions are sometimes 
unavoidable. 
 
Given such problems statement above, the main objectives of this study are as 
follows: 
1) To evaluate the commercial performances of the Indonesian PSCs systems 
since its first application up to 2003. 
2) To identify which Indonesian PSC variables need to be improved as incentives 
in order to increase the attractiveness of the Indonesian PSC. 
 
The balance between risks and rewards and the division of benefits between 
parties of the Indonesian PSC contract was analysed with the framework of 
principal-agent model theory that incorporating incentive structures and risk-reward 
sharing. The economic yardsticks used were commonly applicable in project 
economic evaluation involving net present value (NPV) of contractor’s entitlement, 
internal rate of return (IRR), ratio of contractor’s entitlement to gross revenues 
(contractor take) and pay out time (POT). Under the premise, higher risk should be 
balanced with higher reward, petroleum E&P venture includes higher risk premium 
than ordinary businesses that translates to higher minimum required rate of return. 
Each company has its minimum required rate of return. The following lists the 
minimum required rate of return of investment in petroleum E&P venture as 
suggested by Jones (1993:9): 
  High risk     :  30% - 40%  
  Medium risk:  20% - 30% 
  Low risk      :  15% - 25% 
While from the GOI view is ratio of government income to gross revenues (GOI 
take). 
 
The scope in evaluating the commercial performances of the Indonesian PSC 
were limited to Indonesian PSC contracts signed during 1966 to 2003 period 
involving entire Indonesian PSC type from PSC first generation (PSC1) to PSC third 
generation (PSC3); together with all incentives packages, from incentives package 1 
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(IP1) to incentives package 5 (IP5). The PSC contracts were categorised by PSC 
contract type, operation years, production type (oil only, gas only, or oil and gas), 
production rate, and location of operation (western-part and eastern-part of 
Indonesia). Due to the trend of risks and costs of extension contract are different in 
the new contract, the study focus only to the new contracts; it excluded the contract 
extension.  
  
The scope in identifying which PSC variables need to be improved as 
incentives were limited to the improvement on the first tranche petroleum, 
investment credit, depreciation method to recover the capital expenditures as well as 
contractor production sharing split, price of DMO, length of DMO price holiday and 
the tax rate respectively.  
 
The scope of the incentive especially for exploration phase was limited to tax 
consolidation application in exploration activities in frontier areas. Currently, the 
Indonesian PSC is ring-fenced for cost recovery and tax purposes. Tax consolidation 
means that expenditures in non-producing contract(s) can be deducted from the 
income in producing contracts of the same contractor(s) for determination of taxable 
income. Applying tax consolidation will decrease the exploration cost of the 
contractor since some of the cost is effectively borne by the government due to 
decreasing tax payment from producing contract. It implies with risk sharing 
between government and the petroleum company. According to IPA (1995:app.1), in 
1995, 31 countries applied tax consolidation in their petroleum ventures, while 14 
countries did not. Monte Carlo simulation was used to identify the impact of the tax 
consolidation application in frontier areas not only on the income of GOI and 
contractor’s profitability but also to quantify the risk involved and compared it with 
the impact of increasing the contractor’s production sharing split.  
 
Monte Carlo simulation is a technique to calculate the uncertainty in a 
forecast of future event. It is effective in assessing risk and modelling uncertainty. 
The strength of Monte Carlo simulation is its universal applicability and contains 
maximum information about possible outcomes in the result. This simulation has 
some advantages, such as the full range of each uncertain input parameter is sampled 
and used in generating the probabilistic model outcome, the ease of implementation, 
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any input-output model can be utilised in the Monte Carlo process and the Monte 
Carlo approach is conceptually simple and easy to explain. 
 
As noted earlier the Indonesian PSC was based on two legal frameworks. The 
first legal framework of the Indonesian PSC system is the Article 33 of the 1945 
Indonesian Constitution, which places the land and water, and natural riches 
contained therein shall be under the jurisdiction of the state and utilised for the 
greatest welfare of the people. The interpretation of Article 33 of UUD 1945 during 
the development of regulatory framework has been rather difficult, since the term of 
under the state’s jurisdiction could have numerous meanings, starting from the 
ownership and direct or indirect exploitation by the state to the understanding that the 
importance thing is that the state regulates and controls branches of production 
important for the state and affecting the life of most people. The latter seems to have 
been used as underlying principle for the government in setting up the policy for 
inviting the private capital to participate in the exploitation of oil and gas. 
 
The second legal framework was the Foreign Investment Law Number 1 of 
1967. The term of foreign capital investment pursuant to Article 1 of the Law 1/1967 
refers to direct foreign investment in which the capital owner will bear the risk from 
such investment. The Foreign Investment Law distinguishes the foreign investment 
into two categories: 
(a) Foreign capital investment for mining E&P business that is open for foreign 
investment based on cooperation with the government in the contract of work 
or other type.  
(b) The government’s role in the form of mining E&P business can be direct as a 
party in the agreement such as in the mining of hard minerals or through state 
owned company such as in the oil and gas and geothermal electricity 
generation. 
 
In the capital investment, a good investment climate is a prerequisite, which 
in turn will require legal certainty in the contract implementation.  Under such a 
premise the Foreign Investment Law provides the assurance and a number of 
facilities covering a number of areas (such as tax, transfer of income and capital, and 
operational aspects). For example, the government will not nationalise or revoke 
 20
fully the right of foreign investment companies, or reduce the right for ownership or 
managing the subject foreign companies. In special circumstances where it is 
necessary to the public interest, a company may be expropriated in accordance with 
legal procedures and appropriate compensation paid with the amount, type and 
method of payment agreeable by both parties, and in the event of failures to reach 
agreement it will be settled through arbitration. 
 
For that reason two other objectives also need to be explored in this study, 
they are: 
3) To identify the petroleum companies’ views with respect to the most desirable 
contract system that suitable given current Indonesia’s economic, social and 
political conditions. 
4) To identify which aspects of Indonesia’s investment climate need to be 
improved. 
 
To date there is no standard format for any petroleum contract type categories 
and each type may contain some of the characteristics of the other. Lan (1990: 1), 
Gao (1993: 10) and Johnston (1994:21-27) categorised the petroleum contract system 
into three main systems: concessionary or royalty and tax system (RAT), production-
sharing contract (PSC) and risk service contract (RSC). In addition to three contract 
types above, Gao added hybrid contract that combined RAT with PSC system in one 
system; while Johnston (1994:21-27) added pure service contract, rate of return 
contract and joint venture. Joint venture and rate of return contract can use RAT, 
PSC or RSC systems. Pure service contract is rarely applied in petroleum E&P 
venture. Moreover Indonesian PSC had three variations; technical assistance 
contract, joint operating agreement run by a joint operating body and enhanced oil 
recovery contract (Johnston, 1994: 21-27). Meanwhile ESCAP (1984: 14 – 21) 
categorised taxation in mineral E&P venture into fixed fee; specific or ad valorem 
duty (royalty); income tax applied at higher rate than other industries; progressive 
profits tax; the resources rent tax and brown tax; as a variant of them; or combination 
of two or more of them. All these ESCAP contract types are RAT system with 
variation of taxation. Abadeer (1993:69-113) categorised the natural resources E&P 
contracts into operated by public company; service contract; cash bonus contract and 
RAT contract. In the RAT contract there are 6 variants contract types, traditional 
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RAT contract, royalty plus cash bonus bidding contract, mixed RAT contract, profit 
sharing contract, resources rent contract and PSC. Recently coal-mining contract in 
Indonesia applies contract of work (COW) system, this system is analogue with RAT 
system in petroleum, due the ownership of the resources is on the contractor side. In 
agriculture, since a long time ago there are three main contract forms: direct 
cultivation, fixed rents tenancy, and sharecropping system. Compared to natural 
resources contracts, the direct cultivation is equivalent to operated by public 
company, fixed rent tenancy is equivalent to RAT while sharecropping is equivalent 
to PSC (Bindemann, 1999:31). Therefore in identifying the petroleum companies’ 
view with respect to the most desirable contract system, the scope of the alternatives 
petroleum contract system to be chosen limited on three alternatives petroleum 
contract systems, they are the Modern RAT, recent PSC and RSC system.  
 
To support the analysis, in identifying the petroleum companies’ view with 
respect to the most desirable petroleum contract type, the study used Analytic 
Hierarchy Process (AHP) in the benefit-cost-risk framework. The AHP is a powerful 
and flexible decision making process to help people set priorities and make the best 
decision when both qualitative and quantitative aspects of a decision need to be 
considered. By reducing complex decisions to a series of one-on-one comparisons 
(pair wise comparison), then synthesizing the results, AHP not only helps decision 
makers arrive at the best decision, but also provides a clear rationale that it is the 
best. Designed to reflect the way people actually think, AHP was developed in the 
1970’s by Prof. Dr. Thomas Saaty and continues to be the most highly regarded and 
widely used decision-making theory. The tool has successfully been used in multi 
criteria’s decision making such as in developing public strategy, developing business 
strategy, project planning, project risk management, construction planning, design 
and the development of new product, decision-support system in the petroleum 
pipeline industry, the priority setting such as in defence planning and agriculture 
biotechnology research; human resources allocation, conflict resolution, supporting 
medical technology, route selection, determining the best sport record and many 
others. Ultimately the tool can support decision makers who face multi criteria 
decision problems with a limited amount of information. 
 
The scope on identifying investment climate’s aspects that need to be 
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improved was limited to some investment climate’s aspects of petroleum E&P 
business in Indonesia.  
 
The result of the study is intended to serve as useful input for decision makers 
in Indonesia, including parliament, central government and their agents such as 
Ministry of Energy and Mineral Resources, Ministry of Finance, BP MIGAS, Tax 
authorities, Ministry of Manpower; provincial government (Gubernur), 
regional/local government (Bupati), to assist in the formulation policy on petroleum 
E&P business; as well as to stakeholders of petroleum E&P business involving the 
multinational, domestic and national petroleum companies and others, aimed at 
maintaining high level of petroleum E&P investment in Indonesia.   
 
 
 
1.4. The Outline of the Study 
 
The outline of the study is organised into five chapters. As already written 
above, Chapter 1 describes the background; the problem statement; the objective, 
scope and the importance; and the outline of the thesis.  
 
Chapter 2 provides reviews of issues in petroleum E&P venture and its 
contractual arrangement, theoretical and methodological framework foundations that 
are grouped into four sections. The first section describes in brief the principal-agent 
model theory incorporating incentive structures and risk-reward sharing; the 
petroleum E&P life cycle chain and risk allocation; the conceptual issues in 
petroleum E&P contract consists of some principles in petroleum E&P contract, 
application the principal-agent model in petroleum E&P contract, economic rent, and 
rate return of investment; and the petroleum E&P contract arrangement. The second 
section describes the development and role of petroleum E&P business in Indonesia, 
the Indonesian PSC terms and variables, the financial diagram flow and model of the 
Indonesian PSC and some literature reviews of the past works on the Indonesian PSC 
analysis. The third section presents the theoretical and methodological framework 
foundation of decision analysis under uncertainty and risk. It is grouped into two sub 
sections. The first sub section provides the need, the theoretical and methodological 
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framework foundation of the risk analysis using Monte Carlo simulation to 
investigate the impact of tax-consolidation application in petroleum E&P venture in 
frontier areas. While the second sub section describes the need, theoretical 
foundation and methodological framework of the Analytic Hierarchy Process in the 
benefit-cost-risk framework to identify the petroleum company view with respect the 
most desirable petroleum contract type for Indonesia. The fourth section presents the 
investment climate especially in petroleum E&P business in Indonesia.  
 
Chapter 3 discusses the methodology of the study, while the result and 
finding are discussed in Chapter 4. Finally the conclusion and recommendation are 
presented in Chapter 5.  
  
 
 
 
CHAPTER 2 
 
 
 
THE LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
 
 
This chapter describes in brief reviews of issues in petroleum exploration and 
production (E&P) venture and its contractual arrangement, theoretical and 
methodology frameworks that were used in this study. The presentation is divided 
into four major sections.  
 
The first section describes the host government and the petroleum company 
relationship in the upstream petroleum E&P venture including the principal-agent 
model theory; the petroleum E&P venture life cycle and risk allocation as well as the 
conceptual issues of petroleum E&P contract that consists of some principles in 
petroleum E&P contract, application the principal-agent model in petroleum E&P 
contract, economic rent and rate return of investment respectively; and the petroleum 
E&P contractual arrangement. 
 
The second section presents the Indonesian Production Sharing Contract, 
including the development and the role petroleum E&P business in Indonesia since 
the first oil discovery in Indonesia in 1885 up to 2003, the salient features of 
Indonesian PSC, and the financial model and diagram flow of the Indonesian PSC 
system. 
 
The third section presents the theoretical and methodology framework 
foundation of decision analysis under risk and uncertainty. There were two methods 
used: first was the risk and uncertainty analysis in petroleum exploration investment 
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decisions. Aimed at determining the impact of removing provision on tax ring 
fencing in the petroleum contract, the tax consolidation application, the study applied 
the simulation method known as Monte Carlo simulation. The other analysis was the 
application of Analytic Hierarchy Process (AHP) in the benefit-cost-risk framework 
to identify the petroleum companies’ views with respect to the most desirable 
petroleum contract type for Indonesia. Therefore the third section was grouped into 
two sub section. The first sub section provides the need, the theoretical and 
methodological framework foundation of the risk analysis using Monte Carlo 
simulation to investigate the impact of tax-consolidation application in petroleum 
E&P venture in frontier areas. While the second sub section describes the need, 
theoretical and methodological framework foundation of the Analytic Hierarchy 
Process in the benefit-cost-risk framework to identify the petroleum company view 
with respect the most desirable petroleum contract type for Indonesia.    
 
Finally, the fourth section examines in brief the investment climate of the 
petroleum E&P business in Indonesia. 
 
 
 
2.1. The Host Government and the Petroleum Company Relationship in the 
Petroleum Exploration and Production Venture 
 
2.1.1.   Principal – Agent Model Theory 
 
According to Laffont and Martimort (2002:1), for many economists, to day 
economics is to a large extent a matter of incentives: incentives to work hard, to 
produce good quality product as well as to study, to invest, to save and others. 
Therefore a central question of economics becomes: how to design foundations that 
provides good incentives for economic agents. Salanie (2005: 5) defined the 
Principal – Agent model in general is a Stackelberg model in which the leader (who 
proposes the contract) is called the principal and the follower (the party who just has 
to accept or reject the contract) is called the agent. Specifically Bindemann (1999:35) 
defined the Principal – Agent theory deals with the actions of a principal, who own 
an asset and an agent, who works with that asset and/or make decisions, which will 
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affect the value of the asset. The theory focuses on designing the optimal contracts 
between the two parties, the principal and the agent. 
 
The starting point of incentive theory corresponds to the problem of 
delegating a task to an agent with private information. There are two types of this 
private information: first the agent can take an action unobserved by the principal, 
the case of moral hazard or hidden action; or second the agent has some private 
knowledge about his cost or valuation that is ignored by the principal, the case of 
adverse selection or hidden knowledge. Incentive theory considers when this private 
information is a problem for the principal, and how to design the optimal incentive 
scheme between these two parties (Laffont and Martimort, 2002:3).  
 
Below there are brief description simple economics samples with a view to 
design an optimal incentive system based on the concept in most standard economics 
textbooks. This presentation draws heavily on the work of Bindemann (1999:41-44), 
who provides a clear and concise description. The first case is simple case of 
incentives under certainty; the second is simple case of incentive under uncertainty 
and parties have same attitude towards risk; and the third is simple case of incentive 
under uncertainty and the parties do not have same attitude towards risk. 
 
 
 
2.1.1.1.   Incentives under Certainty 
 
In simple case there is only one principal and one agent. Assumes the agent’s 
effort e can be observed through output Y, and there are two degrees of effort e, 
where e=2 is a high degree of effort, while a low degree of effort is with e=0. The 
low degree is a symbol of shirking. The agent is paid a wage w, and a reservation 
utility of U=10. The formulation of the agent’s utility function is 
            w-e 
 U = {        (2.1) 
            10 
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Output Y depends on effort e, subsequently high output is Y(e) = Y(2) and 
low output Y(e) = Y(0), then 
     H 
 Y(e)  = {        (2.2) 
     L 
When the output minus the wage paid by the principal to the agent is the principal’s 
profit π, then the profit function 
  π  = R(e) – w       (2.3) 
 
The principal’s objective is to maximize his profit (equation 2.3) through 
minimizing the expected wage Ew and encourage the agent to choose the high effort 
level e=2. To reach it, he would create a contract that specify when a high level 
output YH is achieved, the agent can get a high wage wH; and while in the case of low 
output YL is achieved, the agent can get low wage wL. He has difficulty to determine 
the values of wH and wL that will result in maximum profit focus to the condition of 
incentives for the agent to choose for e=2. The principal has two constraints. First is 
the participation constraint that arises from the existence of the agent’s reservation 
utility U=10. In order to encourage e=2 the contract should specify values for wH if 
Y(2)=H and for wL if Y(2)=L that provide the agent with at least U=0, it can be 
specify as, 
  wH – 2 > 10       (2.4) 
The second constraint is the incentive constraint. It postulates that the utility level 
from working hard should be no less than the utility from shirking, then 
  wH – 2 >  wL – 0      (2.5) 
From equation (2.4) we get wH =12, while with equation (2.5) we get wL = 10. Then 
from a high effort level, profit would be get is 
  π H = H -  wH   =  H  -  12 
While from shirking, the profit would be get is 
  π L = L -  wL  =  L  -  10 
Therefore the contract will be optimal from the principal’s view when π H  > π L or H 
> L + 2. It suggests, under certainty, the principal has to pay the agent at least two 
unit above his reservation utility to encourage a high effort. 
 
 
  
28
 
2.1.1.2.  Incentives under Uncertainty and Parties Have Same Attitude Toward 
Risk 
 
In this case the uncertainty is defined as different sates of nature beyond 
control of the parties, the principal or the agent. It implies that e=2 will not 
necessarily ensure Y=H. Under certainty effort could be observed through output, 
therefore the principal had no need to monitor the agent. Under uncertainty 
condition, the level of output may not or can be directly related to the level of effort. 
As example, assumed that there was big flood attack the cultivation; although the 
agent already works hard to cultivate the land, the output level of cultivation may be 
very low or disappeared, due to the flood has destroyed the plants. Thus, an increase 
in e only increases the probability of Y(e)=H. If nature determines Y(2) and Y(0) as 
     Hprob0.8                          Hprob0.4 
 Y(2)  = {        Y(0)  = {   (2.6)  
     Lprob0.2          Lprob0.6 
 
Then by choosing e=2 the probability of high output increases from 0.4 to 0.8. The 
modification of the agent’s utility function (2.1) needs to be done, in order to 
incorporate uncertainty into the model.  Suppose the agent wants to maximize his 
expected wage Ew minus the effort he put into his work we find   
            w-e 
 U = {        (2.7) 
            10 
with 
  Ew = 0.8 wH  +  0.2 wL    for e=2 
and 
  Ew =  0.4wH  +  0.6 wL    for e=0 
The new participation constraint becomes 
  0.8 wH  +  0.2 wL  - 2 > 10     (2.8) 
In spite of e=2 uncertainty may yield L rather H, then the incentive constraint 
changes to  
  0.8 wH  +  0.2 wL  - 2 > 0.4wH  +  0.6 wL    (2.9) 
The contract has to specify the agent’s state-contingent wages that would result in 
higher utility under e=2 than under e=0 (wH  for Y(2)=H and wL  for Y(2)=L).  
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Given that equation (2.8) means that wL = 60 - 4 wH and (2.9) means wL = wH – 5, 
then the optimal contract would be the one that sets wH =13 and wL=8. 
 
From two examples above, it can be seen that the principal can control the 
agent without extra monitoring. Under certainty the principal can observes the 
agent’s effort through output, while under uncertainty the high agent’s effort can be 
encouraged through the right specification of the agent’s state-contingent wages. In 
the first case (under certainty), the wage bill for the principal is wH =12 and wL=10, 
and in the second case (under uncertainty) is wH =13 and wL=8. While the expected 
wage bill, in both cases is similar, under certainty Ew = wH  and under uncertainty 
Ew= 0.8 wH  +  0.2 wL. It can be concluded that the economic incentive mechanism 
is not costly to implement as long as the principal and the agent have the same 
attitude towards risk.  
 
 
 
2.1.1.3. Incentives under Uncertainty and Parties do not Have Same Attitude 
toward Risk 
 
When one of them is risk averse, then the structure of the contract will 
change. To accommodate it, we introduce subjective probabilities that measure the 
likelihood each of them to realization of the two states of nature, H and L. For the 
principal, P,  
     Hprob0.8                               Hprob0.4 
 YP(2)  = {         YP (0)  = {    (2.10)  
     Lprob0.2                                 Lprob0.6 
Assumed that for the Agent, A, is more risk averse than the principal,   
         Hprob0.7                                 
 YA(2)  = {         YA (0)  =  YP (0)     (2.11)  
     Lprob0.3                                   
Due to the agent is more risk averse than the principal, then the agent expects greater 
compensation compares to the first cases. The equation becomes, 
  EwP = 0.8wH + 0.2 wL > O.7 wH +0.3wL = EwA 
From this equation can be showed that the wage bill expected by the principal is 
higher than the expected by the agent. Equation (2.11) shows 
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  EwA = O.7 wH +0.3wL        for e=2  
and 
EwA = O.4 wH +0.6wL        for e=0 
The new participation constraint becomes 
 O.7 wH + 0.3wL  - 2 >  10    or    wH  = (12-0.3 wL)/0.7  (2.12) 
And new incentive constraint 
 O.7 wH + 0.3wL  - 2 >  O.4 wH +0.6wL    or    wH  =2/(0.3+ wL)   (2.13) 
 
Figure 2.1 shows the graphical presentation of the combination of wH  and wL  that 
maximize e (to the left of (2.13) and are acceptable contracts for the agent (above 
(2.12) as well as the optimal contract (triangle above point E). The principal’s choice 
of wH  and wL  that will minimize his expected wage bill EwP is represented by line 
labelled (2.14), that is  
 
Min EwP = O.8 wH +0.2wL             (2.14) 
 
                     
wH                    
                   (2.13) 
   (12/0.7)                    
                    
                    
14         E           
                    
                     
                   (2.14) 
(20/3)                    
                   (2.12) 
                    
                            
        (22/3)          wL 
 
Figure 2.1:  The Optimal Incentive Structure (Bindemann, 1999:44) 
  
Figure 2.1 shows EwP is minimised at point E. Hence the principal would 
choose a contract with wH=14 and wL =22/3, and 
 EwP = O.8 wH +0.2wL = 12.66 > 10 + 2 
 
Above presentation shows that the agent’s reservation utility is 10 and his 
high effort is 2. In the first case, under certainty where effort is perfectly correlated 
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with output, the principal has to pay the agent 10+2 in order to encourage maximum 
effort. The similar condition also occurs in the second case, 12, under uncertainty 
where parties have same attitude towards risk. While in the third case, under 
uncertainty where the agent more risk averse, the EwP, the 12.66 shows us that the 
principal’s Ew over the agent’s reservation utility plus his effort. The insight 
following this is that the agent is risk averse and therefore requires compensation for 
taking a random wage contract. It can be seen from the difference 12.66 – 12 that in 
turn can be interpreted as the premium for being relatively more risk averse. It can be 
concluded that the principal-agent relationship shows that problems arise when effort 
is not perfectly correlated with output (Bindemann, 1999:44). 
 
 
 
2.1.2. Petroleum Exploration and Production Life Cycle Chain and Risk 
Allocation 
 
The upstream petroleum E&P venture has high risks and uncertainties. The 
geological conditions are uncertain with respect to structure and reservoir. The 
economic assessments of potential profitability of a venture are uncertain with 
respect to costs, probability of actually finding and producing, volume and type of 
petroleum and the future-selling price. Moreover it needs very large capital outlay; 
incomplete information; requires innovation and high technology; needs social 
overhead capital and environmental costs; has long lead-time and long-run sales 
prospect.  
 
Figure 2.2 shows the petroleum E&P life cycle chain and the allocation of 
uncertainty and risk involved. The upstream petroleum E&P operation is a multi 
phase operation; its chained life cycle begins with exploration, followed by 
development, production and abandonment activities. Before execution of the 
exploration activities, the first step to be done is to get approval from the government 
to execute the contract, such as to obtain permits for the operation, to get visas for 
the expatriates, to import equipments, and others. The relationship between the 
petroleum company and government (central and local representatives), formal or 
informal, sometimes goes further than written contract’s terms and conditions. It will 
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be more complicated if the operation’s location of the petroleum company goes 
across more than one regions or countries. Dealing with one region or country has 
enough challenge, predict the challenge of dealing with two regions or countries in a 
project. This process can take longer time than expected, which can result in higher 
cost.  
 
The exploration expenditures depend on a large number of factors such as 
location (onshore, offshore, deep water, jungle location, remote areas) the use two or 
three-dimensional seismic, the depth of the deposit, need of high technology and 
others. If the operation needs more costly technology or uses an inappropriate 
technology, technology risk is occurred. This situation can increase the cost 
unpredictably. Moreover longer exploration time means the later production 
commences, resulting in delay of cost recovery. Financial circumstances might 
change during the period and make borrowing more costly than predicted. All these 
unpredicted higher costs than expected can be categorised as cost risk. 
 
 
 
 
 
           
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
Figure 2.2: Petroleum E&P life cycle chain and the allocation of uncertainty and risk 
involved 
 
The natural resources underneath are not exactly known; the main unknown 
factors in petroleum exploration are discovery of new resources, type of discovery, 
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the size deposit and economic viability of development. The chance of probability 
discovery of petroleum exploration is very low. Ten percent success probability of 
finding hydrocarbon accumulation may be good in exploration. Moreover the 
accumulation can be commercial or non-commercial. The risk associated with the 
probability of finding commercial deposit is known as geological risk.  
 
Discovering petroleum resources requires experiences supported by 
geological expertises. Exploration technology is introduced to reduce uncertainties in 
discovering these resources. However, the resources are only known after they are 
discovered and produced. Hence, there is a clear link between exploration activity 
and the settings of profit sharing and taxation, the contract terms should allow 
sufficient rewards for the petroleum company. 
 
In case of no commercial discovery, the petroleum company bears all the 
risks during the exploration phase. Tens or sometimes hundreds millions USD may 
be spent without finding commercial discovery. The profitability of petroleum E&P 
project must cope this failure; therefore, it needs to generate enough profit not only 
to cover the cost of this project, but also to cover the losses incurred elsewhere.   
 
It would take several years from the start of exploration surveys until the first 
hydrocarbon is produced from the contract area. For example, in Indonesia, it is 
reasonable to assume a time-span of five to six years from the first exploration 
drilling to the first petroleum produced. In case of gas discovery, it is often necessary 
to find first the effective way to dispose the product, as the market is not always 
readily available. In most cases, it takes years to find the market and financial 
backing; therefore leaving the status of commerciality pending on the outcome of 
such efforts.  
 
The time may also be even longer, if the petroleum operation spans across 
more than one regions or countries to reach the market outlet through pipeline. A 
high set up costs are needed spreading over long period of lead times in development 
phase. As an example, the development of deep-sea offshore petroleum E&P 
involves not only innovation, but also requires high technological activities. Hence it 
needs large capital and high fixed costs. These are some of the reasons why 
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petroleum E&P venture has a long lead-time. Moreover petroleum E&P venture 
needs social overhead capital for infrastructure such as roads, water, electricity, 
housing and others. Lead-time of the project may increase with this development.  
 
In addition to high set up cost mentioned above, similar to other businesses, 
there is always risk linked with rising costs in the operations. In the developed area 
where the infrastructure is in place, the exploration and development costs may be 
less. Costs could also vary resulting from unpredictable events during operation.  
These may include longer contract or project approval process, legal matters, 
regulation matters, problems with community and government relation, stricter 
agreement with manpower regulation, condition of infrastructures, environmental 
issues, government interference, security matters and others. The risk linked with 
possibility of increasing cost unpredictably is categorised as cost risk. In minimising 
this risk, the petroleum company needs to recover their cost at the shortest time as 
possible. They also prefer contracts that display a degree of flexibility being linked to 
their internal rate of return.  Petroleum E&P activities also have high environmental 
risks, and the cost could rise unpredictably as unexpected side effects during 
resources producing operation.  
 
After the commercial discovery, geological risk begins to lessen. In contrast, 
price and political risk could intensify. The oil prices are not only influenced by 
domestic’s demand, supply and political condition, but also by international’s 
demand, supply and political conditions. Oil and gas prices are very volatile. The risk 
associated with the possibility of changes in national and international market and 
the possibility that the price will vary unpredictably is categorised as price risk or 
market risk. In case they face oil prices increase significantly and the contract is not 
sufficiently flexible to accommodate this change, then both parties will be concerned 
about the give away of revenues. While in case they faced low oil prices scenario can 
decrease the exploration activities in some oil field and some non-profitability of 
operation.   
 
In the exploration phase the government’s bargaining position is usually 
comparatively weak, and will be weaker so long as capital are still needed to finance 
the exploration and development of the resource. Once the company has reached 
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payout, the bargaining position of the petroleum company is declining. Profitability 
of the petroleum company can appear too excessive to some governments and they 
start to review a fair return on investment and the concept of profitability. The 
government may issue unexpected changes in fiscal terms that influence the internal 
rate of return of E&P venture. The unpredictable changes on fiscal term is 
categorised as fiscal risk. 
 
During the production phase the venture could also face contract risk.  This 
risk links with unexpected revision of the contract or confusion about the contract 
content or non-performance of one party that raises the cost or decreases the internal 
rate of return of the petroleum company. Non-performance of one party, for example 
in case the petroleum company or the host government breaches its commitment, 
would very likely result in reducing benefit for both parties. The government would 
worry to deal with the petroleum company that has not done its obligation in the past, 
such as not finishing projects or trying to renegotiate its works. In contrast, the 
petroleum company would do the same things as well, if they find the same situation 
above. In case the petroleum company taken the view the potential for a future 
default by the government exists, it will insist on the contract either on higher share 
of the profit sharing or incorporating a compensation clause. While in the case 
government taken the view the petroleum company might be breaking its 
commitment, it will warrant a penalty clause as part of the contract. 
 
A petroleum contractual agreement may have a longer term than the term of 
government in power when the agreement was signed. Consequently the petroleum 
company may also face the unpredictable changes in government and political 
situations, known as political risk. Such a risk deals with changing in the policies or 
government resulted from an election or coup, war and others. Political risk has been 
a major issue in international investment. Therefore in addition to geological and 
market or price risks, the investor needs to evaluate and manage the potential 
political risk when evaluating a prospective investment in a foreign country.  
 
The political risk is not confined to the third world. At various times, 
developed countries such as the UK, France and Italy have raised concerns about 
nationalisation. By broadening the definition, the political risk includes changes in 
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legislation that affect the industry such as taxes, labour, environmental regulations 
and other economic measures; the United States itself may be considered to present 
somewhat of a political risk (Berlin, 2003:3).  
 
The degree of willingness to accept political risk varies from company to 
company. What one company finds acceptable may be too risky for another 
company. In assessing the degree of political risk in a particular country, the 
company will look at many indicators, e.g., the current activity in the host country 
that is affecting or is likely to affect the stability of the government (insurrection, 
rebellion, criminal activity), prospect for change of national or local government, 
past history of nationalisations/expropriations, experience of other companies in the 
country, political activity and trends in the region, the overall economic condition of 
the country, forced adverse tax changes/ price controls and others. The most common 
PSC response to political risk is international arbitration. 
 
Given high-risk and uncertainties mentioned above, a petroleum E&P venture 
has implications as follows: 
(a) The expected profit margin must be large enough to accommodate the 
failures elsewhere (Johnston, 1994:5–7) and must have a higher risk 
premium (Siebert, 1984:30).  
(b) Uncertainty increases over time. A way to reduce this uncertainty is by 
giving the company high profit in the early of production activity (Siebert, 
1984:30). It makes shorter pay out time (POT) of its investment.   
(c) Investors tend to choose as smallest risk as possible. They might choose 
other opportunities that have smaller risk and not to invest in a high-risk 
country (Siebert, 1984:30). Higher risk needs more lenient petroleum 
contract and fiscal terms.   
(d) The petroleum company can manage the high-risk investment through   
diversification (Siebert, 1984:30). On the other hand governments are not 
diversified.  
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2.1.3. Some Conceptual Issues in Petroleum Exploration and Production 
Contract  
 
2.1.3.1.   Some Principles in Petroleum Exploration and Production Contract   
 
The financial burden and high risks as well as uncertainties appear above to 
be just too large to be shouldered alone by developing country that has many other 
priorities. Therefore developing countries have invited oil companies to share the 
risks by providing the risk capital for petroleum E&P activities in exchange of direct 
shares of potential profit under some types of petroleum contractual arrangement.  
 
The term contract originates from English word that translates into Bahasa 
Indonesia as perjanjian or persetujuan. According to the Article 1313 of Indonesian 
Civil Code, perjanjian is an act of two or more persons binding themselves to one or 
other persons (Hasan, 2005:14). Black’s Law Dictionary (1999:318) defines contract 
as an agreement between two or more person creating obligations that are 
enforceable or otherwise recognizable at law. Moreover, Samuel Williston as quoted 
in the Black’s Law Dictionary states that a contract is a promise, or a set of promises, 
for breach of which the law gives a remedy, or the performance of which the law in 
some way recognize as a duty.  While Dirdjosisworo (2003:19) defines contract is a 
promise or set of promises for breach of which the law gives a remedy or the 
performance to those breaching the promise along with sanction for execution.  It can 
be concluded that contract is a written agreement signed by parties for the purpose of 
performing together legal obligations based on mutual understanding in respect to 
their relative rights and duties regarding future performance (Hasan, 2005:16). 
 
As quoted by Hasan (2005:24-31) Indonesia Civil Code Book III recognises 
there are four universal principles with respect to the contract law: freedom of 
contract, pacta sunt servanda, good faith and consensualism. Freedom of contract 
means parties have the right to bind themselves legally, to determine the content, its 
enforcement and terms in harmony with the need, to make it in certain forms, or not 
subject or subject to the choice of laws and regulations. Pacta sunt servanda means 
that contracts that legally come to existence and continue to be in force must be 
observed. Therefore the contract is neither unbreakable nor unchangeable. According 
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to Wehberg the pacta sunt servanda as general principle of law is found in all nation, 
while the contract sanctity is an essential condition of the life of any social 
community. The principle of pacta sunt servanda always exists in economic relations 
between parties of agreement. Good faith is a principle in which the parties shall 
perform the substance of the contract based on trust or believe or good will by the 
parties. Good faith of the parties is always implied in any agreement, although it has 
not always been stipulated. Good faith is not confined to in making the legal 
relationship but also applicable in exercising the right and obligation arise from that 
legal relationship. Consensual means having, expressing or occurring with full 
consent. According to Grotius the consensual principle had a religious origin, i.e. one 
word be kept (pacta sunt servanda) and we shall keep our promise. Given such 
principle, each party in the agreement shall be in charge for matters that are not 
executed; regardless of the failure is outside its power and unforeseeable when the 
agreement is signed. 
 
More specific in petroleum E&P venture, petroleum contract is legal 
document that describes the overall framework in which each contracting party is to 
fulfil its obligations. Petroleum contract also involves economic aspects concerning 
costs, rewards and others to be shared by contracting parties (Lan, 1990: 19).  
 
Petroleum contract is complex and differ from the traditional government 
procurement contracts, first due to their multiple phases of their operation where the 
production phase depends on the outcome of the exploration phase. The parties may 
terminate the contract if the first phase was not successful. Second the uncertainties 
on the existence of the resource, the volume of reserves in each discovery, and on the 
level of production are not specified in the contract. Third the costs vary due to the 
unique characteristics of each discovery and technology used. Fourth the uncertainty 
of the product, whether it is oil only, oil and gas or gas only. Fifth the information 
gaps exist between the company and the government. Usually, the company have 
more information about the costs and the value of the resource potential. That is why 
the petroleum E&P contracts should provide flexible terms and incentives to adjust 
to these differences (Abadeer, 1993:23). 
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Moreover petroleum contracts are designed to govern a long-term 
relationship, negotiated on the basis of existing conditions and assumed factors that 
will not confirmed for many years to come. Therefore, when the conditions and 
assumed factors changed, pressure for changing unsatisfactory terms of the contract 
could not be avoided.   
 
There is essentially a similarity between the petroleum contract in developing 
nations and those applied in the agriculture.  In the agriculture there are three forms 
of contract, namely direct cultivation, fixed rents tenancy and sharecropping system. 
Under direct cultivation system, the landlord (the owner of the land) cultivates his 
land alone thereby he will bear all the risks. In contrast with the fixed rents tenancy 
system under which the tenant rents a land from the landlord and pays the fixed rent 
to the landlord and he cultivates the land at its own risks.  
 
While in the sharecropping, the landlord allows the tenant to use his land in 
exchange for specified share of production. The terms may vary; for example, the 
landlord may determine the purpose of land use and how it should be used. The 
landlord also may bear part of the costs that in turn will be reflected in production 
share he will receive and others. If bad weather destroys the crop, all parties bear the 
risk involved, while if the cultivation successes, the production after recovering the 
costs will be shared between the tenant and the landlord and can be regarded as the 
compensation for the tenant risk taking. Therefore sharecropping system is 
essentially a contract form that combines risk sharing and incentives, and the 
relationship between the landlord and tenant is analogue with the principal, who own 
the asset and the tenant is the agent who works with the asset to improve the asset’s 
values (Bindemann, 1999: 31-35). Comparing with the practice in agriculture, direct 
cultivation is equivalent to that the national petroleum company as the landlord doing 
the E&P activities without the foreign petroleum company. The concession/RAT 
system is similar to the fixed rents tenancy and PSC system is equivalent with the 
sharecropping. 
 
The problem is how to design an optimal petroleum contracts including risk 
sharing and incentives between the principal and the agent. 
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2.1.3.2.  Application of the Principal – Agent Model in Petroleum Exploration 
and Production Contract 
  
In the petroleum E&P contract, the principal is the host government or 
government agent or the national petroleum company on behalf of the country (the 
host government), who own the asset (petroleum resources), while the agent is the 
petroleum company who is willing to provide risk capital and technology to explore 
and to produce petroleum resources. When the host government enter into 
negotiations with the petroleum company, expects to provide capital risk and 
technology for petroleum E&P activities, the host government want to guarantee that 
it achieve the best possible contract given the country’s particular conditions.  
 
On the other hand, to achieve successful petroleum E&P investment, prior to 
bidding and negotiating a petroleum contract, petroleum company should take 
several analyses carefully a number of elements into account and evaluate them 
under different scenarios such as geological potential, variation of petroleum prices, 
costs, technology needed, contract terms, risks of the prospect and others (Juritz, 
1999:1 and Bindemann, 1999:29). The objective is to maximise revenues in each 
scenario. After deciding to invest, the petroleum company bids and negotiates the 
contract. The bargaining position of the petroleum company is the greatest in the 
early phases prior to contract signing and exploration phase, before the discovery of 
the resources.  
 
The host government faces two constraints, first given the market for E&P 
capital and technology is extremely competitive, so the willingness to put real money 
at risk in the midst of risk capital scarcity must be made under the attractive terms; 
and second the petroleum company and the host government have similar objectives, 
maximising their revenues. Their successful negotiation will be determined by their 
bargaining position, negotiation skills and country specific conditions. Therefore the 
host government to find the optimal/efficient contract form for its country. The 
contract is optimal/efficient when it is impossible to improve one party’s terms 
without making the other party worse off. As an example, assume a contract is being 
  
41
renegotiated and is presumed remain efficient, then the renegotiation must improve 
two parties conditions or one party improve its condition without the other party 
losing anything. In more specific can be said, assuming that the host government can 
exploit its bargaining position it will try to offer contract form that provide sufficient 
incentives for the petroleum company to sign the contract while at the same time 
guaranteeing the petroleum company will not appropriate all incremental benefits. 
Therefore incentives are one of the main contract characteristics (Bindemann, 
1999:29).  
 
The assessment of the risk involved in a project and judgment of whether 
potential rewards justify taking a particular risk are made by finding the probability 
distribution of the measures are concerned. The risks/uncertainties in petroleum E&P 
are the geological risk, cost risk as well as price risk, technological risk and many 
other risks. The allocation of these risks is a significant factor in the formulation of 
an optimal/efficient contract. As already mentioned earlier the contract can be judged 
as optimal/efficient, it has to be measured efficient by both parties. As an example, 
suppose one party is more exposed the price risk than the other, and then the former 
party is more disadvantages in carrying the price risk.  
 
When writing a contract, the main concern of the host government will want 
to design a contract that his interest will be progress by the petroleum company 
regardless of the fact that the interest of the petroleum company deviates from his 
interest. The host government has to offer contract terms that are attractive enough 
for the petroleum company to engage the contract, therefore, the host government 
needs to provide an incentive to the petroleum company that will encourage him to 
act in the host government’s interest. While in the same time the host government 
has to build up a monitoring system that let him to evaluate the petroleum company’s 
performance and to keep away from moral hazard. It means the host government 
needs to create a system whereby the petroleum company is encouraged to maximise 
his efforts in order to get maximum reward that in turn will also yield maximum 
revenue to the host government. One way to control moral hazard is the host 
government has to pay the petroleum company a reward based on the performance of 
the petroleum company’s. The better the petroleum company performs his job, the 
higher his income.   
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With reference to the principal-agent model, it means the reservation utility 
of the petroleum company has to be recognized. In petroleum E&P venture case the 
reservation utility can be replaced by the rate of return of the petroleum company 
expects from a comparable project elsewhere, and it is the participation constraint. At 
the same time the government has to solve the incentive constraint, due it will want 
to guarantee that it receives maximum revenue from the venture. Therefore the utility 
from working hard (to perform the contract) should be no less than the utility from 
shirking, on other word the profit of the first case has to be larger than the second 
case. For that reason the host government has to pay the petroleum company x units 
above his reservation utility for the contract to be optimal (Bindemann, 1999:36).  
 
In the exploration phase, as mentions in sub section 2.1.2, the petroleum 
company faces uncertainties such as geological risk consists of no discovery, 
discovery but not commercial as well as cost increase (cost risk) might be caused due 
to require more expensive technology (technology risk) and some operational issues 
that makes cost increase and/or extension of exploration phase. The longer the 
exploration phase means the longer the production starts, and the longer cost can be 
recovered. These facts can make petroleum company’s financial circumstances might 
changed and borrowing more costly. In contrast the host government has no direct 
financial risk in this phase. However, it has to monitor the operation of the petroleum 
company to do its work obligation as specified in the contract, such as number wells 
to be drilled, depth, technology applied etc.  
 
As discussed in principal-agent model earlier, under certainty effort can be 
observed through output, thus no special monitoring is required. When the agent’s 
contingent wages are correctly specified, the same result under uncertainty also can 
be achieved. Given under PSC system the cost can be recovered after the production 
exists, it is generally can be assumed that the petroleum company has no incentive to 
artificially make longer the exploration operation. Moreover since the entire risks 
during exploration phase are born by the petroleum company, the host government 
should be ensured in contract terms that the project could generate sufficient rewards 
not only to cover the cost of the project itself, but also to cover the losses incurred 
elsewhere.   
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During production phase the petroleum company might face uncertainties 
such as are cost increase (cost risk), price decrease (price risk) as well as contract 
risk, fiscal risk and political risk, in which the first two risks are the main 
uncertainties. In contrast with exploration uncertainties, the risks during development 
and production phase are shared between the host government and the petroleum 
company. In facing the cost risk, increasing cost is largely borne by the petroleum 
company, means the petroleum company needs more time to recover the cost. As 
example in the case there is a cost recovery limit such as 40%; it means longer time 
for recovering the cost is needed. As the result the petroleum company and the host 
government have to wait longer before they can realise their profit. Seeing that the 
definition of profit is total revenues minus total cost, π = TR - TC, consequently cost 
increase influences both parties, in which its impact is larger for the petroleum 
company than the host government. The recent Indonesian PSC does not have cost 
recovery limit, it is an attractive incentive for the petroleum company.  
 
Under Indonesian PSC system, the host government revenues come from the 
FTP, host government profit share, taxes, DMO and bonuses, while the petroleum 
company’s revenues come from cost oil and its share of profit. As profit is function 
of price and production, π = PY, this equation represents that the increasing 
price/production will increase the profit. If the prices decrease, the increase of 
production is not necessary. Therefore, to make the principal-agent model effective, 
the incentives or rewards, offered to the agent (the petroleum company) have to take 
into account all aspects above, and balanced them in a way that encourages 
maximum effort from the petroleum company while at the same time guaranteeing 
sufficient host government’s revenues. Back to theoretical of Principal-Agent model 
in earlier sub section, especially relevance for the PSC system, the model states that 
the agent has a reservation utility specifying what return he can receive from an 
alternative investment. Under certainty, the principal has to compensate the agent by 
paying x units above that reservation utility. Under uncertainty x is greater that under 
certainty if maximum effort is to be encouraged (Bindemann, 1999:38).    
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2.1.3.3.   Economic Rent 
 
The size, the quality and the distance to the market of petroleum resources are 
aspects that make petroleum resources differ from each other. The resources that are 
of higher quality and closer to the final market are more valuable and they are 
usually produced first. These valuable resources will be produced in order to achieve 
their profitability until the point is reached where the rest of the remaining resources 
are only marginally profitable to be exploited. On these remaining resources there are 
no profits, due to the revenue from them just equals to the cost of produced the 
resources. On contrary, for high reserves deposits that have high quality and more 
close to final market, with the same price, may results extremely profitable (ESCAP, 
1984:6). 
 
Seeking economic rents is particularly prevalent in petroleum economies. For 
petroleum E&P venture, Johnston (1994: 5-6), ESCAP (1984:6) and others define 
economic rent (synonymous with excess profit) in petroleum resources E&P project 
as the difference between the value of production and the cost to produce it. In the 
literature the term economic rent has been interchangeably with resource rent, 
mineral rent, pure rent, true rent, economic profit and pure profit. The study used the 
economic rent.  
 
Figure 2.3 shows the illustration of the allocation of revenues from petroleum 
E&P project for costs and division of profits. From the project point of view itself the 
total project’s profit is the gross revenues minus the cost recovery that consists of 
exploration, development and production costs.  
 
Gross Revenues of the project = Production x Price 
Cost Recovery of the project = Exploration Cost + Development Cost + 
Production Cost 
Profit of the project = Gross Revenues of the project – Cost Recovery 
of the project 
or = (Production x Price) – (Exploration Cost + 
Development Cost + Production Cost)  
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When a petroleum company works as a contractor for the national owned 
company (or government agent) on behalf of the host government, the total profit 
must be shared between the petroleum company and the host government. The 
contractor would then be entitled to receive the costs spent for exploration, 
development and production as well as their share of profit (contractor’s profit 
share), namely contractor entitlement.  This is illustrated as follows.  
  
Contractor Entitlement =  Contractor’s profit share  + Cost Recovery 
or = Contractor’s profit share + Exploration Cost + 
Development Cost + Production Cost  
 
From the host government, the remainder of gross revenues after taken the 
contractor entitlement is called the Economic Rent (Government Take),  
 
Economic Rent (Government Take) = Gross Revenues – Contractor Entitlement 
 or =  (Production x Price) – (Contractor’s 
profit share + Exploration Cost + 
Development Cost + Production Cost) 
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Figure 2.3: Allocations of revenues from production petroleum E&P project 
(Johnston, 1994:7) 
 
The objective of any government would be to optimise the economic rent 
through royalties, sharing of production, taxes, government participation and many 
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others. The subject would then be how such economic rent could be captured 
efficiently. Higher take for the government through better production sharing split in 
favour of the government and higher tax rate may result in maximising the economic 
rent. Such a condition however may discourage investment, resulting in reduced 
level of petroleum activity, which in turn would reduce the government’s revenues in 
the long run. Any system must provide an appropriate balance that involves 
balancing the possibility of deterring investment that can reduces the revenues as a 
whole against collecting too little the economic rent through overly generous 
agreements. For that reason the important dynamic in international negotiations and 
contract design is how petroleum contract can ensure the government gets a part 
from the outcome of petroleum venture while at the same time it still gives a 
reasonable profit to the petroleum company (Johnston, 1994:5–7), (Marcotte, 
2001:1-2) and (ESCAP, 1984:7).  
 
In the case that there is perfect information and no uncertainty, the host 
government can easily calculate in advance how much the economic rent would be 
yielded by petroleum E&P project and can collect this economic rent from the 
company. But in reality, the E&P project has a very high degree of uncertainty that 
causes the host governments and petroleum companies to behave differently.   
 
Petroleum companies may be risk averse. The more risky the petroleum E&P 
venture is the more return will the petroleum company require if they contribute in 
the venture; it means the higher will be the risk premium. Under uncertainty the 
economic rent value of an E&P project is a variable and two important determinants 
of the economic rent value are the risks of the project and investor’s attitudes toward 
risk. The more risky E&P ventures are, and the more risk averse investors are, the 
smaller will be the economic rent value for the government (ESCAP, 1984:8). 
 
In maximising the economic rent, the government and contractor must 
consider the influences of petroleum E&P variables on their return of investment. 
Partowidagdo (2000:1-4, and 1996) modified a causal approach diagram from Naill 
that illustrates the framework of petroleum business in a developing country (Figure 
2.4). The plus or minus sign represents a relationship between the two variables 
linked by the arrow. According to him, a change in variables in petroleum E&P 
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venture such as unproved reserves, discovery rate, proved reserves, cost, investment, 
and production will influence positive or negative changes on others. 
 
 
                     (-)             (+)   
      
                     (-)                                                  (+)                                           (-) 
 
 
                     (-)                (-)                              (+)                (+)                      (+) 
             
                                         (-)                              (-)                 (+)                      (-)           
 
 
Figure 2.4: Causal-loop diagram of petroleum discovery model in typical developing 
country (Partowidagdo, 2000:4) 
 
For example, production and proved reserves have a negative relationship, 
which means as production increases proved reserves would decrease. An increase in 
discovery rate will increase proved reserves, since they have a positive relationship. 
Unproved reserves decrease as discovery rate increases, and the proved portion of 
resources expands. If the proved reserves are depleted, then cost of exploration 
increases, because the explorers will look for more difficult or costly areas and in 
turn it will decrease the return of investment. This situation occurred in Indonesia, 
due to the maturing of western-part; increasing exploration activities must be focused 
in eastern part of Indonesia that mostly located in deep water and frontier areas. 
Exploration costs in deep water and remote areas are more costly, the decrease in the 
return of investment can be halted by issuing some incentives that can decrease the 
exploration cost and setting up an investment climate that is conducive to do 
business. 
 
If planned properly, technology tends to decrease costs. But it may also 
increase costs, which usually occurs when the activity faces unpredictable complex 
structure, needs sophisticated technology in rural area, deep water, frontier area, or in 
Unproved Reserves Discovery Rate Proved Reserves 
Cost/Expenditures  Investment  Production 
Technology 
Taxation
Return of Investment
Environment Price 
Demand
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the case of lack of infrastructure. Again this situation needs incentives that can 
decrease the exploration and development cost. 
 
In addition, while fulfilment of environmental regulations tend to increase 
costs, it is essential that the environment be preserved for the future generation.  The 
increase in environmental cost should be temporarily or near term, as environment is 
preserved, the overall cost to maintain would decline in the long run. 
 
As the revenue increases due to the rise in production and price, the return on 
investment would improve. Such improved return of investment would usually result 
in increased investment in the exploration, and in turn, result in better discovery rate.  
In order to increase discovery rate, in case of declining reserve-to production ratio 
(R/P), exploration activity needs to be increased to add the proved reserves. 
Incentives to decrease the exploration cost and an investment climate that is 
conducive to investment are needed. While high price of petroleum would reduce the 
demand, and in the long-term it could reduce the return of investment of petroleum 
venture.  
 
The return on investment will decrease as the tax rate increases, thus resulted 
in decreasing the attractiveness of the petroleum investment in the country, 
especially if the petroleum’s reserves are not large enough. 
 
 
 
2.1.3.4.   Rate of Return on Investment  
 
Mc.Cray, A. W. (1975), Jones, D. R. (1993:7-12), Seba (1998:155-189), 
Newendrop (2000:16-46) and others recommend three parameters to determine the 
profitability of certain petroleum E&P project proposal, namely Net Present Value 
(NPV), Internal Rate of Return (IRR) and Payback Period (POT).   
 
Net Present Value (NPV), which is derived by discounting a project’s cash 
receipts using the required discount rate, summing them over the lifetime of the 
proposal and deducting the investment outlay. Each company has its discount rate. In 
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the mineral investment, expenditures would be credited through the whole life of the 
project, so the NPV of the project is as follows: 
 
  n Rt                    n         Ct 
NPV   =          Σ   -------------    -   Σ   ------------         
  t=1    (1  +  k )t           t=1  (1  +  k )t 
 
If the present value of net in cash flow in the future is higher than the present value 
of investment (NPV > 0), the project is financially feasible because it is profitable.  If 
the present value of net in cash flow on the future is lower than the present value of 
investment (NPV< 0) the project is financially not feasible because it is not 
profitable.  
 
Internal Rate of Return (IRR), is defined as the rate of discount, which 
equates the present value of the stream of net receipts with the initial outlay       
(NPV = 0): 
 
n   Rt                     n             Ct 
Σ    -------------   =     Σ     --------------             
 t=1       (1  +  r )t         t=1        (1  + r ) t 
 
  where: Ct  :  initial cash outlay on the project 
   Rt  :  net cash flow at time t 
   n    :  project life 
              r    :  the internal rate of return 
 
In general the IRR will be compared to the relevant levels of company’s 
minimum required of rate of return. Each company has its minimum required rate of 
return. If the IRR is higher than the company’s minimum required rate of return, the 
investment is profitable and financially feasible. If it is lower, the investment is not 
profitable and financially is not feasible.   
 
In the treatment of uncertainty and risks in petroleum E&P venture, most 
investors are risk averse, he/she will choose the less risky project than the more risky 
project with the same net present value. The risk premium depends on the riskiness 
of the project. Higher risks must be balanced with higher rate. This risk premium 
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represents the company’s required compensation for taking the risk. The size of the 
risk premium is affected by actions of the government, and will be lower if 
commercial and political risk can be reduced. The commercial risk can be reduced by 
the government, for example by making exploration data freely available or by 
financing exploration activities. While strengthening the macroeconomic and fiscal 
stability are required to reduce the political risks (Baunsgaard, 2001:6). Jones 
(1993:11) recommended the minimum required rate of return of the investment on 
petroleum E&P project as follows: 
  High risk     : 30% - 40% 
  Medium risk: 20% - 30% 
  Low risk      : 15% – 25% 
  
Uncertainty increases over time. A way to reduce this uncertainty is by giving 
the company high profit in the early of production activity (Siebert, 1984:30) that 
shortens pay out time (POT) of its investment. The POT is the time needed for all 
investment outflows to be compensated by back inflows, the formula as follows: 
  Σ Cash inflow  -  Σ Cash outflow  =  0                  
Shorter POT is better, because the cash-outflow can be paid out in shorter time, and 
in turn can be invested in other projects. 
 
 
 
2.1.4.   Petroleum Exploration and Production Contractual Arrangement 
 
Based on the owner of the petroleum resources, as shows in Figure 2.5 
Johnston (1994:21-27) categorised the petroleum contract system into two major 
categories: concessionary or royalty and tax system (RAT) and contractual systems. 
In RAT system, the petroleum company through government licensing may privately 
own the petroleum resources. While in contractual system the government still 
retains its ownership of the resources, the petroleum company as the contractor of the 
government (sometimes delegated to national petroleum company or government 
agent) provides all financing and technology for the operation of petroleum E&P 
project.  
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In contractual system there are two systems, namely the Production Sharing 
Contract (PSC) and Service Contract. The difference between those contracts is the 
type of contractor receives, cash or in kind (crude). In PSC system, the profit oil in 
kind is shared between the government and the contractor after recovering the cost, 
while in Service Contract system the contractor gets fee in cash as payment for the 
services.  
 
 
 
 
 
The first branch deals with the “title” to the mineral resources. 
Royalty/Tax systems allow title to hydrocarbons to transfer at the wellhead 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The primary difference here rests upon whether 
 The “fee” is taken in “cash” (Service) or in “kind” (PSC) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Divided primarily upon whether remuneration is based upon a flat fee (Pure), or profit (Risk) 
 
 
 
      
 
 
 
Figure 2.5: Petroleum E&P contractual arrangement (Johnston, 1994:25) 
 
Service Contract system may further be divided into two types: Pure Service 
Contract and Risk Service Contract (RSC). These contracts differ in fee sharing, a 
flat fee in Pure Service Contract or profit in Risk Service Contract. According to 
Johnston (1994:24) the Pure Service Contract is rarely applied in petroleum E&P 
venture.  
 
Besides the two main systems, there are other types of petroleum contracts 
such as Joint Venture, Technical Assistance Contract (TAC), Enhanced Petroleum 
Pure Service 
Contract 
Risk Service 
Contract 
PETROLEUM CONTRACTUAL ARRANGEMENT 
CONCESSIONARY/ 
ROYALTY & TAX   
CONTRACTUAL 
Service Contract Production Sharing Contract 
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Recovery Contract (EOR) and Rate of Return Contract (RORC).  These systems can 
use RAT, PSC or RSC systems as the basis. 
 
 
 
2.1.4.1.   Concessionary/Royalty and Tax 
 
In RAT system the petroleum company through government licensing may 
privately own the petroleum resources. The government only sets up the rules for 
licensing, including establishment of fee for land use and degradation, and imposing 
royalties and production taxes without being involved with the industry itself. In this 
system the operation is carried out and the risk is borne by the petroleum company. 
 
As Cottee (1992:482) said in the Australian Northern Territory Department of 
Mines and Energy, the word “royalty” came from an ancient royal prerogative that 
all silver and gold found within the realm belonged to the King.  The gold and silver 
ownership could be transferred from the King through paying to the monarch a title 
some described and which became known as Royalty. According to Machmud this 
system is also called Royalty and Tax system (RAT), since its main features are 
royalty payment and taxes (Machmud, 2000:37).   
 
Before 1950 the traditional RAT system was almost the sole contract form 
between developing countries’ governments and international petroleum companies. 
At that time most petroleum E&P ventures in Latin America, North Africa, Middle 
East and Far East were operated by seven major companies, known as the Seven 
Sister, namely Exxon (former Standard Oil Company of New Jersey), Mobil (former 
Socony-Vacuum Oil Company), Gulf Oil Corporation, Texaco, Standard Oil 
Company of California, British Petroleum Company and Royal Dutch/Shell 
Transport and Trading (Machmud, 2000:34).  
 
In its early development, there were essentially no standard form of contract, 
including the financial terms and the duration of contract.  For example, under the 
RAT system applied in Indonesia in the early 20th century, the term was 75 years, 
while in the Middle East the term varied from 60 to 82 years. Under the traditional 
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RAT the exclusive right provided to the petroleum company was an almost 
unrestricted right and excessive rights; such right granted by the government 
included the right to explore, mine, extract, refine, transport, export and sell the 
petroleum produced (Gao, 1993:29). 
 
As the bargaining position of the government increased, the traditional RAT 
system began to change since 1940.  Venezuela led the change by imposing in 1943 
taxes in addition to royalty in 1943.  A new income tax law followed this in 1948, in 
which the tax became 50% of the profits, later known as the concept of equal profit 
sharing. Saudi Arabia followed the 50/50 profit sharing scheme in 1950. The 
changing in RAT contract terms continued throughout the 1980s; in addition to 
royalty and tax, the modern RAT system may include bonus payment, pricing control 
and windfall profit, the latter to capture excess profits from unexpectedly high oil 
prices (Gao, 1993: 32).  
 
In Thailand, the RAT system granted the petroleum company to acquire 
ownership right over its concession area, managerial control of the operations and 
expropriates most of the production. The concession area ranged from 4,000 km2 to 
10,000 km2. The duration of contract was 26 years, which divided into 6 years for 
exploration and 20 years for production phase. The obligation of the concessionaire 
was to perform its obligations in petroleum exploration both in the forms of 
minimum expenditures as specified in the contract. Relinquishment at the end of four 
years operation, 50% of each exploration block for onshore area, and 35% of each 
deep-water block. The fiscal regime consisted of surface reservation fee, royalty, 
income tax, and the special remunerator benefit. The rate surface reservation fee was 
payable at 100,000 baht (3800 USD) per km2 per year. Royalty must be paid in cash 
or kind, with sliding scale rate based on production levels. The concessionaire was 
subject to pay tax at a rate of 50% of net profit, or 35% of profit plus 23.08% 
remittance tax, and was payable semi-annually. If the concessionaire had annual 
petroleum profit, it was then subject to payment of the Special Remunerator Benefit 
at a sliding rate. There were also a number special advantage clause that must be 
furnished to the government by the concessionaire such as a government right to 
purchase oil on first priority basis and preference to local goods and service, 
signature bonus and annual bonus, domestic supply, preference for domestic 
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services, employment and training, Thai government participation and others (Gao, 
1993:71 – 112). To summarise, the recent modern RAT contains numerous fiscal 
devices, layers of taxation, and sophisticated formulae  
 
According to Gao (1993: 71 – 112) Thailand’s Modern RAT system is 
relatively generous and a simple arrangement in terms of form, content and 
administration. He assumed the case of Thailand illustrated the weak bargaining 
position of governments with unproven reserves on the edge of the world petroleum 
system. The Modern RAT system serves as a useful device for attracting foreign 
petroleum companies to invest in the developing countries with unproven petroleum 
potential, geographically isolated exploration areas such as frontier, remote and deep 
water areas, little capital, technology and administrative expertise  
 
Modern RAT system has also being used in the politically stable country and 
developed countries, such as United States, Australia and Norway and others. 
Through 1993 around 122 countries in the world utilised the RAT system (Gao, 
1993: 21).  
 
 
 
2.1.4.2. Production Sharing Contract  
 
Ibnu Sutowo, the first President Director of Pertamina introduced the PSC in 
early 1960s and since then the PSC as introduced by Indonesia has been used as a 
model in various developing countries throughout the world.  This type of contact 
has become its own rightful and unique style of cooperation in the petroleum venture 
(Pertamina, 1989:4). The PSC contract is intended to accommodate the Indonesia 
national aspiration who wishes to exploit its natural resources in accordance with 
Article 33 of the 1945 Indonesia’s Constitution that states: All the natural wealth on 
land and in water is under the jurisdiction of the State and should be used for the 
benefit and welfare of the people.  
 
The keys of the PSC system are the government ownership of the resources 
and the sharing of production in kind. While the government still retains its 
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ownership of the resources; the contractor provides all financing and technology for 
the operation and bears the risks. Such concept of mineral ownership by the State 
was developed in the Napoleon era, as the French legal concept states that the 
Government shall own the ownership of minerals, not individuals for benefits of all 
citizens (Johnston, 1994:22). 
 
The contractor explores and develops resources under general supervision of 
host government agency or the national petroleum company on behalf of the 
government. The risk during the exploration activity are borne by the contractor, 
while during production are shared between government and contractor. Although all 
operations are planned and carried out by the contractor, the host government closely 
monitors the contract operation through periodic reporting and submission of 
information by the contractor.  
 
Important financial parameters in the contract include method of cost 
recovery, production sharing split, bonuses and royalty payment. The cost recovery 
is the repayment of the exploration, development and production expenditures of the 
contractor, which commences when the contract area begins its first production. The 
provision on cost recovery is usually described in detail in the contract. In order to 
provide a guaranteed income for the government from any petroleum E&P venture, 
some PSC has a provision that limits the amount of cost that can be recovered 
annually. The cost that has not been recovered may be carried forward to be 
recoverable in subsequent years. Such cost recovery ceiling will affect the 
contractor’s cash flow and return on investment.  
 
Under the PSC term, profit oil or profit gas is defined as remaining revenues 
after royalty and cost recovery. This profit will be shared between the contractor and 
the host government at an agreed formula. In addition, contractor will pay taxes on 
its share of profit. 
 
Although the rules of PSC can be interpreted as being strict by some 
investors, the concept provides investor with an attractive opportunity for profitable 
operation; thereby the PSC system has been used as a model in various countries 
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throughout the world. During 1966 – 1998 period there were around 268 PSC 
contracts signed in 74 countries (Bindemann, 1999:47). 
 
Petroleum contracts, such as PSC are designed to govern a long-term 
relationship negotiated on the basis of existing conditions and assumed factors that 
will not be confirmed for many years to come.  When the conditions and assumed 
factors change; pressure for changing unsatisfactory terms of contract could not be 
avoided.  Indonesia is of no exception; over the time the financial terms have 
changed.  For example, over the years Indonesia has made several revisions or 
amendments in the original contract.  The first revision made following the drastic 
increase in crude oil prices in 1973; it increased Pertamina and Government’s take to 
85% for oil and 70% for gas. The revision also included the amended provision on 
companies’ payment of Indonesian income tax, which would allow the US 
companies to meet the IRS rulings for tax credit.  Following revisions involved 
providing additional economic incentives to meet the industry’s plight for improved 
terms. As a result, there have been three generations and five economic incentive 
packages investment as well as three variations of PSC system in the development 
PSC system in Indonesia.  
 
 
 
2.1.4.3.   Variation of the Indonesian Production Sharing Contract 
 
The PSC was initially developed for new exploration acreage. As demands 
for risk capital continued to increase, the scope of co-operation was also expanded to 
include Pertamina’s fields and prime acreage’s previously reserved for Pertamina.  
This has resulted in various types of contract Technical Assistance Contracts or 
TAC, and Enhanced Oil Recovery Contracts or EOR; Pertamina determines the type 
of contract applicable to a block or working area when offering it to other parties. 
 
The TAC was first introduced in 1967. Under TAC, Pertamina surrendered 
the operations of Pertamina’s producing fields or old shut-in fields to be 
rehabilitated.  The main objective is to enhance production and exploitation of the 
existing petroleum reserves, as well as continuation of Pertamina production. The 
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contractor uses its expertise and capital to improve production and takes a percentage 
from the incremental slice of production brought by his efforts. The term of contract 
initially varied between contracts, but in the mid 1970’s they were modified to 
follow the form and term of Production Sharing Contract.   
 
Production Sharing Contract JOA was first introduced in 1977. Under JOA, 
Pertamina and contractor have equal interests in the contract with the contractor as 
operator.  This type of contract is used for exploration acreage previously operated or 
reserved for Pertamina’s own development. In this system Pertamina holds a 
maximum 50% participating interest and the remaining is the contractor’s 
participating interest. The term is subjected to the same terms as in the PSC. A 
further development of the Joint Operation Agreement is the delegation of 
operatorship to Joint Operating Body, an operating organisation that is staffed by 
Pertamina and Contractor’s personnel and supervised by a Joint Operating 
Committee (JOC). The membership of the JOC constitutes of Pertamina and 
contractor. The JOC approves the work program and the budget and sets policies.   
 
Introduced in late 1988, Enhanced Oil Recovery Contract (EOR) was 
introduced for the purpose of undertaking enhanced oil recovery projects within 
certain depleted fields that being operated by Pertamina through primary recovery 
methods. Pertamina and Contractor have equal interest in the contract, but Contractor 
will provide all funds required for pilot, development and operation with the operator 
is delegated to Joint Operating Body.    
 
 
 
2.1.4.4.   Risk Service Contract 
 
Under the RSC system, the government retains ownership of petroleum 
resources, while the petroleum company explores at its sole risk as the contractor of 
the government. The government also supervises the operation. In the case of 
successful exploration all production will belong to government. The government 
allows the contractor to recover those costs through sale of the petroleum and pays 
the contractor a fee based on a percentage of the remaining revenues. This fee is also 
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subjected to taxes. While in RSC, the contractor does not receive a share of 
production like in PSC, the terminology and arithmetic between PSC and RSC are 
quite similar, or the arithmetic that shapes out the contractor’s revenues in RSC is in 
the same fashion as a PSC of sharing production.  
 
The RSC system is extensively applied in Brazil. Under the Brazil’s RSC 
system, the government still retained the ownership right of the resources and 
contractor bears the risks during the exploration and development. The contractor 
was required to provide a bank guarantee in the amount of exploration expenditures 
commitment. Geological data fee was payable at USD 250,000 to 500,000. The 
contract area was generally around 3,000 km2, while term of the contract varied from 
contract to contract. The size of remuneration and contract period were negotiated 
through bidding and then stated in the contract. Income tax was set at 25% of the net 
income (Gao, 1993: 476 - 489).  
 
 
 
2.1.4.5.  Comparison among Royalty and Tax, Production Sharing Contract and 
Risk Service Contract System 
 
Dealing with the resources ownership aspect, from the petroleum companies’ 
view, the most important advantage of RAT system is that it grants the owner 
something like to a type of real property. It provides good security to borrow money 
if the petroleum company needs to raise the finance for the operation and it can be 
mortgaged and can support easement and caveats. In contrast, the ownership of the 
resources in PSC and RSC still belong the government, therefore the PSC and RSC 
contractors do not have the advantage as in RAT system above. In recent years, the 
PSC contractors, particularly those based in the USA, can book the reserves in their 
balance sheets even though they do not own them. The rationale behind this is that 
the petroleum company is entitled to produce for a long period time. It can book the 
reserves because of access rather than legal title. Because of that PSC is attractive to 
petroleum companies (Bindemann, 1999: 85). But from the point of view 
government, the RSC and PSC are more attractive than RAT. In RAT system 
government cannot involve in the strategic decision-making and control the 
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development of the resources, since the ownership belongs to the petroleum 
company. 
 
Dealing with risk aspect, the risks during exploration phase in RAT, PSC and 
RSC are similar; they are borne by the contractor. While in development and 
production phases, in RAT system the petroleum company bears all those risks; 
while in PSC and RSC systems, they are shared between the contractors and the 
government.  
 
The level of control of host government in PSC is medium, more than in RAT 
but less than in RSC system. RAT has the simplest arrangement in terms of form, 
content and administration, followed by RSC, while PSC has the most complex form. 
These two aspects make the RAT more attractive on the view of the petroleum 
company.  
 
Cottee (1992:485-487) made a comparison between the PSC system applied 
in Timor Gap and RAT system in Australia. The RAT allows the producer of large 
field to reap more profit/high reward, due to its flat rate. In contrast, it could cause 
premature shut-in in marginal field, if costs tend to rise during the latter phase of 
production. This situation can be minimised through imposing a rate of return 
royalty. The RAT might make sub-economic production. For example, when the oil 
price is low, then the marginal field or sub-economic discovery should wait until the 
price increases (Cottee, 1992:484).   
 
From the point of view of host government, the disadvantages of RAT system 
is that the royalty is flat which will not support in maximising the economic rent for 
the government. Another disadvantage is that the government is not involved in the 
operations and risks that could cause situation of unrealistic policies and regulations. 
From the company’s perspective, as royalty could easily be changed, it could become 
disadvantage for the petroleum company. In politically stable country, such 
disadvantage is unlikely to occur thereby it is not a major concern. The royalty is 
payable from the first day of production, even before the development cost of the 
project has paid off, which would lead to the increase in the threshold rate of return 
required thereby discourage new investment (Cottee, 1992:484-485).   
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One of the advantages of PSC system on the host government view is that, 
with the authority of the ultimate approval and mine remain vested in host 
government, the PSC system can maximises the multiplier effect of development of 
the domestic industry; the PSC can have various preference provisions for its 
national product and services. The host government could also get maximum 
economic rent of any large discovery. The PSC system also allows disputes to be 
referred to some sort international arbitration; this at least allows a contractor to feel 
that the host government is not always both a judge and jury (Cottee, 1992:485-487). 
 
On the other hand, one of disadvantages of PSC system is that it could 
encourage inefficiencies on costs since the petroleum company could reimburse all 
its operating cost. PSC also requires a relatively large bureaucratic and difficult 
administration, such as tender process, cost recovery monitoring and others. It is 
arguable the PSC system close to a nationalised industry, since this system has the 
high degree of government involvement and interference in a lot of essential 
management decisions in PSC system (Cottee, 1992:485-487). 
 
The RSC as applied in Brazil appears similar to the PSC, but differs in certain 
important matters. The most basic is that the recovering of costs of contractor is in 
cash not in kind, it gives the contractor fewer rights in the service area, and it gives 
the government the possibility of asserting direct control over the development and 
production strategies (Gao, 1993: 493). 
 
In analysing some RAT (in US, UK, Norway and Colombia) and PSC 
contracts systems (in Angola and Equador), Mannarino (1991: 172-173) made a 
conclusion that there is no overall best contract if considered only by its clauses, 
either for the host government or the petroleum company. In fact, the host countries 
have to model the petroleum contract dispositions in accordance with the exploration 
results. According to him, the best contract is the one yielding the petroleum 
company the opportunity of an overall compensation equivalent to other activities. It 
requires the host government to understand the geological risk associated with 
exploration activities. Moreover Cavoulacos (1986:4) had similar opinion as 
Mannarino: the petroleum contract is not just specific terms; it should be chosen 
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based on individual country and project circumstances. He suggested having sliding 
scales in the contract form selected. The host governments should avoid the desire to 
over regulate and should select petroleum companies appropriate to the country’s 
geological potential and overall circumstances. 
 
 
 
2.2.   The Indonesian Production Sharing Contract 
 
2.2.1. The Development and the Role of the Petroleum Exploration and 
Production Industry in Indonesia 
  
Since the first oil discovered in 1885, the role of petroleum business is 
important for the government, the Dutch Government (Dutch Governor General of 
Netherlands’ East Indies) in the era of Dutch Colonial and then the Government of 
Indonesia (GOI) since the Indonesia’s Independence Day in 1945. The following 
presentation describes briefly the development and the role of the petroleum E&P 
industry in Indonesia from it first discovered to 2003 period. 
 
 
 
2.2.1.1. The period of Concessionary/Royalty and Tax and Contract of Work 
 
Indonesia’s petroleum E&P industry is one of the oldest in the world. It 
started more than a century ago (see Figure 2.6). Aeiko Janszoon Zijlker discovered 
the first sufficient commercial well at Telaga Said field in Langkat, East Coast of 
Sumatra in 1885. The year 1885 later was considered as the birth of Indonesia’s 
petroleum industry. This was soon followed by discoveries at Ledok in East Java, 
Muara Enim in South Sumatra and Sanga-Sanga in East Kalimantan (Pertamina, 
1994:6). These events then led to the establishment of the Koninklijke 
Nederlandsche Maatschappij tot Exploitatie van Petroleum-bronnen in Nederlandsch 
Indië (Royal Dutch Company) in 1890 by Zijlker and his friends.   
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Figure 2.6: Indonesia’s petroleum contract development 1885 – 2003 (Pertamina, 
1997:16)  
 
This company carried on all phases of petroleum business from production, 
refining to marketing crude oil. Their first refinery was built in 1892 and the first 
crude oil port was built in Pangkalan Susu in 1898. Adrian Stoop, the former 
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employee of Zijlker, followed him building a petroleum company in Surabaya after 
he discovered oil reserves in Surabaya in 1887 and built oil refinery in Wonokromo, 
East Java and Cepu, Central Java in 1890. After that Shell Transport and Trading 
Company, a British company that had been drilling in East Kalimantan since 1891 
and discovered oil reserves in 1894, built refinery in Balikpapan. Since then up to the 
end of nineteenth century, there were eighteen companies operating in Indonesia 
(Andel, 1961:75-80 and Pertamina, 1994:7-8). 
  
In 1907 the Royal Dutch Company merged with the Shell Transport and 
Trading Company to form Royal Dutch Shell. Since then Royal Dutch Shell Group 
ran all the petroleum business in Indonesia and dominated colonial oil exploration 
for more than thirty years (Andel, 1961:75-80 and Pertamina, 1994:7-8). By 1911 
Royal Dutch Shell operated concessions in Sumatra, Java, and Kalimantan, and 
Indonesian oil production was almost 4% of total world production. Later this 
company divided its activities into three subsidiary companies, i.e. Bataafssche 
Petroleum Maatschapij (BPM), Aziatic Petroleum and Saxon Petroleum company 
that each of them carried on production, marketing and oil transport. In east Java 
there was Dortshe Petroleum Company, but it was sold to BPM in 1911. 
 
In 1912 an US Company built his subsidiary in Indonesia, named 
Nederlandsche Koloniale Petroleum Maatschapij (NKPM), later it changed to 
Standard Vacuum Petroleum Maatschapij (SVPM) and changed again in 1959 to 
Standard Vacuum Petroleum (Stanvac), who ran oil field in Talang Akar, Pendopo 
South Sumatra. In order to face the competitiveness of the US Company, BPM and 
English government with fifty-fifty shares, built a new petroleum company named 
N.V. Nederlandshe Indische Aardolie Mij (NIAM), which operated in Jambi and 
Bunyu Island, East Kalimantan and started its production in 1924. 
 
In 1930, Standard of California built his subsidiary in Indonesia, named 
Nederlandshe Pacific Petroleum Maatschapij and in 1936 signed a new contract to 
explore oil in Rokan block. In the same year Standard of California built cooperation 
with Texas Company (Texaco) a new company, named California Texas Oil 
Company (Caltex) that got concession in along coast Central Sumatra and Pekanbaru 
and discovered oil in Minas structure in 1943. Although their production did not 
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begin until the 1950s, the Duri and Minas oil fields became the Indonesia’s most 
important oil fields, amounted to 50% of Indonesia’s oil production. Later Caltex 
developed Minas as the largest oil field in the world after the Second World War 
(Andel, 1961:75-80 and Pertamina, 1994:7-8). 
 
In the effort to expand its business, in 1935 BPM built 264 kilometres 
pipeline to transfer oil from Jambi field to the refinery location in Plaju. In the same 
year BPM with Shell and Stanvac built a new petroleum company that operated in 
Irian Jaya, named De Nederlandsch Nieuw Guinea Petroleum Maatschapij 
(NNGPM). In 1935 NNGPM got concession near Sorong and its first production 
started in 1948 from Klamono field 4000 barrels per day. As a result Indonesia 
became the largest oil production country in the Far East with average oil production 
around 62 million barrels per year during 1939 – 1940 (Pertamina, 1994:7-8). 
 
The earlier legislation in petroleum industry was the Dutch East Indies’ 
Mining Law of 1899 and 1906, which was amended at various times. This Law 
constituted the legal basis for petroleum concessions issued by the colonial 
government to certain concessionaires, known as traditional concessionary/royalty 
and tax (RAT) system. The law separated the ownership of the land from the 
ownership of the subsoil petroleum resource. The petroleum resource wealth of the 
country was the property of the state. The explanatory memorandum of this law 
stated that it was the intention of the government to use the petroleum resource 
wealth of the Dutch East Indies as a source of revenue. The concession term ran up 
to 75 years, during these 75 years period the concession holder acquired right to 
explore and to produce the oil resources in an area of land defined as the concession 
and having direct control over these resources. For return of its right the concession 
holder obliged to pay a royalty of 4% and corporate tax to the colonial government 
(Andel, 1961:75-80 and Pertamina, 1994:7-8).  
 
In 1918, the colonial government revised the regulations, making less 
favourable to petroleum companies. The petroleum company had an obligation to 
drill and to return those part of concession area that had no oil prospects. The 
company was further obliged to pay a profit tax amounting to as much as 20% of the 
net profit. Because they derived from Section 5A of the 1918 amendment to the law 
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1899, these concessions were historically known as 5A Contract/Agreement. The law 
amended again in 1929 that decreased the period of concession from 75 years to 40 
years, higher requirement conditions such as to drill for the concession holder and 
others. The tougher amendment (less favourable to petroleum company) showed the 
Dutch Colonial’s bargaining position increased. The RAT system dominated the oil 
scene in Indonesia and remained valid until 1960, but was not operative during the 
period 1942-1945 because of the Japanese wartime occupation of the colony. 
 
With the Japanese attack on the Dutch East Indies in 1942 demolition squads 
destroyed many important oil installations. To get them rebuilt after the War the 
Dutch East Indies Government adopted let alone policy that exempted reconstruction 
fund from foreign exchange and customs controls. Under this agreement, foreign 
companies could retain all earnings from oil sales as long as they agreed to provide 
from their own overseas sources the necessary fund required to restore their 
production facilities and oil fields. The Dutch East Indies Government got some 
foreign exchange out of the oil especially by selling to the companies the local 
currency for taxes, royalties, etc. The let alone agreement was continued by 
Indonesia after its independence in1945 until 1960. This agreement simply allowed 
the 5A contract to remain in effect until the introduction of a new legislation.  
 
In 1945 Indonesia proclaimed his independence and nationalistic feelings 
were running high, the government increased its control over the oil sector during the 
1950s and 1960s. The concessions were regarded as being far too generous to foreign 
companies at the expenses of the country. The GOI froze all the concessions as the 
responses. This action made stagnation in petroleum development, and it was 
disadvantageous for both, the GOI and the foreign petroleum companies. Since the 
war much had changed and with the transfer of sovereignty on December 27, 1949 
the petroleum companies lost their political influence. However, their production 
costs, prices and distribution policy were kept secret and the GOI never got a clear 
picture of the situation (Andel, 1961:75-80). 
 
A new episode in the Indonesian petroleum industry was started with the 
birth of the Indonesian Law Number 44 prp of 1960, the Mining of Mineral Oil and 
Gas, which was signed by President Sukarno on October 26, 1960. It changed the 
  
66
legal working status of the foreign petroleum companies and practically nullified 
their investments. The most important change was the declaration that the mining of 
oil and gas should only be undertaken by the state and exclusively carried out by 
national petroleum company. The concession had officially come to an end and 
converted into Contract of Work (COW, in Bahasa Indonesia: Perjanjian Karya or 
Kontrak Karya). With this Law, the petroleum companies were named as contractors 
to the national petroleum company. Three national petroleum companies were thus 
established and authorized by the GOI to develop and exploit the mineral resources; 
they were Permina, Pertamin and Permigan. Later in 1966 GOI dissolved Permigan, 
and in 1968 Permina and Pertamin were merged into one company, Pertamina, in 
order to raise the efficiency of the operation of petroleum industries in Indonesia. 
 
The term COW was employed to describe a type of arrangement under which 
the foreign petroleum company was a contractor to the GOI, and the term concession 
had been replaced with authority to mine in deference to the nationalistic demand 
that mining rights be vested in national oil companies. The COW contract was 
approved by the government, and was ratified by the parliament and had the force of 
law. The management of the operation was still in the responsibility of the petroleum 
company.  
 
The contract’s duration was 20 years for the extension of concession contract. 
While for new contract, contractor was obliged to pay 5 million USD as signing 
bonus and the duration of contract was 30 years. The net profit was shared 60% for 
the GOI (inclusive contractor’s taxes) and 40% for the contractor. And 20% of total 
revenues were reserved as a minimum GOI income out of the COW. The contractor 
obliged to deliver 25% of their share to the GOI as DMO at a reimbursed of 0.20 
USD fee per barrel. Contractor owned all physical assets acquired for the operation.  
  
The foreign petroleum companies valued the law as unattractive, as a result 
Indonesian oil production reduced to only about 2% of the total world output, and in 
the world market the value of its oil available for export was practically negligible, 
even though it represented about 222 million USD or 24% of the total exports of 
Indonesia. On the other hand, the government was completely dependent on oil as a 
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source of state revenue, both in local currency and in foreign exchange, that they 
were reluctant to risk the experiment (Andel, 1961:75-80). 
 
Three COW contracts were signed in 1963, Caltex as the contractor to 
Permigan, Stanvac as the contractor to Permina, and Caltex as the contractor of 
Pertamin (Pertamina, 1994:31-32). Although the COW contracts were seen better 
than RAT contract, but Ibnu Sutowo, the President Director of Permina valued COW 
as similar to RAT system, since the management was still the responsibility of the 
petroleum company. Therefore, he introduced a new petroleum contract system, the 
PSC system in the mid 1960s. Now COW is no longer employed in Indonesia, the 
last two COWs were expired in 1993. 
 
According to Gao (1993:153-154), three relevant points were suggested as 
the significance of the COW. First, these systems helped to prevent a precipitous 
withdrawal of the remaining foreign investment from Indonesia; second, they 
provided the Indonesia’s petroleum administrators at that time with the opportunity 
to educate themselves about the industry; and third, the most important, the COW 
gave birth to the PSCs.  
 
In 1962 Indonesia joined Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries 
(OPEC) as an active member. OPEC member countries meet at least twice a year to 
coordinate their production policies in light of market fundamental, in an effort to 
control oil price volatility and to counter what they see as softening crude oil prices.  
 
 
 
2.2.1.2.   The Production Sharing Contract First Generation   
 
Actually agreements similar to the idea of PSC system were already signed in 
Indonesia, first between Permina and the Kobayashi group in 1960, followed by 
Refican and Asamera in 1961. But it is generally agreed that the IIAPCO contract of 
1966 between an independent petroleum company named IIAPCO and Permina, 
covering a block in western part of Java Sea was the first genuine PSC in petroleum 
industry. The PSC basic principles agreement in the IIAPCO contract called the First 
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Generation of PSC (PSC1) would then become the standard principles for PSC 
system until now.  
 
At first the major petroleum companies were not eager on PSC system, they 
were unwilling to invest capital into venture in which they were not allowed to own 
or even to manage. However, later they accepted the PSC system, because they were 
worried about loosing too much territory to the independents. (Bindemann, 1999:68).  
 
The IIAPCO experience opened the gate to mushrooming PSCs (Gao, 
1999:165). Moreover Machmud (2000:53) said that IIAPCO and its successors, 
Sinclair and ARCO, also are worthy of having pioneered the Indonesian offshore 
operations. They were the first to operate offshore in Indonesia. 
 
In PSC1 agreement (see Table 2.1) GOI is the owner of the petroleum 
resources. The duration of the contract was 30 years, including 6 to 10 years 
exploration period. Pertamina on behalf of the GOI was responsible for the 
management of the operations. The contractor was responsible for the preparation 
and execution of work program as specified in the contract. If commercial oil 
discovery were not made by the end of the exploration period, the contract would be 
automatically terminated. All risks occurred during exploration phase were borne by 
the contractor only. In case of commercial discovery, all expenditures would be 
recovered through cost recovery mechanism. The cost recovery would be limited to 
40% of the annual production. Contract was based on production sharing not profit 
sharing; hence the remaining oil after cost recovery deduction was shared between 
the Permina on behalf of GOI and contractor with production-sharing split of 65/35 
(65% for the GOI inclusive of all contractors’ taxes and 35% for the contractor). This 
production-sharing split became 67.5/32.5 for production above 75,000 BOPD. The 
contractor was free to export its entitlement under the cost recovery. The purchased 
equipments became the property of GOI. The contractor was obligated to supply out 
of its share each year, 25 % of production times its share percentage to the domestic 
market obligation (DMO) at price of 0.20 USD per barrel. These terms represented a 
very simple system and guaranteed a minimum 49% of production for Indonesia 
annually (Anwar et.al, 1989:4). 
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A special body called Dinas Koordinasi Kontraktor Asing (DKKA) initially 
been created by P.N. Permina in the late 1960s, later its name was changed to Badan 
Koordinasi Kontraktor Asing (BKKA) in the late 1970s by Pertamina (the resulting 
company from the merger of Permina and Pertamin in 1968). Later it was changed 
again to Badan Pembinaan Pengusahaan Kontraktor Asing (BPPKA) in the late 
1980. It functioned as a coordinating body reporting directly to the President Director 
of Pertamina. According to Machmud (2000: 54) in the beginning control exercised 
was not tough, but after 1976 became pervasive to the extreme. Later on, in 2002 by 
the Oil and Gas Law Number 22 of 2001, it was changed again to Badan Pelaksana 
Kegiatan Usaha Hulu Minyak dan Gas Bumi (BP Migas) under the Ministry of 
Energy and Mineral Resources.  
 
The de facto expansion of the state was sustained by a general policy shift to 
justify greater GOI intervention in the economy. Sukarno’s Guided Economy was 
initiated in a new eight-year development plan begun in 1959, which entailed a 
twelve-fold increase in government project expenditure from the previous plan, 
without clear sources of finance. By the mid-1960s, central bank credit to the 
government accounted for half of government expenditures. This deficit spending led 
in turn to mounting inflation, which peaked at 1,500% between June 1965 and June 
1966. At the same time, foreign debt mounted, both from the West and increasingly 
from the Soviet Union. The economy stagnated and by 1966 per capita production 
was below the 1958 level (US Library Congress, 1998). Steady flows of investment 
capital were needed in all sectors to rehabilitate the economy.  
 
The PSC1 system was successful to increase the GOI revenues and to 
rehabilitate the Indonesia’s economy. Annual Indonesia’s oil production increased 
three times from 1966 production to its peaked in 1977 at over 600 million barrels. 
And a year later in 1977, Indonesia started its role as supplier of LNG when the 
facility in Bontang, East Kalimantan was opened and followed by the second plant in 
Arun, North Sumatra (Machmud, 2000:56). Table 2.2 shows that during nine-year 
period (1966-1975), 59 PSC1 contracts were signed. Compared to other PSC 
systems, PSC1 had the highest number of producing contract, 18 PSC1 contracts or 
56% out of total producing PSC contracts during 1966 – 2003. While the other 41 
PSC1 contracts were already terminated in 2003. Moreover exploration activities 
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increased from 17 wells in 1967 reaching several peaks with the highest 212 wells in 
1974. Since the oil price increases of 1970’s, the petroleum sector has become a 
significant contributor to the economy.  As late as 1980’s oil and gas was still the 
biggest single export commodity, contributing to about 49% of the Indonesia’s 
export earnings (US Embassy, 2004:1).  
 
Table 2.1: Development of the Indonesian PSC system 1966 – 2003 (Anwar et al, 
1989: 3-8 and Pertamina, 2000: 9 –15)   
 
 
No 
 
Term 
  
 PSC1  
 (1966 – 1975) 
 PSC2 
(1976 - 1988) 
 PSC3 
(1988 – recent) 
1 Investment Credit  
 
 
- For new field: 20% of capital 
expenditures for production 
facilities. 
The IC will henceforth be 
given regardless the 
condition the Indonesia 
income out of the 
development project not be 
less than 49 % of the 
project revenues 
2 Commerciality 
 
- Minimum guarantee 49 % of 
the gross revenue for GOI 
  Abolished 
3 Domestic Market 
Obligation  
- Quantity 
- Price holiday  
- Price 
 
 
25 % of con.profit share  
- 
- 0.20 USD/B 
 
  
25 % of con.profit share 
 5 years with export price 
0.20 USD/B (after 5 years) 
  
 
25 % of con.profit share 
5 years/60 months 
As stated in each IP  
4 First Tranche Petroleum  
 
No No 20 %  of production shared 
GOI and contractor as 
production sharing split 
5 Cost Recovery A cost recovery limit of 
40% of total revenues  
No limit No limit 
6 Depreciation of Capital 
Expenditures 
- 7 years DDLB 5 years DDLB  
7 Oil Production Sharing 
Split, GOI : Contractor 
65/35  (inclusive taxes)   
67.5//32.5 (inclusive taxes)  
for production over 75,000 
BOPD.  
85/15 
  
As stated in each Incentive 
Package 
8 Gas Production Sharing 
Split, GOI : Contractor 
- 70/30 
  
As stated in each Incentive 
Package 
9 Tax Inclusive in production 
sharing split 
Before 1984 
56 %  (45 %  Income + 20%  
Dividend Tax).   
Since 1984 : 
48%  (35%  Income +  20% 
Dividend Tax)  
48 % 
10 Others   Deregulations of procedures 
for procurement of 
materials and services by 
contractor  
 
Following the downfall of Sukarno, the New Order regime under Suharto 
pursued, with financial assistance from the International Monetary Fund (IMF), a 
variety of emergency stabilization measures to put the economy back on course. The 
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New Order remained committed to a stable economic environment encouraged by 
responsible fiscal and monetary policy, but concerned over foreign economic 
dominance, the limited national industrial base, and the need for pribumi economic 
development mandated increased government regulation during the 1970s. In spite of 
these increasing government controls, the economy continued to prosper throughout 
the 1970s, with GDP growing an average 8% annually (US Library Congress, 1998). 
 
Table 2.2: PSC contracts signed in Indonesia 1966 – 2003 (Pertamina, 2000:11, US 
Embassy, 2004:app.3, BP Migas, 2004) 
 
Period Time Frame Total % Total  Producing Success Ratio Success Ratio  Non-Prod. Act. Terminate
    Contract  1966 - 2003 Contract  by each type total.prod.con. Contract Contract 
PSC1 1966 - 1975 59 25% 18 29% 56% 0 41 
PSC2 1976 - 1988 64 23% 8 13% 25% 3 53 
PSC3+IP1 1988 - 1989 5 2% 0 0% 0% 0 5 
PSC3+IP2 1989 - 1992 33 13% 3 9% 9% 5 25 
PSC3+IP3 1992 - 1993 10 4% 3 30% 9% 5 2 
PSC3+IP4 1994 - 2002 70 27% 0 0% 0% 44 26 
PSC3+IP5 2003 16 6% 0 0% 0% 16 0 
PSC3+all IP 1988 - now 134 52% 6 4% 19% 70 58 
Total 1966 - 2003 257 100% 32 12% 100% 73 152 
 
The PSC1 system worked well until mid-1970s. Law No. 8 of 1971 
determined once and for all that in the petroleum sector only PSC type contracts 
were available foreign investors, and that there was no room for COW. The COW 
signed prior to the promulgation of Law No.8 of 1971 remained in full force and in 
effect, and upon the contract’s expire date, they would have to be converted into 
PSC. This law also created a monopoly by establishing Pertamina as the sole agency 
for petroleum activities, both upstream and downstream (Machmud, 2000:57-58). 
 
When crude oil price increased significantly from 3.69 USD per barrel in 1973 
to 10.57 USD per barrel in 1974, it created windfall profit. GOI argued, the windfall 
profit should not only benefit the contractor, but should give benefit to the GOI too. 
As a result, windfall agreement was signed in 1974; whereby up to a price of 5 USD 
per barrel in revenues from crude oil sales, the sharing split was to be held at 35/65 
(inclusive of taxes). While if oil price rose in excess of that base price, the sharing 
split would shift to 15/85 in favour of Pertamina. The base price was to be adjusted 
periodically, following the rise and fall of the UN Commodity Index. At the same 
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time negotiations were started about DMO price, due to the low DMO price (only 
0.20 USD/barrel). As a result the number of contract signed decreased to the lower of 
only one contract signed in 1974. 
 
In 1975 another event occurred, a new ruling of taxes was issued by the tax 
agency in home country of the majority of the contractors operating in Indonesia, 
which did not allow tax credits for corporate taxes paid in Indonesia. This situation 
brought about major changes to the PSC terms leading to new generation of PSC 
system, named PSC2. 
 
 
 
2.2.1.3.  The Production Sharing Contract Second Generation and the Variation 
of the Production Sharing Contract    
 
The basic principles of the PSC2 were similar to the PSC1, with some 
modifications (see Table 2.2). In PSC2, no cost recovery limit was applied and cost 
recovery was based on generally acceptable accounting principles. Capital 
expenditures were allowed be depreciated over 7 years double declining balance, and 
non-capital cost including intangibles might be expensed. Under the PSC2, in the 
initial years, revenue could be claimed all for the expenditures as cost recovery.  GOI 
only started to receive a share of production whenever all costs had been recovered, 
something normally occurred only after several years of production. This contract 
looks reasonable in the economic perspective, given the continuing rise in oil price. 
 
In addition, the production-sharing split was changed to 15/85 for oil and 
30/70 for natural gas in favour of GOI, because gas development took longer lead 
times and required larger front-end investment. Contractor’s share was subjected to 
corporate income tax of 56% (45% income tax and 20% of the balance as dividend 
tax). The new Tax Law of 1984 changed the tax rate from 56%to 48%.   
 
Unfortunately, the reaction of the petroleum company to these contract 
changes was not favourable, the number of exploration and contracts signed still 
decreased to the second lowest peak. No contract was signed in 1976. The strong oil 
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price at that time saved the industry. Prices continued to soar in 1981, reaching 35 
USD per barrel, and oil exports peaked at 15 billion USD, or about 70% of total 
export earnings. In 1982, however, production declined, reaching a low of 460 
million barrels and the oil market began to weaken that same year, when Indonesia's 
Minas crude was priced at 29 USD. 
 
To get exploration going again, then GOI issued two extra incentives. The 
first was the investment credit incentive, amounting to an additional allowance for 
cost recovery of 20% of asset value for direct production facilities, applicable only to 
a new field, taken out of gross production in the earliest production year and subject 
to GOI getting 49% of production over the life of the field. The second was better 
pricing structure for DMO whereby for the first 5 year (DMO price holiday) of 
commercial production from new field, the contractor received a price per barrel 
equal to the export price. After that the DMO price then going down to 0.20 USD per 
barrel. 
 
In 1980 GOI issued Presidential Decree No 10 of 1980 and No 14A of 1980, 
which were initially intended for use in the government institution for procurement 
of goods and services. This decree stated that procurement of goods exceeding 500 
millions IDR shall be approved by a procurement team and applicable for state 
owned company, including Pertamina and the PSC contractors. The GOI justified its 
policy of applying the Presidential Decree 14A of 1980 in the PSC on the ground for 
national development and promotion of domestic product and services (Hasan, 
2001:26).  
 
In general contractors did not object to promoting the use of domestic 
products and services as the implementation of Presidential Decree No 14A of 1980, 
but more to the procedures they have to follow. According to them, the procedure 
implementing the decree particularly the layers of approvals and sequences of 
negotiations for lower prices had contributed to substantial delays in the award of 
contracts, which in turn affected execution of work program (Hasan, 2001:26). 
These problems ran for a long time, until in 2000 the GOI responded by revising the 
delegation of authority and raising the permissible level of expenditure of PSC for 
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procurement of goods and services and streamlining the process for soliciting the 
approvals by issuing Presidential Decree No 16 of 1994 and No 8 of 2000. 
 
Moreover, by the implementation of Presidential Decree 14A of 1980 in such 
situation, GOI seemed to have treated the contractors as one of the governmental 
unit and placed Pertamina above the contractors. It was opposite with the initial 
provision as stated by Ibnu Sutowo when he introduced the first PSC, which stated 
that the management of the operations in the cooperation contract was a parallel 
relationship within the context of cooperation contract and coordination (Hasan, 
2005:94). In contrast, in the Malaysian PSC, for the utilisation of domestic products, 
Petronas (states own petroleum company) published the procedure and regulation 
agreeable to the parties (Machmud, 1999:96-97). While China set up procedure for 
procurement of good and services including preferential treatment for domestic 
products by standardisation of local content (Kinney, 1994: 231-239).  
 
Other issue was on value added tax (VAT or PPN in bahasa Indonesia, Pajak 
Pertambahan Nilai). In 1983 the GOI issued Law No. 1983 on value added taxes on 
goods and services and sales taxes on luxury items (PPN 1984) that was effective 
starting at 1 January 1985 and had been amended two times, in 1994 by law No.8 of 
1993 and by Law No. 18 of 2000. Petroleum activities under the PSC were not 
subject to VAT. Drilling activity was not an object for VAT, while for non-
producing active PSC; the VAT payment was deferred until the commencement of 
production (Kartadinata, 1991). The issue was on the mechanism and the long time 
required to refunding VAT that had been paid. The VAT refund should not be more 
than 60 days, but in reality it took several months that also indication of lack 
coordination between institutions. According to IPA (2004) the impact in the long 
term was to increase the need of additional working capital and to reduce the interest 
of investor for investment. 
 
The success of the PSC2 contract was below that of the PSC1. There were 64 
PSC2 contracts signed during 1976 – 1988, in which only 8 contracts were 
successful in producing oil and gas, 3 contracts were still active in 2003 but not 
producing, and the remaining 53 contracts failed and were terminated. The 49% rule 
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was highly unpopular and was later mistakenly used as threshold for commerciality, 
whereas it was only intended for the investment credit incentive.   
 
As demands for risk capital continued to increase, to attract investment in 
Pertamina own field operations, GOI had introduced some variants of the PSC 
system involving Technical Assistance Contract (TAC), Joint Operating Agreement 
run by a Joint Operating Body (JOA/JOB), and Enhanced Oil Recovery (EOR), 
which came into being in 1980s, except two TAC contracts in 1968.   
 
Table 2.3 shows that in total 41 TAC contracts were signed up to 2003, in 
which 9 were producing oil, 28 were non-producing active, while 4 were already 
terminated in 2003. Only 2 contracts executed exploration and production operation 
and coordinated by BP Migas. The other 39 TAC contracts only rehabilitated 
Pertamina’s old fields and were coordinated by Pertamina. Nearly all TAC contracts 
(except 2 contracts) had transferred their stakes to foreign companies and 65% of 
them were not active, due to financing difficulty or reluctance to take risks (Hasan, 
2001:30). 
 
Table 2.3: Indonesia’s Petroleum Contracts signed 1966-2003 (Pertamina, 2000:11, 
US Embassy, 2004:app.3, BP Migas, 2004)   
 
Producing Non Producing Active Terminate Contract  
Type 
Total 
 Contract Total % Total % Total % 
PSC 257 32 9% 73 21% 152 44% 
JOA 6 1 0% 1 0% 4 1% 
JOB 33 7 2% 9 3% 17 5% 
TAC 41 9* 3% 28 8% 4 1% 
EOR 8 6 2% 2 1% 0 0% 
Other 2 0 0% 2 1% 0 0% 
Total 347 55 16% 115 33% 177 51% 
    *  2 coordinated by BP MIGAS, 7 by Pertamina 
 
Thirty-three JOB contracts were signed during 1977-2003 period, in which 7 
were producing, 9 were non-producing and 17 were already terminated. While during 
the same period, 6 JOA contracts were signed, in which one was producing, one was 
non-producing active, while 4 contracts were already terminated. Only 8 EOR 
contracts were signed during 1978 – 2003, in which 6 were producing and 2 were 
non-producing active. 
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2.2.1.4. The Production Sharing Contract Third Generation and the Incentive 
Packages   
 
The worldwide economic had slowed down starting in the early 1980’s, 
followed by world recession during 1986 to 1987, which made consumers’ effective 
conservation and diversification. The oil market gradually turned into buyers’ market 
and oil price started decreasing. An unexpected event happened, fundamental 
elements of the petroleum industry started to weaken as oil prices dropped in 1986 to 
below 20 USD, consequently the number of contract’s signed dropped to only 4 and 
the number of exploration sharply decreased to 82 wells that year.  
 
In addition to the difficult situation above, Pertamina and contractor also 
faced problems; the commerciality criteria of the new field in the view of Pertamina 
in which the economics should secure GOIa income of no less than 49% of revenues 
(includes contractor’s taxes). This condition created a problem in application to the 
development of marginal field (Anwar, et.al, 1989: 5-6).  
 
The fall of oil price became problems for both parties. Indonesia suffered 
most, not only that its petroleum revenues were cut in half, but also in fields that 
already in tail-end period, it hardly got any share oil left, since all revenues were only 
enough to recover the expenditures. Hence the spirit of production sharing became 
diluted. The tail-end contractors were applying for 20 years extension to allow 
sufficient time for recovery of investment and profits from results of continued 
exploration or from activity secondary recovery project. Both parties were willing to 
renew the PSC system; especially since the government needed to secure its revenues 
during tail-end production period (Anwar et.al, 1989: 5-6).  
 
As the revenues from petroleum industry were expected to continue to play as 
the primary income for Indonesia, in securing GOI’s income and to accommodate the 
forthcoming extension of PSC, GOI introduced the Third Generation of PSC (PSC3) 
in 1988. 
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The PSC3 showed increasing flexibility. A new term was introduced, First 
Tranche Petroleum (FTP). FTP is a volume of 20% of gross production, firstly taken 
up before the cost recovery of expenditures, and it was shared between parties with 
the same production-sharing split and subject to tax. The objective of FTP was to 
secure the GOI income in the first production period. The FTP became the basic 
feature of the PSC3, and it was perceived as solving the issue of the commerciality 
criteria. Contractor argued the FTP was like a royalty payment. 
 
Additionally, the change of the market from a sellers market to buyers market 
made uncertainty higher, the investment for petroleum E&P activities dried up. The 
drop in petroleum business in Indonesia had caused GOI to introduce incentive 
packages that were issued in 1988, 1989, 1992, 1994 and 2003; in this study they 
were named IP1, IP2, IP3, IP4 and IP5. The development of the incentives packages 
can be seen in Table 2.5. The trend in those following incentive packages reflected 
the increasing importance of the petroleum E&P activities in frontier areas and deep 
water.  
 
The First Incentive Package (IP1) was introduced in August 1988 (see Table 
2.5). The investment credit incentive of 17 % (20% according to old Tax Law) was 
applied to both oil and gas in new development without any conditions. In addition 
after the 5 years DMO price holiday, the DMO price of new field was set at 10% of 
the export price, but in the old field it was still set at 0.20 USD per barrel. The IP1 
included deregulation measures to be taken in the procurement procedure.  
 
Due to higher geological risks and infrastructure remoteness in frontier areas, 
the IP1 improved the production sharing split in these areas. The sharing split for 
production up to 50 MBOPD was 80/20; 85/15 for production 50 – 150 MBOPD; 
and 90/10 for over 150 MBOPD. For gas, production sharing split was still kept at 
70/30 after tax in favour of GOI. Only five PSC3+IP1 contracts were signed in 1988, 
and all of them failed and were terminated.  
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Table 2.4: Development of Incentive Packages 1966 – 2003 (Anwar, et al, 1989:9-
10; Pertamina, 2000:9 –15 and Petrominer, 2004:10-14) 
 
Term 
  
  IP1  
(1988) 
  IP2  
(1989)  
 IP3 
 (1992) 
 IP4 * 
(1993) 
 IP5  
(2003) 
Investment Credit 
(IC) 
 
17 %  (20% 
according to old Tax 
Law) 
For deep sea areas 
over 600 ft.: 
 Oil = 110 % 
 Gas = 55 %  
Pre-Tertiary   : 110% 
Water depth for oil gas 
-  200-1500m  : 110% 
-   > 1500m    : 125%  
No longer applied Up to 110 % 
Commerciality Abolished Abolished Abolished Abolished Abolished 
DMO: 
- Quantity 
- Holiday Price 
- Price (after first 
five years) 
 
25 % share prod. 
5 years (60month) 
10% export price 
  
 
25 % share prod. 
5 years (60month) 
10% export price 
 
25 % share prod 
5 years (60month) 
15% export price. 
 
25 % share prod. 
5 years (60month) 
25% export price 
 
25 % share prod. 
5 years (60month) 
25% export price 
(mar), conv.15% 
FTP 20 %  prod. shared   20 %  prod. shared   20 %  prod. shared   15 %   prod. shared   10%t all for GOI 
Cost Recovery No limit No limit No limit No limit No limit 
Depreciation 
Capex 
DDLB Capex DDLB Capex: 
For gas field 
having reserves>7ys 
100%  assets useful 
life 
having reserves<7ys 
50% assets useful life 
DDLB Capex 
50% assets useful life 
DDLB Capex.  DDLB Capex. 
Oil Production  
Sharing Split:  
GOI/Contractor 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Conventional  
Old field  = 85/15 
New field = 85/15 
 
 
Frontier 
< 50 MBOD = 80/20  
150 MBOD  = 85/15  
> 150MBOD= 90/10  
 
  
Conventional   
Old field  = 85/15 
New field, Marginal 
fields EOR = 80/20 
 
Frontier   
Marginal fields and 
EOR = 75/25 
Pre-Tertiary and deep 
sea > 1500m 
<50 MBOD= 80/20  
150 MBOD= 85/15  
>150MBOD=90/10  
 
 
 
 
 
Frontier: 80/20 
 
Frontier 
water depth > 1500m  
75/25 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Frontier and 
water depth > 1500m    
65/35   
 
Ranging from   
 80/20  to  65/35 
 according  to 
geological and 
geographic 
conditions 
  
 
Gas Production 
Sharing Split 
GOI/Contractor 
 
Conventional  70/30  
 
 
Frontiers & water 
depth:  70/30  
 
no change Conventional  
old contract  : 70/30  
 new contract: 65/35  
water depth>1500m  
60/40 
Frontier water depth 
>1500m  55/45              
 
 
 
 
 Frontier and 
water depth  
> 1500m: 60/40  
Ranging from   
 60/40 to 55/45     
Tax 48 % 48 % 48 % 48 % 
since 1997: 44 %  
(30% income and 
20% div.tax)   
44 % 
Deregulation 
procurements and 
procedures 
Further simplication 
in line with the 
deregulation policy 
    
Extension to the 6 
years explor. 
2 x 2 years 1 x 4 years    
Gas pricing 
 
 
Not always oriented 
toward the gas field 
development econ. 
Will be oriented 
toward the gas field 
development econ. 
   
Access to data In the context of 
acreage to be 
tendered/bidding 
Data acquired from 
surveys conducted by 
Pertamina will be 
available to 
prospective PSC 
contractors 
   
*) for Eastern Indonesia areas and part of Western Indonesia having similar geological and geographic conditions 
 
At that time most of the exploration activities were carried out in 
conventional producing areas located in western part of Indonesia. GOI thought a 
better share for contractor in frontier areas would provide the right motivation to 
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attract the petroleum company to explore in these areas. For that reason GOI issued 
the Second Incentive Package (IP2) in February 1989 (Table 2.4), it addressed the 
production split for marginal fields, oil produced from pre-tertiary reservoir rocks, 
tertiary EOR projects, and the investment credit incentives for deep-sea areas.   
 
The investment credit was increased to 110% for oil and 55% for gas for both 
the extended and new contracts that operate in standard, frontier and deepwater areas 
(deepwater being over 1500 m). While the DMO price for existing contract was 
changed to 10% of export price.  
 
After tax oil production sharing split for marginal field (marginal field is 
defined as a field that its average production within the first two year is up to 10 
MBOPD) was set up at 80/20 for new conventional areas and at 75/25 for frontier 
areas. While the after tax oil sharing split for EOR projects was changed at existing 
fields to 80 /20 for old and new PSC in conventional areas, and to 75/25 for frontier 
areas. Specifically for oil production from pre-tertiary reservoir rock, both existing 
and new conventional field, the after tax oil production sharing split was changed 
based on the volume of production (sliding scale). It was 80/20 for production up to 
50 MBOPD, 85/15 for production between 50 – 150 MBOPD, and 90/10 for 
production more than 150 MBOPD. While for frontier and deepwater, the after tax 
oil split was changed to 75/25 for production up to 50 MBOPD, 80/20 for production 
between 50 – 150 MBOPD, and 90/10 for more than 150 MBOPD production.  
 
The extension of the 6 years exploration period was changed to 1 x 4 years. 
The gas pricing will be oriented towards field development economics for new 
project and the access data will not be restricted only to contract areas open for 
bidding. The PSC3+IP2 increased the number contracts signed, 15 contracts in 1990 
and 16 contracts in 1991; but in 1992 the number of contracts signed dropped again. 
 
The Third Incentives Package (IP3) was introduced in August 1992; it placed 
more emphasis to stimulate activities in gas exploration and development in both 
conventional and frontier areas with better production sharing split and the 
improvement in investment credit and DMO.  
 
  
80
At that time natural gas played an increasing role in Indonesia and would 
continue in the future. Therefore better production sharing split for gas was issued. 
The after tax gas production sharing split was changed to 60/40 for new frontier and 
to 65/35 for new conventional areas. For water depth in excess of 1,500 m, the 
production split went to 55/45 for new frontier and to 60/40 for existing PSC. And 
the after tax oil split specifically for new frontier areas was changed to single 
production sharing split (no sliding scale) of 80/20, and for depth water in excess of 
1,500 m to 75/25. While investment credit were increased to 110% for gas and oil 
development in pre-tertiary reservoir, conventional as well as frontier and deepwater; 
whereas for water depths in excess of 1,500 meters the incentive went to 125%. 
 
To maintain production level at 1 MMBOPD and to delay net oil imports 
until at least 2010, GOI knew that the E&P activity in high risk and remote areas 
should be encouraged. Hence, the Fourth Incentives Package (IP4) was issued in late 
1993 and became effective in January 1994. The IP4 was based on geological 
reasoning with geographical consideration. The purpose of this incentive was to 
encourage the petroleum E&P in the frontier areas in eastern part of Indonesia and 
part of western part of Indonesia that had similar geographic condition.   
 
The IP4 provided a really meaningful effort towards simplification. The 
production split for oil in frontier areas became 65/35 and for gas it became 60/40. 
The DMO price after 5 years holiday went to 25% of the export price. The FTP was 
reduced to 15%. There was only one water depth cut-off (at 200 meters), and no 
distinction was made between reservoir rock ages. Investment credit was no longer 
applied, and commerciality was abolished. Further adjustment was made in 1997, 
decreasing the tax rate to 44% (30% income tax and 20% dividend tax). 
 
The IP4 came into effect in 1994. As a result of the application of the IP4, 70 
contracts were signed during 1994 – 2002 period, the highest compared to three other 
incentive packages. Although the number of contracts signed increased, the oil and 
gas production had not increase yet. In 2003 (10 years after IP4’s application) all 70 
contracts had not produced oil and gas; 44 contracts were still active in exploration 
activities while 26 were already terminated.  
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The highest number of PSC3+IP4 contracts signed was 29 contracts in 1997 
and it was the highest of petroleum contracts signed during 1966-2003. But after that, 
though the oil price increased, the uncertainties resulted in diminishing level of new 
investment; only four contracts were signed in 1999, five in 2000, increased to 11 in 
2001 and decreased again to only one in 2002.   
 
The IP4 had the longest application time than other incentive packages, from 
1994 to 2003 before the issuing of the new incentive package 5 (IP5). During that 10 
years period, Indonesia faced many problems and issues that influenced the 
petroleum E&P activities. Some of them are as follows. 
 
The consequences of Indonesia joining the 21st century in terms of 
international trade put greater pressure on the GOI to become market oriented. 
Investors needed greater transparency and deregulation. Worse situation occurred, 
the country economic collapsed deeply in 1997. This financial crisis revealed a 
number of unseen weaknesses in the economy such as a weak financial system with 
lack of transparency, unprofitable investment in real estate, and shortcoming in the 
legal system (Touwen, 2003:8). GOI was forced to turn to the International Monetary 
Fund (IMF) for an emergency debt-relief package totalling to $43 billion. This 
situation made the financial strength of Indonesia decreased drastically. The IMF 
recommended Indonesia to implement an economic reform program in order to help 
to save its economy that included creating greater transparency and stricter 
enforcement of laws and regulations in the area of government procurement. 
   
In the same year a shock political change also occurred. The Indonesia’s 
people power forced the GOI to do political reformation process and Suharto was 
forced out from office and was replaced by B.J.Habibie as president of Indonesia in 
May 1998. Political changes rapidly evolved; B.J.Habibie initiated a genuine 
democratic process for choosing a parliament and a president in the June 1999 
election. The full Parliament then elected Abdurrahman Wahid as president and 
Megawati as vice president. Wahid was accused of incompetence and impeached in 
July 2001 and replaced by Megawati. During her presidential time, democratic, 
peaceful and smooth Indonesia’s parliamentary elections as well as the first and 
second rounds of presidential elections were successfully conducted in April, July 
  
82
and September 2004. As a result, Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono replaced her as 
President in October 2004. The new government and parliament give strong 
promising positive points on business investment climate in Indonesia. 
 
Other issues arose, the majority of companies participated in bidding round 
and the winners were domestic companies and newcomers. This situation indicated 
the increasing interest of domestic investors and the declining interest of foreign 
investors to invest risk capital in Indonesia. The trend of declining interest can also 
be seen in the increasing number of foreign oil companies transferring their 
Indonesia’s contract, opening up opportunities for domestic company to take over. In 
general, the foreign oil contractors had been focusing their operation to improve the 
production and cash flow from existing assets and were not set to make large and 
risky investment (Hasan, 2005: 72 - 73). 
 
As part of implementation of the reformation process in Indonesia and 
enhancing national unity, in 1999 the GOI promulgated the Law No 22 of 1999 and 
No 25 of 1999. The Law No 22 of 1999 provided the provincial government with 
greater authority to manage their internal affairs, except in certain areas such as 
national security, foreign policy, fiscal and monetary policy, justice system, religious 
affair, strategic policy and national planning. According to this law regional 
governments have the authority to approve investments in all areas except oil and 
gas, which remained under jurisdiction of central government. While petroleum 
operations are still within the jurisdiction of central government, the local 
government now controlled many of supporting activities. They could issue 
regulations and permits that in the past were issued by the Directorate General of Oil 
and Gas, such as issues for construction services, utilisation of contract area for other 
non-petroleum activity, waste petroleum products, environmental control and others. 
The law on local taxation give local governments the right to impose new taxes and 
levies within certain limits. 
 
The Law No 25 of 1999 addressed the sharing or allocation of revenue 
between the central and regional governments. Under the law the revenue from oil 
and gas would be shared 85/15 and 70/30 between the central and regional 
government respectively.  Of the 15% of the oil revenue flowing to the region, six 
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percent would go to the district where the petroleum operation was located, six 
percent would be shared among the other districts in the province, and the remaining 
three percent would go to the provincial government.  Similar sharing ratio is applied 
to gas revenue.  
 
These new legislations recognised political reality. Indonesian citizen in 
different parts of the country want greater involvement in the management of their 
day-to-day affairs. This is a common aspiration around the globe. There are 
considerable opportunities in the process. The expectation is that there will be an 
enhanced local provision of public goods, tailored to local preferences and 
considerations. This should create greater prosperity for all Indonesian citizens, in 
the context of enhanced economic activity across Indonesia. International experience 
suggested that ill-sequenced reforms could vitiate the objectives and advantages of 
the decentralization process. The danger is that effective service delivery can be 
threatened even in places where the state presently provides such services, that there 
can be a capture by local interests threatening good governance, and that Indonesia 
hard-earned stabilization might be jeopardized (Ahmad and Hofman, 2000). 
 
Since it was introduced in January 1, 2001 there had been uncertainty over 
details of the implementation of regulations. The regional or local government 
seemed to have little knowledge on the petroleum operation and contract that often 
had led them overestimating the forthcoming revenue from oil and gas. Local leaders 
had greater authority, but many of these leaders levied fees and duties. Foreign 
companies, particularly in less-developed areas, frequently came under pressure to 
provide facilities and services provided by the government. Local communities often 
asked for additional gains by promoting extra-contractual concessions and monopoly 
arrangements between foreign and local firms. This would create uncertainty and 
decrease the new investment levels (Hasan, 2001:10). 
   
Another reformation process occurred; in November 2001 the Parliament 
(DPR, Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat) promulgated the Oil and Gas Law No. 22 of 2001, 
which replaced the 1960 Oil and Gas Law and Law of Pertamina No. 8 of 1971. This 
law eliminated Pertamina’s monopoly over the upstream and downstream sectors and 
transferred Pertamina’s responsibility for administering the upstream petroleum 
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sector to the government through a new implementation agency named Badan 
Pelaksana Kegiatan Usaha Hulu Minyak dan Gas Bumi (BP Migas) and downstream 
petroleum sector to Badan Pengatur (BHP Migas).  
 
The Oil and Gas Law No. 22/2001 stated that, petroleum business activities 
are divided into upstream business activities and downstream business activities. The 
BP Migas shall conduct supervision on the implementation of upstream business 
activities on the cooperation contract, while the BHP Migas shall conduct 
supervision on the implementation of downstream business activities on the business 
license. 
 
In upstream business activities, the law stated that, the government as the 
holder of the mining controls the oil and gas resources. The minister shall determine 
the business entity/permanent establishment, which will be given the authority to 
conduct the exploration and production activities in the operational areas. The 
government as the holder of the mining authority establish the BP Migas to reform 
the management of the upstream business activities. The business entity or 
permanent establishment shall conduct upstream business activities based on the 
cooperation contract with BP Migas, and BP Migas shall appoint the seller of the 
state’s portion of oil and/or gas that will give the maximum benefit for the country. 
 
BP Migas took over Pertamina’s upstream functions and management of 
petroleum contractors, formally established through the Government Regulation 
No.42 of 2002 on 16th of July 2002. The duties of BP Migas are: to provide advice to 
the Minister in preparing policy and offering working areas for cooperation; to sign 
the cooperation contract; to review and submit to the Minister for its approval the 
first plan of development in a contract area; to approve the subsequent plan of 
development, excluding the item above; to approve the work program and budget; to 
monitor and report to the Minister the execution of cooperation contract; and to 
appoint the seller of the government’s share of and/or gas, that can generate the 
maximum profit for the government.  
 
The effectiveness of the reforms will depend largely on the details of the 
implementation, where all substantive and procedural changes will need to be issued 
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in the implementing regulations. The transition period in implementing those new 
laws made uncertainty and some problems. 
 
As example the VAT issue as mentioned in section 2.2.1.3 was becoming 
more complex as Pertamina function in coordinating PSC contractors was 
transferred to BP Migas, while the implementation regulation has not been issued. 
Since May 2003 Pertamina had not been in position to refund the VAT to the PSC. 
As a result the contractors did not possess receipt of VAT paid, therefore it could not 
file claim for the refund of VAT that had been paid. According to the information 
given by Indonesian Petroleum Association (2004) in the pre-conference dialogue no 
2 on 13 October 2004, by 1 September 2004 VAT refund to be paid by the 
Directorate General Tax to the PSC had amounted to around 1 trillions IDR. 
 
By the end of 2003 the GOI had not yet completed its implementing 
regulations for the upstream and downstream sector. A few key areas considered 
seriously by the contractor to be included in the regulations were sanctity of contract 
for existing PSC, the lack of clarity of the DMO and potential overlapping 
responsibilities between upstream and downstream authorities BP Migas and BHP 
Migas including natural gas transportation via pipeline (US Embassy: 2004:1-2). 
 
Security remained a major concern for investors, particularly following the 
terrorist bombing attack in Bali in October 2002, in Hotel J.W. Marriot Jakarta in 
2004, in front of Australia’s Embassy in Jakarta on 9 September 2004 and other part 
of Indonesia, renewed military operations in Aceh, as well as separatism and 
communal violence continuing to challenge national unity in Papua and others.  
These conditions reduced the attractiveness of petroleum business in Indonesia.  
 
In addition to issues above, the recent trend of mergers, consolidation and 
acquisitions within the oil and gas industry will place the exploration budget in fewer 
hand, thereby the number of players seeking for exploration rights is likely to lessen. 
With acquisitions, petroleum’s company could get a good new work area not only 
with a lower capital investment, but also with a lower risk and shorter lead-time 
(Hasan, 2001).  
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To response issues above GOI had provided the incentive to blocks tendered 
out in 2003, in this study named as Fifth Incentive Package (IP5). Under the IP5, the 
production sharing split was increased ranging from 80/20 to 65/35 for oil and from 
60/40 to 55/45 for gas according to their geological location conditions. Furthermore, 
the GOI had also offered credits up to 110% for investment credit, and 10% fixed 
FTP in the sense that it was only for the GOI benefit. The contractor committed to 
spend 140.9 million USD for the first three contract years that cover geophysical and 
geological studies, 2D and 3D seismic surveys and drilling of exploration wells. 
Contractor would also pay signature bonus directly to the government in amount of 
26.6 million USD (Table 2.5). The IP5 was successful in increasing the number of 
contracts signed, to 16 PSC contracts signed in 2003. But the exploration activities 
were still low, only 41 exploration wells in 2003. 
 
To summarise, to maintain dynamic petroleum E&P activities, the GOI have 
demonstrated pragmatism in solving the problems occurred. PSC3 with all its 
incentive packages (IP1, IP2, IP3, IP4 and IP5) was successful to attract investors, in 
total 134 PSC3 contracts were signed representing 52% of total PSC contracts signed 
during 1966 – 2003 period. In contrast, the productivity of the PSC3 contract was 
very low, only 4% were producing. The problems occurred due to the petroleum 
companies considered the commercial attractiveness of the existing Indonesian PSC 
needed to be improved, and more incentives for conventional areas, marginal field 
development and exploration investment in frontier areas were needed. In addition, 
the investment climate of the Indonesian petroleum E&P business also needed to be 
improved. 
 
Although there were declining tendencies in productions and  (see Figure 2.7, 
2.8 and 2.9) decreasing contribution of petroleum to GDP from 12% in 1991 to 
below 10% in 2002 – 2004, notwithstanding the currently high oil prices; however 
the petroleum sector will continue to play an important role in the economic 
development of Indonesia in the future, not only as the major source of revenues but 
also as the sources for supplying energy for domestic requirement and the feedstock 
to strategic industry as well as to support of the growth of many areas where mining 
activities exist due to multipliers effect, creating considerable number of employment 
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across the country and others respectively. This means the GOI must resolve all 
those problems as soon as possible.  
 
 
Figure 2.7:  Indonesia’s income from petroleum business (IMF, 2005:58) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2.8: Indonesia’s historical oil production 1966 – 2004 and projection through 
2015 (Warnika, 2005) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2.9: Indonesia’s gas historical production 1994 – 2004 and projection 
through 2015 (Warnika, 2005) 
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2.2.2.   The Indonesian Production Sharing Contract Terms and Variables 
 
Some of the definition of the PSC variables can be shown in Table 2.5. The 
brief discussions of some PSC terms and variables are as follows. 
 
 
 
2.2.2.1.   Title of the Resources, Management Clause, Right and Obligation of 
Parties 
 
Title of the resources was vested in the BP Migas (previously in Pertamina) 
on behalf of the GOI either in its geological or at any phase of production. Legally 
the PSC granted the contractor the right to receive an allocation of production for 
risks assumed and services rendered. This payment in the form of production is made 
at the point of export if there is a commercial discovery. 
 
In Indonesian PSC, BP Migas is responsible for the management of 
petroleum operations, and the contractor is responsible to BP MIGAS for execution 
of the agreed work program. Contractor agrees to provide all the financial, technical, 
skill, equipment necessary, personnel and others required for performance of the 
work program operations. Contractor carries out such operations at its sole risk and 
cost, which will be reimbursed out of commercial production. All operations must 
maintain its environment. After the contract relinquishment of part of area, contractor 
must remove all installations in a manner acceptable and perform all necessary 
restoration activities in accordance with applicable GOI regulations to prevent 
hazards to human life, property of others and environment. 
 
 According to Machmud (2000: 119-120) the management clause in the 
Indonesian PSC and Malaysian PSC was almost identical in written, but in practice 
they handled their task differently. The Malaysian PSC exercise management 
through Joint Management Committee (JMC), consisting of representatives of 
Petronas and contractor with unanimous decision. The JMC met occasionally as 
required and exercises a loose management style, management by exception and 
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operating by guidelines more than by directive. China also had a JMC, consisted of 
representatives of state owned company and contractor and the decision was made 
amicably through consultation and unanimous. The Chinese JMC presents their 
management on a day-to-day basis; prefer a more hands-on style. 
 
In contrast Indonesian PSC exercises management through a designated 
bureaucracy, the former BPPKA as a sub division of Pertamina (now BP Migas), 
involved in every aspects of operations and likes to operate by directive. Moreover 
there are other agencies in Indonesia (e.g. MIGAS, BPKP, the state auditing agency, 
a subdivision of Ministry of Finance) that in certain instances directly deal with the 
contractor. Machmud (2000:183) also found some problems occurred in the 
execution of management clause of the Indonesian PSC such as bureaucracy, 
tendering rule, the role of BPPKA/Pertamina, the RPTK process on personnel 
management, crypto taxes, the mark up myth, and others. As opposed to China and 
Malaysia, Indonesia has x factor that made it difficult for investor to calculate cost 
and profitability. He said that if this x factor left unchecked, latter situation would 
prove extremely damaging to the attractiveness of Indonesian petroleum business. 
 
 
 
2.2.2.2. Duration, Contract Area and Relinquishment/Exclusion of Area 
 
The duration of Indonesian PSC system is 30 years, divided into two phases. 
The first is the exploration phase, which lasts for a six to ten years from the effective 
date of contract. If at the end of the initial six years as from the effective date or the 
four years extension no petroleum in commercial quantities is discovered, then the 
contract shall automatically be terminated entirely. The second phase is the 
production phase, which commences from the date the area is declared commercial 
and continues to the conclusion of the contract term. At the end of 30 years 
operations, the contract will be terminated, or can be extended. Both parties must 
approve the extension of contract. In comparison with Malaysia and China, the 
Chinese PSC had similar duration contract as Indonesian PSC, 30 years; while the 
duration contract on Malaysian PSC was 24 years in conventional field contract and 
38 years in deepwater field contract (Machmud, 2000).  
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In the Indonesian PSC, the contract area differed from one contract to 
another, ranging significantly from some 240 km2 to 320,000 km2. It tended to be 
smaller in recent years.  
 
Relinquishment is a standing requirement in PSC, which provides two type of 
surrender: mandatory and optional relinquishment. The general purpose of 
exclusions and relinquishments requirement in the contract is to put sufficient 
pressure on the contractor to assure a continuous work effort in the contract area. If 
the contractor’s efforts fail, the exclusion mechanism allows for the relinquished 
areas to be put up for bid again, so another party can attempt to make it work. 
 
In Indonesian PSC, under the mandatory relinquishment provision, on or 
before the end of the initial three years period as from the effective date, contractor 
shall relinquish 25% of the original total contract area and at the end of the sixth 
period shall relinquish 25% of the original total contract area. Before the end of tenth 
contract year, after relinquishment contract area shall not be in excess of 20% of the 
original total contract area. At the end of contract year, if GOI and contractor do not 
agree to extend the contract, contractor shall have the right to relinquish any portion 
of contract area. While under optional surrender provision, the contractor is given the 
right to surrender at the end of the second contract year and prior to the end of any 
subsequent year any portion of the contract area upon giving 30 days notice to BP 
Migas. The entire contract area must be returned if no discovery is made by the end 
of the exploration period, unless an extension is granted. 
 
 
 
2.2.2.3. Minimum Exploration Expenditures Commitment and Bonuses 
 
Minimum exploration expenditures commitment is a major obligation in the 
PSC contract. The contractor is required to commence petroleum operations not later 
than six months after the effective date of contract and to spend in each of the initial 
6 – 10 year exploration periods the minimum rates of exploration expenditure as 
specified in the contract. Any under expenditures in the given year may be carried 
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forward to the next year, and over expenditures can be automatically subtracted from 
the subsequent year’s commitment. In the IP5, contractor was committed to spend 
140.9 millions USD for the first three contract years that covered geophysical and 
geological studies, 2D and 3D seismic surveys and drilling of exploration wells. 
 
Compared to Malaysian PSC and Chinese PSC, the minimum exploration 
expenditures commitment in Indonesian PSC appears to be the most lenient, it 
simply allows carry-overs in case of a deficit in annual minimum expenditures; and 
in case of the expenditures over the minimum commitment, it allows credits against 
the next year’s commitment. Malaysia requires a performance guarantee and allows 
carry over only if justifiable. While in China PSC, it allows carry over of deficit from 
one exploration phase to another only after approval from CNOOC and unfulfilled 
commitments in the last exploration phase must be established in cash (Machmud 
(2000:123). 
 
Bonus payments are borne solely by the contractor and cannot be included in 
the operating costs, which are recoverable from production, but can be charged 
against tax liabilities once profitable operation commences. There are two types of 
bonuses in Indonesian PSC, first is signature bonus and second production bonus. 
Signature bonus is to be paid after approval of the contract for information 
concerning the acreage field held by government and made available to the 
contractor. The amounts are varies from contract to contract from 1 million to 5 
million USD; under the IP5 the amount of signature bonus is 26.6 million USD. 
 
Production bonus is a compulsory payment by contractor and to be paid once 
production reaches certain specified level over a period time, usually 120 
consecutive days. The number and amount of the bonus vary from contract to 
contract, depending perhaps on the geology potential of the area. Usually in 
Indonesian PSC the triggering production starts from a low of 0 – 50 MBOPD to a 
high of 100 – 500 MBOPD, with the total commitment ranging commonly from 15 
million to 50 million USD.  The higher the signature and production bonuses can 
make the contractor’s NPV and IRR lower. 
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The result of Bindemann’s study (1999:52) found that during 1966 to 1998 
Eastern Europe and Asia had the lowest signature bonuses, while the highest were in 
the Middle East and Central America. While Machmud (2000:126-126) found that 
Malaysian PSC did not have bonus payment requirement, but China PSC had it. Both 
bonus payments in Indonesian PSC and Chinese PSC were not cost recoverable. 
 
 Table 2.5. : Definition of some PSC variables   
 
Variables Definition 
First Tranche 
Petroleum (FTP) 
A portion of petroleum production taken firstly before any 
deduction of cost recovery and will be shared between GOI 
and contractor per year based on production sharing split as 
specified in the contract. 
Investment Credit 
(IC) 
Investment Credit allows the contractor to recover an 
additional percentage of capital costs through cost recovery. 
The credit is taken out of gross production before recovering 
the expenditures. 
Cost Recovey The recovering of the exploration, development and 
production expenditures to the contractor from any 
petroleum produced.  
Profit oil or profit 
gas 
The remaining revenues after royalty (if applicable), FTP, 
investment credit (if applicable) and cost recovery. 
Production 
Sharing Split  
The rate of production sharing split between the GOI and the 
contractor. 
Domestic Market 
Obligation 
(DMO) 
A percentage of the contractor’s profit oil should be sold to 
the government at discounted price. The quantity of the 
DMO varies from contract to contract, provided that the pro 
rata quantity does not exceed 25% of total production from 
its contract area 
DMO price 
(DMOpr) 
The price of the DMO that are paid by GOI to the contractor 
after DMO holiday price ended. 
DMO holiday 
price (DMOhol) 
The time that contractor get the price of oil for DMO as 
export price. Under Indonesian PSC the DMO holiday price 
set up at 5 first years (or 60 month) since the first production 
commences. 
Taxation The contractor tax liabilities refer to the relevant tax law 
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2.2.2.4.   First Tranche Petroleum  
 
FTP, which was first introduced by Indonesia in IP1 in 1988, is a portion of 
petroleum production amounting some percentage of production taken up firstly 
before deduction of cost recovery and will be shared between GOI and the contractor 
every year on the basis of applicable profit sharing split. The objective of the FTP 
payment is to ensure the GOI revenues at the first production and to ensure that 
marginal field still generate revenues for the GOI. Contractor share from FTP is also 
taxable. FTP effectively is like royalty payment or cost recovery limit, with the rate 
is the royalty rate multiplies production sharing split, so investor valued FTP as one 
of an inefficient PSC term. Especially for marginal fields with low net cash flow 
even before FTP, it might reduce that cash flow to zero and make the field 
uneconomic. Initially, under IP1, the FTP size was 20% of production and shared 
between GOI and contractor. It was then decreased to 15% under IP4, still shared 
between GOI and contractor; and then under IP5 was decreased again to10% but, all 
for the GOI benefit. In effect, this FTP for GOI benefit only is similar to royalty 
payment. The higher the royalty payment the lower NPV is. 
 
Bindemann (1999: 48-49) found that during 1966 to 1998, royalties in Asia 
and Eastern Europe have on average been much lower than other regions; the 
averages were below 4% and 5% respectively whereas the rest of the world has an 
average between 7% and 9%. The rates of royalty diverged. In Asia royalties vary 
between zeros to 12.5%, while in Eastern Europe it vary between zeros to 17.5%. In 
fact PSC contracts in the Bindemann study dataset fell into four categories of zero, 
10%, 12.5%, and 20% royalties. One country had more than 20% royalty (Chile with 
45%) and only five countries had less than 10% royalty. Analysis also showed that 
net exporter countries charged higher royalties than net importers, and onshore 
contracts were relatively tougher for the petroleum company than offshore contracts. 
The 10% FTP of the IP5 (100% goes to GOI) could be considered as royalty 
payment, which was above average of royalties in Asia countries. However, the rate 
was relatively low, hence it was still attractive. But if the entire FTP goes to GOI 
then the basic concept of FTP has changed. 
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2.2.2.5.   Investment Credit 
 
Indonesia introduced the concept of investment credit in 1977 under PSC2 
system. Investment Credit (IC) allows the contractor to recover an additional 
percentage of capital expenditures for production facilities through cost recovery. 
The credit is taken out of gross production before recovering the expenditures. The 
IC is subject to taxation and may be carried forward to succeeding years if it is not 
fully taken. Currently under the IP5, it amounted up to 110% depending on the 
geological condition. Higher investment credit size results in higher income to 
contractor. 
 
 
 
2.2.2.6.   Cost Recovery 
 
The contractor is allowed to recover all the expenditures of petroleum 
operations from their production after deduction of FTP through cost recovery 
mechanism. Cost recovery is made up of: exploration, development and production 
expenditures; current depreciation and amortisation; interest on financing (if allowed 
as specified in contract); investment-credit (if allowed as specified in contract), and 
the un-recovered costs carried forward from previous years. The portion of 
petroleum used for reimbursement of the expenditures is commonly referred to as 
cost oil. BP Migas on behalf of the GOI must approve all expenditures for recovery. 
Cost recovery is calculated annually and all goes to contractor. Generally gas cost 
recovery is calculated separately from oil cost recovery.  
 
In Indonesian PSC system, all expenditures associated with a given 
block/contract must be recovered from revenues generated within that block/contract, 
it is called that the block/contract is ring fenced. This stipulation has a huge impact 
on the recovery of expenditures of exploration and development.  
 
Expenditures above are classified as capital and non-capital expenditures. 
Capital expenditures, which mean expenditures made for items that normally have a 
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useful life beyond the year incurred, includes equipment, tangible properties, 
building, transportation facilities and others. While non capital expenditures, which 
refer to those expenditures incurred and related to current year’s operations, includes 
wages, salaries, administration, exploration expenditures, drilling expenditures, 
production expenditures, rental payment and others. 
 
Capital expenditures are recovered in the form of depreciation method, which 
carry over one half of the depreciation life by the double-declining balance method. 
Recovering capital expenditures through depreciation is valued as one of the 
inefficient terms of PSC, since it will delay in recovering the costs; in particular it 
might make marginal field uneconomic.  
 
The non-capital expenditures can be recovered directly in the current year as 
soon as income is available from the contract area and the un-recovered expenditures 
are reimbursed on a straight-line basis. In the current Indonesian PSC system, the 
expenditures can be recovered annually without limit; and the unrecovered costs can 
be carried forward in the case the production is not enough to recover them. 
 
During 1966 to 1998, almost half of all contracts in the dataset of Bindemann 
study (1999:49-50) specified cost recovery limit at either 40% or 100%, while almost 
one-third were at 30% or 50%. Only 2.5% of the dataset were at zero and the 
remaining 20.5% of the dataset was concentrated in the 20% to 29% bracket and the 
51 to 99% bracket. These facts suggest the Indonesian PSC has an attractive cost 
recovery term.  
 
 
 
2.2.2.7.   Production Sharing Split 
 
Production sharing split is the main term in PSC. Profit oil or profit gas is 
gross revenue less the FTP less cost recovery less investment credit. This profit is 
shared between the contractor and the GOI by using the production sharing split as 
specified in the contract. The contractor’s share of profit is also subjected to taxation. 
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The progressiveness of the development of the production sharing split in the 
Indonesian PSC could be seen in Table 2.1 and Table 2.4. Currently, under the IP5 
terms, GOI increased the production sharing split again, after-tax production sharing 
split ranging from 80/20 to 65/35 for oil and from 60/40 to 55/45 for gas in favour of 
GOI depending on their geological condition. 
 
Several studies done by Arco (Machmud, 2000: 128 – 129), Johnston (1994: 
130-131), Yuwono (1998) and Dharmadji and Parlindungan (2002) found that 
compared to Malaysian and Chinese PSCs, the Indonesian PSC for conventional 
areas (before the IP5, with production sharing split 85/15) was nearly equal to 
Malaysian PSC and valued as the toughest fiscal term in the world; however, the 
Indonesian PSC for frontier and deepwater areas was the best among the three 
(Machmud, 2000: 130 – 134). 
 
According Johnston (1994, 64), as illustrated in Figure 2.10, there is the 
effective trade-off of geological potential, success rate, field size, maturity factor, 
infrastructure and other key factors that influence business decisions against 
contractor take. Increase in the geological potential, success rate, field size, maturity 
factor, infrastructure and others might decrease the contractor production sharing 
split; ranging between the lowest of 15% and the highest of 55%. The 
progressiveness of the increasing of contractor production sharing split in Indonesian 
PSC showed that GOI and Johnston have similar view, the ranging of contractor 
production sharing split under IP5 (between 20% - 35% depends on the geological 
condition) was in the range stated above and the more difficult geological potential 
the higher production sharing split is.  
 
Only 45 of the 268 PSC contracts in Bindemann (1999:50) data set had fixed 
profit oil sharing split, the remaining have some kind of sliding scale that either 
based on output or rate of return. Table 2.6 shows that during 1966 to 1998 period, 
the highest maximum average profit oil-sharing split for the contractor was found in 
Central America, at 65%, while the lowest was in Middle East, at 28%. While 
Central America, Eastern Europe and South America with up to 39% granted the 
most generous minimum-sharing split to the contractor. The spread between the 
highest and lowest maximum varies from 10-percentage point in South America to 
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85 point in Asia and South Central Africa. Recently maximum-sharing split of profit 
oil tends to increase in all regions except in Middle East, where from an average of 
27%, it declines significantly lower than elsewhere. Exporter countries offer less 
favourable sharing split to the contractor than importer countries (Bindemann, 
1999:51). The IP5 has production sharing split based on geological condition; the 
minimum formula was below the average minimum of Asia countries, but the 
maximum split was slightly higher than the average maximum of Asia countries. 
These facts indicate that the minimum formula of the IP5 might need to be improved. 
 
 
THE GLOBAL MARKET for EXPLORATION LICENSES 
The most common denominator for comparison of fiscal system is the contractor split 
 
CREATING A LEVEL PLAYING FIELD 
15%                                                                                           55% 
CONTRACTOR PRODUCTION SHARING SPLIT 
ROCKS 
• Geological potential 
• Success Rates  
• Fields Size 
• Maturity Factor 
• Infrastructure etc. 
 GOOD                                                                                                 NOT  SO GOOD  
               
              
Figure 2.10: Creating a level playing field (Johnston, D., 1994:64) 
 
 
Table 2.6: Production/profit oil sharing split for contractor of 268 PSC contracts 
during 1966 –1998 period (Bindemann, 1999:51) 
 
Country Average Prod. 
Sharing Split 
Max. Prod. Sharing 
Split 
Min. Prod. Sharing 
Split 
 Max Min Highest Lowest Highest Lowest 
Asia 44.15 28.21 100 15 60 10 
Central America 64.71 36.57 95 40 85 20 
South America 48.00 38.80 50 40 50 30 
Eastern Europe 51.93 37.00 80 40 60 10 
Middle East 27.80 15.75 60 11.8 40 7.5 
North Africa 38.67 18.00 100 19 50 10 
South Central Africa 55.69 29.17 100 15 75 5 
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2.2.2.8. Domestic Market Obligation 
 
Indonesian PSC have incorporated a uniform provision, obliging contractor to 
fulfil their obligations toward the supply of the domestic market in Indonesia with 
the price below the market, called Domestic Market Obligation (DMO). The goal of 
DMO is to give security for the oil and gas domestic supplies for the Indonesia. The 
quantity of the DMO varies from contract to contract, provided that the pro rata 
quantity does not exceed 25% of total production from its contract area. The oil price 
for DMO prior to 1984 was 0.20 USD per barrel; after that this price had increased 
several times, and currently under IP5 it was 25% of the export price for marginal 
field both new and old oil, while for conventional field it was 15% of the export 
price. The contractor consider that DMO requirement can reduce the NPV and IRR 
of contractor, if in any year, recoverable expenditures exceed the difference of gross 
revenues less FTP and investment credit especially due to the low DMO Price 
(Dharmadji and Parlindungan, 2002:7). 
  
China PSC does not have DMO obligation, while in the Malaysian PSC 
DMO was imposed only in the event of national emergency or shortage of supply of 
oil to the domestic market with normal oil price (Machmud, 2000: 124). 
 
 
 
2.2.2.9.  Taxation 
 
Merriam-Webster's Dictionary of Law (1996) defines taxation is a charge 
against a citizen's person or property or activity for the support of government based 
by the Law. This system used by governments to obtain money from people and 
organizations. The objective of taxation is the only practical means of raising the 
revenue to finance government spending on the goods and public services (Tanzi and 
Zee, 2001:1; and Toni, 2005:2).  
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The taxation provisions of the PSC usually override the general tax law, 
especially with regards to corporate income tax. The rates of corporate income taxes 
for PSC contractor are as follows: 
• PSC signed before 1985 were subject to 45% corporate tax and dividend 
withholding tax at 20% on balance, totalling to 56% tax rate. 
• PSC signed between 1985 and 1994 were subject to 35% corporate tax and 
dividend withholding tax at 20% on balance, totalling to 48% tax rate. 
• PSC signed between 1995 to present are subject to 30% corporate tax and 
dividend withholding tax at 20% on balance, totalling to 44% tax rate. 
The changes on the tax rate have no effect on the contractor after tax share. The 
before tax production sharing split are calculated with fixed after tax production 
sharing split.  
 
 Though the principle of the Income Tax Law dated 9 November 1994 allows 
tax consolidation in certain business sectors, but it is not allowed in petroleum 
business. In Indonesian PSC system, the tax income associated with a given 
block/contract must be recovered or paid from revenues generated within that 
block/contract; the block/contract is ring fenced. In practice this means that a 
company working on one contract while developing another new one contract cannot 
reduce its taxable income from the former contract. The objective of ring fence is to 
protect present tax revenues. The most common ring fence is applied within the 
block/contract of the petroleum deposit. Too tight ring-fence can discourage 
exploration and investment activities. Loosening the ring fencing can be done 
through widening the boundary incorporating several blocks/contract of the similar 
company (Baunsgaard, 2001:7). It means applies tax consolidation among several 
blocks/contract. Tax consolidation means that expenditures in non-producing 
contract(s) can be deducted from the income in producing contracts of the same 
contractor(s) for determination of taxable income. It implies with risk sharing 
between the host government and the contractor, because some of exploration costs 
are borne by the host government. Tax consolidation application resulting in 
reducing the contractor’s expenditures, therefore tax consolidation is one of possible 
incentive can be offered. 
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  2.2.2.10. Participation, Employment, Training, Local preference and 
Submission of Information 
 
Participation requirement becomes a standing clause for all Indonesian PSC 
since the PSC2 (1976). The participation clause provides that GOI (was delegated to 
BP Migas) has the right to demand a 10% undivided interest to be offered to either a 
limited liability company or Indonesian entity, collectively called Indonesia 
Participation. The demand is to be made upon commercial discovery, therefore 
assumes no exploration risks.  
 
Under Malaysian PSC, the Petronas Carigali on behalf of Malaysia 
government has the right to get minimum 15% of equity (Machmud, 2000: 125). The 
interest is carried throughout the exploration phase. While under China PSC, the 
China National Company, CNOOC, has the right to participate as full partner to 
maximum 51% at the time development phase commences. In modern petroleum 
contract, the participation clause bother most petroleum companies, it can be strong 
disincentives to the investor (Machmud, 2000: 114).  
 
All Indonesian PSC attach importance to the issue of Indonesiation, which is 
realised through training, education and employment of Indonesian personnel for all 
job classification. The contractor must seek approval from BP Migas to hire and 
place employees, and in the event of expatriate hiring, prior approval from the 
Minister of Mines and Energy is required. The Indonesian personnel employed by 
the contractor are deemed to have Pertamina status. 
 
As the consequences of the state ownership of natural resources and 
management control over operations, all Indonesian PSC stipulate that BP Migas 
have title to all original data resulting from the petroleum operations. Accordingly, 
contractors are to submit to BP Migas copies of all such original geological, 
geophysical, drilling well, production and other data and reports.  In turn BP Migas 
makes a promise not to disclose the submitted data to any third party without prior 
consultation with the contractor.   
 
  
101
 
 
2.2.3. Financial Diagram Flow and Model of the Indonesian Production 
Sharing Contract 
 
The financial diagram flow of the Indonesian PSC system can be seen in 
Figure 2.11, while the financial equation model is shown in Figure 2.12. As the 
objectives of the Indonesian PSC system are optimising the economic rent for the 
GOI and reasonable profit for contractor, the financial model of PSC follows 
diagram as mentioned in sub section 2.1.3.3.  
 
Before petroleum produced, there are only cash out paid by the contractor, 
consisting of the exploration and development expenditures, and after the 
commencement of petroleum production then there are additional production 
expenditures. In case that there is commercial production and assuming that annual 
petroleum production is P, annual average petroleum price is Prc and gross revenues 
is GRev, then  
GRev = P x Prc         
 
Before any other deduction, firstly GRev is subtracted by FTP requirement, 
with the rate of FTP (ftprate) as specified in the contract,  
FTP = ftprate x P x Prc 
The FTP is shared between GOI and contractor as production sharing split (cpss) that 
specified in the PSC contract. The contractor share from FTP (CSFTP) and the GOI 
share from FTP can be written, 
CSFTP = cpss x FTP   
             = cpss x (ftprate x P x Prc)   
 While GOI share from FTP are, 
GOISFTP = FTP – CSFTP 
                 = (ftprate x P x Prc) – {cpss x (ftprate x P x Prc)} 
                 = (1 – cpss) x (ftprate x P x Prc)  
  
After the subtraction of FTP they become net revenues, NR, 
NR = GRev – FTP 
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       = (P x Prc) – (ftprate x P x Prc) 
       = (1 – ftprate) x P x Prc     
From equations above, it can be seen that the higher FTP rate can lower the 
contractor share from FTP and net revenues (NR) of the project, while on the other 
hand increase the GOI share from FTP. Since cost recovery is recovered from NR, 
the remaining money for recovering the contractor expenditures decreases when FTP 
rate increases. 
 
If investment credit (IC) is allowed for capital expenditures of production 
facilities (Capex) at the rate (icrate) as specified in the contract, then 
IC = icrate x Capex 
Increase in investment credit rate can make higher contractor income, since the 
investment credit is for the contractor.  
 
The contractor can recover all their exploration, development and production 
expenditures that consist of non-capital (Nopex), capital expenditures (Capex), 
investment credit and un-recovered costs carried forward (UEC) through cost 
recovery mechanism. The capital expenditures will be recovered through 
depreciation method as specified in the contract. Interest on financing (IR) also can 
be recovered from cost recovery, if specified in the contract too. The equation of the 
cost recovery is, 
CR = Nopex + Capex* + IC + IR +UEC 
      = Nopex + Capex* + IR + UEC + (icrate x Capex) 
 
The higher the expenditures of the contractor and investment credit rate are 
the higher will the cost recovery and contractor income be, since all cost recovery is 
for the contractor. In optimising the economic rent, the expenditures of the contractor 
must be made effectively. The expenditures must be classified properly, which ones 
are the true expenditures and which are not. The classification process must be done 
transparently in simple procedure. As an example, one method the Malaysian PSC 
already practices, is by making a list called negative list, the list of unrecoverable 
costs, so those costs that are not in the negative list are recoverable. In the event there 
are dispute, the disputed costs are resolved through consultations. (Machmud, 
2000:98). 
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After recovering the cost recovery from NR, the remaining revenues is called 
profit oil (PO) and it is shared between contractor and GOI according to cpss 
specified in the contract. The contractor profit oil share (CPOS) and GOI profit oil 
share (GOIPOS), 
PO = NR – CR 
CPOS = cpss x PO                 
GOIPOS = PO – CPOS 
The higher the cpss is the higher will the contractor profit oil share be, on the other 
hand, the lower will GOI share from profit oil be. The GOI must offer the cpss 
carefully in optimising the economic rent while still providing sufficient contractor’s 
profitability.  
 
 
 
 
           (-) 
          (-)    (+) 
 
         (-)    (+) 
 
       (+)  
            
       
            
     
 
 
        (-) 
 
    (-)    (+) 
          
                (+) 
              
    (+)    (-) 
          
                (+) 
          
 
Figure 2.11: Diagram Flow of the Indonesian Production Sharing Contract 
 
The total contractor share (TCsh) consists of contractor share from FTP plus 
contractor share from profit oil,  
Gross Revenues
Investment Credit 
FTP
Cost Recovery 
Profit oil to be shared
GOI Take = GOI profit oil share +  
GOI FTP share
Contractor Take = Contractor profit 
oil share + Contractor FTP share
DMO
DMO fee
Tax
Taxable Income 
Total GOI Take
Contractor Entitlement 
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TCsh = CFTPS + CPOS  
While the GOI Take (GOITk) consists of GOI share from FTP plus GOI share from 
profit oil, 
GOITk = GOIFTPS + GOIPOS 
  
GRev = P x Prc 
 FTP = ftprate x P x Prc 
CSFTP = cpss x FTP    
 = cpss x (ftprate x P x Prc)  CSFTP = cpss x FTP   
 = cpss x (ftprate x P x Prc)   
GOISFTP = FTP – CSFTP 
 = (ftprate x P x Prc) – {cpss x (ftprate x P x Prc)} 
 = (1 – cpss) x (ftprate x P x Prc) 
NR = GRev – FTP 
 = (P x Prc) – (ftprate x P x Prc) 
 = (1 – ftprate) x P x Prc 
IC = icrate x Capex 
CosRec = Nopex + Capex* + IC + IR +UEC 
 = Nopex + Capex* + IR + UEC + (icrate x Capex) 
 PO = NR – CosRec 
CPOS =  cpss x PO 
GOIPOS = PO - CPOS 
TCsh = CFTPS + CPOS  
GOITk = GOIFTPS + GOIPOS 
DMO = dmorate x CPOS 
DMOfee = dmoprice x DMO 
CTI = TCsh – DMO + IC 
Tax = taxrate x (TCsh – DMO + IC) 
CET = TCsh – DMO + DMOfee*– Tax + CO 
TGOITk = GOITk + DMO – DMOfee + Tax 
Note: *  Recovered through depreciation method as specified in contract 
 
P = Annual Production  PO = Profit Oil 
Prc = Average Price annually CPOS = Contractor profit oil share 
GRev = Gross Revenues GOIPOS = GOI profit oil share 
FTP  = First Tranche Petroleum  cpss = Contractor production sharing split 
CSFTP = Contractor FTP share TCsh = Total Contractor Share 
GOISFTP = GOI FTP share GOITk = GOI Take 
ftprate  First Tranche Petroleum rate DMO  = Domestic Market Obligation   
IC = Investment Credit dmorate = DMO rate 
icrate = Investment Credit rate dmoprice = DMO price 
Cosrec = Cost Recovey CTI = Contractor Taxable Income 
NR = Net Revenues Tax =  Tax must be paid by contractor 
Nopex = Non Capital expenditures CET = Contractor Entitlement 
Capex* = Capital Expenditures  TGOITk =  Total GOI Take 
 
Figure 2.12: Financial equation model of the Indonesian PSC 
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In Indonesian PSC, contractor has obligation to sell a part (dmorate) of its 
contractor profit oil share in domestic market (DMO) at export price during the first 
five years of production; after that, at a price (dmoprice) specified in the contract, 
which is usually below the export price. Therefore during those first five years, the 
DMO obligation does not influence the income of contractor, while after the first five 
years, the income of contractor decreases. 
DMO      = dmorate x CPOS  
DMO fee = DMO x dmoprice 
Higher dmorate and lower the dmoprice will result in lower contractor take. As 
DMO is very important in ensuring the oil domestic market in Indonesia, the DMO 
requirement is still needed. The lower dmoprice needs to be improved. In the 
Malaysian PSC, the DMO obligation occurs only in the event of state emergency or 
shortage supply of oil for any reasons, by declaration of government of state. In this 
case Petronas has the right to pre-empt all or part of oil produced from the contract 
area at a normal oil price value.    
 
Since cost recovery is tax-free, the contractor’s taxable income (CTI) is the 
contractor share from FTP plus contractor share from profit oil (TCsh) minus DMO 
and plus investment credit.  
CTI = TCsh – DMO + IC 
 Tax = taxrate x CTI 
 
The contractor entitlement (CET) consists of the total contractor share minus 
DMO, plus DMOfee, minus tax and plus the cost recovery. While the Total GOI 
Take consists of GOI share from FTP plus GOI share from profit oil plus DMO 
minus DMO price and plus taxes. Hence the CET and Total GOI Take are, 
CET = TCsh – DMO + DMOfee - Tax + Cosrec    
TGOITk = GOITk + DMO – DMOfee + Tax 
 
Finally, the GOI Take in percentage was the ratio of total GOI takes to Gross 
Revenues, and the Contractor Take in percentage was the ratio of total contractor 
entitlement to Gross Revenues. 
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Yuwono (1998) and Dharmadji and Parlindungan (2002) compared the 
commercial performances of the Indonesian PSC contract with some other countries 
through cash flow analysis. In their cash flow analyses, Yuwono used three 
Indonesia’s historical data field, while Dharmadji and Parlindungan used one data 
field model. 
 
Yuwono (1998) compared the commercial profitability of the Indonesian PSC 
(with and without incentive packages) with other countries including China, 
Malaysia, Thailand, USA and Brazil. The financial analyses used Indonesia’s 
historical financial and production data of three contracts that were operated in 
Indonesia that had average production of 87, 39 and 22 MBOD. The profitability 
variables they used involving Net Present Value at LIBOR rate as discount rate 
(NPV@6%), internal rate of return (IRR), pay-out time (POT), government take and 
contractor take.  
 
Table 2.7 shows the summary of the fiscal regimes of those countries and the 
result of their cash flow analysis. Various contract types were used in those 
countries. Indonesia and Malaysia used PSC, China used PSC hybrid, while Thailand 
and USA used RAT, and Brazil used RSC system.  
 
China, USA and Thailand had sliding scale royalty payment; in China it was 
based on production profile, and so was in Thailand but with maximum 15% royalty 
rate, while in USA it was based on location condition with rate varied from 12.5% to 
20%. Malaysia had fixed 10% royalty, while Indonesia did not have royalty payment, 
but it had FTP requirement that was shared between parties; contractors argued that 
the FTP was effectively royalty   payment. On the other hand, Brazil did not have 
royalty payment. China and Malaysia had limit on cost recovery payment. In China, 
it was limited to 50% of gross revenues, while in Malaysia it was limited to 20% of 
gross production.  
 
Tax rate was set at 48% in Indonesia; at 33% in China; at 45% plus 25% duty 
on profit exported in Malaysia; at 50% in Thailand; at 6% production tax plus 
income tax 46% plus windfall tax > 81% in USA; while it was set at 25% in Brazil.  
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Table 2.7: Summary of fiscal regimes and the result of Indonesia, China, Malaysia, 
Thailand, USA and Brazil comparative analysis (Yuwono, 1998:57-59) 
 
Items Indonesia  China  Malaysia  Thailand  USA  Brazil  
Type PSC PSC hybrid PSC RAT RAT RSC 
Duration 
   Exploration 
  Dev+ Production 
30 years 
3 years 
30 years 
 
7 years 
12+15 ys 
 
5 years 
20 years 
39 years 
2,3,4 years 
20 +10 years 
 
5-10 ys 
until not prod. 
 
Bonuses 
   Signature bonus 
   Production bonus 
 
Yes 
Yes 
 
Yes 
No 
None  
Yes 
  
Royalty Effective 
royalty with 
FTP 
Sliding based 
production 
10% Sliding rate 
prod.max 
15% 
12.5%  – 
20% depends 
on loc 
 
Cost Recovery   Limited to 50% 
of gross rev. 
Limited to 20% 
of gros prod. 
   
Profit share before 
tax (in favour of 
gov) 
71.15/28.85 Varies based on 
annual gross 
prod. (X factor) 
 70/30  
(PSC 1985) 
   
Taxes 48% 33% 45% 
25% duty on 
profit exported 
50% Prod. Tax 
6% 
Inco tax 46% 
Windfall tax 
other -> 81% 
25% 
Other DMO 
With incentives 
 70% supple. 
Payment if 
price over base 
DMO 
Surface 
rental 
SRB windfall 
profit based 
increment oil 
price 
 Commerciali
prod.110% 
of all costs 
Sliding scale 
remuneration 
Buy-back 
Gov. Particip. 10% 51% 15% Max 20%   
  Model 1 1969 – 1996 (average production 87 MBOD)  
Incentive Package 
NPV@6%, billion USD 
IRR, % 
POT, year 
Government Take, % 
Contractor Take, % 
applied 
3,198 
35% 
6 
62% 
38% 
 
2,764 
30% 
8 
63% 
37% 
 
3,252 
30% 
8 
61% 
39% 
 
3200 
36% 
7 
62% 
38% 
 
2,347 
31% 
7 
63% 
37% 
 
4,082 
34% 
8 
59% 
41% 
Incentive Package 
NPV@6%, billion USD 
IRR, % 
POT, year 
Government Take, % 
Contractor Take, % 
no 
2.709 
27% 
8 
63% 
37% 
     
Model 2 1979 – 1996 (average production 39 MBOD) 
Incentive Package 
NPV@6%, billion USD 
IRR, % 
POT, year 
Government Take, % 
Contractor Take, % 
applied 
1,340 
31 
7 
39 
61 
 
109 
9 
8 & 20 
57 
43 
 
(151) 
3 
9&20 
59 
41 
 
544 
24 
7 
53 
47 
 
218 
10 
11 & 19 
53 
47 
 
193 
10% 
9&19 
54 
46 
Model 3 1984 – 1996 (average production 22 MBOD) 
Incentive Package 
NPV@6%, billion USD 
IRR, % 
POT, year 
Government Take, % 
Contractor Take, % 
applied 
635 
21 
10 
42 
58 
63 
8% 
14 
53 
47 
(221) 
-2 
>20 
59 
41 
441 
14 
13 
44 
56 
182 
10 
15 
49 
51 
240 
12 
13 
49 
51 
  
In addition, Indonesia had DMO requirement, Malaysia had 70% supplement 
payment if price was higher than the base price, Thailand had DMO surface rental 
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(SRB) windfall profit based on increment oil price, and Brazil had commerciality 
production 110% of all costs sliding scale remuneration buy-back. The highest 
government participation was in China at 51%, at maximum 20% in Thailand, at 
15% in Malaysia and at 10% in Indonesia. Profit oil share before tax in Indonesia 
was 71.15%/28.85%, in Malaysia it was 70/30 in favour of government, while in 
China it varied based on annual gross production (X factor). 
  
Yuwono found that the Indonesian PSC with Incentive Package system was 
very attractive, ranked second to only Thailand. He suggested some of the 
Indonesian PSC’s variables are need to be revised, including the length of DMO 
holiday price; the criteria’s of interest recovery for the exploration needs to be 
defined clearly. According to him, tax consolidation was not in line with the basic 
philosophy of the PSC’s systems and the win-win solution (Yuwono, 1998:72). 
 
Dharmadji and Parlindungan (2002) made a comparison of fiscal regimes in 
the Asia Pacific region, including Australia, China, India, Indonesia and Malaysia 
through cash flow simulation analysis based on generic model of each fiscal regime 
of those countries with the same field data model. The profitability variables they 
used included net present value at 10% discount rate (NPV@10%), internal rate of 
return (IRR), pay out time (POT), profit to investment ratio (P/I) and contractor take.  
 
Table 2.8 shows the summary of fiscal regimes, the model used and the 
economics’ indicator as result of the cash flow analysis of the countries that was 
done by Dharmadji and Parlindungan. Only Australia used RAT system, the other 
countries applied PSC system. Based on the size of their proven oil reserves in year 
2000, China owned the highest reserves size, followed by Indonesia, Malaysia, India 
and Australia. In term of production size in 2000, China also ranked as the highest oil 
producer, followed by Indonesia, Malaysia, Australia and India. 
 
Australia had royalty requirement, varied from 10 to 12.5% based on 
production and 40% of PRRT; in China royalty varied based on production rate, in 
India the royalty was 12.5% for onshore and 10% offshore, in Malaysia it was 10%; 
while in Indonesia, it was effectively the FTP.  
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Table 2.8: Summary of fiscal regimes and economic indicators of some Asia Pacific 
countries (Dharmadji and Parlindungan, 2002:2-6) 
 
Items Australia China India Malaysia Indonesia  
Type 1. Royalty Excise 
2. PRRT PSC PSC PSC PSC 
Duration 
   Exploration 
   Production 
 
6 years 
21 years 
 
7 years 
15 years 
 
7 years 
20 years 
 
5 years 
20 years 
 
3 years 
30 years 
Bonuses 
   Signature bonus 
   Production bonus 
None  
Yes 
No 
None None  
Yes 
Yes 
Royalty 1.   Royalty 10%- 
-12.5%  
      Excise based 
on production 
2.   PRRT 40% 
Varies based on 
production rate 
12.5% onshore 
10% offshore 
10% Effective royalty 
with FTP 
Cost Recovery  Limited to 50% 
of gross 
revenues 
No limit Max 50% for 
oil and 60% for 
gas 
  
Profit share (in favour of 
government) 
None Varies based on 
annual gross 
production 
Varies based on 
Investment 
Multiple 
Varies based on 
production 
71.15/28.85 
Taxes 36% 33% 50% 45% 
25% duty on 
profit exported 
48% 
Other    70% 
supplementary 
payment if 
price over base 
Domestic 
Market 
Obligation 
2000’s Oil prod. Bopd 722,799 3,195,000 535,742 780,000 1,460,693 
2000’s proven oil 
reserves, million barrels 
2,835 30,600 3,338 5,050 9,665 
Assumption of the field model 
Field size, MMBBL 150 Initial oil price, USD/BL 18 
Peak production rate, bopd 80,000 Oil price escalation, % 3 
Decline rate, % 15 Capital investment, million USD 150 
Field life, year 11 Operating cost, USD/BL 5 
  Capital and operating costs escalation 3 
Result: Economic Indicator 
NPV@10%, E3 USD 468,415 449,003 246,815 159,088 123,815 
IRR, % 79.4 65.0 51.8 38.3 31.7 
POT, year 2.5 2.9 2.9 3.1 3.2 
P/I ratio 6.6 6.1 3.3 2.3 1.9 
Contractor Take, % 41.7 42.4 23.0 16.4 13.3 
 
Two countries had limit on cost recovery; in China the limit was 50% of 
gross revenues while in Malaysia it was 50% of gross revenues. Only Indonesia had 
fixed profit sharing, 71.15/28.85 before tax in favour of government. In China it 
varied based on gross production, in India it varied based on investment multiple 
while in Malaysia it varied based on production.  
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The lowest tax rate was 33% in China, followed by 36% in Australia (but it 
had high PRRT 40%), then by 48% in Indonesia. In India the tax rate was 50% while 
in Malaysia it was 45% plus 25% duty on profit exported. Other requirements were 
that Malaysia had 70% supplementary payment if price was higher than the base and 
Indonesia had DMO obligation. 
 
The result showed that from their economic indicators, Australia was the 
most favourable, followed by China, India, Malaysia and Indonesia as the second 
most to the least respectively. Although China had the highest reserves and 
production size, its economic indicator ranked as the second favourable after 
Australia.  
 
Each of parameters (bonuses, royalty, cost recover limit, contractor profit 
split, taxes and DMO) influenced the contractor’s cash flow, NPV and contractor 
take. The higher bonuses, royalty, taxes and DMO are the lower the contractor’s cash 
flow, NPV and contractors take. Cost recovery limit and contractor profit oil sharing 
split had the most significant influence on contractor cash flow, the higher cost 
recovery limit and the higher the contractor profit oil sharing the better. They 
suggested that contractor needs a good understanding on fiscal terms to make a good 
investment decision, while the government needs to understand its country condition 
and other countries in the region in order to develop a competitive fiscal term. 
Improvement of the Indonesian PSC terms must be considered seriously.  
 
Both Yuwono’s and Dharmadji and Parlindungan’s analyses suggested that 
Indonesian PSC without Incentive Package was the least attractive among the 
compared countries. This fact suggests that the Indonesian PSC without Incentive 
Package need to be improved. 
 
Yuwono used 6% and Dharmadji used 10% discount rate, meanwhile only 
one field data model used in Dharmadji and Parlindungan’s analyses and three 
samples field below 100 MBOD used in Yuwono analyses. The Indonesian PSC1 
(for standard conventional field) and the Third Incentive Package terms and variables 
were used in these analyses. To understand the commercial performances of the 
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Indonesian PSC as a whole are not adequate with only one field model or only three 
data field to be analysed, they need more records and variability of samples. While 
each petroleum company has its discount rate that depends on its financial 
conditions, from unofficial information we obtained, some companies used discount 
rate of 10%, 15%, 25% or even higher of 40%. Moreover recent the Indonesian PSC 
already offered the Fifth Incentives Package that sound more profitable for the 
investor. That is why more accurate analyses of Indonesian PSCs’ commercial 
performances were needed be done. 
 
 
 
2.3.   Decision Analysis under Risk and Uncertainty 
 
2.3.1. Identifying the Impact of Tax Consolidation Application in Frontier 
Areas 
 
2.3.1.1. The Need for Identifying the Impact of Tax Consolidation Application 
in Frontier Areas 
 
Given declining tendencies on Indonesia’s geological potential especially in 
western part of Indonesia, while the remaining basins (proved reserves, unproved 
reserves and have not been drilled) have been found largely in eastern part of 
Indonesia, deep water and frontier areas that have higher risks and costs. Moreover 
risk capital is being more scarce and competitive. Therefore Indonesia needs more 
strong incentives for exploration investment in high-risk isolated frontier and 
deepwater areas.  
 
Successful development of any potential petroleum prospect in frontier and 
deepwater will require an acceptable mix of favourable reservoir performance, 
attractive commercial contract terms, sound regulations, and production technologies 
that can meet the challenge. Reservoir performance and commercial incentives are 
two important drivers in searching oil and gas resources, while technological 
advancements are critical for developing them economically (Bergman, 1999). As 
already mentioned earlier, the commercial risk can be reduced by the government, 
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for example by making freely available exploration data or by financing exploration 
activities (Baunsgaard, 2001:6).  Financing a part of exploration activities can be 
done through tax consolidation. Tax consolidation means that expenditures in non-
producing contract(s) can be deducted from the income in producing contracts of the 
same contractor(s) for determination of taxable income. The tax consolidation 
implies some sharing of exploration risk between the contractor and the government. 
From the government point of view, the application of tax consolidation represents 
current investment by Indonesia for the future; specifically it represents the 
reinvestment of a part of current government oil and gas revenue today to raise the 
level of exploration activity in achieving profit in the future. That is why the tax 
consolidation is one of possible incentives in order to raise the investment level in 
those frontier areas. 
 
Some countries had been successful in applying tax consolidation. Thirty-one 
countries had already applied tax consolidation in their petroleum ventures, including 
United Kingdom, Norway, France, Germany, Denmark, Netherlands, Nigeria, 
Congo, Ghana, Australia, Brunei, China, India, Papua New Guinea, Thailand, 
Philippine, Turkey, Argentina, Canada, USA, Mexico, Peru and others. As an 
example UK, after applying tax consolidation in 1983 as part of their tax reform; 
realized a rapid recovery from severe drilling slump in 1978-1981 and enjoyed 
increased discoveries, which added an average of one billion barrels per year oil 
reserves through 1992 (IPA, 1995:4). Moreover, as already noted earlier, several 
writers also suggested applying tax consolidation to attract exploration investment in 
Indonesia’s frontier and deep-water areas. Therefore risk analysis of the application 
of tax consolidation on the GOI income and profitability of contractor as well as 
quantifying the risk involves respectively was needed be taken.  
 
 
 
 2.3.1.2.   Risk, Uncertainty and Risk Analysis 
 
The presentation of the risk analysis theoretical and methodology framework 
background was condensed from the work of Murtha (1995, 1997), Crystal Ball 
(2005) and others. Uncertainty and risk refer to the outcomes and their implications 
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of some future event. In casual discussion, they are often used interchangeably, but 
they have very different technical meanings. Risk is the chance of injury, damage, or 
loss; the degree of probability of loss; or the amount of possible loss. Risk will be 
reserved to describe the potential gains or losses associated with particular outcomes. 
While uncertainty is the quality or state of being uncertain, lack of certainty, doubt. 
Uncertainty will describe and refer to the range of possible outcome (Murtha, 1995). 
 
Because risk is linked with probability, risk can be accommodated through 
the purchase of insurance or hedging. For example, we do not know if we will be in 
an automobile accident next year, however, since the probability of being in an 
accident is known, to protect against that unfortunate outcome we can buy insurance.  
 
On the other hand uncertainty is the lack of knowledge concerning the 
probability distribution of future events. Insurance is unavailable to protect against 
negative outcomes. Therefore, it is essential that the analyst must incorporate 
uncertainty into their analysis and that the decision maker incorporates uncertainty 
into the decision process. A lack of knowledge does not prevent making assumptions 
concerning potential outcomes that should be taken into consideration. Even so, 
uncertainty is an element of almost all decision process.  
 
Most people desire low risk, which would interpret to a high probability of 
success, profit, or some form of gain. The more you know about the potential risks, 
the better you can deal with them. Almost any change, good or bad, includes some 
risk. Once the risks have been identified, a model can help you quantify the risks. 
Quantifying risk means putting a value or price on risk, to help you decide whether a 
risk is worth taking. Risk analysis is any form of analysis that studies and attempts to 
quantify risks associated with an investment. The general objective of risk analysis is 
describing the range of possible outcome and their consequences. Risk analysis is a 
future-oriented activity, which is trying to forecast or predict events yet to come. One 
of the main reasons for this activity is to compare alternative investments (Murtha, 
1997:37). 
 
Much of risk analysis consists of estimating something with range of values 
rather than with a single value. As example, instead of the single point estimate of 34 
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million USD, it is better reported that the NPV of a petroleum project is a normal 
distribution with a mean of 34 million and a standard deviation of 1.7 million USD.  
 
Typically random variables are used to describe future events whose 
outcomes are uncertain. Random variable is any variable that has a probability 
distribution frequency (PDF) or a cumulative distribution frequency (CDF) that 
defines it.  PDF and CDF of A is graph that tells about how the values of A are 
distributed. Histogram to describe a set of a number of values after we group the data 
into non-overlapping classes, such as approximating a PDF may suggest a type of 
distribution, a shape of PDF. There are two rules of PDF: first the scale on x-axis 
tells the range of values of the variable and the height of the curve tells how likely 
the values on the x-axis are to occur that the total area under the PDF is 1.00. Second 
the area under the curve between x = a and x = b is the probability that x lies between 
a and b. 
 
While the corresponding CDF for given PDF is obtained by a cumulative 
process, just as CDF was defined for histograms. Two rules for CDF: first the CDF 
curve ranges from 0.0 to 1.0 on the vertical scale and from minimum to maximum 
value of X, so the curve is monotonically non-decreasing. Second, the value on the 
Y-axis corresponding to X = a, is the probability that X is less than or equal to a. 
 
Some types of PDF widely applicable in the oil and gas industry (Figure 
2.13), such as (Murtha, 1995 and Crystal Ball, 2005): 
a) The Normal Distribution PDF. The normal distribution describes many natural 
phenomena such as IQ’s, people heights, inflation rate, or error in 
measurements. It is a continuous probability distribution. The parameters are 
mean and standard deviation. There are three conditions underlying normal 
distribution: first some value of the unknown variable is the most likely (the 
mean of the distribution); second the unknown variable is can as likely as 
above or below of the mean (symmetrical about the mean); and third the 
unknown variable is more likely to be close to the mean than far away. 
b) The Triangular Distribution PDF. In some sense, the triangular distribution is 
merely a simple description of variable, which is more likely to attain values 
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near its mode than near the extremes. It is a continuous probability distribution. 
The parameters are the minimum, the most likely and the maximum. There are 
three conditions underlying the triangular distribution, the minimum and the 
maximum number of items must be fixed and the most likely number of items 
falls between the minimum and maximum values, forming a triangular shape of 
distribution.  
c) The Uniform Distribution is completely specified by giving its minimum and 
maximum value. There is no mode for the uniform distributions and the median 
equals the mean. In the uniform distribution, between the maximum and 
minimum are equally likely to occur. It is a continuous probability distribution. 
The parameters for uniform distribution are maximum and minimum. There are 
three conditions underlying uniform distribution, the minimum value is fixed, 
the maximum value is fixed and all values between minimum and maximum 
are equally likely to occur. 
d) The Binomial Distribution PDF is an example of a discrete distribution. A 
random variable X that is binomially distributed counts the number of 
successes in n independent trials where p is the probability of success on each 
trial. When p = ½ the binomial distribution is symmetric.  
e) The Lognormal Distribution PDF. It describes variables, which are highly 
skewed to the right, which mean that large values of X have much smaller 
probability than values of X in the opposite direction. It is a continuous 
probability distribution. The parameters are mean and standard deviation. There 
are three conditions underlying lognormal distribution, the unknown variable 
can increase without bound, but is confined to a finite value at the lower limit; 
the unknown variable exhibits a positively skewed distribution; and the natural 
logarithm of the unknown variable will yield a normal curve. 
f) Pareto Distribution is widely used for the investigation of distribution that 
associated with such empirical phenomena such as city population size, the 
occurrence of natural resources, the size of companies, personal income, stock 
price fluctuations, and error clustering in communication circuit. It is a 
continuous probability distribution. The parameters are location and shape. 
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        (a) Normal Distribution        (b) Triangular Distribution 
 
 
 
 
 
                   (c) Uniform Distribution        (d) Binomial Distribution  
 
 
 
 
 
                    (e) Log Normal Distribution                     (f) Pareto Distribution 
Figure 2.13:  Some type of Probability Distribution Frequency   
 
 
 
2.3.1.3.   Risk Analysis Using Monte Carlo Simulation 
 
As already mentioned above, risk analysis is a future-oriented activity that 
studies and attempts to quantify risks associated with an investment. One method to 
carry out the risk analysis is using Monte Carlo simulation. This simulation was 
initially developed during the World War II by researchers in Los Alamos National 
Laboratory during their experimental work to estimate the probability of a neutron 
that would cause fission chain reaction. The method was named Monte Carlo for its 
similarity with roulette game, a simple random number generator.  
 
Monte Carlo is a technique to calculate the uncertainty in a forecast of 
future event. It is effective in assessing risk and modelling uncertainty. Monte Carlo 
simulation allows us to replace uncertain quantities in spreadsheet models with 
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reasonable estimates ranges and then see more accurately how that uncertainty 
affects the outcome of the model. It provides information concerning the best and the 
worst-case range of outcomes or probability of reaching specific targets. 
 
This simulation involves approximation of the distribution of possible 
outcome of certain combinations of random variables, of which each has its own 
probability distribution function, by means of statistical sampling. This method is 
often used when the model is complex, non-linear, or involves more than just a 
couple uncertain parameters. A simulation can typically involve over 10,000 
evaluations of the model, a task that in the past was only practical using super 
computers.  
 
At each trial, the method will sample the distribution of each variable 
randomly and then calculate the outcome. As the number of trials increases, the 
distribution of experiment results will approximate the probability distribution 
function of the outcome. This distribution of the outcome will cater to questions such 
as the likelihood a certain project will generate NPV more than 100 million USD, a 
certain reservoir has 90% chance to have oil in place bigger than 100 million STB 
and others. These kinds of answers will help in assessing the risk of certain outcome. 
 
Figure 2.14 shows an example of an application of Monte Carlo simulation 
to estimate a simple equation of F = X*Y. At each trial, the distribution function of 
the input parameters X and Y are sampled, the realizations of X and Y of the trial are 
then multiplied to calculate F. The trial process is then repeated multiple times, if the 
number of trials is sufficient enough then histogram of the trial results is the 
approximation of the distribution function of F.  
 
The strength of Monte Carlo simulation are its universal applicability, the 
result contains maximum information about possible outcomes and the methods itself 
leads to sensitivity analysis. While the advantages of the simulation are: first the full 
range of each uncertain input parameter can be sampled and used in generating the 
probabilistic model outcome. The second advantage is easy to implement, any input-
output model can be utilised in the Monte Carlo process without making any 
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modifications to the original model. While the third advantage is that the Monte 
Carlo approach is conceptually simple and easy to explain. 
 
90.52 95.26 100.00 104.74 109.48
X
43.31 46.65 50.00 53.35 56.69
Y
F = X*Y
Trial X Y F
1 99.25 52.1 5170.925
2 102.4 51.19 5241.856
3 100.05 48.34 4836.417
… … … …
Frequency Chart
.000
.006
.012
.018
.024
0
60.75
121.5
182.2
243
4,250.00 4,625.00 5,000.00 5,375.00 5,750.00
10,000 Trials    69 Outliers
Forecast: F=X*Y
Cummulative Distribution Function of F
0%
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
60%
70%
80%
90%
100%
3,500.00 4,000.00 4,500.00 5,000.00 5,500.00 6,000.00 6,500.00
F
X mean = 100
Std. Dev. = 3.16
Y mean = 50
Std. Dev. = 2.23
F mean = 4994
Std. Dev. = 273.05
 
Figure 2.14:  Schematic Example of Monte Carlo Simulation 
 
Monte Carlo simulation starts with development of a model, i.e., one or more 
equations, together with assumptions and logic relating the parameter in the equation. 
After the model was developed, the second step is determining the influencing 
factors/variables, which may cause the largest affects against the outcome. Then to 
analyse and identify the inter relationship between each factors. This procedure was 
done by either using expert opinion or historical data information.  
 
The third step is to determine the input values for each variable above to 
apply it in the model. The input values for variables above are in distribution form. 
Therefore, determining the most suitable distribution for each variable based on 
historical information or expert opinion has to be done. Lognormal distributions are 
often used for many of the volumetric model input, while triangular distributions are 
also fairly common and are easy to adapt because they can be symmetric or skewed 
either left or right. In the case there are sufficient historical data, then these data can 
be used to determine the suitable distribution. Expert opinion is only used to 
determine the distribution in the case there are not enough information available. The 
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fourth step is run the model using Monte Carlo software to shape the probability 
distribution of the outcomes. Sensitivity analysis the will be drawn as the final step 
(Murtha, 1997:2-3).   
 
Back to petroleum E&P venture, given this venture characterised as high risk 
and uncertainty venture. Meanwhile the operation faces complex situation due to 
their multiple phases of their operation where the production phase depends on the 
outcome of the exploration phase; the uncertainties on the existence of the resource, 
the volume of reserves in each discovery, and on the level of production are not 
specified in the contract as well as the costs vary and technology used; the price vary 
and the uncertainty of the product (oil only, oil and gas or gas only) respectively. 
Therefore investment decision-making in this venture faces complex situation.  As 
example due to its uncertainties, it is difficult to choose the accurate assumptions to 
forecast the profiles of input variables of the model such as production, cost, price 
and others in doing the cash flow analysis.  
 
As already mentioned earlier, under Monte Carlo simulation each input 
variable has its own probability distribution and the probability distribution of the 
outcome will cater to questions such as the probability a certain project has 80% 
chance will generate NPV more than 100 million USD and other.  Moreover this 
method often used when the model is complex, non-linear, or involves more than just 
a couple uncertain parameters. It also has many advantages and strength as already 
mentioned earlier, such as easy of implementation and conceptually simple and 
others. These facts imply that this method is appropriate to be used in making risk 
analysis in petroleum E&P venture. 
 
This method already used by the Indonesian Petroleum Association (IPA, 
1995) in investigating the impact of tax consolidation. The IPA ran a simple Monte 
Carlo simulation model of the application of tax consolidation in Indonesia with 
scenario and assumptions applied as seen in Table 2.9. The input variables were total 
well drilled per year, operation years, tax rate, exploration expenditures, 
development expenditures, oil price, the chance of commercial discovery reserves, 
the distribution of commercial reserves size. The model used was the PSC3 with IP4 
terms and variables.  
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Table 2.9:  Scenario, Assumption and Result of IPA’s Monte Carlo Simulation on 
tax consolidation application in Indonesia (IPA, 1995:app. II) 
  
No Items Assumption Remarks 
1 Total drilling wells per 
year 
50 wells Represent the difference between 
historic level of 125 wells per year 
and the current level 75 wells per 
year 
2 Total exploration 
spending increased per 
well 
11 millions USD per well in 
1994 USD 
Totally 550 millions per year, it is 
equal to the average level of total 
exploration per wildcat well during 
period 1983 - 1991 
3 Tax rate  48% GOI maximum cost of 264 millions 
USD and contractors of 282 
millions USD per year in 1994 
dollar 
4 Period 10 years, 1996 - 2005 Long enough to give a 
representative answer but 
manageable for calculation 
5 Oil price Constant at 17 USD/barrel    
6 Escalation for cost and 
price 
4%  
7 Discount date and 
discount rate 
1/1/1996 and 10%  
8 PSC 1993’s Incentive Package  Profit split 65/35, no investment 
credit, FTP of 15% and DMO price 
of 25% of market 
9 Distribution of activity 
by play type  
Shallow water     60% 
Remote Onshore 30% 
Deep water          10% 
Reflects the relative economics and 
cost of exploring in different 
environments 
10 The distribution of 
reserve size if 
commercial discovery is 
made  
50 MMB       80% 
150 MMB     15% 
450 MMB     5% 
Consistent with historic trends in 
Indonesia 
11 The chance of 
commercial discovery 
from given well 
5% Consistent with historic results in 
Indonesia 
12 Result of analysis after 
simulation ran 10 times 
Mean GOI’s IRR: 26% and  
NPV@10%: 3,114 million 
USD 
GOI spending per year 1% of total 
GOI revenues or 3.8% of GOI oil 
& gas revenues in 1994 
 
Total well drilled per years are assumed 50 wells per year with the cost 11 
millions per well (average level of total exploration per wildcat well during period 
1983 – 1991), totally 550 millions per year. Operation year was set up 10 years. Tax 
rate assumed 48%, hence the GOI maximum expenditures cost of 264 millions USD 
and contractors of 282 millions USD per year. The oil price was set up at 17 USD 
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per year escalated at 3% per year. The chance of commercial discovery was 5%, and 
distribution of commercial reserves size were set up at 50 MMB of 80%, 150 MMB 
of 15% and 450 MMB of 5%. While the play type were set up at shallow water of 
60%, remote onshore of 30% and deep water of 10%.  
 
The simulation ran only 10 times. The result of tax consolidation application 
in Indonesia during ten years period 1996 – 2005 showed good long-term economics 
to the GOI. The average IRR of the GOI was 26% and cumulative cash flow over 
ten-year period was 14 billions USD. While in the short time the GOI lost only 
around 1% of its total revenues or only 3.8% of oil and gas GOI revenues in 1994.  
 
The IPA analysis only analysed from the view of GOI, it did not quantify the 
risk involved for both parties, did not the impact on contractor’s revenues, did not 
compare its impact with increasing the production sharing split, the period of 
analysis only 10 years, the number of running was too low only 10 times, and some 
other assumptions were needed to be concord. Higher trials statistically could give 
better results and smoothen the distribution lines. Therefore analysis to investigate 
the impact and risk involve of tax consolidation application especially in Indonesia 
frontier areas on the GOI income and profitability of contractors and compares with 
the increasing the production sharing split with assumptions almost matched with 
recent Indonesia’s conditions was considered be done.  Monte Carlo simulation was 
chosen be used in this risk analysis. 
 
 
 
2.3.2. Identifying the Companies’ Views with Respect to the Most Desirable 
Petroleum Contract System 
 
2.3.2.1.  The Need for Identifying the Companies’ Views with Respect to the 
Most Desirable Petroleum Contract System 
 
The uncertainties in petroleum E&P venture lead to different perceptions by 
interest parties (petroleum companies and host governments). The perception of each 
player is a function of its information, effort, expertise and experience. Different 
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perceptions will lead to different contractual relationships and different allocation of 
risks and rewards between the contract’s parties (Abadeer (1993:8). Moreover 
experiences and knowledge might result differences in perceptions, feelings and 
judgments about something subject. While environment conditions changes might 
also changes the experiences. The contractor’s experiences and knowledge in doing 
petroleum E&P business as well as changes in the business environment in Indonesia 
could change their perception, feelings and judgments about them, including their 
judgment about the benefits, the costs and the risks of the petroleum E&P operation 
in Indonesia. Thus contractor’s experiences, expertise and the Indonesia’s geological 
potential, economic, social and political conditions changes might change the 
contractor’s view, which is the most desirable petroleum contract system that match 
with those conditions.  
 
Risk capital is being more scarce and competitive; many changes on 
Indonesia’s economic, social and political conditions occurred; and spectacular 
changes of world oil prices as mentioned earlier made the competitiveness of the 
Indonesia’s petroleum venture decreased and the bargaining position of Indonesia 
reduced. Moreover the remaining basins (proved reserves, unproved reserves and 
have not been drilled) have been found largely in eastern part of Indonesia, deep 
water and frontier areas that have higher risks and costs. One of many other 
alternatives can be done in order to attract petroleum E&P investment is offering the 
petroleum companies’ desirable petroleum contract system. That is why GOI needs 
to understand the petroleum companies’ views with respect to the most desirable 
petroleum contract system.  
 
 
 
2.3.2.2.  The Analytic Hierarchy Process  
 
Making decision in complex situation whenever both objective and subjective 
factors are present is not easy. Analytic Hierarchy Process (AHP), a well-known 
method for solving complex decision-making problems can be applied (Alford, 2004: 
4).  The AHP is described by Saaty and Kearns (1985:19) as a 
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“… systematic procedure for representing the elements of any 
problem, hierarchically. The AHP organises the basic rationality by 
breaking down the problem into its smaller and smaller constituent 
parts and then guides decision makers through a series of pairwise 
comparison judgments (which are documented and can be re-
examined) to express the relative strength or intensity of impact of 
the elements in the hierarchy. These judgments are then translated to 
numbers. The AHP includes procedures and principles used to 
synthesize the many judgments to derive priorities among criteria 
and subsequently for alternative solutions” 
(Saaty and Kearns, 1985:19) 
 
This method has already been applied to wide range of complex decision 
problems. Some examples are: developing public strategy (Saaty, 2000:10-11); 
developing business strategy (Kintarso and Peniwati, 2001: 1-7, and (Hummel JM, et 
al, 2001: 41 – 64); design and the development of new product (Kengpol and 
O’Brien, 2000:1-4; and Hummel JM, et al, 2001: 72 – 144); a post evaluation of a 
project (Azis I.J., 1989: 38 - 48); technological assessment (Hummel, 2001: 1 – 14); 
designing inter-organizational communication (Hummel JM, et al, 2001: 18-36); 
project risk management (Mustafa and Al-Bahar, 1991); decision-support system in 
the petroleum pipeline industry (Nataraj, 2005); prioritisation methods for defence 
planning (Nguyen, 2003); priority setting in agriculture biotechnology research 
(Braunschweigh, 2000); conflict resolution (Saaty, 2000:10); human resources 
allocation (Saaty and Peniwati, 2000); determining the best sport record (Alford, 
2004: 1-99);  and many others. However, no application of AHP has been reported in 
the literature for choosing the desirable petroleum E&P contract system on the view 
of petroleum company. Below, the basic principles and steps in the AHP are 
described, followed by an explanation of its theoretical basis that was condensed 
from many sources as mentioned above. 
 
The AHP method is developed based on some fundamental facts and thoughts 
that first human minds can value two different objects comparatively. Second human 
mind is inconsistent, but a well-informed people will have a rationale mind, its 
philosophy is it is better to be approximately right than precisely wrong; this method 
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leads to a limit of 10% inconsistent level. Third the most accurate way to draw 
priorities of the objects is pair wise comparisons. AHP is created based on objectivity 
is agreed upon subjectivity; therefore qualitative data must be transformed to 
quantitative data in order to draw a consistency (Peniwati, 2000:2). 
 
There are three steps in decision-making involving AHP: first decomposition 
of a complex unstructured problem and then structured them into a hierarchical 
structure that shows the problem’s key elements and their relationship; second 
comparative judgment about its element by making pair wise comparisons; third 
synthesis of priorities derived from the judgment with respect to the overall goal. The 
software package called Expert Choice incorporates the AHP methodology and 
enables the analyst to structure the hierarchy and solve the problem through pair wise 
comparisons using relative or absolute measurement. 
 
The first step is breaking down the decision problem into a hierarchical 
structure. Building the hierarchy structure is the most challenging of the three steps 
in the AHP (Alford, 2004:5). The hierarchy structure starts at top level that states the 
overall goal of the decision making from the decision maker viewpoint. Followed 
directly beneath this goal are the main criteria to be considered when making 
decision. For greater precision, the criteria may be divided into sub criteria, creating 
an additional in the hierarchy.  
 
Figure 2.15 shows a general three level hierarchy structure. The overall goal 
can be seen in top of the hierarchy and is broken into four key criteria that directly 
influence the goal above them. In general, there is no limit to the size and number of 
levels within the hierarchy, can be two or three levels of criteria and sub criteria or 
more. In this simple example there is only one level. The bottom level states a list of 
alternatives that could solve the problem. Hierarchy structure is said to be complete 
when every element of a given level functions as criteria for all elements of the level 
below.  
 
After a hierarchy as the representation of the problem has been realised, then 
it is followed by the second step: evaluating the alternatives and weighting the 
criteria. The alternatives are compared in pairs (pair wise comparison) to access their 
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relative performance with respect to each criterion. People already intuitively reduce 
complexity by using these pair wise comparisons (Hummel JM, et al, 2001: 45). 
With the same procedure, the criteria are compared in pairs to define their 
importance with respect to the overall goal. The comparisons are based on hard data, 
as well as on intuition, experience, and expertise of the participants. That is why 
AHP explicitly allows for subjective judgments and recognizes their legitimate role 
in ex ante analysis (Braunschweigh, 2000:33).  
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
  
    
Figure 2.15:  A General Three Hierarchy Structure 
 
The Fundamental Scale as seen in Table 2.10 is used to elicit the 
comparisons. This scale was derived from the basic mathematics of neural firing that 
leads to a well-known logarithmic law of stimulus response, and has been validated 
for effectiveness, not only in many applications but also compared with other scales 
by applying it in real life situation where measurements are already known. The 
numbers are used to represent how many times the larger of two elements dominates 
the smaller one with respect to a property or criteria they have in common. 
 
The use of verbal comparisons facilitates the weighting of criteria, as well as 
evaluation of alternatives in terms of non-quantifiable criteria. Once these verbal 
comparisons are made, they are translated into the numerical values of the 
fundamental scale. After the entire pair wise comparisons were already done, and 
then a set of local priorities will be generated, which express the relative impact of 
the set of criteria on an criterion in the level immediately above. The relative 
strength, value, worth, desirability will be found, or probability of each of the items 
being compared by solving the matrices, each of which has reciprocal properties. In 
Goal 
Criterion 2 Criterion 3 Criterion 4 
Alternative Alternative Alternative 
Criterion 1 
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this case a set of eigenvectors need to be computed for each matrix and then the 
result was normalized to unity to obtain the vectors of priorities. 
 
Table 2.10: The Fundamental Scale (Saaty, 2001:28) 
 
Intensity of 
Importance 
Definition Explanation 
1 Equal Importance Two activities contribute equally to the 
objective 
2 Weak …. Between Equal and Moderate 
3 Moderate importance Experience and judgement slightly favour 
one activity over another 
4 Moderate plus …. Between Moderate and Strong 
5 Strong Importance Experience and judgement strongly 
favour one activity over another 
6 Strong plus …. Between Strong and Very Strong 
7 Very Strong or demonstrated 
importance 
An activity is favoured very strongly over 
another; its dominance demonstrated in 
practice 
8 Very, very strong …. Between V. Strong and Extreme 
9 Extreme importance The evidence favouring one activity over 
another is of the highest possible order of 
affirmation 
Reciprocals of above 
 
 
 
 
Rationales 
 
If activity i has one of the above 
nonzero numbers assigned to it 
when compared with activity j, 
then j has the reciprocal value 
when compared with i 
 
Ratios arising from the scale 
If x is 5 times j, i.e., x = 5y, then y = x/5 or y 
= 1/5 x. 
 
 
 
If consistency were to be forced by 
obtaining n numerical values to span the 
matrix. 
 
Figure 2.16 shows the type of matrix used to enter the pair wise comparisons. 
As example, the comparison of alternative 1 with alternative 2 yields the value a12. 
For obvious reasons, the diagonal cells always contain the value 1. Due to the 
judgments may not be consistent; therefore the eigenvector method described below 
is used to compute these values. 
 
   Alternative 1 Alternative 2 Alternative 3 Local Priority  
Alternative 1 1 a12   
Alternative 2   1   
Alternative 3    1  
 
Figure 2.16: Matrix to derive local priorities 
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The third step was synthesising the local priorities throughout the hierarchy, 
in order to compute the global priorities of the alternatives,. The principle of 
hierarchic composition is, for each alternative, the local priorities are multiplied by 
corresponding criterion weight, and the results are summed up to obtain the global 
priority of the alternative with respect to the overall goal stated in the top level.  Thus 
the equation (Braunschweigh, 2000:34): 
      M                  L                                                         M 
Al =   Σ  Alm Vm              with  Σ Alm  = 1         and      Σ Vm = 1             
             m=1                 l=1                                   m=1 
where: 
Al  : final priority of alternative 1 
Alm : priority of alternative l with respect to criterion m 
Vm : weight of criterion m 
 l : (1,……., L) 
 m : (1,……, M) 
 
Basically pair wise comparison uses matrix form, it is a square form in which 
an array of numbers is arranged. When a set of elements (criteria or alternatives) of 
problem are compared with each other, a square matrix is given as: 
 
a11 a12  a13 … a1n 
      A =      a21           a22            a2           …       a2n 
… … … … … 
an1 an2 an3 … ann 
  
This matrix has reciprocal properties, that is: 
 
  aji   =   1 / aij            for all i,j = 1, 2,…..n 
    
A vector of weights or priorities w = (w1, w2….wn) is computed. Note that by 
using ratio scales, the estimated weights are only unique up to multiplication by 
positive constant. Thus w is equivalent to cw where c > 0. For simplicity, usually w 
normalised so that it adds up to 1 or 100. When the judgments were perfectly 
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consistent, i.e., aikakj = aij , then the entries of the matrix A would contain no errors, 
and could be expressed as aij = wi / wj. Note that  
 
aikakj = wiwk / wkwj = wi wj = aij    for all i,j,k = 1,2,…,n. 
 
 In this case the last result can be drawn by simply normalise any column j of A to 
yield the final weights: 
                 n     
wi = aij  /  Σ akj            for all i = 1,2,…,n.                
                  k=1  
Yet, errors in judgment are common, so the final result using column normalisation 
would depend on which column is chosen. 
 
Saaty (1985) recommends the eigenvector method for estimating the weights 
when there are errors in judgment. The method computes w as the principal right 
eigenvector of the matrix A: 
 
Aw  =  λmax w,  
Where λmax is the maximum eigenvalue of the matrix, or  
      n     
wi =  ( Σaij wi) / λmax            for all i = 1,2,…,n.                
                   j=1  
The eigenvector method is a simple averaging process by which the final weights w 
is computed as the average of all possible ways of comparing the alternatives. 
 
Actually the result the matrix does not have perfected consistent, due to 
someone does not have consistency of preference. In matrix theory, in the case little 
wrong on coefficient could result a little inconsistency of eigenvalue. With 
combination what are discusses above, if the value of the matrix A is one and A is 
consistent, then a little inconsistency from aij still has maximum eigenvalue λmax, 
and the value is near to n and the other eigenvalue near to zero. The inconsistency of 
matrix could be shown from Consistency Index (CI), with equation: 
 
CI   =   (λmax   -  n) / (n  – 1)  
  
where  :  λmax   =   maximum eigenvalue  
  
129
                    n          =    the matrix size  
 
 For each size of matrix n, random matrices are generated, and their mean CI 
value, called the random index (RI), is computed. According to the Saaty on his 
calculation with 500 samples, if numerical “judgment” in random from scale 1/9, 1/8, 
… 1, 2… 9, then it could give consistency average of matrix as stated in Table 2.11. 
The comparison between CI and RI of a matrix be defined as Consistency Ratio (CR) 
   
 CR   =   CI  /  RI 
 
In the AHP, the matrix comparison could be used if the value of Consistency Ratio 
(CR)  < 0.1. This allowing with inconsistencies is a major strength of the AHP 
(Hummel JM, et al, 2001: 45). 
 
Table 2.11: Matrix size vs. Random Consistency  
 
Matrix Size 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 
Random 
Consistency 
0.00 0.00 0.58 0.90 1.12 1.24 1.32 1.41 1.45 1.49 1.51 1.48 1.56 1.57 1.59 
 
 
 
2.3.2.3.   Choosing an Appropriate Method 
 
As already discussed in section 2.1.2, in the entire phases of petroleum E&P 
operation, from exploration, development and production phase petroleum company 
faces uncertainties and risks, from geological, costs, technological, price, fiscal, 
contract to political risk and others. When it fails to discover commercial discovery, 
the petroleum company bears all the risks. In the case it discovers commercial 
petroleum production; it gets benefit as the result of their activities. Due to many 
aspects influencing the petroleum E&P operation above, in identifying the petroleum 
companies’ views with respect to the most desirable contract system that could 
attract petroleum companies to invest in petroleum E&P venture in Indonesia is 
complex and have multiple criteria both physical / objective and psychological / 
subjective aspects.  
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In his research about priority setting in agricultural biotechnology research, 
Braunschweig (2000:26-32) compared the AHP method with four other methods that 
have been developed for establishing research priorities; they are scoring, cost-
benefit analysis, mathematical programming, and simulation models. He defined 
priority in research is the process of ranking different research alternatives, while 
decision making is the process of choosing a set of alternatives.   
 
In scoring model, criteria that reflect the objectives of the subject are defined 
and weighted by decision makers, and then the alternatives are scored according to 
each criterion by using a discrete scale. These scores are then multiplied by each 
criterion weight. The ordinal ranking of alternatives can serve as a basis for 
allocation. Several advantages of scoring model are it relatively easy to apply, it 
facilitates the integration of multiple objectives and the model can cope with both 
qualitative and quantitative criteria. 
 
While cost-benefit analysis usually utilize the concept of economic surpluses, 
whether explicitly or implicitly. Supply and demand curves in market framework can 
be used to explain its basic principles. Technology innovation generated by research 
will shift the supply curve to the right. This shift denotes benefits that can be 
measured as net changes in consumer and producer surpluses. To calculate the net 
benefit, the benefit compared with the cost, which the estimation can be expressed as 
an IRR, NPV or a cost benefit ratio. To accommodate uncertainty, expected values 
need to be estimated based on different assumptions or probability distribution. Cost 
benefit analysis method is useful for estimating the economic consequences of 
different research activities. The limitation of this method is all costs and benefits are 
expressing in monetary terms only.  
 
Mathematical programming is an optimisation for guiding the allocation of 
limited resources. The basic approach is to formulate an objective function that is 
maximised subject to certain constraint, such as funding, human resources or 
institutional capacity. Mathematical programming can be used to illustrate the trade 
offs among objectives and to analyse the implications of changing constraints. May 
be due to the considerable analytical skill required for proper formulation of the 
model, time consuming process (the effort needed to collect and process data is 
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similar to that required of benefit-cost and scoring models plus additional time 
needed to design, test and run the model), only a few application of programming 
method are reported in the literature. 
 
Simulation models are based on principles of production economics. They 
estimate the functional relationship between input (such as research investment) and  
output (such as agriculture production). Through modelling the agriculture 
production sector or part of it, simulation model usually operate on a higher 
aggregate level. A production function may be used to represent the econometric 
relationship between agriculture productivity and research expenditures and 
additional determining factors. The effects of various research expenditures on 
productivity are simulated and translated the result into a supply curve shift that 
illustrated its economic consequences. Simulation models are very flexible and can 
be used to analyse the wider impact of research investments, but the process need 
substantial time and skill for collecting the detail data and determining the 
mathematical relationship to build the model and the econometric relationships is 
based on time series data that are not readily available. 
 
With respect to three key requirements i.e. participation, transparency, and a 
standardised measurement procedure, Braunschweig evaluated those methods above. 
Under cost benefit analysis, mathematical programming and simulation models all 
place analyst at the centre of priority setting process, consequently these models have 
a low potential for active participation. Methodological complexity of simulation 
models and mathematical programming results in poor transparency, while cost 
benefit analysis and scoring model are fairly transparency, due to those two models 
the process of generating the model is easily understood. Cost benefit analysis 
focuses on the economic impact of the research, simulation models can take into 
account a wider range of research effects, but they do not provide ranking of research 
project. Both mathematical programming and scoring models can incorporate many 
different effects, including qualitative effects. Braunschweig concluded that among 
four models only scoring model fits all the requirements imposed by complexity of 
biotechnology decision making, however the different methods are not mutually 
exclusive, such as the outcome of a benefit cost analysis could used as input for 
scoring model, or a simple integer programming approach could be used to allocate 
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the resources based on the priorities generated by the scoring model. However the 
scoring model has limitation, i.e. its high cost due to the considerable amount of time 
needed for scientist and other participants in the process, and the absence of a sound 
theoretical framework. Another limitations are based on the lack of theoretical basis 
of scoring model, there is no procedure to prevent double counting due to 
overlapping criteria, to translate the differently measured (quantitative) impact and 
verbally expressed (qualitative) impact into meaningful scores to aggregate the 
scores across all these criteria, taking into account their different weight. The AHP 
has the potential to overcome this deficiency (see subsection 2.3.2.1). Therefore in 
his research Braunschweig used the AHP method. 
 
To identify the most desirable petroleum contract system is analogue with 
priority setting that had been done by Braunschweig above. In his study, 
Braunschweig made a priority setting the alternatives of agriculture biotechnology 
research, while this study made priority setting the alternatives petroleum contract 
system. Moreover Nguyen (2003) also succeeded in using AHP in prioritisation 
methods for defence planning. Looking at the advantages of the AHP method 
mentioned above, this study valued that AHP method in the benefit-cost-risk 
framework was appropriate to identify the petroleum companies’ views, which is the 
most desirable petroleum contract that is suitable with the current Indonesia’s 
geological potential as well as the economic, social and political conditions 
respectively.  
 
 
 
2.3.2.4. Developing the Model for Identifying the Companies’ Views with 
Respect to the Most Desirable Petroleum Contract System 
  
Any decision has several favourable and unfavourable concerns to consider. 
The favourable impacts are called the benefits and the unfavourable impacts are 
called the costs. The uncertain concerns of a decision are the positive opportunities 
that the decision might create and the negative risks that can entail (Saaty, 2001:93).  
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Saaty suggests the use of separate hierarchy for these three concerns, the 
benefit hierarchy structure, the cost hierarchy structure and the risk hierarchy 
structure, with the same alternatives on the bottom level of each. Hence one obtains 
three priority vectors, a benefit priority vector, a cost priority vector and a risk 
priority vector. The weightings of benefit, cost and risk criteria were calculated 
through the comparison of the mean score of each combination of the benefit criteria, 
the cost criteria and the risk criteria. Then the (benefit / (cost x risk) vector is 
obtained with the highest ratio indicating the preferred alternative (Saaty, 2001:43).   
 
The first step of the analysis was to set up the goal of the AHP analysis. The 
goal was to identify the most desirable petroleum contract system in the views of 
petroleum companies that could attracts petroleum companies to invest in upstream 
petroleum E&P venture in Indonesia.  
 
As already noted earlier, the decision-making process in investing money in 
petroleum E&P faces complex situations; it does not only depend on geological 
potential but it also depends on many uncertainties and risks. To achieve successful 
petroleum E&P investment, prior to bidding and negotiating a petroleum contract, 
petroleum company would take several analyses carefully a number of elements into 
account and evaluate them under different scenarios such as geological potential, 
variation of petroleum prices, costs, technology needed, contract terms, risks of the 
prospect and others. The objective is to maximise revenues in each scenario.  
 
When a petroleum company works as a contractor for the national owned 
company or government agent on behalf of the host government, due to total profit 
must be shared between the petroleum company and the host government, then the 
petroleum company be entitled to receive the petroleum company’s share of profit 
and the cost recovery. As the share of profit comes from production multiplies price, 
while production profile can be search from the geological potential of the 
basin/area/country be offered. A rise in geological potential of the basin/area/country 
means the higher the opportunity to get the benefit and the higher return of 
investment might be, and possibly could yield higher attractiveness on investment 
opportunity.  
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The geological potential could be estimated based on criteria: reserves (R) 
include two aspects remaining discovered reserve and estimate undiscovered reserve, 
total reserve addition (TRA), current production (CP) and reserve to production ratio 
(R/P). As shown in Table 2.12, the reserve (R) is defined as reserves that has already 
been discovered but has not been produced (remaining discovered reserves) plus the 
potential amount of undiscovered reserves in the basin/area/field/ country. Total 
reserve addition (TRA) is the total reserves addition in the last several years proved 
as well as probable in the basin/area/field/ country. While the latest data of annual 
petroleum production represents the current production (CP) of the basin/area/field/ 
country; and reserves to annual production ratio (R/P) is the ratio between the size of 
reserve to the size of annual production of the basin/area/field/ country disregarding 
production declines or any reserve growth, it shows the number of years of future 
production at current production rates. Those four aspects could be joined in the 
Benefit Hierarchy Structure (see Figure 2.17).  
 
Table 2.12: Definition of criteria in petroleum E&P venture  
    
A. Benefit 
Reserves (R) proved and 
potential 
The reserves that has already been discovered but has not been produced 
(remaining discovered reserves plus the potential amount of undiscovered 
reserves) in that basin/area/field/ country. 
Total Reserve Addition 
(TRA) 
Total reserve addition in the last several years (TRA) proved as well as 
probable (P+P) 
Current Production (CP)  The latest data of annual petroleum production.   
Reserve/Production Ratio 
(R/P)  
Reserves/annual production ratio. R/P ratio disregards production declines 
or any reserve growth shows the number of years of future production at 
current production rates 
B. Cost 
Cost Risk (CR)  
 
Cost expenses plus increasing costs vary irregularly due to unpredicted 
operational issues such as unexpected side effects that decrease the quality 
of environment during operation; longer in contract and project approval 
process; legal issues; community relation; government relation; security of 
assets, people and ownership; manpower regulation and relation; 
interference from other government agencies; infrastructures; delay in 
operations, security and others. 
Geological Risk (GR)  The possibility of failure in exploration result activity and failure in 
technology chosen. 
C. Risk 
Price Risk (PR) Happens because demand may go up or fall at some point in time either 
because of a change in demand behaviour or because of new sources of 
supply (market risk), and because price may vary irregularly. 
Fiscal Risk (FR)  Occurs due to changes in the fiscal terms such as tax, inflation, or others. 
Contract Risk (CoR)  
 
Happens due to unpredicted revision in the contract element, confusing 
about the contract content or non-performance of one party  
Political Risk (PoR)  
 
Happens due to changes in the political condition, either by having a new 
party in power or by some type of coup, election, implementation of new 
regulation and others. 
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Figure 2.17: The Benefit Hierarchy Structure of petroleum E&P venture 
 
After signed the contract, during exploration phase activities, immediately the 
petroleum company must expense costs for exploration activities and faces 
increasing costs irregularly (CR). While the chance in exploration activities to 
discover commercial petroleum deposit is very low, the risk associates with the 
probability exploration does not find a commercial deposit is known as geological 
risk (GR). Geological risk and cost risk will be entailed immediately in the operation, 
so these two aspects could be joined in the Cost Hierarchy Structure (see Figure 
2.18).  
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2.18: The Cost Hierarchy Structure of petroleum E&P venture 
  
After discovery geological risks begin to diminish; in contrast price risk, 
market risk, fiscal risk, contract risk, political risk intensify during development and 
production phase of the life cycle of the venture.  Price and market risk could be 
COST
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The Goal: to identify the most desirable contract system in the views of petroleum companies that 
could attract petroleum companies to invest in petroleum E&P venture in Indonesia. 
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The Goal: to identify the most desirable contract system in the views petroleum companies that 
could attract petroleum companies to invest in petroleum E&P venture in Indonesia.   
BENEFIT
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joined together into price risks. Those four criteria: Price Risk (PR), Fiscal Risk 
(FR), Contract Risk (CoR) and Political Risk (PoR) could be joined in the Risk 
Hierarchy Structure (see Figure 2.19).  
   
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
  
Figure 2.19: The Risk Hierarchy Structure of petroleum E&P venture 
 
Evaluating the benefits that might be obtained in investing in E&P venture in 
Indonesia is done through scoring from 1 to 7 in order of its importance impact to 
increase the benefit stream of the venture (Note 7 is the most important and 1 is the 
least important) of the four criteria of the benefit hierarchy structure, with the 
assumption that all parameters below exist in the recent Indonesia’s condition. The 
cost hierarchy valuation is also done through scoring from 1 to 7 in order of its 
importance of those two cost criteria above in making additional cost or reducing the 
revenue. Similar to those two hierarchy structures above, the valuation of risk also 
through scoring from 1 to 7 in the order of its importance of the four risk criteria in 
making additional risk or reducing the revenues.  
 
As already mentioned earlier in Chapter 1 there is no standard format for any 
petroleum contract type categories and each may contain some of the characteristics 
of the other. Lan (1990: 1), Gao (1993: 10) and Johnston (1994:21-27) categorised 
the petroleum contract system into three main systems: concessionary or royalty and 
tax system (RAT), production-sharing contract (PSC) and risk service contract 
(RSC). In addition to three contract types above, Gao added hybrid contract that 
combined RAT and PSC system into one system, while Johnston (1994:21-27) added 
pure service contract, rate of return contract and joint venture. Joint venture and rate 
RISK
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(PR) 
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of return contract can utilise RAT, PSC or RSC systems. Pure service contract is 
rarely applied in petroleum E&P venture. Moreover Indonesian PSC has three 
variations, they include technical assistance contract, joint operating agreement run 
by a joint operating body and enhanced oil recovery contract; however, all of these 
types were still PSC systems (Johnston, 1994: 21-27). Meanwhile ESCAP (1984: 14 
– 21) categorised taxation in mineral E&P venture into fixed fee; specific or ad 
valorem duty (royalty); income tax applied at higher rate than other industries; 
progressive profits tax; the resources rent tax and brown tax; as a variant of them; or 
combination of two or more of them. All of these ESCAP contract types are RAT 
contracts with variation of taxation.  
 
Abadeer (1993:69-113) categorised the natural resources E&P contracts into 
operated by public company; service contract; cash bonus contract and RAT 
contract. In the RAT contracts there are 6 variants contract types, which include 
traditional RAT contract, royalty plus cash bonus bidding contract as well as mixed 
RAT contract, profit sharing contract, resources rent contract and PSC. Currently, 
coal-mining contract in Indonesia applies contract of work system (COW). This 
system is analogue to RAT system in petroleum sector, since the ownership of the 
resources is on the contractor side. While in agricultural sector, since a long time ago 
there are three main contract forms, which include direct cultivation, fixed rents 
tenancy, and sharecropping system. Compares to natural resources contracts, the 
direct cultivation is equivalent to operate by public company, fixed rent tenancy to 
RAT and sharecropping is equivalent to PSC (Bindemann, 1999:31). 
 
Looking back to the petroleum industry development in Indonesia, since its 
first discovery until 1963, Indonesia’s oil industry was operated under the traditional 
RAT system. In 1963 it was then changed to Contract of Work, while 1966 up to 
present it applied PSC system. Indonesia objected the traditional RAT system, since 
under the RAT system, the exclusive right given to the petroleum company was an 
almost unrestricted right and exorbitant privileges; the government granted 
petroleum company the right to explore the prospect, drill, extract, refine, carry 
away, export and sell the petroleum produced (Gao, 1993:29).  
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The development of the RAT system showed that currently this system had 
transformed into modern system that contained numerous fiscal devices, layers of 
taxation, and sophisticated formulae and others. As example, Thailand’s modern 
RAT system was relatively generous and simple arrangement in terms of form, 
content and administration. In this system, beside royalty and taxes, there were a 
number special advantage clauses that must be provided to the government by the 
concessionaire, such as a government right to purchase oil on first priority basis, 
preference to local goods and service, signature bonus, annual bonus, domestic 
supply, preference for domestic services, employment and training, government 
participation and others.  
 
According to Gao (1993: 71 – 112), Thailand Modern RAT system serves as 
a useful tool for attracting foreign petroleum companies to invest in the developing 
countries with unproven petroleum potential, geographically isolated exploration 
areas such as frontier, remote and deep-water areas, little capital, technology and 
others. As currently Indonesia has very weak financial capacity to invest in high-risk 
petroleum E&P investment and must attract investor in high-risk exploration 
investment in frontier areas, the modern RAT system may serve as a useful device to 
attract foreign direct investment in the geographically isolated exploration frontier 
areas. That is why beside the current PSC system, the modern RAT and RSC system 
are chosen as the alternatives, which will be investigated in this analysis. 
 
Answering two questions of each comparison between two alternatives 
contract system drew pair wise comparisons among alternatives. As an example:  
• The first question in comparison judgment between RAT and RSC under 
Indonesia’s Reserves (R) condition is: To reach the objective of attracting 
investor to invest in petroleum E&P industry in Indonesia, under Indonesia’s 
Reserves (R) condition, which is more important/desirable, RAT or RSC system?  
• If the answer of the first question is that RAT is more important than RSC, then 
the second question is: Under Indonesia’s Reserves (R) condition, how much 
more important/desirable is RAT over RSC (or RSC over RAT, in the case of 
RSC more important than RAT)?  
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The pair wise comparisons were done for all those criteria above. The 
respondent’s judgment, opinion and pair wise comparisons between variables and 
alternatives of petroleum contracts were collected through the same questionnaires as 
mentioned in Appendix A. 
 
The results of the questionnaires were processed with Expert Choice 2000 
second edition software from Expert Choice, Pittsburgh PA. First for the benefit 
hierarchy structure, the cost hierarchy and then the risk hierarchy structure followed 
it. The weightings of benefit, cost and risk criteria were calculated through the 
comparison of the average score of each combination of the benefit critera, the cost 
criteria and the risk critera. The rating vector of Benefits / (Costs x Risks) was used to 
weight the corresponding vectors of priorities of the alternatives and to obtain the 
overall ranking of the alternatives. The highest score of alternative contract system 
was the most desirable alternative contract system on the petroleum companies’ 
views. Then, as a final step, sensitivity analyses were drawn. 
 
 
 
2.4.    Investment Climate of the Petroleum Business in Indonesia 
 
World Bank (2004:1 - 2) defines the investment climate as the set of location-
specific factors shaping the opportunities and incentives for all companies (from 
individual farmers and micro entrepreneurs to local manufacturing company and 
multinationals) to invest productively, create jobs, and expand The companies’ 
decisions to invest will depend largely on the way government policies and 
behaviours shape the investment climate in those locations. A good investment 
climate not only generates companies’ profits by minimising costs and risks, but also 
improves the outcome for society as a whole. Improving the investment climate 
drives the growth of the society and reduces poverty.    
 
Government policies and behaviours make a strong influence in shaping the 
investment climate through their impact on costs, risks, and barriers to competitions. 
Therefore government needs to tackle those three criteria in creating a better 
investment climate. Although the governments have limited influence on geography 
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aspect, they have more significant influence on the security of property rights, 
approaches to regulation and taxation, the condition of infrastructure, the functioning 
of finance and labour markets and broader governance features such as corruption 
and others (World Bank, 2004: 4). 
 
The costs of doing business can be influenced by government policies and 
behaviours. As example, increasing tax rates might increase the costs of doing 
business. Governments also have important roles in providing public goods, 
supporting the provision of infrastructure, and others. Weakness in government 
performance in these roles can greatly increase the costs of doing business and make 
many potential opportunities unprofitable. As example, the result of World Bank 
(2004: 4-5) survey on investment climate of some countries showed that the costs of 
contract enforcement difficulties, inadequate in infrastructure, crime, corruption and 
regulation can amount to over 25% of the sale, or more than three times what 
companies typically pay in taxes. Both the level and composition of these costs vary 
widely across countries. 
 
Government policies uncertainty, macroeconomics instability, and arbitrary 
regulation can raise the risks of opportunities and freeze incentives to invest. But 
governments have important role in reducing the risks by maintain a stable and 
secure environment, including by protecting property right (World Bank, 2004).  
 
Investment climates vary not only across countries but also within countries 
because of differences in the way national policies are administered and in the 
policies and behaviours of sub national governments. Even within single location, the 
same conditions can affect companies differently depending on the activity they 
engaged in and their size, often hitting small and informal companies the hardest. 
Hence creating good investment climates are the responsibilities not only central 
government, but also local government and business community as well. 
 
Petroleum companies are facing unprecedented pressure to explore and 
produce new reserves. With demand at an all-time high and increasing pressure to 
spend profits, companies are looking around the world for opportunities. Investment 
climate was one aspect analysed in looking at the world for opportunities. 
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The changes of laws and policies are needed to improve the investment 
climate, not only on the formal policies improvements, but also more importantly on 
the implementation of these policies in practice. Over 90% of companies in 
developing countries report gaps between formal policies and what happens in the 
implementation (World Bank, 2004: 6).  
 
Indonesia has similar experiences. As example, in improving the investment 
climate the GOI announced three new laws: the Law No 22 of 1999 that give greater 
authority to regional governments to manage their internal affair, the Law No 25 of 
1999 that addressed sharing or allocation of revenue between the central and regional 
governments and the Oil and Gas Law No. 22 of 2001 which replaced the 1960 Oil 
and Gas Law and Law of Pertamina No. 8 of 1971. This Oil and Gas Law eliminates 
Pertamina’s responsibility for administering the upstream petroleum sector to the 
government agent (BP Migas) and downstream sector to Badan Pengatur (BHP 
Migas). Although the objectives of these laws are very good, but in their 
implementation there has been uncertainty over details of the implementation of 
regulations that must be resolved immediately. 
 
From his study about the Indonesian PSC during 1966 to 1999 period 
focusing on the implementation of management clause, Machmud (2000:183) found 
some problems occurred in the execution of management clause of the Indonesian 
PSC such as bureaucracy, tendering rule, the role of BPPKA/Pertamina, the RPTK 
process on personnel management, crypto taxes, the mark up myth, and others. As 
opposed to China and Malaysia, Indonesia had x factor that created difficulties for 
investor to calculate cost and profitability. He said that if this x factor left unchecked, 
latter situation would prove extremely damaging to the attractiveness of Indonesian 
petroleum business.  
 
Machmud (2000:189-190) suggested that there were some issues in 
Indonesian PSC which needed improvement, including the improvement in 
Indonesia’s investment climate in general and especially for petroleum, addressing 
seriously all contractors complaints and resolving problems as earliest as possible. 
PSC contractual provision should be upheld. The involvement of Pertamina should 
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be restricted to approval of work program and budget and should not include 
involvement in contractor internal affairs, such as personnel matters, expatriate work 
permits, and control by Pertamina should be through post audit. In addition, a forum 
should be created for serious periodic discussion, where appropriate, so any 
controversial issues can be resolved at the earliest time. 
 
In facing the 2001 Oil and Gas Law with the aimed to gain understanding on 
the senior executives’ views on the future of petroleum industry in Indonesia and 
problems that contributed to the operational constraint, PriceWaterHouseCoopers 
(2002) conducted a survey to the senior executives of the petroleum companies 
operating in Indonesia, in which 11 senior executives responded to the survey. Some 
results (Table 2.13) showed that geological potential of Indonesia had been strong 
positive aspect supporting investor in to oil and gas activities; with 1.7 score (the 
most attractive feature). It was followed by the existing PSC framework with 2.6 
score, even though they expected that improvements be made on commercial terms 
of PSC by additional incentives for development of gas resources. Hence Indonesia 
remained attractive in terms of geological potential and PSC contract framework. In 
contrast respondents valued the regulatory framework was the least attractive (score 
4.5).  
 
The survey also found there were ten most important issues faced by the oil 
and gas industry. The five most important issues were confusion as to the roles of the 
central, provincial and regional governments; interference from other government 
agencies, such as the tax authorities; corruption, collusion and nepotism; community 
relations; and security of assets, people and ownership rights. They agreed that the 
major issues urgently in need of improvements were those related to security, legal 
certainty and contract sanctity. In the absence of legal certainty and contract sanctity 
investors would have difficulties in evaluating the investment prospect in Indonesia. 
 
In order to understand the implementation of those laws, in the questionnaire 
PriceWaterHouseCoopers asked the CEOs respondents opinions about the 
implementation of those laws. The result showed, 70% of respondent agreed that 
there were confusion between the role of central, provincial and regional 
government. They also agreed that these issues could be resolved, 25% in year 2003 
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and another 75% in year 2004 and beyond. When respondents were asked about the 
opportunity of interference from other governmental agency in their petroleum E&P 
activities, 80% of respondents agreed that there was interference from the other 
government agency. As PriceWaterHouseCoopers (2002) survey suggested the 
urgent need for improved investment climate included ensuring continued 
acknowledgement of contract sanctity, elimination of operational constraint such as 
providing security protection of asset, and maintaining legal certainty. 
 
Table 2.13: The rank of parameter for petroleum investment in Indonesia 
(PriceWaterHouse Coopers, 2002)  
  
Parameter Score 
Geological potential 1.7 
The existing PSC Framework 2.6 
Trained Workforce 3.4 
Foreign Ownership Regulatory 3.5 
Contract and Project Approval Process 3.6 
Infrastructure 4.1 
Regulatory Framework 4.5 
 Note: 1 = most attractive, 5 = least attractive 
 
Although President Megawati made important strides in maintaining 
domestic political stability, improving the economy, and routing out domestic 
terrorists; which encouraged greater confidence in the economy during the first half 
of 2003, she made much less progress in improving Indonesia's troubled investment 
climate. Existing and potential investors cite a number of concerns with respect to 
Indonesia's investment climate, including security, the lack of legal certainty, 
prolonged contract negotiations, confusion over regional autonomy policies and 
fiscal decentralization, and tax and labour issues (US Embassy, 2004:1).  
  
Moreover, according to IMF (2004), the Indonesia’s investment climate in 
2003 was similar to what mentioned above. The regulatory environment for doing 
business in Indonesia was considered to be less conducive than in neighbouring 
countries. Based on the database of the World Bank’s Doing Business Database that 
provided indicators of the cost of doing business by focusing on regulations that 
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enhance or constrain business investment, productivity and growth; starting a 
business in Indonesia required more procedures and time than in neighbouring 
countries (as well as to the broader averages in Asia). Legal, institutional, and 
governance indicators for Indonesia compared unfavourably to neighbouring 
countries. Measures of the quality of public institutions, government efficiency, and 
the regulatory environment place Indonesia near the bottom of all countries ranked, 
and consistently below neighbouring countries. For example, Transparency 
International’s Corruption Perception Index ranks Indonesia 122 out of 133 
countries, well below its peers.  
 
IMF (2004) also reported that preliminary results of a joint World Bank-
Asian Development Bank private investment climate study, based on responses of 
400 companies mainly in Java, suggested that investors were most concerned about 
macroeconomic instability, policy uncertainty, and corruption. Other important 
concerns include tax rates and tax administration, cost of financing, the legal system, 
labour regulations and electricity. Moreover the survey Regional Autonomy Watch 
identified illegal fees as a major problem of doing business in Indonesia, while a 
Japanese Bank for International Cooperation (JBIC) study noted that Indonesia had 
slipped to the sixth largest recipient of Japanese investment in 2003 (from fourth 
place in 2000), as Vietnam and India took the fourth and fifth places, respectively. 
The study cited the key factors discouraging investment as the unstable political and 
social conditions, the local labour difficulties as well as currency and price stability. 
Is there any improvement in Indonesia’s investment climate in 2004? 
  
 
 
CHAPTER 3 
 
 
 
METHODOLOGY 
 
 
 
As noted earlier in Chapter 1 there are four objectives of the study. The 
methodologies used to reach these four objectives are presented in the following 
order: 
3.1. Methodology to evaluate the commercial performance of the Indonesian PSC 
during 1966 to 2003 period, 
3.1.1. Data collection, data set, population and sampling framework, 
3.1.2. Assumption and analysis. 
3.2. Methodologies to identify some PSC variables need to be improved as 
incentives, 
3.2.1. Methodology to identify the impact of the application of incentives 
package 5 and respondent proposed terms on improvement some PSC 
Variables, 
3.2.1.2. Data collection, data set, population and sampling framework, 
3.2.1.3. Assumption and analysis. 
3.2.2. Methodology to identify the impact of some PSC variables changes and 
some Petroleum E&P Variables Changes, 
3.2.2.1. Data collection, data set, population and sampling framework, 
3.2.2.2. Assumption and analysis. 
3.2.3. Methodology to identify the impact of tax consolidation application in 
frontier areas, 
3.2.3.1. Single commercial contract analysis, 
3.2.3.2. Aggregate combined contracts analysis. 
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3.3. Methodology to identify the petroleum companies’ views with respect to the 
most desirable petroleum contract system. 
3.4. Methodology to identify which aspects of petroleum investment climate needs 
to be improved. 
 
 
 
3.1. Methodology to Evaluate the Commercial Performance of the Indonesian 
Production Sharing Contracts 
 
Given profitability is the petroleum company’s main concern, while on the 
other hand the government net income is the host government’s main concern, thus 
the revenues from the petroleum E&P business should be sufficient to meet both 
interests. These two should be balanced. The balance between risks and rewards and 
the division of benefits between parties of the Indonesian PSC contract was analysed 
used the principal-agent model theory framework that incorporating incentive 
structures and risk-reward sharing (sub section 2.1.1 thru 2.1.3). Concerning this 
model means the reservation utility of the petroleum company that can be replaced 
by the rate of return of the petroleum company (contractor) expects from a 
comparable project elsewhere has to be known and, at very least matched. At the 
same time due the host government want to guarantee can receive maximum revenue 
from the venture, therefore the host government has to solve the incentive constraint. 
The utility from working hard (to perform the contract) should be no less than the 
utility from shirking; it means the profit resulted from the working hard case has to 
be higher than that resulted from shirking case. For that reason the host government 
has to pay the petroleum company x units above his reservation utility for the 
contract to be optimal. The valuation of the commercial performances of the 
application of Indonesian PSC contracts since its first application in 1966 to 2003 
period on the parties’ views was drawn based on this principle.  
 
The rate of return of the contractor was represented by the contractor’s 
NPV@15%, IRR, contractor take (ratio contractor entitlement to gross revenues) and 
POT. In this analysis the discount rate to calculate the NPV was set at 15%. While 
the contractor’s IRR was compared with the minimum required rate of return of 
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petroleum investment as suggested by Jones for evaluating petroleum venture as 
follows: 
High risk     :  30% - 40%  
Medium risk:  20% - 30% 
  Low risk      :  15% - 25% 
From the view host government revenue was represented by GOI take (ratio total 
GOI take to gross revenues). 
 
Evaluation of the representative commercial performance of the application 
of the Indonesian PSC system requires the same contract’s type, time frame of 
operation as well as the size of operation years, type of production and the same 
range of production rate of the contracts. Based on their historical operation years, 
the contracts samples were categorised into three categories, they were 10 years, 20 
years and 30 years of operation respectively. Within each operation year they were 
categorised into contract type, production type and production rate.  
  
In this study, the commercial performances of the Indonesian PSC application 
were analysed based on the contract type, operation years as well as production type, 
production rate and by location work area of the contract respectively. 
 
As noted earlier in Chapter 2, since its first application, there had been 
several generations of Indonesian PSC, from PSC first generation (PSC1, 1966-
1975), PSC second generation (PSC2, 1976 – July 1988), to PSC third generation 
(August 1988 – recent). Additionally, there were 5 incentive packages inside PSC3, 
which included the Incentive Package 1 (IP1, August 1988 – February 1989), 
Incentive Package 2 (IP2, March 1989 – July 1992), Incentive Package 3 (IP3, 
August 1992 – December 1993), Incentive Package 4 (IP4, 1994 - 2002), and the 
newest, Incentive Package 5 (IP5, 2003 - recent). Each generation had its time frame 
around 10 years, except the PSC third generation with its five incentive packages, 
which had more than 15 years time frame. It was difficult to search the detail 
contents of all 257 PSC contracts; therefore in this analysis it was assumed that the 
contracts could be categorised based on the time frame they were signed. For 
example PSC contracts signed between 1966 and 1975 period was of PSC1 type; 
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contracts signed between 1976 and July 1988 period belonged to PSC2 type and so 
on. 
 
Based on the type of hydrocarbon produced, the PSC contracts could be 
categorised as oil producing only, gas producing only or oil and gas producing 
contracts. While based on production rate, the PSC contracts could be categorised 
into five field sizes. They were: 
(a) Small Field: field with production rate less than 10 thousand barrels oil per day 
(MBOPD) for oil or less than 10 thousand oil equivalent per day (MBOEPD) 
for oil and gas. 
(b) Medium Field: field with production rate between 10 – 50 MBOPD/MBOEPD.  
(c) Large Field: field with production rate between 50 – 100 MBOPD/MBOEPD. 
(d) Very Large Field: field with production rate over 100 MBOPD/MBOEPD. 
(e) Extra Large Field: field with production rate over 200 MBOPD/MBOEPD. 
 
Geographically, the contracts can be classified based on the work area of 
petroleum E&P operation, namely western-part and eastern-part of Indonesia. 
Sumatra, Natuna, Java, Kalimantan islands and their surrounding ocean are classified 
as western-part of Indonesia, while starting from the east of 200 m offshore 
Kalimantan in Makasar Strait to Bali, Lombok, Maluku and Irian Jaya islands and 
their surrounding ocean are classified as eastern-part of Indonesia work area. In 
addition, the contracts can also be classified based on onshore and offshore locations 
of the contracts. Petroleum E&P activities in the land or island is called onshore 
work operation while the petroleum E&P activities in water such as river and ocean 
are called offshore work operation.  
 
 
 
3.1.1. Data Collection, Data set, Population and Sampling Framework 
 
The data collection was performed by primary data and secondary data. The 
primary data were collected from historical financial & non-financial data of 
petroleum contractors that were active in Indonesia during 1966 – 2003 periods from 
unpublished BP Migas and Pertamina databases while the secondary data were 
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collected from various publications including official and unofficial reports from BP 
Migas, Pertamina, US Embassy Jakarta Petroleum Report and others, books, journal, 
as well as research papers and articles, which were published, unpublished or 
presented in various seminars and others. 
 
Since its first application in 1966 to 2003, there were 257 PSC contracts 
signed in Indonesia (see Table 3.1). Out of these, only 32 PSC contracts (12% of 
total 257 PSC contracts) produced commercially, 73 contracts were still in 
exploration phase and the remaining 152 contracts were already terminated.  
 
Table 3.1: PSC contracts signed during 1966 – 2003 based on contract type 
 
No Time Frame /  Total Indonesia 
  Contract type Producing NonProd.active Terminate Total 
1 PSC1 18   41 59 
2 PSC2 8(1)* 3 53 64(1)* 
3 PSC3+IP1   1 5 6 
4 PSC3+IP2 3 5 25 33 
5 PSC3+IP3 3(2)* 4 2 9(2)* 
6 PSC3+IP4   44 26 70 
7 PSC3+IP5   16   16 
  Total 32(3)* 73 152 257(3)* 
   Note:   * (..)  number in bracket was the number of extended contract 
 
Out of these 32 producing contracts, three contracts were the extension of the 
COW system; they were extended to one PSC2 contract and two PSC3+IP3 contracts 
(see Table 3.2). As a result only 29 new producing PSC contracts (11% of total 
contract) are active recently. Moreover, five producing contracts did not have 
complete and accurate financial data; hence, they could not be used as samples. Thus 
only 24 contracts were used as the data set to identify the commercial performances 
of the producing PSC contracts.  
 
Table 3.2: Producing PSC contracts during 1966 – 2003 based on contract type  
 
 PSC1 PSC2 PSC3+IP2 PSC3+IP3 Total 
Total Producing PSC contracts 18 8 3 3 32 
Extension of COW  1  2 3 
Population 18 7 3 1 29 
Data do not complete 3  2  5 
Can be used as samples 15 7 1 1 24 
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Samples were taken from those 24 contracts. Entire data set that had 30 years, 
20 years and 10 operation years were analysed and categorised by contract type, 
operation years, production type and production rate, as explained previously. 
Additionally, especially to evaluate the commercial performance of each work area 
as one field, entire historical data of PSC contracts, including producing, non-
producing and terminated contracts, in each area during 1966 – 2003 period were 
combined as one field, as representative of each work area. 
 
 
 
3.1.2. Assumption and Analysis 
 
The financial model of the PSC contracts followed the Indonesian PSC 
financial model as shown in Chapter 2 section 2.2.3. The independent variables were 
the expenditures, production, prices profiles of the field; the dependent variables 
were the NPV, IRR, as well as contractor take, POT and GOI take respectively. 
While the PSC variables, i.e. the first tranche petroleum (FTP), investment credit, 
contractor production sharing split, DMO holiday price and tax rate were the changes 
variables. Cash flow analysis was used to evaluate the commercial performances of 
the producing PSC contracts on the views of both parties, the PSC contractor and the 
GOI, and was analysed based on the contract type; operation years as well as 
production type and production rate of the PSC contract respectively.  
 
Some basic assumptions taken in the empirical cash flow analyses were: 
(a) Historical financial and non-financial data of the producing PSC contracts were 
used in the analyses. 
(b) To categorise the contract type based on the time frame when it was signed. 
(c) Each contract was treated as one field petroleum E&P operation. 
(d) In the case that the size of samples within a category was more than one, an 
average result is taken as the representative of this category. 
 
Especially to evaluate the commercial attractiveness of each work area, two 
cash flow analyses were done for each work area, which is western-part, eastern-part, 
onshore and offshore of Indonesia. The objective of the first analysis was to identify 
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the commercial attractiveness of contracts in each location area. Assumption taken 
was similar with basic assumption mentioned above. The commercial attractiveness 
of each location was taken from the mean of the result of analysis of samples on each 
location. The objective of the second analysis was to evaluate the commercial 
attractiveness of each location as one field. In addition to the basic assumptions 
above, other assumptions taken in this analysis were: 
(a) Each location was treated as one field petroleum operation. 
(b) Data were taken from historical financial and non financial data of entire PSC 
petroleum companies operated on each location included producing PSC 
contracts, non-producing actives and terminated PSC contracts during 1966 – 
2003 and combined as one field operation. 
 
The results were analysed based on the contractor’s NPV@15%, IRR, 
contractor take (ratio of contractor entitlement to gross revenues) and POT for the 
contractors’ point of view; and GOI take (ratio total GOI to gross revenues) for the 
GOI view. While the contractor’s IRR was compared with the minimum required 
rate of return of petroleum investment as suggested by Jones that already mentioned 
above.   
 
 
 
3.2. Methodologies to Identify Some PSC Variables need to be Improved as 
Incentives 
 
To identify some PSC variables need to be improved as incentives in raising 
the attractiveness of the Indonesian PSC system and in turn hopefully could increase 
the petroleum E&P investment level in Indonesia also used the principal-agent model 
theory framework that incorporating incentive structures and risk-reward sharing as 
noted in section 3.1. Under the premise that higher risk should be balanced with 
higher reward, the host government must be aware and accept that in the higher risks 
investment situation the government income can be lower. Higher risk investment 
needs more incentives to raise the reward, and incentives given should be based on 
reasonable economic and given on the whole life cycle of the venture. The host 
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government must consider these principles in decision-making policy in organising 
the petroleum contractual arrangement.   
 
The PSC variables to be analysed were the first tranche petroleum, the 
investment credit, as well as depreciation method in recovering the capital 
expenditures, the contractor production sharing split, the domestic market obligation 
price, the DMO holiday price and the tax rate respectively. 
 
As already noted, first tranche petroleum (FTP) is a portion of petroleum 
production taken firstly before any deduction of cost recovery and will be shared 
between GOI and contractor per year based on production sharing split as specified 
in the contract. The objective of the FTP is to guarantee the GOI income at 
production commencement. Before IP5 introduction in 2003, the FTP was set up at 
15% and shared between contractor and GOI with production sharing split as stated 
in the contract. Under the IP5, the FTP is decreased to 10 % but all are for the GOI 
benefit. In this case the FTP is similar to royalty payment. Decreasing FTP size is 
one of possible incentives since it will shorten time to recover the contractor 
expenditures. 
 
Investment credit allows the contractor to recover an additional percentage of 
capital costs through cost recovery. The credit is taken out of gross production before 
recovering the expenditures. It is subject to taxation and may be carried forward to 
succeeding years if it is not fully taken. Under the IP5 the investment credit is set up 
at 15.78% for conventional field and 102.14% for marginal field and frontier 
area/deep areas. Increasing the investment credit size is one of possible incentive in 
order to attract investor. 
 
The Indonesian PSC system allows capital expenditures to be recovered 
through five years double declining balance (DBBL) method. Loosening the 
depreciation method will shorten the time recover the capital expenditures. 
 
Production sharing split is the main term in PSC. Profit oil or profit gas is 
gross revenue less the FTP less cost recovery less investment credit. This profit is 
shared between the contractor and the GOI using the production split as specified in 
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the contract. The profit is also subjected to taxation. In PSC1, for conventional area, 
the contractor’s production sharing split (cpss) was set at 15%; the remaining 85% 
was for GOI. Under IP5, the cpss varies based on the geological condition, ranging 
from 20% to 35% for oil and from 35% to 40% for gas. Higher cpss logically will 
make higher profit for contractor, but consequently it will lower the GOI income.  
 
Government specifies a percentage of the contractor’s profit oil should be 
sold to the government at discounted price, called Domestic Market Obligation 
(DMO). The quantity of the DMO varies from contract to contract, provided that the 
pro rata quantity does not exceed 25% of contractor production share from its 
contract area. The goal of DMO is to give security for the oil and gas domestic 
supplies for the host country. The DMO price in the IP5 term was set up at 15% of 
export price for conventional field and 25% of export price for small (marginal) 
field. Increasing the DMO price is one possible incentive can be given. For the first 
five years oil production (new oil), the price of oil for DMO is set up as export price, 
it called DMO holiday price. The longer DMO holiday period gave will make higher 
income for contractor during its earlier of production; hence it can be one of possible 
incentive to attract investor.  
 
In 1995 the income tax rate were reduced to 30% of taxable income and 20% 
of dividend tax, which together make a total 44% of tax income rate. Decreasing the 
tax rate is one possible incentive can be given to attract investor. The methodologies 
are presented in the following sub sections. 
 
 
 
3.2.1. Methodology to Identify the Impact of Application of the Fifth Incentives 
Package and Respondents’ Proposed Terms on Improvement some PSC 
Variables  
 
3.2.1.1.   Data collection, Data set, Population and Sampling Framework     
 
Data collection and data set were similar as noted in section 3.1.1. The 
primary and secondary data collected were also from similar sources as noted in that 
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section. In addition to data above, the other primary data of the CEOs petroleum 
companies’ proposed terms on improving some PSC variables were collected 
through questionnaires.   
 
A survey through questionnaires involving CEOs of petroleum companies 
operating in Indonesia and petroleum experts was conducted. Three objectives of the 
questionnaires (see Appendix A) were as follows: 
(1) To collect the CEOs’ suggestions to improve some PSC variables. 
(2) To collect their judgment, opinion and pair wise comparisons of some 
benefits, costs and risks variables of the petroleum E&P business in 
Indonesia. 
(3) To collect their views about some investment climate variables of petroleum 
business in Indonesia. 
 
The results of item number (1) were used to identify the impact of the 
application of the CEOs’ proposed terms on the contractor’s profitability and GOI 
income and were compared with the results of the historical case and the application 
of the IP5 terms. The results of item number (2) were used on the benefit-cost-risk 
analysis with AHP presented in section 3.3 below. The results of item number (3) 
were used to identify some variables of Indonesia’s investment climate discussed in 
section 3.4 below. 
 
Before distributing the questionnaire, we had sent the questionnaire’s draft to 
four petroleum experts, to get their comments in improving it. Two of them 
responded and gave comments in improving the questionnaire. The improved 
questionnaire was distributed to the respondents. 
 
Two groups of respondents were chosen:  
(a) The Chief Executive Officers (CEOs) of the petroleum companies, which were 
currently active in Indonesia. The samples were taken from the population of 
the petroleum companies currently active in Indonesia. 
(b) The petroleum experts, who did not represent either the petroleum companies 
or the GOI, but had expertise and experiences in managing E&P venture in 
Indonesia.   
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The criteria of the respondents were: persons who were involved and or held 
authority (recent or former) in decision making in petroleum E&P investment of the 
company; had experiences and or educational background in the field of engineering, 
petroleum economics, business, management, law or others that were relevant with 
decision making in petroleum E&P investment.  
 
Data from BP Migas (BP Migas, 2004) showed that in 2004 there were 121 
active petroleum contracts and managed by BP Migas, consisted of 101 Production 
Sharing Contract (PSC); 18 Joint Operation Agreement (JOA) and Joint Operation 
Body (JOB); and two Technical Assistance Contracts. Out of the total, 37 contracts 
were producing and 84 contracts were in the development or exploration phase. The 
producing contracts included 29 PSC, six JOA and JOB, and two TAC.  
 
The Indonesian regulation stated that each of petroleum contract must be 
administered by one company, hence one petroleum company may have more than 
one contracts, thus in terms of operating petroleum companies the actual number 
would be less than 121 companies. On the contrary several companies may own a 
contract.  Due the high dynamic activities of petroleum companies, the changes of 
the participants of the petroleum company’s share, the operator and the contractor 
move rapidly, the owners could change rapidly through merger, acquisition, 
takeovers or others. As example during 1999 - 2002 period there were about 4 
acquisitions, 14 mergers and 9 takeovers of petroleum companies happened in 
Indonesia (US Embassy, 2004:15-16). Moreover the participant of a petroleum 
company shareholder can be more than one, as examples around 50% out of total 
producing PSC contracts in the data set was owned by more than three companies. 
Consequently it was difficult to search the exact number of petroleum companies 
currently active in Indonesia. From the PSC contracts data, we found around 24 
petroleum companies. The questionnaires were sent to these 24 petroleum companies 
and five petroleum experts (retired petroleum executives) as respondents during 
March to August 2004.  
 
The population of the analysis were the producing PSC contracts that already 
had 30 operation years. In facts only 12 PSC1 contracts type already had over 30 
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operation years. Stratified random sampling method by production type and 
production rate was taken from those 12 producing PSC1 during their 30 operation 
years, which each category of production rate and production type was represented 
by one sample.  
 
 
 
3.2.1.2.   Assumption and Analysis  
 
The simulations of cash flow analyses were done for samples as the 
representative of each category. The financial model of the PSC contracts followed 
the Indonesian PSC financial model as shown in Chapter 2 section 2.2.3. The 
independent variables were the expenditures, production, prices profile of the field; 
the dependent variables were the NPV, IRR, as well as contractor take, POT and GOI 
take respectively. While the PSC variables, i.e. the first tranche petroleum (FTP), 
investment credit, contractor production sharing split, DMO holiday price and tax 
rate were the changes variables. Except the PSC variables figures proposed by the 
CEO’s petroleum companies through questionnaires, the detail of scenarios and 
assumptions of the simulations taken can be seen in Table 3.3.  
 
Expenditures, productions and prices profile were taken from contractor’s 
historical data and were treated as the base case. As the expenditures data were 
supplied as a total for each contract, the simulation assumed that the capital 
expenditures was set at average capital to total expenditures during 1994 to 2003 
period ratio multiplied by the total expenditures. Investment credit in all scenarios 
was taken from the investment credit for oil production, while the interest recovery 
and GOI participation were assumed not available.  
 
Five simulation cash flow scenarios analyses were run; one case utilised the 
historical PSC1 contract terms (actual case), referred to as the base case (see detail 
figures of IP5 terms of each PSC variables in Table 3.3); one case used incentive 
package 5 financial terms for conventional field (IP5-conv case, the lowest figures); 
one case utilised the incentive package 5 for the marginal field (IP5-mar case, the 
highest figures); while two cases used the respondent’s proposed terms, one with and 
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the other without depreciation method. The latter included one case which assumed 
the five years double declining balance for recovering the capital cost (quest+depre 
case) and one case which assumed that the capital cost were treated similar to the 
non-capital cost, it was recoverable at the year when it spent or without depreciation 
(quest-nodepre case). In these two latter cases (quest cases) the PSC financial 
variables were taken from the result of the questionnaires. The contractors’ 
NPV@15%, IRR, contractor take (contractor entitlement in % of total revenues) and 
POT for the contractors’ point of view and GOI take (total GOI take in % of total 
revenues) for the GOI’s view of the five cases were analysed used the principal-agent 
model theory framework that incorporating incentive structures and risk-reward 
sharing as shown in Chapter 2 subsection 2.1.1 thru 2.1.3 and Chapter 3 sub section 
3.1. 
 
Table 3.3: Scenarios and Assumptions 
 
Base case : Expenditures, productions, prices from one life cycle contractors historical 
data 
Operation years : One life cycle of PSC (30 years) 
Production : Oil only or oil & gas 
Capital Expend. : Average Indonesia’s capital exp. to total exp. ratio during 1994 – 2003 
period times total expenditures = 22.3% x total expenditures 
Investment Credit : Investment credit  was taken from investment credit of oil 
Interest Recovery : Not available  
GOI participation : No participation 
 
PSC3 + IP5 Terms  N 
o 
Variables 
 
Historical  
(PSC1) Conventional field Small (Marginal) field  
1 FTP Historical data 10% all for GOI 10% all for GOI 
2 Depreciation 5 years DDBL 5 years DDBL 5 years DDBL 
3 Investment Credit No 15.7800% 102.1400% 
4 DMO    
   - DMO quantity 25% of contr. prod  share 25% of contr. prod  share 25% of contr. prod  share 
   - DMO holiday price 5 years 5 years 5 years 
   - DMO Price 20ct USD/B 15% of export price 25% of export price 
5 Oil Split: GOI : Con    
   - After-tax 85  :  15 80 : 20 65 : 35 
   - Before-tax  64.2857% : 35.7143% 37.5000% : 62.5000% 
6 Gas Split: GOI : Con.    
   -  After-tax 65  :  35 65: 35 60  :  40 
   -  Before-tax  37.5000% : 62.5000% 28.5714% : 71.4286% 
7 Tax 56% and 48% 44% 44% 
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3.2.2. Methodology to Identify the Impact of some PSC Variables and some 
Petroleum E&P Variables Changes 
 
3.2.2.1.   Data Collection, Data set, Population and Sampling Framework 
 
 Data collection and data set were similar as noted in sub section 3.1.1. The 
primary and secondary data collected were also from similar sources as noted in that 
section with the exception of the CEOs’ proposed terms. The sampling method of the 
analyses was similar with the sampling method presented in sub section 3.2.1.1. 
 
 
 
3.2.2.2.   Assumption and Analysis 
 
The simulations of cash flow analyses were done for samples representative 
of each category. The financial model of the PSC contracts also followed Indonesian 
PSC financial model as shown in Chapter 2 section 2.2.3. The independent variables 
also were the expenditures, production, and prices profiles of the field; while the 
dependent variables were the NPV, IRR as well as contractors take, POT and GOI 
take respectively. The PSC variables taken as the changes variables for analyses were 
the first trance petroleum, the investment credit, the depreciation method in 
recovering the capital expenditures, the contractor production sharing split, the 
domestic market obligation price, DMO holiday price and tax rate. The scenarios and 
assumptions of the cash flow simulation taken were also similar the ones shown in 
Table 3.3. The application of IP5 terms was used as the base case. 
 
In order to identify the impact of the improvement of FTP, for each sample 
case (small oil field, medium oil field, large oil field, medium oil & gas field, large 
oil & gas field, very large oil & gas field, extra large oil & gas field), eight cases cash 
flow analyses were drawn, which can be divided into two groups. The first group 
assumed that the FTP 100% for the GOI’s benefit, while the second group of 
scenarios assumed that the FTP shared between contractor and GOI. For both groups, 
the FTP was varied of 12.5%, 10% and 7.5% (these were the 10% FTP of IP5 term 
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increased and reduced by 25%), while the other variables were kept constant. In the 
second group the variation of FTP were added with 15% and 20%.   
 
While in order to identify the impact of the improvement of investment 
credit, depreciation method, production sharing split, DMO price, DMO holiday 
price, and tax rate on the profitability of contractor and GOI income; two models 
scenarios cash flow simulations analysis were drawn of each sample case (small oil 
field, medium oil field, large oil field, medium oil & gas field, large oil & gas field, 
very large oil & gas field, extra large oil & gas field). First, the base case cash flow 
model, in which the IP5 terms were applied (the detail figures of IP5 terms of each 
PSC variables can be seen in Table 3.3). In the second model, while the other 
variables were kept constant, for each sample case simulation were drawn for six 
PSC variables changes as follows:  
• The investment credit increased 25% of its IP5 term figures (inv.crdt.up 
case). In small (marginal) field case from 102.140% as the base case 
increased to 127.675%, and in conventional fields (medium, large and over 
fields) from 15.78% increased to 19.725%. 
• Recovering the capital expenditures without depreciation (nodepre case). 
• The contractor production sharing split increased 25% of its IP5 figures 
(cpss.up case), in small (marginal) field case from 35% as the base case to 
44% for cpss oil and from 40% to 50% for cpss gas, while in conventional 
fields (medium, large and over fields) from 20% to 25% for cpss oil and 
from 35% to 44% for cpss gas. 
• The DMO price increased 25% of its IP5 figures (DMOpr.up case), in small 
(marginal) field case from 25% of export price as the base case to 31.3% of 
export price and in conventional fields (medium, large and over fields) from 
15% of export price to 18.75% of export price. 
• The DMO price holiday increased 25% of its IP5 figures (DMOhol.up 
case), from five years as the base case to 6 years. 
• The tax rate decreased 25% below its IP5 figures (tax down case), from 
44% as the base case to 33% tax rate. 
• The oil and gas prices increased 25% of their historical figures. 
• The expenditures increased 25% of their historical figures 
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• The production profile increased 25% of their historical figures. 
 
The contractors’ NPV@15%, IRR, contractor take (contractor entitlement in 
% of total revenues) and POT for the contractors’ point of view and GOI take (total 
GOI take in % of total revenues) for the GOI’s view were analysed used the 
principal-agent model theory framework that incorporating incentive structures and 
risk-reward sharing as shown in Chapter 2 subsection 2.1.1 thru 2.1.3 and Chapter 3 
sub section 3.1. 
 
To determine the most and the least sensitive parameters, the projected results 
were presented in Tornado diagram (see Figure 3.1). In each simulation case, the 
results were compared with the base case in percentage changes in Tornado Diagram. 
Tornado Diagram or chart is a device used with stochastic models that illustrates the 
degree to which a function (the output) is influenced by each of its parameters. The 
uncertainty in the variable associated with the largest bar, the one at the top of the 
chart, has the maximum impact on the result, with each successive lower bar having 
a lesser impact. As example, Table 3.4 and Figure 3.1 show the impact of the 
changes of contractor production sharing split (cpss) 25% up from the base-case. The 
impact of changing variable was compared to the base case in percentage. In the case 
of GOI Take declined from the base-case 60% to 58% as a result of 25% cpss 
increased then the result from increasing 25% of cpss was 96% of the base-case. If 
GOI Take of base-case was assumed  = 0, then GOI Take decreased to minus 4% 
below the base case as result of cpss increased and so on. Figure 3.1 also shows the 
highest impact of the cpss changes was on the changes of NPV@15% (31%) that had 
the longest bar placed in the top of the chart. The NPV@15% was the most sensitive 
variables to the changes of cpss. It was followed by IRR, contractor take, GOI take 
and POT was the least.  
 
Table 3.4: Calculation method of the result of the cash flow analysis 
 
Result 
 
Base case 
 
The actual result if cpss 
up  25%  of base case 
  
The result if cpss up 25% 
compared to base case  
(base case = 100%) 
Assumed 
 base case = 0 
 
POT 7 7 0% 0% 
GOI Take 60% 58% 96% -4% 
Contractor Take  40% 42% 107% 7% 
IRR 36% 40% 111% 11% 
NPV@15%/B  0.17 0.23 131% 31% 
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Figure 3.1: Example of Tornado Diagram of contractor production sharing split 
changes 
 
 
 
3.2.3. Methodology to Identify the Impact of Tax Consolidation Application in 
Frontier Areas 
   
The Monte Carlo simulations were drawn to identify the impact of the tax 
consolidation application in frontier areas not only on the income of GOI and 
contractor’s profitability but also to quantify the risk involved and compared with the 
impact of increasing the contractor’s production sharing split. The tax consolidation 
application was set up strict to improve the exploration activities in frontier area 
only.  
 
Two simulations were drawn, as follows: 
a) Single commercial contract analysis, 
b) Aggregate combined contracts analysis. 
 
 
 
3.2.3.1.   Single Commercial Contract Analysis 
 
To compare how tax consolidation application in frontier area affected the 
GOI’s income and contractor’s profitability in case of commercial discovery, single 
0%
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commercial contract was considered. Six possible scenarios combined of tax 
consolidation and increasing contractor’s production sharing split were investigated: 
(a) 65/35 production sharing split without tax consolidation (fifth incentives 
package figures) as the base case, 
(b) 65/35 production sharing split with tax consolidation,   
(c) 60/40 production sharing split without tax consolidation, 
(d) 60/40 production sharing split with tax consolidation, 
(e) 55/45 production sharing split without tax consolidation, 
(f) 55/45 production sharing split with tax consolidation. 
 
The financial model of the PSC contracts followed the Indonesian PSC 
financial model as shown in Chapter 2 section 2.2.3. Other than the contractor 
production sharing split and the tax consolidation above, the assumptions of the other 
PSC variables were set up at the highest figures of the fifth incentives package 
variables as summarised in Table 3.5. They were as follows: the signature bonus was 
26.6 million USD; the FTP of 10% in sense all go to GOI; the production sharing 
split of 65/35 in favour of GOI; the investment credit of 102.14%; the depreciation of 
five years double declining balance; the DMO price of 25% of export price; the 
DMO holiday price of five years and the tax rate of 44%. 
 
The first assumption was the tax consolidations were applicable strictly to 
cover exploration cost in frontier areas only. Duration of each activity was set up at 
one life cycle of PSC contract, 30 years. The exploration phase of each contract was 
assumed to be performed in the first 3 years, followed by development phase, if there 
was commercial discovery, which covers year 4 to year 8. Analysis was limited to 
the additional contracts signed in the first 10 years after tax consolidation was issued. 
 
The input variables were the total additional contract in frontier area/year, the 
exploration cost, the tax rate, the successful discovery, the commercial discovery, the 
reserve discovery size, the development cost (capital and non capital costs), the 
production cost, the production type, the production profile and the oil prices.  
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Table 3.5: Assumptions in Tax-consolidation simulation 
 
MODEL 
The Indonesian PSC financial model as shown in Chapter 2 section 2.2.3 
PSC CONTRACT TYPE 
The Fifth Incentives Package (the highest figures) 
1 Signature bonus 26.6 million USD 
2 Minimum Exploration commitment 140.9 million USD during the first three operation years 
3 FTP 10% all for GOI 
4 Depreciation 5 years DDBL 
5 Investment Credit 102.14% 
6 Contractor production sharing split 35% 
7   - DMO quantity 25% of contractor production share 
8   - DMO holiday price 5 years 
9   - DMO Price 25% of export price 
10 Tax rate 44% 
SCENARIO AND ASSUMPTION 
No Items Assumption Remark 
11 Tax consolidation 
application  
Strictly to cover exploration cost in frontier areas only 
12 Analysis was limited to The additional contracts signed in 
the first 10 years after tax 
consolidation was issued 
Historical showed that each PSC generation 
effectively used around 10 years after that 
changed to other generation 
13 Duration of contract  30 years Duration PSC contract life cycle 
14 Period of analysis 2004 –2033 period  
15 Discount rate and 
discount date 
25% 
1/1/2004 
 
INPUT VARIABLES ASSUMPTIONS 
16 Exploration cost/area Uniform probability distribution 
with minimum and maximum value 
of 140.9 and maximum of 200 
million USD. All values were at 
2004 value. 
The minimum value was set up at the minimum 
exploration commitment as stated in the IP5 
terms (140.9 million USD for the first three years 
contract), while the maximum value was set up at 
roughly three times the historical maximum 
exploration expenditures cash out in 2003 (BP 
Migas, 2004).  
17 Development 
expenditures/barrel 
Uniform probability distribution 
between 6 to 9 USD/barrel, in 
which 50% was capital 
expenditures. 
The minimum value was set up at the 2004’s 
average of development cost of 24 US petroleum 
companies that operated in other eastern 
hemisphere (except Midle East), while the 
maximum value was set up at the 2004’s average 
of development cost of world operation of 24 US 
petroleum companies (EIA, 2006:34). If there 
was commercial discovery that covers year 4 to 
year 8 
18 Escalation of cost rate   3% / year Average of the changes of US Consumer Price 
Index during 1990 – 2003 period 
19 Fixed production cost Uniform probability distribution 
with minimum and maximum 
values of 20 and 30 million USD 
Educated guess. The combination of fixed and 
variable operating cost give mean of total 
operating cost of 4.31 USD/barrel in line with 
2004 EIA data (EIA, 2006:34). 
20 Variable production cost Uniform probability distribution 
between 1.0 to 1.5 USD/barrel 
See above 
21 Year production start Year 6  
22 Hydrocarbon produced   Oil  
23 Production profile trend Constant plateau rate for first three 
years of production then decline 
exponentially 
Plateau rate set to 11% of reserve. Initial decline 
rate 17.4 %/year 
24 Oil price Triangular distribution with 
minimum, mode and maximum 
values of 9, 21 and 76 USD /barrel 
respectively, in 2004 value 
Approximation of historical US crude oil price 
during 1974 – 2003 period, adjusted to 2004 
value. 
25 Oil Price escalation 3%/year 
 
Average changes of historical US crude oil price 
during 1974 – 2003 period  
OUTPUT VARIABLES 
26 GOI view: GOI’s NPV@25%, IRR and reserves addition value and probability distribution 
27 Contractor view: Contractor’s NPV@25% and IRR value and probability distribution 
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The total probability distribution of additional contract in frontier area / year 
was assumed to be triangular probability distribution with minimum, most likely and 
maximum values of each scenario would be discussed latter below in the 
methodology of aggregate combined contracts. The probability distribution of 
exploration expenditures for each area was assumed to be uniform distribution with 
minimum and maximum values of 140.9 million USD and 200 million USD 
respectively. The minimum value was set up at the minimum exploration 
commitment as stated in the IP5 terms (140.9 million USD), while the maximum 
value was set up at roughly three times the historical maximum exploration 
expenditures cash out in 2003 (BP Migas, 2004). All values were at 2004 value.  
 
The tax rate was assumed similar to the IP5 terms of 44%. In the scenarios 
with tax consolidation, the tax consolidation cost to government was assumed as tax 
rate times the total exploration cost. In contrast there was no cost in the scenario 
without tax consolidation, the GOI income was the total GOI take in the entire 
scenarios. Therefore in the scenarios with tax consolidation, the tax consolidation 
cost to GOI was 44% of the total exploration expenditures while the remaining 56% 
of total exploration expenditures was the cost for contractors. The exploration 
expenditures were distributed evenly from the first to third years of the contract. It 
was assumed in single commercial contract analysis that the minimum commercial 
reserve size was 150 millions barrels of oil (Conoco Phillip, 2004).  
  
The development cost per barrel, if there was commercial discovery, was 
assumed to have uniform probability distribution with minimum and maximum 
values of 6 and 9 USD per barrel respectively. The minimum value was set up at the 
2004’s average of development cost of 24 US petroleum companies that operated in 
eastern hemisphere (not including Middle East area), while the maximum value was 
set up at the 2004’s average of development cost of world operation of 24 US 
petroleum companies (EIA, 2006:34). Half of the development cost was assumed to 
be capital expenditures. In the case of commercial discovery, the development cost 
was distributed evenly from year 4 to year 8 and escalated by 3% per year. This 
value was an average of the annual changes of US Consumer Price Index during 
1990 to 2003. 
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The production cost was divided into two types, fixed production cost and 
variable production cost. Fixed production cost represented the expenses that were 
independent of production rate, while variable production cost represented the 
expenses that were dependent on the production of the field. The fixed production 
cost was assumed to have uniform distribution with minimum and maximum values 
of USD 20 and 30 millions respectively, while the variable cost was assumed to have 
uniform distribution with minimum and maximum values of 1 and 1.5 USD/barrels 
respectively. The production cost was also escalated by factor of 3% per year. While 
the probability distribution values of the production costs, both fixed and variable 
were based on educated guess, these values gave mean total production cost of 
around 4.31 USD/barrel. For comparison purpose, the 2006 EIA data showed that the 
average lifting cost worldwide was 4.25 USD/barrel, while for eastern hemisphere 
(not including Middle East area), the cost was 4.26 USD/barrel (EIA, 2006:34). 
 
The type of hydrocarbon produced in each discovery was assumed to be oil. 
The production starts in year six, where the oil yearly production was linearly 
increased from 50% of the plateau production to 100% plateau production in year 9. 
The yearly plateau production was set at 11% of the reserve. The plateau production 
was maintained for 2 years, afterward the production declined by 17.4% 
exponentially each year. Figure 3.2 shows the production profile in term of 
percentage of the total reserve.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.2: Yearly oil production profile for commercial contracts 
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Oil price probability was assumed to have triangular probability distribution 
with most likely of 21 USD per barrel. The minimum and maximum prices were set 
of 9 to 76 USD per barrel respectively. This distribution was based on the 
approximation of actual yearly historical US crude oil price distribution since 1974 
(after the historical OPEC embargo) adjusted to 2004 USD value. The oil price was 
escalated by 3% per year; this value was an average annual change of historical US 
crude oil price from 1974 to2003. 
 
To properly characterize the possible outcomes, the Monte Carlo simulations 
were drawn 10,000 times using Crystal Ball software academic professional edition 
version 7.2 from Decisioneering Inc.  
 
The output variables from the contractor’s view were the size and the 
probability distribution of contractor’s NPV@25%, as well as the IRR. While from 
the GOI’s view, the output variables were the size and the probability distribution of 
GOI’s NPV@25%, IRR as well as the reserve addition. It was assumed that the tax 
reduction in tax consolidation scenarios was the GOI cash outflow or investment, so 
that the GOI’s IRR can be calculated. The analyses of the output variables also used 
the principal-agent theory framework as noted in section 3.1. 
 
To simplify the comparison between tax consolidation application and 
production split increased, three scenarios were analysed in more detail as follows: 
a) The 65/35 production split case without tax consolidation, which were referred 
as the base case,  
b) The 65/35 split case with tax consolidation, which were referred as the tax 
consolidation case, and  
c) The case with 55/45 production split case without tax consolidation, which 
were referred as the production split increase case. 
In effect, the comparison was between the most conservative tax consolidation 
scenario and the most progressive production split scenario.  Another comparison 
also made as well in term of the ratio of contractor’s Cash Flow and contractor’s 
share of exploration cost: 
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The ratio of contractor’s Net Cash Flow to its Exploration cost will be used to 
calculate the approximate probability distribution of the number of contracts signed 
each year in aggregate combined contracts analysis below. 
 
 
 
3.2.3.2.   Aggregate Combined Contracts Analysis 
 
To analyse whether the increase in exploration activity associated with tax 
consolidation were beneficial to the GOI or not, another Monte Carlo simulation was 
evaluated. This time, the analysis was not based on single commercial contract; 
rather, the analysis was performed on the combined contracts basis. The simulation 
was done for two scenarios; tax consolidation with 65/35 contractor production 
sharing split, and production sharing split 55/45 without tax consolidation, i.e. the 
conservative tax consolidation and progressive increasing production split scenarios. 
 
The assumptions used in addition to the ones explained above were as below. 
The analysis were limited to only the additional areas signed during the first 10 years 
since tax consolidation or increase in production split (55/45) started to be effective. 
While the number of contracts signed each year under tax consolidation scenario was 
assumed to have triangular probability distribution with, 
a) Tax consolidation case (production sharing split 65/35 with tax consolidation): 
most likely value of 3, minimum and maximum values of 0 and 6 respectively. 
b) Progressive improved production split case (production sharing split 55/45 
without tax consolidation): most likely, minimum and maximum values were 
set up at ratio of NCF/CE of production split 55/45 case to NCF/CE of tax 
consolidation case times its each value in tax consolidation case. 
 
The success probability of commercial discovery of each contract was 
assumed to be normally distribution, with mean 12.5% and P5 of 14.51; this value 
was set up at historical average ratio of producing PSC contract to total PSC contract 
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signed during 1966 – 2003 in Indonesia. Assuming that the minimum commercial 
reserve discovery in frontier area was 150 million barrels (ConocoPhillips, 2004); the 
probability reserves size was assumed to have Pareto distribution with location 150 
million barrels and P5 of 450 million barrels. 
 
The total exploration cost described previously was applied only to contracts 
that discover oil reserve (whether commercial or non-commercial). If there were no 
discovery made, the exploration cost would only amounted up to 2/3rd of the total 
exploration cost of contract with discovery, distributed up to the first two years of the 
contract. The above assumption was made in consideration that if any discovery were 
made after the drilling of the first few wells there would be more exploration activity 
to delineate and determine the reserve size and its commerciality. While if there were 
no discovery after the first few wells, then exploration activity was stopped. 
 
The outcomes considered in this Monte Carlo simulation would the aggregate 
GOI and contractor’s NPV@25% and IRR as well as the reserve addition. It means 
that the cash flows of all possible contracts were combined into single cash flow to 
determine the aggregate NPV@25% and IRR. Similar to the single contract 
simulation, assuming that the tax reduction was the GOI cash outflow/investment, so 
that the GOI’s IRR can be calculated. The output variables were be analysed used the 
principal-agent theory framework as noted in section 3.1. 
 
 
 
3.3. Methodology to Identify the Petroleum Companies’ Views with Respect to 
the Most Desirable Petroleum Contract System 
 
As already mentioned earlier petroleum companies experiences, expertise, 
information and knowledge in doing petroleum E&P business as well as changes the 
business environment and investment climate in Indonesia could change their 
perception and judgments about the petroleum business in Indonesia, these will also 
determine their judgment about the benefit, the cost and the risk of the petroleum 
E&P operation in Indonesia. Thus petroleum companies experiences and the 
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Indonesia’s geological potential, economic, social and political conditions changes 
can transform the contractor’s view, which is the most desirable petroleum contract 
system that suitable given those conditions.  
 
In order to attract investor, one alternative that can be used by GOI is offering 
the investor’s desirable contract system. Consequently GOI needs to identify the 
petroleum company’s view with respect to the most desirable petroleum contract 
system. 
 
Analytical Hierarchy Process (AHP) in the benefit cost and risk framework 
was drawn to identify the petroleum companies’ views with respect to the most 
desirable contract system, given recent geological potential, diminishing exploration 
activity, economic, social, security, political condition of Indonesia. The analysis was 
drawn based on the theoretical and methodology framework of AHP and model as 
described in Chapter 2 sub section 2.3.2.  The first step of the analysis was to set up 
the goal of the AHP analysis. The Goal is to identify the most desirable petroleum 
contract system in the views of petroleum companies that attracts petroleum 
companies to invest in upstream petroleum E&P venture in Indonesia. In order to 
achieve the goal, the alternative contract systems considered be chosen were modern 
RAT, RSC and recent Indonesian PSC system. The background of choosing these 
alternatives also can be seen in subsection 2.3.2.  
 
The second step of the analysis was to set up three hierarchy structures: the 
benefit, the cost and the risk structures as shows in Chapter 2 in Figure 2.17, Figure 
2.18 and Figure 2.19. Four criteria in benefit hierarchy structure were: Reserve 
potential (R), Total Reserve Addition in the several years (TRA), Current Production 
(CP), and Reserve to Production Ratio (R/P). In cost hierarchy structure there were 
two variables Geology Risk (GR) and Cost Risk (CR, included Technology Risk); 
while in risk hierarchy structure were Price Risk  (PR, included Market Risk), Fiscal 
Risk  (FR), Contract Risk (CoR), and Political Risk (PoR).  Definition of criteria in 
petroleum E&P venture above can be seen in Table 2.12. 
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Pair wise comparisons of the four possible benefit criteria in investing in 
petroleum E&P venture in Indonesia was done through scoring these criteria from 1 
to 7 in order of its importance ((Note 7 = the most significant/ important/ strong, 6 = 
very significant/ important/ strong, 5 = significant/ important/ strong plus, 4 = 
significant /important/ strong, 3 = moderate significant/ important/ strong, 2 = weak 
significant/ important/ strong, and 1 is the least significant / important/ strong) in 
generating benefit streams or revenues. Pair wise comparisons in the cost hierarchy 
valuation was also done through scoring the two cost variables from 1 to 7 in order 
of its importance in making additional cost or reducing the revenues. Likewise pair 
wise comparisons in the risk hierarchy valuation was also done through scoring the 
four risk variables from 1 to 7 in order of its importance in making additional risk or 
reducing the revenues. 
  
Pair wise comparisons between those alternatives contract system were done 
through answering two questions of each comparison. As example, the first question 
in pair wise comparison judgment between RAT and RSC under Indonesia’s 
Reserves (R) condition was:  
(a) To reach the objective of attracting petroleum companies to invest in 
petroleum E&P venture in Indonesia, under Indonesia’s Reserves (R) 
condition, which is more important/desirable RAT or RSC system?  
In the case the answer of the first question RAT is more important than RSC, then 
the second question was:  
(b) Under Indonesia’s Reserves (R) condition, how much more 
important/desirable was RAT over RSC (or RSC over RAT, in the case 
RSC more important than RAT)?  
The scoring system used fundamental scale that developed by Saaty (see Table 2.10). 
These pair wise comparisons were done for all those variables above. 
 
The assumptions taken in this analysis were: 
(a) Indonesia was treated as one field of upstream petroleum E&P operation. 
(b) The income/profit of the three alternatives fiscal system (RAT, RSC and PSC) 
had the same amount. 
(c) All variables were in the recent Indonesia condition (year 2004). 
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The respondent’s judgment, opinion and pair wise comparisons between 
variables and alternatives of petroleum contracts were collected through the same 
questionnaires and respondents as mentioned in sub section 3.2.1.1 and Appendix A.  
 
The results of the questionnaires were processed with Expert Choice 2000 
second edition software from Expert Choice, Pittsburgh PA. First for the benefit 
structure, it was followed by the cost and then the risk structure. The weight of 
benefit, cost and risk criteria was calculated through the comparison of the average 
score of combinations of the benefit criteria, cost criteria and the risk criteria. The 
rating vector of Benefits / (Costs x Risks) was used to weight the corresponding 
vectors of priorities of the alternatives and to obtain the overall ranking of the 
alternatives. The highest score of alternative contract system was the most desirable 
alternative contract system on the petroleum companies’ views in attracting 
petroleum companies to invest in petroleum E&P venture in Indonesia. 
 
 
 
3.4. Methodology to Identify which Aspects of Investment Climate Need to be 
Improved 
 
Petroleum companies are facing unprecedented pressure to explore and 
produce new reserves. With demand at an all-time high and increasing pressure to 
spend profits, companies are looking around the world for opportunities. As already 
noted in Chapter 1, the prospects and the pace of oil and gas development would 
depend on the successful efforts to attract the needed capital, Indonesia needs to 
improve the petroleum contract’s commercial terms and the investment climate.   
 
In order to identify some aspects considered by petroleum companies in the 
decision-making process to enter petroleum venture in Indonesia and some 
investment climate aspects/criteria affect their operation in Indonesia, a survey of 
CEOs of petroleum companies operating in Indonesia and petroleum experts were 
conducted. The questionnaires and respondents as mentioned in section 3.2.1.1 and 
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Appendix A were made to collect the CEOs judgments and opinions. Some criteria 
asked in the questionnaires were: 
a) Criteria that were considered in decision making to enter the petroleum venture 
in Indonesia. 
b) Some operation issues that affected the company operation in Indonesia. 
c) Understanding on the roles of central, provincial and regional governments 
under the Laws Number Law 22/1999 on Regional Autonomy and Law 
25/1999 on Fiscal Decentralization and the Oil and Gas Law Number 22/2001. 
d) Understanding on the roles of Pertamina, BP Migas and Ministry of Energy and 
Mineral Resources under the Oil and Gas Law Number 22/2001 
e) Government – Company Relationship. 
f) The attractiveness of existing Indonesian Production Sharing Contract. 
g) The improved financial terms of the existing Indonesia’s PSC system that 
petroleum company like to see. 
h) The strength of some benefit, cost and risk criteria that were considered in 
entering in petroleum venture in Indonesia. 
i) Pair wise comparisons among benefit, cost and risk criteria and alternatives of 
petroleum contract system. 
 
The result of the questionnaires were analysed based on the contracts’ and 
companies’ judgments and opinions. 
  
 
 
CHAPTER 4 
 
 
 
EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE, COMMERCIAL PERFORMANCES AND SOME 
POSSIBLE IMPROVEMENTS 
 
 
 
 The presentation of the result and finding follows similar sequence to the 
four objectives of the study as noted in Chapter 1 as follows, 
4.1. Commercial performances of Indonesian Production Sharing Contracts, 
4.1.1. Commercial performances by contract’s type and operation years, 
4.1.1.1. PSC1 during 30 years operation, 
4.1.1.2. PSC2 during 20 years operation, 
4.1.1.3. PSC3+IP2 and PSC3+IP3 during 10 years operation. 
4.1.2. Commercial performances by location, 
4.1.2.1. Average western-part vs. average eastern-part of Indonesia, 
4.1.2.2. Average onshore vs. average offshore of Indonesia, 
4.1.2.3. Indonesia, western-part, eastern-part, onshore and offshore as 
one field. 
4.2. Results of identifying some PSC variables need to be improved as incentives 
4.2.1. Impact of the application of Incentive Package 5 and Respondents’ 
Proposed Terms on Improvement some PSC Variables of some 
financial PSC variables, 
4.2.2. Impact of improvement of some PSC variables, 
4.2.2.1. First tranche petroleum, 
4.2.2.2. Investment credit, 
4.2.2.3. Depreciation method, 
4.2.2.4. Contractor production sharing split, 
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4.2.2.5. Domestic market obligation price 
4.2.2.6. Domestic market obligation holiday price, 
4.2.2.7. Tax rate, 
4.2.2.8. Overall comparison; 
4.2.3. Impact of tax consolidation application in frontier areas, 
4.2.3.1. Single commercial contract analysis result, 
4.2.3.2. Aggregate combined contracts analysis result; 
4.3. The most desirable contract system in Indonesia on the view of petroleum 
company, 
4.3.1. The most desirable contract system on the view of small company 
operating in eastern-part of Indonesia, 
4.3.2. The most desirable contract system on the view of medium company, 
4.3.3. The most desirable contract system on the view of large company; 
4.4. Investment climate of the Petroleum E&P business in Indonesia. 
 
 
 
4.1. Commercial Performances of the Indonesian Production Sharing Contracts   
 
4.1.1. Commercial Performances by Contract’s Type and Operation Years 
 
As mentioned in sub section 3.1.1 of Chapter 3, samples of the analysis were 
taken from 24 producing PSCs that had complete and accurate data. PSC1 dominated 
the number of these 24 producing PSC contracts (63%), followed by PSC2 (29%) 
and one each from the PSC3+IP2 and PSC3+IP3 types. Out of these 24 contracts, 12 
PSC1 contracts had already been operated for more than 30 years, 3 PSC1 contracts 
between 25 – 29 years, 7 PSC2 between 20 – 24 years, while the PSC3+IP2 and 
PSC3+IP3 contracts had been operated for more than 10 years each.  
 
Commercial performances analysis of the application of Indonesian PSC 
system were done for 12 PSC1 contracts during 30-operation years, 7 PSC2 contracts 
during 20-operation years, one PSC3+IP2 and one PSC3+IP3 contract during 10-
operation year each, totalling to 21 PSC contracts. In addition samples were also 
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analysed based on their production type and production rate. The results of these 
empirical cash flow analyses are shown in Table 4.1 and Table 4.2. 
 
As shown in Table 4.1, based on their production rate, of these 21 producing 
contracts, five can be categorised as small fields (24%), seven as medium fields 
(33%), four as large oil fields (19%), four as very large fields (19%) and one as extra 
large field (5%). These facts show that 57% of PSC producing contracts had 
production rate up to 50 MBOEPD, 19% had production rate between 50 – 100 
MBOEPD, and 24% had production rate over 100 MBOEPD. While based on their 
production type, eight were categorised as oil fields (38%) and 13 as oil and gas 
fields (62%). 
 
Table 4.1: 21 samples producing PSC contracts by contract type and production rate 
 
Field Type 
PSC1     
- 30 years
PSC2     
– 20 years
PSC3+IP2 
– 10 years
PSC3+IP3  
– 10 years Total % 
Small oil 1 1 1  3 14% 
Medium oil 2 1   3 14% 
Large oil 2    2 10% 
Very large oil        
Extra large oil         
Sub total oil field 5 2 1  8 38% 
         
Small o&g  2   2 10% 
Medium o&g 1 2  1 4 19% 
Large o&g 1 1   2 10% 
Very large o&g 4    4 19% 
Extra large o&g 1    1 5% 
Sub total o&g field  7 5  1 13 62% 
         
Sub total small field 1 3 1  5 24% 
Sub total medium field 3 3  1 7 33% 
Sub total large field 3 1   4 19% 
Sub total very large field 4    4 19% 
Sub total extra large field 1    1 5% 
Total 12 7 1 1 21 100% 
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4.1.1.1.   PSC1 during 30 operation years 
 
Based on the type and production rate categorisation, almost all of the 12 
PSC1 samples during their 30 operation years were categorised into large and over 
large fields (8 contracts or 67%). In which three were categorised as large fields 
(with production rate 50 - 100 MBOEPD), four as very large fields (with production 
rate over 100 - 200 MBOEPD), and one as extra large fields (with production rate 
over 200 MBOEPD). The remaining, one is categorised as small field (with 
production rate below 10 MBOEPD) and three as medium fields (with production 
rate 10 - 50 MBOEPD). 
 
The mean, maximum and minimum of the lead-time, the range spent from the 
time of first exploration to the time of first production, of these 12 PSC1 were 5 
years, 13 years (mean medium oil field) and 1 year (small oil field) respectively. The 
long lead-time occurred due to longer exploration needed, delay in production or 
longer time to develop gas infrastructure. The mean, maximum and minimum of the 
IRR were 40%, 114% (medium oil and gas field) and 5% (small field) respectively, 
while for the contractors take values, they were 43%, 81% (small oil field) and 29% 
(large oil field) respectively. The mean, maximum and minimum of POT were 9.8 
years, 16.5 years (mean medium oil field) and 5 years (medium oil and gas field) 
respectively.  
 
The division of benefits between parties of 75% of these 12 PSC1 samples (9 
contracts consisted of two large oil fields, one medium oil & gas field, 6 large and 
over oil and gas fields) resulted sufficient reward for contractors, contractors got 
positive NPV@15% during their 30 years of operation, their IRRs were above 
minimum required rate of return of high-risk investment, with range between 31% to 
114%, while their POT ranged between 5 to 12 years and the contractor take values 
were between 21% to 43%. One sample, the medium oil and gas field, had a very 
high IRR (114%). This occurred due to short lead-time (3 years) and short POT (5 
years). In addition, this contract had relatively high production in its beginning years 
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and its expenditures during the last 15 years of operation were very low, mostly the 
expenditures for production operation only.  
 
Meanwhile, the remaining 25% of the samples, the one small or marginal 
field and two medium fields, had negative NPV@15% during their 30 years 
operation, while their IRR were below 15% and their contractor takes were over 
45%. This was due to their small revenues for recovering their expenditures; hence 
as a result, the remaining revenues (profit oil) to be shared between contractor and 
GOI were low or none. 
 
Table 4.2: Summary of the result of empirical cash flow analysis of Indonesian PSC 
by production’s type, production rate and operation years 
        A.  PSC1on 30 years operation         
Total Prod. Field Prod. Lead Oil&Gas Oil   Con.Tk GOI Tk NPV@15% IRR POT 
 contract type type years year (MBOEPD) (MBOPD) % % 000 USD % year 
1 oil small 29 1 1.0  1.0  81% 19% (3,085) 5% 10  
1 oil medium 20 10 39.8  39.8  45% 55% (8,348) 13% 13  
1 oil medium 14 16 33.0  33.0  50% 50% (13,863) 10% 20  
Mean med.oil  2   17 13 36.4 36.4 47% 53% (11,106) 11% 16.5 
1 oil large 27 3 95.4  95.4  38% 62% 115,035  36% 8  
1 oil large 26 4 60.2  60.2  21% 79% 143,410  45% 9  
Mean large oil   2   27 4 77.8 77.8 29% 71% 129,222  40% 9 
1 o&g medium 27 3 31.8  31.7  31% 69% 101,422  114% 5  
1 o&g large 26 4 67.8  54.2  39% 61% 96,236  31% 8  
1 o&g v.large 26 4 133.9  112.7  43% 57% 151,398  37% 9  
1 o&g v.large 25 5 119.9  89.6  31% 69% 190,976  60% 7  
1 o&g v.large 27 3 106.5  59.3  37% 63% 172,632  38% 7  
1 o&g v.large 25 5 111.4  32.3  45% 55% 335,363  38% 10  
Mean vlarge o&g   4   26 4 118.0 73.5 39% 61% 212,592  43% 8 
1 o&g ex.large 21 9 325.9  86.3  35% 65% 465,818  38% 12  
Mean PSC1-30 years     25 5 94.1 51.6 43% 57% 141,586 40% 9.8 
        B.  PSC2 on 20 years operation         
1 oil small 10 10 2.5 2.5 89% 11% (234,722) ny ny 
1 oil medium 5 15 10 10.0 91% 9% (72,257) ny ny 
1 o&g small 12 8 2.1 0.5 89% 11% (281,157) ny ny 
1 o&g small 13 7 1.7 0.5 73% 27% (13,903) ny ny 
mean small o&g 2   13 8 1.9 0.5 81% 19% (147,530) ny ny 
1 o&g medium 16 4 25.1 6.4 85% 15% 6,758  17% 5 
1 o&g medium  3 17 17.1 0.8 75% 25% (27,864) 3% ny 
mean med.o&g 2   10 11 21.1 3.6 80% 20% (10,553) 10% ny 
1 o&g large 7 13 65.8 3.8 79% 21% (42,809) 9% 16 
Mean PSC2-20 years   9 11 20.2 4.0 84% 16% (101,574) ny ny 
 C. PSC3+IP2 on 10 years operation  
1 Oil Small 8 2 0.2 0.2 88% 12% (2,970) nyt*) 4 
 D. PSC3+IP3 on 10 years operation  
1 o&g Medium 7 3 15..3 14.4 73% 27% (29,544) ny**) 7 
Note:    *)    IRR: 15% on 4 years operation 
**)  IRR: 10%  on 9 years operation 
 178
 
From the view of GOI, the GOI take of the small oil field was very low, only 
19%. This occurred due to its small revenues only enough to recover the 
expenditures; as a result only small profit was shared between GOI and contractor. 
The others had GOI take relatively high with mean, range between maximum and 
minimum of 57%, 71% (mean large oil field) and 53% (mean medium oil field) 
respectively. It suggests that, from the point of view of GOI, the PSC1 generated 
sufficient income for GOI, except for small and medium oil fields. 
 
To summarise, in general the commercial performance of the PSC1 was very 
attractive, the division of benefits between parties resulted sufficient rewards for 
parties, except for one small oil field (with production rate only 1 MBOPD) and two 
medium oil fields (production rate 39.8 and 33 MBOPD). These facts suggest more 
incentives are needed in order to increase the commercial performances and the 
attractiveness of the development of oil fields with production rate below 50 
MBOPD. 
 
 
 
4.1.1.2.   PSC2 during 20 operation years 
 
Based on the type and production rate categorisation, 6 of the 7 PSC2 
samples (86% of the samples), during their 20 operation years were categorised into 
small and medium fields, only one was categorised as large oil and gas field. 
 
The lead-time of PSC2 type was longer than the lead-time of PSC1 with 
mean, maximum and minimum of 9 years, 13 years (mean small oil and gas field) 
and 5 years (medium oil field) respectively. During their 20 years of operation, four 
fields (one small oil field, one medium oil field and two small oil and gas fields) had 
no IRR and their investment had not broken even yet. Their NPV@15% values were 
still negative, except for one medium oil and gas field. Their contractor take was 
high with mean; maximum and minimum of 84%, 91% (medium oil field) and 79% 
(large oil and gas field) respectively. The higher contractor take was due to their 
relatively small revenues were still used to recover the exploration expenditures. 
 179
 
The medium oil and gas field had mean IRR of 10%, while the large oil and 
gas field had lower IRR (9%) due to its longer POT. This might happen due to 
contractor delaying its production, their production facilities development needed 
longer time or needed longer exploration time.  
 
From the view of GOI, the GOI take during the 20 years of operation was still 
low; the mean, maximum and minimum values were 16%, 21% (large oil and gas 
filed) and 9% (medium oil field) respectively. It shows that the contributions of the 
PSC2 to GOI income during their 20 years of operation were still low.  
 
It can be concluded that the commercial performances of PSC2 contracts 
during their 20 years operations were below the PSC1 contracts, the division of 
benefits between parties resulted insufficient reward for both, due to their small 
production rates. These facts indicated that there were declining tendencies on 
productivity and commercial performances of PSC contracts after PSC1 time frame. 
Moreover, they also suggested that more incentives were needed especially for fields 
with production rates below 50 MBOPD, in order to increase the commercial 
performances and increase the attractiveness of the development of those fields.  
 
 
 
4.1.1.3.   PSC3+IP2 and PSC3+IP3 during 10 years operation 
 
Based on its production type and rate, during their 10 years operation, the 
PSC3+IP2 sample was categorised as small oil field (production rate 0.2 MBOPD), 
while the PSC3+IP3 sample was categorised as medium oil and gas field (production 
rate 15.3 MBOEPD). The samples had short lead-time, the PSC3+IP2 had 2 years 
and the PSC3+IP3 had 3 years lead-time and their investment had already been paid 
out in 4 years operation for PSC3+IP2 and in 7 years for PSC3+IP3.  
 
During 10 years operation, the division of benefits between parties did not 
resulted enough reward for parties, due to their small production rate. Their 
NPV@15% values were still negative. Although their overall IRR in 2003 were still 
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undefined, the PSC3+IP2 contract already had IRR of 15% on their 4th year of 
operation while the PSC3+IP3 had IRR of 10% on their 9th year of operation. The 
decrease on NPV and IRR occurred due to they cashed out high investments, in its 
last six years for PSC3+IP2 contract and its two years until 2003 for PSC3+IP3 
contract.  
 
Understandably, their GOI Take values were still low; their incomes were 
still used for recovering the expenditures during their first 10 years operation. 
Although the commercial performances PSC3+IP2 and the PSC3+IP3 during their 10 
years operation could not be concluded yet; they show potential commercial 
performances due to the short lead-time and POT. The facts also indicated that 
productivity and the commercial performances of the PSC3+IP2 and the PSC3+IP3 
contracts were below the PSC1 contracts. 
 
 
 
4.1.2. Indonesian Production Sharing Contract Performances by Location 
 
As shown in Table 4.3 and Table 4.4, western-part of Indonesia dominated 
the total number of PSC contracts signed, totalling to 175 contracts, in which 99 
were located offshore and the remaining 76 were located onshore. The other 82 PSC 
contracts were located in eastern-part of Indonesia, in which 35 contracts were 
located onshore and 47 were in offshore location. 
 
Western-part of Indonesia also had the highest number of producing 
contracts, in total 27 contracts or 84% of the total 32 producing contracts. The 
eastern-part only had only 5 producing contracts. All of these 32 contracts were 
operated in conventional areas, no one in frontier area. 
 
Moreover western-part also dominated the number the non-producing PSC 
contracts signed, in total 46 contracts or 63% of the total 73 non-producing contract. 
The remaining 27 non-producing contracts were located in eastern-part of Indonesia. 
Similarly, for the terminated contracts, 67% were operated in western-part, while the 
remaining 33% were located in eastern part of Indonesia. 
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Table 4.3:  Indonesian PSC contracts signed during 1966 – 2003 by location and 
contract’s type  
 
No Time Frame  West-onshore   West-offshore    West  
  /Con.type P NP Ter P NP Ter P NP Ter 
1 PSC1 5  9 9  17 14   26 
2 PSC2 5  17 3 1 22 8 1 39 
3 PSC3+IP1    1    2     3 
4 PSC3+IP2 1 3 8 1 1 7 2 4 15 
5 PSC3+IP3 3 2 2      3 2 2 
6 PSC3+IP4   10 7   17 10   27 17 
7 PSC3+IP5   3     9     12   
  Total 14 18 44 13 28 58 27 46 102 
      76     99     175   
 
No Time Frame  East-onshore  East-offshore   East  
  /Con.type P NP Ter P NP Ter P NP Ter 
1 PSC1 4  5    10 4   15 
2 PSC2   1 8   1 6   2 14 
3 PSC3+IP1    2   1     1 2 
4 PSC3+IP2 1 1 5    5 1 1 10 
5 PSC3+IP3   2          2   
6 PSC3+IP4   2 3   15 6   17 9 
7 PSC3+IP5   1     3     4   
  Total 5 7 23 0 20 27 5 27 50 
      35     47     82   
 
No Time Frame  Onshore  Offshore  Total Indonesia 
  /Con.type P NP Ter P NP Ter P NP Ter Total  
1 PSC1 9   14 9   27 18   41 59 
2 PSC2 5 1 25 3 2 28 8 3 53 64 
3 PSC3+IP1     3   1 2   1 5 6 
4 PSC3+IP2 2 4 13 1 1 12 3 5 25 33 
5 PSC3+IP3 3 4 2       3 4 2 9 
6 PSC3+IP4   12 10   32 16   44 26 70 
7 PSC3+IP5   4     12     16   16 
  Total 19 25 67 13 48 85 32 73 152 257 
      111     146     257     
Note: PSC1 (1965-1975); PSC2 (1976-08/1988); PSC3+IP1 (09/1988 - 02/1989); PSC3+IP2 (03/1989 - 07/1992); PSC3+IP3  
         (08/1992 - 12/1993); PSC3+IP4 (01/1994 – 2002); PSC3+IP5 (2003 – now) 
P = producing; NP = non-producing active; Ter = terminated contract 
 
There were in total 146 PSC contracts located in offshore location, the 
remaining 111 contracts were located in onshore location. In contrast, the 
productivity of onshore (59%) contracts was higher than offshore contracts (41%). 
Overall, 66% of the total 73 non-producing contracts were located in offshore; the 
remaining 34% were in onshore. Furthermore, 56% of the total 152 terminated 
 182
contracts were also located offshore while the remaining contracts were located 
onshore. 
 
Out of 24 producing PSC1 contracts, 13 PSC1 were operated in western-part; 
two PSC1s in eastern part, seven were operated onshore and eight PSC1 contracts 
were located offshore. All 7 producing PSC2 were located in western-part, 4 in 
onshore and 3 in offshore location. On the other hand, one PSC3+IP2 and one 
PSC3+IP3 contracts were operated in western-part and onshore location. 
 
 
 
4.1.2.1.  Average Western-part vs. average Eastern-part of Indonesia 
 
The result summary of empirical cash flow analysis Indonesian PSC during 
1966 – 2003 period by location can be seen in Table 4.4. Western-part of Indonesia 
dominated the producing contracts, out of 12 PSC1 during 30 years operation, 10 
PSC1 contracts (83%) were located in western-part of Indonesia; the remaining 2 
PSC1 contracts (17%) were in eastern-part of Indonesia. There were two medium oil 
fields, two large oil fields, one large oil and gas field, four very large oil and gas 
fields and one extra large oil and gas field operated in western-part of Indonesia. On 
the other hand, only one small oil field and one medium oil and gas field were 
located in eastern part of Indonesia. Western-part of Indonesia on average could be 
categorised as very large field with mean production rate of 109.4 MBOEPD, while 
eastern-part of Indonesia could be categorised as medium field with mean production 
rate of 16.4 MBOEPD. 
 
In addition, all 7 PSC2, and the PSC3+IP2 and PSC3+IP3 samples were 
operated in western-part of Indonesia too. These facts show that the contract 
productivity of the western-part was higher than the productivity of eastern-part. 
However, the majority of E&P activities were performed in the western-part area, 
68% out of total 257 PSC contracts signed during 1966-2003, indicated that 
petroleum companies had already searched every inch of western-part. Therefore 
western-part of Indonesia can be categorised as a mature province of petroleum 
resources. 
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Table 4.4: Summary of the result of empirical cash flow analysis Indonesian PSC by 
location 
 
   A.  PSC1 30-years   B. PSC2 20-years   IP2-10 ys  IP3-10 ys
  West East  Onsh Offsh  West  East Onsh   Offsh  West-on West-on
Total contract 10 2 5 7 7 0 4 3 1 1 
Total small oil field   1 1   1     1 1   
Total medium oil field 2     2 1     1     
Total large oil field 2   1 1             
Total very large oil field                     
Total small oil & gas field         2   2       
Total medium oil & gas field   1 1   2   2     1 
Total large oil & gas field 1     1 1     1     
Total very large oil  & gas field 4   1 3             
Total extra large oil & gas field 1   1               
Mean Production years 24 28 26 24 9   11 7 8 7 
Mean Lead Time 6 2 4 6 11   9 13 2 3 
Mean Oil&Gas prod.rate (MBOEPD) 109.4 16.4 106.1 85.2 17.7   11.5 26.1 0.2 15.3 
Mean Oil prod. rate (MBOPD) 66.3 16.3 42.3 69.1 3.5   2.0 5.4 0.2 14.4 
Mean Contractor take (%) 38% 56% 42% 40% 83%   80% 86% 88% 73% 
Mean GOI take  (%) 62% 44% 58% 60% 17%   20% 14% 12% 27% 
Mean NPV@15% (000 USD) 164,866 49,168 208,586 100,581 (95,136)   (79,041) (116,596) (2,970) (29,544) 
Mean IRR (%) 35% 59% 48% 32% 6%   10% 9% ny*)  ny**)
Mean POT (years) 10 7.5 9 10 11   5 16 4 7 
*)  15%(4 years operation) 
**)  10% (9 years operation) 
 
During their 30 operation-years, the mean of lead-time of PSC1 contracts 
located in western-part was 6 years, longer than the mean lead-time of the eastern-
part (only 2 years). The eastern-part also had longer production years than western-
part (28 years vs. 24 years). The mean of contractor take (38%) and IRR (35%) of 
western-part were lower than the ones of the eastern-part (contractor take of 56% and 
IRR of 59%). The POT of eastern-part was also shorter than the one of western-part. 
These facts show that although all areas were commercially attractive, the 
profitability of contractors operated in eastern-part of Indonesia was higher 
compared to the ones of western-part of Indonesia. Since all PSC2 and the PSC3+IP2 
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and PSC3+IP3 were operated in western-part and none in eastern-part, no 
comparison could be drawn for them. 
 
From the GOI perspective, overall western-part of Indonesia gave more 
benefit than the eastern-part, due to the higher total producing contracts and the 
higher GOI take compared to the ones of eastern-part of Indonesia.  
 
Can be concluded, both work areas, western-part and eastern-part of 
Indonesia, in average, the division of benefits resulted sufficient reward for parties. 
The fact that western-part of Indonesia became more mature province, suggested that 
the petroleum E&P investment level in eastern-part of Indonesia must be increased in 
the future. In order to achieve the increasing level of E&P investment in eastern-part 
of Indonesia, more lenient contract terms and more attractive incentives were needed 
for eastern-part of Indonesia and especially for frontier areas. 
 
 
 
4.1.2.2. Average Onshore vs. Average Offshore Indonesia 
 
 In all, there were 11 producing contracts (5 PSC1, 4 PSC2, one PSC3+IP2, 
one PSC3+IP3) operated in onshore area, and based on their production rates and 
types, one was categorised as small oil field, two as small oil & gas fields, 3 as 
medium fields, one as large oil field, one as large oil field, one as very large and one 
as extra large oil field. While for the 10 contracts (7 PSC1 and 3 PSC2) operated in 
offshore area, one was categorised as small oil field, three as medium oil fields, two 
as large fields and three as very large fields. On average both onshore and offshore 
locations were categorised as medium field, with mean production rate of 11.5 
MBOEPD for onshore and 26.1 MBOEPD for offshore. 
 
The onshore location had shorter lead-time than the offshore area (4 vs. 6 
years in PSC1, and 9 vs. 13 years in PSC2) and longer production years (26 vs. 24 
years in PSC1 and 11 vs. 7 years in PSC2). From the contractor’s view, the PSC1 
contract operated in onshore area during their 30 years operation overall had better 
mean NPV@15%, mean IRR, mean contractor take and mean POT than ones of 
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offshore area. In contrast, the PSC2 in offshore area have better mean contractor take 
and mean IRR than the ones of onshore area. Since all PSC2 and the PSC3+IP2 and 
PSC3+IP3 were operated in western-part and none in eastern-part, no comparison 
could be drawn for them. 
 
On the other hand, from the GOI’s view, offshore areas had slightly higher 
GOI take than the one of onshore. In contrast, onshore area had slightly higher GOI 
Take. These facts show that onshore and offshore areas had nearly similar 
commercial performances.   
 
 
 
4.1.2.3.  Indonesia, Western-part, Eastern-part, Onshore or Offshore as one 
field 
 
The results of the cash flow analyses of the commercial performance of each 
area of Indonesia, including overall Indonesia as one field are shown in Table 4.5. 
The data were taken from the entire historical financial and non financial data of all 
PSC petroleum companies operated in each location including producing PSC 
contracts, non-producing actives PSC and terminated PSC contracts during 1966 – 
2003 and combined and assumed as one field operation.   
 
Table 4.5 shows the commercial performance of Indonesia as a whole was 
very high and gave sufficient income to GOI and sufficient reward for contractor. It 
had only 4 years of lead-time, 35% contractor’s take (or 65% GOI take), 37% IRR 
(above the minimum required rate of return of high-risk petroleum E&P investment) 
and 11 years POT as well as 65% GOI Take respectively.   
 
Western part had the longest operation years (37 years); therefore this 
location also had the highest production and NPV@15%. Eastern part had shorter 
lead-time (only one year) than the western-part that had 4 years lead-time. Contractor 
take in western-part (36%) was slightly higher than the one eastern-part (35%), 
consequently the GOI take of western-part was slightly lower than the one of eastern-
part.  
 186
 
Table 4.5: Result of Empirical Cash Flow Analysis Indonesian PSC during 1966 – 
2003 period where each location treated as one field 
 
Area/Items Indonesia   Western-part  Eastern-part Onshore   Offshore   
Start year operation 1967 1967 1970 1968 1967 
Operation years 37 37 34 36 37 
Production years 33 33 33 33 33 
Lead Time 4 4 1 3 4 
Oil&Gas prod rate (MBOEPD) 1,455  1,426  29  811  644  
Oil prod rate (MBOPD) 974  946  28  527  447  
Contractor Take (%) 35% 36% 35% 31% 42% 
GOI Take  (%) 65% 64% 65% 69% 59% 
NPV@15% (000USD) 1,554,511 1,503,472 77,624 1,145,574 558,359 
IRR 37% 37% 1% *) 41% 34% 
POT (years) 11 11 5 11 10 
*) IRR during 1983-2002 periods of 55%   
 
In 2003 the IRR of western-part was above the minimum required rate of 
return of high-risk investment (37%) and much higher than the IRR of eastern-part. 
The eastern-part of Indonesia actually had higher IRR of 55% during 1983 to 2002 
period. This was due to in 2002 and 2003 period it cashed out a huge expenditures 
totalling to 29% of total expenditures during 1966 to 2003 period. In 2003, its IRR 
decreased to only 1%. In contrast, eastern-part had shortest POT, only 5 years, while 
for western-part of Indonesia the POT was 11 years. These facts show both western 
and eastern-part of Indonesia were commercially attractive and give sufficient 
income to GOI and sufficient reward for contractor.  
 
Comparing the onshore and offshore areas, onshore area had shorter lead-
time (3 years) than the one of offshore area (4 years). The IRR of onshore (41%) was 
above the minimum required rate of return of high-risk investment and higher than 
the one of offshore (34%). Offshore location had higher contractor take (42%) than 
onshore location (31%), as a result onshore gave higher GOI take than offshore 
location. But onshore had slightly longer POT (11 years) than POT of offshore (10 
years). These facts show onshore and offshore locations were commercially 
attractive and give sufficient income to GOI and sufficient reward for contractor.  
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To summarise, the commercial performances of entire location areas i.e. 
western-part, eastern-part, onshore, offshore and Indonesia on average and as one 
field each were attractive; both parties got sufficient rewards. Western-part was a 
mature province, while in contrast eastern-part had low number contracts signed and 
high number of unexplored basins. Moreover most of these unexplored basins are 
located in deep water and remote areas known as frontier areas. Therefore in order to 
increase the reserves size and production capacity, boosting exploration investment 
in eastern-part of Indonesia is needed as the first priority. To achieve this, more 
lenient petroleum contract terms and more special incentives are needed. 
 
 
 
4.2. Result of Identifying some PSC Variables Need to be Improved as 
Incentives 
   
     From the 12 PSC1 producing contracts, we obtained 7 representative 
samples for production type and rate categories. One sample represented case A, the 
small (marginal) oil field, two samples represented case B, the conventional field oil 
field, and four samples represented case C, the conventional oil and gas field (four 
samples). The cases were described below. 
1) Case-A represented small (marginal) oil field with production rate below 10 
thousand barrels oil per day (MBOPD): one sample with oil production rate of 1 
MBOPD. 
2) Case-B represented conventional oil field: 
• Case-B1: medium oil field with production rate between 10 and 50 
MBOPD: one sample with production rate of 33 MBOPD. 
• Case-B2: large oil field production rate between 50 and 100 MBOPD: one 
sample with production rate of 95.426 MBOPD. 
3) Case-C represented conventional oil and gas field: 
• Case-C1: medium oil and gas production field (between 10 and 50 thousand 
barrels oil equivalent per day (MBOEPD): one sample with 31.795 
MBOEPD oil and gas production. 
• Case-C2: large oil and gas production field (between 50 and 100 
MBOEPD): one sample with 67.762 MBOEPD oil and gas production   
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• Case-C3: very large oil and gas production field (between 100 and 200 
MBOEPD): one sample with 106.528 MBOEPD oil and gas production. 
• Case-C4: extra large oil and gas production field (over 300 MBOEPD): one 
sample with 325.932 MBOEPD oil and gas production. 
  
The independent variables were the expenditures, production, and prices 
profiles of those seven fields above, while the dependent variables were the NPV, 
IRR, contractor take, POT and GOI take. The PSC variables, i.e., the First Tranche 
Petroleum (FTP), investment credit (IC), contractor production sharing split (cpss), 
DMO price (DMPpr), DMO holiday price (DMOhol) and tax rate (taxrate) were the 
changed variables. Three analyses were drawn for all cases above, the first analysed 
the impact of the application of Incentives Packages 5 (IP5), the second the 
application of the CEOs suggestions on improvement some PSC variables and the 
third the impact of the improvement of some PSC variables. The results are 
presented as follows.  
 
 
 
4.2.1. Impact of the Application of the Fifth Incentive Packages and CEOs 
Proposed Terms of some PSC variables 
 
4.2.1.1.   Respondent’s Profile 
 
The questionnaires were sent to 24 petroleum companies presently active in 
petroleum E&P operation in Indonesia during 1st of March to 31st of August 2004. 
Eight (30% of total 24 companies) companies returned the questionnaires, and these 
eight had in total of 45 petroleum contracts in Indonesia. Table 4.6 lists the profile of 
the respondents. The respondent contracts represented 37% of the 121 total active 
contracts in Indonesia and 122% of total 37 producing contracts. The numbers of 
contracts hold by each respondent varied from two to as high as 13 contracts. Of the 
total 45 contracts, 37 were PSC, 4 were JOB, 1 was JOA and the remaining 3 were 
TAC contracts. In addition, the questionnaires were sent to five petroleum experts, 
two returned the questionnaires.  
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Table 4.6: Company respondents’ profile 
 
Company's Respondent profile Total Mean % Total 
Total Companies 8  30% of 24 respondents 
Total Contract 
 
45 
 
6 
 
37% of total 121 contracts managed 
 by BP Migas 
122% of 37 producing contracts 
   -  PSC 37  82% 
   -  JOB 4  9% 
   -  TAC 3  7% 
   -  JOA 1  2% 
Total Operation years 244 30.5  
   -  Above 40 years  1  13% 
   -  30 - 40 years 4  50% 
   - Below 20 years 3  38% 
Total Annual Expenditures    
   -  Less than 20 million USD 2  25% 
   -  20 - 100 million USD 0  0% 
   -  Over 100 million USD 6  75% 
Total Annual Production    
   -  Less than 10 MBOPD 2  25% 
   -  10 - 50 MBOPD 1  13% 
   -  Over 50 MBOPD 5  63% 
   -  Exploration phase 1  13% 
Company Type    
   -  National Oil Company 1  13% 
   -  Foreign Oil Company 6  75% 
   -  Gas company 1  13% 
Operation outside Indonesia 7  88% 
Present Upstream activity    
   -  Onshore 3   
   -  Offshore 1   
   -  Onshore-Offshore 4   
   -  Frontier area 2   
   -  Deep water 100 m 2   
Present Upstream activity location    
   -  Western part of Indonesia 7   
   -  Eastern part of Indonesia 4   
 
In terms of experiences, all CEO who returned the questionnaires had more 
than ten years experiences in managing the petroleum company. Also, the company 
respondents had an overall average of 30.5 years of operation in Indonesia.  
Consisting of six foreign companies, one national company and one gas company. 
All of these companies, except one, had worldwide operation. One company had 
operated in Indonesia for more than 70 years, four companies for more than 30 years, 
and three companies for less than 20 years.  
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Location wise, the majority of respondents operated in the western-part of 
Indonesia; three companies operated in onshore, one in offshore and the remaining 
four operated in both onshore-offshore locations. In addition, two companies 
operated in frontier and had two contracts in deep water. 
 
In terms of annual expenditures, 75% of the respondents had budget of more 
than 100 millions USD, while the remaining 25% had less than 20 millions USD. 
Furthermore, 63% of the survey respondents had production rate of more than 50 
MBOPD, 13% had between 10 and 50 MBOPD, and 25% had less than 10 MBOPD. 
One was still in exploration phase. 
 
Only two petroleum experts returned the questionnaires. They had more than 
ten years of experiences in managing the petroleum companies but they were not 
currently active in managing the petroleum operations. One had educational 
background in law especially on petroleum contract while the other one had 
educational background in petroleum economics and law especially on petroleum 
contract. Their books were used as references of this study. 
 
 
 
4.2.1.2. Result and Finding   
 
Five scenarios analyses were drawn, historical PSC1 case (actual case) as 
base case, Incentives Package 5 for conventional field case (IP5-conv case), 
Incentives Package 5 for marginal field case (IP5-mar case), the CEOs respondent’s 
proposed terms with and without depreciation method cases (quest+depre case and 
quest-nodepre case). Table 4.7 shows the scenarios and assumptions were used in all 
cases above. 
 
The respondents proposed terms (see Table 4.7) were to decrease the FTP and 
shared between contractor and GOI; increase the cpss, DMO price as well as the 
DMO price holiday and investment credit respectively. In addition, the respondent 
also proposed to allow direct recovery of capital expenditures at the time it spent or 
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essentially no depreciation method was applied. Since most respondents did not state 
the exact size of their proposed PSC variables changes, we selected the suggestions, 
which were nearest to the IP5 figure terms as the respondent’s proposed terms. The 
results are presented in Figure 4.1 to Figure 4.7.  
 
Table 4.7: Scenarios, assumptions and result of questionnaires 
 
Small (Marginal) field  Actual (PSC1) Incentive Package 5 (IP5) Result of Questionnaires 
 FTP     Actual   10% all for GOI   10% shared GOI & Con. 
 Depreciation     5 years DDBL   5 years DDBL   No depreciation 
 Investment Credit     Actual   102.1400%   102.1400% 
  - DMO Quantity     25% of production   25% of production   25% of production 
  - DMO Holiday price      5 years   5 years   10 years 
  - DMO Price     20ct USD/B   25% of export price  100% export price 
 Oil PSF: GOI : Con.         
 -  Post-tax   85  :  15   65 : 35   60  :  40 
 -  Pre-tax   65  :  35     37.5000% : 62.5000%  28.5714%: 71.4286% 
 Gas PSF: GOI : Con.       
 -  Post-tax   70  :  30   60  :  40  50 : 50 
 -  Pre-tax  42.3077% : 7.6923%   28.5714% : 71.4286%   10.7143%: 89.2857% 
 Tax     56% and 48%   44%   44% 
Conventional field  Actual (PSC1) IP5  Result of Questionnaires
 FTP     Actual   10% all for GOI    10% shared GOI & Con 
 Depreciation     5 years DDBL   5 years DDBL    5 years DDBL 
 Investment Credit     Actual   15.7800%    15.7800% 
  - DMO quantity     25% of production   25% of production   25% of production 
  - DMO holiday price     5 years   5 years   5 years 
  - DMO Price     20ct USD/B   15% of export price    25% of export price 
 OilPSF: GOI : Con.        
 -  Post-tax    85  :  15   80 : 20    75  :  25 
 -  Pre-tax    65  :  35     64.2857% : 35.7143%  55.3571% : 44.6429% 
 Gas PSF: GOI : Contractor      
 -  Post-tax   70  :  30   65: 35       60 : 40 
 -  Pre-tax 42.3077% : 57.6923%   37.5000% : 62.5000%  28.5714%: 71.4286%   
 Tax     56% and 48%   44%  44% 
 
As the Figure 4.1 shows, in the small (marginal) oil field case, the application 
of IP5 for conventional field (IP5 conv case) increased the GOI take from 19% in 
actual case to 26%.  In the other three cases the GOI take decreased to 22%, 7% and 
6% for case IP5-mar, quest1 and quest2 respectively. Consequently, the contractor’s 
revenues and other economic parameters (NPV, IRR, contractor take and POT) 
changed in the opposite direction. The IRR changed from 5% in the actual case to 
undefined in IP5-conv.case, to 7% in IP5-mar case, to 18% in quest+depre case, and 
to 19% in quest-nodepre case.  
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Figure 4.1:  Impact of application of IP5 and respondent’s proposed terms on 
parties’ in small (marginal) field case 
 
The Incentive package 5 for the marginal fields (IP5-mar case) increased the 
profitability of the contractor with less decrease on GOI income compared to the 
respondent’s proposed terms, but its IRR was still below the minimum rate of return 
of small-risk investment. On the other hand, the respondent’s proposed terms with 
and without depreciation increased the IRR to over the minimum required rate of 
return of low risk petroleum investment. Although the application of the 
respondent’s proposed terms in small (marginal) field case gave contractor better 
profitability by decreasing of GOI income significantly, it must be addressed in order 
to increase the attractiveness of the small reserves. Otherwise these small (marginal) 
reserves would never be monetized (lost forever).  
 
There were two contracts used in the cash flow analysis in conventional oil 
field cases, i.e. case B-1 and case B-2.  The case B-1 had an average production of 
33,034 BOPD (medium oil field), while the case B-2 had an average production of 
95,426 BOPD (large oil field).  Figure 4.2 and Figure 4.3 illustrate the cash flow for 
various scenarios including historical (actual-case), IP5conv-case, quest+depre case 
and quest nodepre case. From GOI and contractor’s perspective, the actual and the 
IP5conv-case in case B1 and B2 gave essentially similar results. The impact of 
changing financial terms was more significant in the cases using the respondent’s 
proposed terms. For example, in the quest+depre case and quest-nodepre case, the 
GOI take reduced from 50% to 44% for medium oil field and from 63% to 58% for 
the large oil field case. 
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Figure 4.2:  Impact of application of IP5 and respondent’s proposed terms on 
parties’ in medium oil field case 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4.3:  Impact of application of IP5 and respondent’s proposed terms on 
parties’ in large oil field case  
   
Contractor take was essentially not changed from actual-case to IP5conv-
case, but in quest case it increased from 50% to 56% in medium oil field case and 
from 37% to 42% in large oil field case. Meanwhile the NPV@15% and IRR were 
slightly increased from actual case to IP5conv-case. However in the questnodepre 
case, they increased significantly higher than in the quest+depre case. In medium oil 
case, IRR increased from 9.6% in actual case to 13.8% in quest+depre case and to 
14.5% in questnodepre case; while in the large oil case it increased from 36% in 
actual case to 42% in IP5conv case, 53% in quest+depre case and 57% in 
questnodepre case.  
 
We summarise that, first the PSC1 terms (actual case) was still attractive for 
large oil field case; second the impact on the contractor’s economic indicators was 
more significant in the questnodepre case and also more significant in the case of 
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larger production. These facts suggest that recovering the capital expenditures 
without depreciation was the more desirable incentive option to improve the 
contractor’s economic indicators especially for medium (production rate below 50 
MBOPD) oil field development. 
 
In oil & gas field cases, there were four cases, namely Case C-1 through 
Case-4, representing medium oil & gas field (C1), large oil & gas field (C2), very 
large oil & gas field (C3) and extra large oil & gas field (C4).  Figure 4.4 thru Figure 
4.7 show the results of the four cases assuming four different PSC terms: historical 
(actual-case), IP5conv-case and quest1-case and quest2-case.  
 
From the contractor’s perspective, there were increasing tendency on all their 
economic parameters from actual-case, to the IP5conv-case and all quest-case, except 
on extra-large field case (C4-case). The impact on the contractor’s economic 
indicators was more significant in the quest-cases, but their impact slightly decreased 
with increasing size of the field. On extra large oil and gas field, contractor take 
decreased from 35% on actual case to 34% on IP5conv-case, and similarly for IRR, 
from 38% to 35%. The ques+depre case and questnodepre case gave similar results, 
the IRR were increased from IP5-conv-case but still below the actual case (37%), 
while contractor take are increased to 38% on quest cases. To summarise, the 
respondent proposed terms did not significantly change the profitability of contractor 
and GOI income in extra large oil and gas field. 
 
Looking at the IRR, Figures 4.1 to 4.7 show, that the application of PSC1 
(actual case) was still attractive since the IRR was over the minimum required rate of 
return of high risk petroleum investment (over 30%) as suggested by Jones, except 
for small (marginal) and medium oil field cases. These facts suggest that the 
respondent proposed PSC terms are needed as incentives to increase the profitability 
of contractor of oil field with production rate below 50 MBOEPD. Although the 
PSC1 terms were still attractive for the larger field, due to declining tendencies 
occurred in the productivity of contracts after the PSC1 time frame, to attract 
investor, to increase the fifth incentive package (IP5) terms for conventional field 
(the lowest figures IP5 terms) are needed as incentives for the larger field cases. 
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Figure 4.4: Impact of application of IP5 and respondent’s proposed terms on parties’ 
in medium oil & gas field case 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4.5: Impact of application of IP5 and respondent’s proposed terms on parties’ 
in large oil & gas field case 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4.6: Impact of application of IP5 and respondent’s proposed terms on parties’ 
in very large oil & gas field case 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4.7: Impact of application of IP5 and respondent’s proposed on parties’ in 
extra large oil & gas field case 
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4.2.2. Impact of the Improvement of some PSC Variables 
 
4.2.2.1.   First Tranche Petroleum 
 
First Tranche Petroleum (FTP) is a portion of petroleum production 
amounting some percentage of production taken up firstly before deduction of cost 
recovery and is shared between GOI and contractor yearly as production sharing split 
(cpss) specified in the PSC contract. FTP is also taxable. The objective of the FTP is 
to guarantee the GOI income at first production commences. Logically lesser size of 
FTP is the better on the investors’ view. Under the IP5, the FTP was set up at 10% in 
sense all go to GOI benefit; it is totally similar to pure royalty payment.  
 
Figures 4.8 thru Figures 4.10 show the impact of FTP size changes in small, 
medium and large oil fields cases. Figure 4.8 shows the impact of FTP changes in 
small (marginal) field case. The second group (FTP was shared between contractor 
and GOI as cpss specified in the contract scenarios) resulted in lower income for the 
GOI and all the economic parameters (NPV, IRR and POT) of contractor over the 
first group (100% FTP for the GOI benefit scenarios), even on higher FTP such as 
15% and 20% FTP cases. The differences between impact of FTP of first group and 
the second group in marginal cases were high. As examples, in 10% FTP cases, the 
IRR in the case in which FTP was shared between parties (15%) was much higher 
than the IRR in the case in which 100% FTP go to GOI (7%).  
 
On the other hand, the GOI take in 10% FTP shared between parties (16%) 
was lower than the GOI take in case in which all FTP was for GOI benefit (22%). It 
occurred due to the small revenues in small (marginal) field case. The more the FTP 
sizes the more its impact on reducing the revenues to be shared. It can be concluded 
that the impact of FTP size on profitability of contractor in small (marginal) field 
case was significant. The provision of 100% FTP for GOI would be a disincentive 
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factor for the development of small (marginal) oil field, and it contradicted the 
objective of lowering the FTP size under the IP5. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4.8: Impact of changing FTP size in small (marginal) oil field 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
       
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4.9: Impact of changing FTP size in medium oil field case 
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Figure 4.10: Impact of changing FTP size in large oil field case 
 
The impact of FTP changes on oil medium and large oil fields, as shown in 
Figure 4.9 and Figure 4.10 had similar trend with the impact on small (marginal) 
field case. From the GOI point of view, the GOI take values increased in all cases in 
which FTP was 100% for GOI by around 3% to 5% over the case in which FTP was 
shared between GOI. On the other hand, from contractor’s view, all cases in which 
FTP was shared between GOI and contractor resulted in higher contractor’s 
economic indicators compared to ones of the cases in which FTP was 100% for GOI 
benefit, even in the cases in which higher FTP were applied (15% and 20%). But the 
impact was lower than the impact on the small (marginal) oil field case. As an 
example, in 10% FTP cases, the IRR of the case in which FTP was shared between 
parties in medium oil field (11%) was slightly higher than the IRR of the case in 
which 100% FTP was for GOI (10%), while the GOI take of case in which 10% FTP 
was shared between parties (48%) was slightly lower than the GOI take of case in 
which all FTP was for GOI benefit (50%). 
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 For the large oil field case, the IRR of the case in which FTP was shared 
between parties (47%) was higher than the IRR of the case in which 100% FTP was 
for GOI (44%).  It can be concluded that the provision of 100% FTP for GOI would 
be a disincentive factor for the development of conventional oil field and 
contradicting with the objective giving incentive by lowering the FTP under the IP5. 
 
Figure 4.11 through Figure 4.14 show the impact of FTP changes in medium, 
large, very large and extra large oil and gas field. They showed similar trend with 
marginal field case and conventional oil field, all cases in which FTP was shared 
between the GOI and contractor resulted in higher contractor’s economic indicators 
compared to the case in which all FTP was for GOI benefit. On the contrary, from 
GOI point of view, the GOI take increased in all cases in which 100% FTP was for 
GOI. The impacts in these cases were also lower than in the small (marginal) oil field 
case. It can be concluded that the provision of 100% FTP for GOI would be a 
disincentive factor for the development of the conventional oil and gas field and it 
contradicted with the objective of giving incentive by lowering the FTP under the 
IP5. 
 
Moreover, compared to other PSC variables, as shown in Figure 4.4 thru 
Figure 4.14, the strongest impact of decreasing the FTP by 25% was in the small 
(marginal) field case, while in the larger field cases the FTP ranked as the fourth, 
except in extra large field case ranked as the third. 
 
To summarise, first, the provision of 100% FTP for GOI would be a 
disincentive factor for the development of the all field cases, contradicting with the 
objective of giving incentive by lowering the FTP under the IP5. Secondly, the 
impact of the FTP changes was significant on the profitability of contractor in small 
(marginal) oil field case, while the impact on conventional field cases were less than 
in the impact on small field case. These facts suggest that in order to increase the 
attractiveness of the development of small (marginal) field, the FTP reduction is 
needed and must be shared between contractor and GOI. 
 
 200
 
 
Bindemann’s study showed that during 1966 to 1998 (1999:48-49), royalties 
in Asia varied between zeros to 12.5% with an average of 4%, on the other hand, in 
the Eastern Europe; the royalties were between zeros to 17.5% with an average 5%. 
The average values for the rest of the world were between 7% and 9%. It also 
showed that net exporter countries charged higher royalties than net importers, and 
onshore contracts were relatively tougher for the petroleum company than offshore 
contracts. In fact 91% of all PSC contracts in the dataset had royalties in the four 
categories of zero, 10%, 12.5% and 20% royalty. Only one contract had more than 
20% royalty (Chile, 45%) and only five were below 10%. The 10% FTP of the IP5 
(100% go to GOI) can be categorised as the second category of royalty and the size 
is more than the average of Asia countries. 
 
The FTP is important to secure the GOI income at the beginning years of 
production and the consistency of the main concept of sharing the production in the 
PSC system must be honoured; hence the FTP requirement is still needed in 
Indonesian PSC system. As an incentive for small field case the size of FTP can be 
reduced below 10% and it must be shared between GOI and the contractor as 
specified by the production sharing split stated in the PSC contract. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
    
 
  
    
 
 
Figure 4.11: Impact of changing FTP size in medium oil & gas field case 
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4.12: Impact of changing FTP size in large oil & gas field case 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
4.13: Impact of changing FTP size in very large oil & gas field case 
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 4.14: Impact of changing FTP size in extra large oil & gas field case 
 
 
 
4.2.2.2.   Investment Credit  
 
In order to identify the impact of the improvement of some PSC variables on 
the profitability of contractor and GOI income, two models cash flow simulations 
were drawn on each sample case (small oil field, medium oil field, large oil field, 
medium oil & gas field, large oil & gas field, very large oil & gas field, and extra 
large oil & gas field). The first one was the base case cash flow model, in which the 
IP5 terms were applied. Detail figures of IP5 terms of each PSC variables can be 
seen in Table 4.7 and samples of the base case cash flow simulation can be seen in 
Appendix B1 to B7. In the second model, in which one of the six PSC variables was 
varied while the other variables were kept constant.  
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The six PSC variables were: 
• The investment credit increased by 25% of its IP5 term figures (inv.crdt.up 
case), in small (marginal) field case from 102.140% as the base case to 
127.675%, while in conventional fields (medium, large and over fields) from 
15.78% to 19.725%. 
• Recovering the capital expenditures without depreciation (nodepre case). 
• The contractor production sharing split (cpss) increased by 25% of its IP5 
figures (Cpss.up), in small (marginal) field case from 35% as the base case to 
44% for cpss oil and from 40% to 50% for cpss gas, while in conventional 
fields (medium, large and over fields) from 20% to 25% for cpss oil and from 
35% to 44% for cpss gas. 
• The DMO price increased by 25% of its IP5 figures (DMOpr.up), in small 
(marginal) field case from 25% of export price as the base case to 31.3% and in 
conventional fields (medium, large and over fields) from 15% of export price to 
18.75%. 
• The DMO price holiday increased by 25% of its IP5 figures (DMOhol.up), 
from 5 years as base case to 6 years. 
• The tax rate decreased by 25% below its IP5 figures (tax down), from 44% as 
the base case to 33%. 
In each sample case, the results were compared with the base case in 
percentage changes, and described in Tornado Diagram.  
  
Table 4.8 shows the results of the analyses, while Tornado Diagrams in 
Figure 4.15 thru Figure 4.21 show the impacts of the changes of these PSC variables 
in percentages changes from the base case figures, Figure 4.15 for small (marginal) 
oil field case, Figure 4.16 and Figure 4.17 for medium and large oil field, while 
Figure 4.18 thru 4.21 for medium, large, very large and extra large oil and gas field 
case. The results and findings of these simulation analyses are presented in the 
following discussions. 
 
Investment Credit allows the contractor to recover an additional percentage of 
capital costs through cost recovery. The credit is taken out of gross production before 
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recovering operating cost. Increasing the investment credit size is one of possible 
incentives for the contractor.  
 
In the small (marginal) case, increasing the investment credit increased the 
IRR significantly, up by 28% over the base case, from 7.3% to 9.3%. The impacts on 
the larger production were less; in the medium oil field case the IRR only increased 
by 1.5% and in large oil field case it increased by 0.8%. In medium and large oil & 
gas fields cases, the IRR increased by only 0.8% at the highest to 0.12% at the least 
(in extra large oil & gas field) over the base case. The NPV@15% of medium oil 
field case increased by only 2.4% while for the large oil field case it increased by 
1.5% over the base case. In medium and large oil & gas field cases, the NPV@15% 
increased between 1% and 0.22% % of the base case, while in small (marginal) field, 
the NPV@15% was still negative. The changes of contractor take and POT in all 
cases were less than the above variables. These facts show that raising the size of 
investment credit increased the profitability of contractor significantly only in the 
small (marginal) field case. This was due to the size of investment credit in small 
(marginal) field case was much higher than in medium and large field cases 
(102.14% vs. 15.78%). 
 
From the GOI view, if the size of the investment credit was increased by 
25%, the GOI take in small (marginal) field case decreased by 3% of the base case, 
in medium oil field case it decreased by 0.3% of the base case, while in the 
remaining cases, it only decreased 0.1% of the base case. Hence, increasing the 
investment credit size gave minimum impact to GOI income.  
 
Compared to the impacts of other PSC variables, the impact of increasing 
investment credit was almost the least, except in small (marginal) oil field case. The 
impact of improvement in investment credit in small (marginal) oil field case ranked 
as the third strongest, after the impact of recovering the capital expenditures without 
depreciation. On the contrary, in larger field cases, it ranked as the weakest or the 
second weakest. 
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The results suggest that increasing the investment credit can be used as an 
attractive incentive especially for marginal field and medium field. It can increase the 
contractor’s profitability significantly while at the same time its impact to the GOI 
income was small. For larger field cases, increasing the investment credit as 
incentive may not be important, the contractors’ profitability was sufficiently high, 
and its impact was minimal. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4.15: Impacts of some PSC variables changes on parties’ in small (marginal) 
oil field case  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4.16: Impacts of some PSC variables changes on parties’ in medium oil field 
case 
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Figure 4.17: Impacts of some PSC variables changes on parties’ in large oil field 
case 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4.18: Impacts of some PSC variables changes on parties’ in medium oil & 
gas field case 
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Figure 4.19: Impacts of some PSC variables changes on parties’ in large oil & gas 
field case 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4.20: Impacts of some PSC variables changes on parties’ in very large oil & 
gas field case 
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Figure 4.21: Impacts of some PSC variables changes on parties’ in extra large oil & 
gas field case 
 
 
 
4.2.2.3.   Depreciation Method 
 
The capital expenditures, such as building, transportation facilities, 
equipment, etc that have useful life beyond the years incurred are recovered in 
depreciation rate method. In current Indonesian PSC, the recovering of capital 
expenditures follows five years double declining balance rate method. The shorter 
the time to recover the capital expenditures means the faster to get the profit. To 
recover the capital expenditures without depreciation is then a possible incentive to 
attract investor.   
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Table 4.8:  Impacts of some PSC variables and some Petroleum E&P variables 
changes on parties’ 
Base Case (IP5 Terms were applied) 
Result Case A  Case B1  Case B2  Case C1  Case C2  Case C3  Case C4  
GOI Take  22% 50% 63% 67% 60% 60% 66% 
Con.Take   78% 50% 37% 33% 40% 40% 34% 
NPV@15%/B  (0.14) (0.08) 0.12 0.39 0.17 0.21 0.16 
IRR 7.30% 9.90% 42.10% 136.80% 36.20% 48.30% 34.50% 
POT 8 19 6 4 7 6 12 
FTPt down 25% of its Incentive Package 5 figures 
GOI Take  20% 50% 62% 67% 60% 60% 65% 
Con.Take   80% 50% 38% 33% 40% 40% 35% 
NPV@15%/B  (0.10) (0.07) 0.13  0.41  0.18  0.22  0.17  
IRR 10% 10.3% 44% 142% 37% 50% 35% 
POT 7  19  6  4  7  6  12  
Investment Credit up 25% of its Incentive Package 5 figures 
GOI Take  21% 50% 63% 67% 60% 60% 66% 
Con.Take   79% 50% 37% 33% 40% 40% 34% 
NPV@15%/B  (0.11) (0.08) 0.13 0.4 0.18 0.21 0.17 
IRR 9.30% 10.10% 42.40% 137.80% 36.50% 48.60% 34.60% 
POT 8 19 6 4 7 6 12 
No depreciation applied in recovering capital expenditures 
GOI Take 21% 50% 63% 67% 60% 60% 66% 
Con.Take 79% 50% 37% 33% 40% 40% 34% 
NPV@15%/B (0.11) (0.06) 0.15 0.42 0.2 0.22 0.16 
IRR 9% 11% 48% 163% 41% 51% 35% 
POT 8 19 6 4 5 6 12 
Contractor production sharing split up 25% of its Incentive Package 5 (IP5) figures 
GOI Take 24% 49% 61% 65% 58% 57% 60% 
Con.Take 76% 51% 39% 35% 42% 43% 40% 
NPV@15%/B (0.15) (0.06) 0.16 0.5 0.23 0.26 0.22 
IRR not yet 11% 47% 155% 40% 53% 39% 
POT 8 19 6 4 7 6 12 
DMO price up 25% of its Incentive Package 5 figures 
GOI Take 21% 50% 63% 67% 60% 60% 66% 
Con.Take 79% 50% 37% 33% 40% 40% 34% 
NPV@15%/B (0.13) (0.08) 0.13 0.4 0.18 0.21 0.17 
IRR 8% 10.00% 42% 137% 36% 49% 35% 
POT 8 19 6 4 7 6 12 
DMO holiday price’s up 25% of its Incentive Package 5 figures 
GOI Take   22% 50% 63% 67% 60% 60% 66% 
Con.Take   78% 50% 37% 33% 40% 40% 34% 
NPV@15%/B  (0.12) 0.08  0.13 0.41 0.18 0.21 0.17 
IRR 8% 10% 44% 138% 37% 49% 35% 
POT 8 19 6 4 7 6 12 
Tax rate down 25% of its Incentive Package 5 figures 
GOI Take 22% 49% 61% 65% 58% 57% 61% 
Con.Take 78% 51% 39% 35% 42% 43% 39% 
NPV@15%/B (0.13) (0.07) 0.16 0.48 0.22 0.25 0.21 
IRR 8% 11% 46% 152% 40% 52% 38% 
POT 8 19 6 4 7 6 12 
Oil & Gas price up 25% of their historical figures 
GOI Take 30% 57% 68% 71% 65% 64% 67% 
Con.Take 70% 43% 32% 29% 35% 36% 33% 
NPV@15%/B 0.05  (0.04) 0.19  0.53  0.26  0.29  0.23  
IRR 17% 12.7% 53% 171% 44% 57% 40% 
POT 6  17  6  4  7  6  12  
Expenditures up 25% of their historical figures 
GOI Take   10% 41% 57% 62% 55% 56% 67% 
Con.Take   90% 59% 43% 38% 45% 44% 33% 
NPV@15%/B  (0.42) (0.13) 0.09  0.35  0.13  0.17  0.23  
IRR not yet 7.0% 32% 103% 29% 40% 40% 
POT 10  20  8  5  8  6  12  
Production down 25% of their historical figures 
GOI Take 10% 39% 55% 61% 54% 54% 64% 
Con.Take 90% 61% 45% 39% 46% 46% 36% 
NPV@15%/B (0.43) (0.15) 0.08  0.34  0.09  0.16  0.13  
IRR not yet 6.0% 29% 95% 24% 37% 28% 
POT 11  20  8  5  8  6  13  
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In the small (marginal) field case, the case in which the capital expenditures 
were recovered straight on the year they are cashed-out without depreciation 
increased the contractor’s IRR significantly, by 28% above the base case. In the 
higher production rate case, recovering capital expenditures without depreciation 
gave less impact on IRR. In medium oil field case it increased by 10% above the 
base case, in large oil field case by 13%, in medium oil & gas field case by 19%, in 
large oil & gas field case by 14%, in very large oil & gas field case by 6% above the 
base case, and in extra large oil & gas field, the IRR did not increase (0%). These 
tendencies also occurred on NPV@15% changes. The contractor take only increased 
by 0.9% in small (marginal) field case and even less on higher fields cases, by 
between 0.2% to zero, except in extra oil & gas field case, where it decreased by 
0.4% below the base case. 
 
As for the impact on the GOI, recovering the capital expenditures without 
depreciation decreased the GOI take by 3.3% below the base case in small (marginal) 
field case, remained the same in medium oil field, decreased by between 0.2% to 
zero in higher fields cases, except in extra large field case where the GOI take 
increased by 0.2% above the base case.  
 
Compared to the impact of other PSC variables changes, recovering capital 
expenditures without depreciation method had more impact on contractor’s 
profitability than investment credit changes. In small (marginal) oil field case as the 
second and in medium oil field case it ranked as the strongest variable, while in 
larger field cases it ranked as the third, except in extra large field where it ranked the 
least. 
 
Hence, it can be concluded that recovering the capital expenditures without 
depreciation can be utilised as incentive, especially for small (marginal) field and 
medium oil fields cases developments.   
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4.2.2.4.   Production Sharing Split 
 
Sharing the production after FTP and cost recovery payment is one of the 
main terms in PSC system. Profit oil or profit gas is defined as the remaining 
revenues after deduction of FTP and cost recovery. This profit is split between the 
contractor and the GOI as production sharing split as stated in the contract. Before 
2003 the oil production split in conventional oil & gas field was 85/15, while in 
frontier (marginal) field it was 70/30 in favour of GOI. Under the IP5 the oil 
production sharing splits were increased to varied from 80/20 to 65/35 depending on 
the geological conditions. As for gas, before 2003 the gas production sharing split in 
conventional field was 70/30 and in small (marginal) field it was 60/40 in favour of 
GOI. Currently, under the IP5 the gas production sharing split was 65/35 in favour of 
GOI. The contractor share from profit oil is also subjected to taxation. Increasing the 
contractor’s production sharing split (cpss) is a possible incentive to investor, since 
logically it can increase the profitability of investor. But, on the other hand, it will 
decrease the GOI income.  
 
As the base case, the cpss in the IP5 conventional oil field base case (IP5-
conv-case) was assumed to be 20%, while in the IP5 small (marginal) oil field base 
case (IP5-mar-case) it was assumed to be 35%.  Increasing cpss 25% above the base 
case, the cpss became 25% in conventional field case and the cpss became 44% in 
small (marginal) field case.  
 
 Table 4.8 shows that the contractor’s IRR of small (marginal) oil field base 
case and medium oil field base case were below the minimum required rate of return 
of low-risk petroleum investment (15%) and their NPV@15% were negative. In the 
larger field cases their IRRs were above the minimum required rate of return of high-
risk petroleum investment (over 30%) and their NPV@15% were positive. These 
facts suggest that increasing the cpss as incentives is needed only for small and 
medium oil development. 
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The impact of increasing cpss 25% of the base case in small (marginal) field 
case did not increase the profitability of contractor; on the contrary the IRR of the 
contractor decreased from 7% in the base case to undefined, since the contractor still 
got negative income. The contractors take decreased by 2% below the base case. The 
small production size in small (marginal) field made the revenues were still used to 
recover the expenditures; therefore the remaining production to be shared was very 
small or none.  
 
On the contrary, in medium, large, very large oil and oil & gas field cases, 
increasing the cpss 25% of the base case significantly increased the profitability of 
contractor. The NPV@15% increased by between of 18% to 34%, the IRR increased 
by between10% to 13%, while the contractor take increased by the range of 3% to 
17% above the base case.  
 
The GOI take in small (marginal) field case increased by 8% above the base 
case as the impact of increasing the cpss 25% above the base case. While in medium, 
large, very large, extra large oil& gas fields cases, the GOI take decreased by in the 
range of 3% to 9% (extra large oil & gas field case) below the base case, when the 
cpss was increased by 25% above the base case. These figures were below the 
increases in NPV@25%, IRR and contractor take. To summarise, in small (marginal) 
field increasing cpss did not increase the profitability of contractor; while in the other 
cases it increased the profitability of contractor.  
 
Increasing the cpss was the most powerful variables to increase the 
profitability of contractors; in larger field cases it ranked as the strongest, except in 
small (marginal) field case where it ranked as the least. It happened due to the small 
remaining production to be shared between contractor and GOI (gross revenues from 
production after FTP payment and recovering the expenditures) in small (marginal) 
field case. That is why increasing the cpss had less impact on the profitability of 
contractor. 
 
Compared to other countries, the Bindemann data set during 1966 – 1998 
period (Bindemann, 1999:50 - 51) showed that the minimum cpss figure in IP5 was 
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below the minimum cpss average of Asia countries, but its maximum cpss was 
slightly above the maximum cpss average of Asia countries. The maximum and 
minimum average cpss of Asia countries ranked as the third toughest cpps compared 
to other region. In addition, currently the maximum cpss tended to increase in all 
regions except in Middle East where from an average of 27%, it declined 
significantly lower than elsewhere. Also, exporter countries offered less favourable 
sharing split to the contractor than importer countries Therefore to attract investor, 
increasing cpss still need to be offered as attractive incentives especially for small 
and medium oil field development. While for larger field cases, the cpss of fifth 
incentive package (IP5) figure was still attractive, since the resulting contractor IRR 
was above the minimum required rate of return of high risk petroleum investment 
(over 30%). 
 
 
 
4.2.2.5.   Domestic Market Obligation Price 
 
Government specifies a percentage (25%) of the contractor’s profit oil should 
be sold to the government at discounted price; it is called Domestic Market 
Obligation (DMO). The goal of DMO is to give security for the oil and gas domestic 
supplies for the country. Under the IP5 the price of DMO (DMO-price) was set at 
15% of export price for conventional field and 25% for small (marginal) field. 
Increasing the DMO price is one possible incentive that can be offered. 
 
In the small (marginal) oil field case, increasing the DMO price by 25% 
increased the IRR by 17% above the base case, increased the NPV@15% by 6% and 
increased the contractor take by only 1% above the base case. It did not have impact 
on the POT, and the GOI take decreased by 3% below the base case.   
 
On the other hand, increasing DMO price by 25% gave less impact on the 
medium, large, very large and extra large oil & gas field cases. The NPV@15% 
increased by on the range of 0.3% to 2% above the base case, the IRR on the range 
of 0.1% to 0.4%, and the contractor take and contractor share on the range 0.1% to 
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0.5% above the base case. The GOI take decreased less than the sizes of the 
contractor take increase, on the range of 0.2% to 0.3% below the base case.  
 
Compared to other PSC variables, the impact of increasing the DMO price 
was less, except in small (marginal) field case where it ranked as the third strongest 
on the economic parameters of contractors. While in the larger fields cases it ranked 
as the weakest or the second weakest. It suggests that increasing the DMO price is an 
attractive incentive only for small (marginal) field development. 
 
 
 
4.2.2.6.   Domestic Market Obligation Holiday Price  
 
As the base case, the DMO holiday price was set up 5 years and then 
increased by 25% to 6 years. The results can be seen in Figure 4.8(a) to Figure 
4.8(g). In marginal field case, increasing the DMO holiday price from 5 to 6 years 
increased the IRR by 16% above the base case while the contractor take increased by 
only 0.5%. On the other hand, the GOI take decreased by 1.6% below the base case.  
 
In conventional field cases, when the DMO holiday price increased to 6 
years, the impacts were lower than the impacts in small/marginal field case. The IRR 
increased only by 3.9% in medium oil field, by 3.4% in medium oil & gas field, by 
0.7% in large oil & gas field, by 2% in large and very large oil & gas field and only 
by 0.6% in extra large oil & gas field. The NPV@15% increased by 5.6% in medium 
oil field, by 4.4% in large oil   field, by 3.3% in medium oil & gas field, by 4% in 
large and very large oil & gas field and only by 1.6% above the base case in extra 
large oil & gas field cases. The impacts on contractor take were also lower, on the 
range 1% to 0.3% over the base case. The GOI take decreased on the range 1% to 
0.2% below the base case. There were declining tendency of the impacts as the field 
got larger.  
 
Compared to other PSC variables, the impact of increasing the DMO holiday 
price was less and ranked as the fourth strongest. These facts suggest that increasing 
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DMO holiday price can be used as incentives especially for small (marginal) field 
development, with less impact on GOI income. 
 
 
 
4.2.2.7.   Tax Rate 
 
The contractor tax liabilities refer to the relevant tax law since the tax in 
general may be found under a separate set of laws. Decreasing the tax rate will 
logically increase the contractor incomes, and therefore will increase the profitability 
of contractor.   
 
Decreasing the tax rate in small (marginal) field case increased the IRR by 
12% above the base case while the contractor take only increased by 0.3%. On the 
other hand, the GOI take decreased by 1.2% below the base case. These lower 
impacts of decreasing tax rate in small (marginal) field was due to the small revenues 
from the small field was only enough for recovering the exploration and 
development costs. The remaining revenues (profit oil) for contractor were small and 
the cost recovery is free from tax payment. Therefore in small (marginal) field case, 
the changes on tax rate only gave low impact on the size of tax payment and 
contractor income.  
 
There were increasing tendency on NPV@15% changes with the increase in 
field size. The NPV@15% increased on the range of 16% (in medium oil field case) 
to 27% (in extra large oil & gas field case) above the base case. In conventional field 
cases, the IRR increased on the range of 10% (in medium oil field case) to 8% (in 
very large oil & gas field case) above the base case. The impacts on contractor take 
were less than the impacts on NPV@15%, on the range of 3% to 14% above the base 
case. On the other hand, GOI take decreased on the range of 3% (medium oil filed 
case) to 7% (extra large oil 7% gas field case).  
 
Compared to other PSC variables, the impacts of decreasing of tax rate 
ranked as the second strongest after the increasing the cpss, except in small 
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(marginal) field case; although it increased the IRR by 12% above the base case, it 
still ranked as the second weakest. These facts suggest that decreasing the tax rate 
can be used as incentive in the development of small (marginal) and medium field 
cases.  On the contrary, for large and extra large fields, this incentive is not needed 
since the IP5 terms for conventional field still gave sufficient profitability for 
contractor.  
 
 
 
4.2.2.8. Overall Comparison of the Impact of some PSC’s Variables Changes 
 
As shown in Figure 4.15 in the small (marginal) oil field case the IRR was 
the most sensitive variable with changes ranged between 24% to 12%, followed by 
NPV@15%/B, GOI take, and contractor take as the least sensitive variable (range 
between 0.9% to minus 2% below the base case). On the other hand, among PSC 
variables be compared, the increase in FTP, investment credit and recovering capital 
expenditures without depreciation gave the three strongest impact compared to other 
variables in small (marginal) field case; they increased the IRR by 41% in FTP and 
the other of 28% above the base case. Their investment did not pay out yet. 
Increasing cpss 25% above the base case increased the GOI take by 8% above the 
base case. It happened since, due to its small revenues, the remaining revenues to be 
shared (after FTP payment and cost recovery) was small, none or still minus.  
 
While on the larger field cases, the NPV@15%/B was the most sensitive 
variable, followed by IRR, contractor take and GOI take as the least sensitive 
variable. In these larger field cases, the POT did not change, except in large oil and 
gas field case, the POT decreased by 29% below the base case when no depreciation 
method on recovering the capital expenditures was applied. This fact occurred since 
capital expenditures were cashed out during the beginning years of operation; hence 
recovering the capital expenditures straight without depreciation method made the 
POT time shorter. 
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Among PSC variables be compared, the increasing cpss, reducing the tax rate 
and recovering the capital expenditures without depreciation method in larger field 
cases gave the three highest impacts on the changes of the contractor and GOI 
economic parameters, on the range of changes of 34% to 19%. While the other 
variables, reducing the FTP, increasing the DMO price, increasing the DMO holiday 
price time and increasing the investment credit gave less impact. 
 
To summarise, the Fifth Incentives Package (IP5) that commenced by GOI in 
2003 was commercially attractive for the field with production rate above 50 
MBOPD. Hence more incentives are needed for the fields with production rate below 
50 MBOPD. The recommended incentives to be offered to attract investor for the 
field with production rate below 10 MBOEPD (in the order of their impact strengths) 
are: reducing the FTP, recovering the capital expenditures without depreciation, 
increasing the investment credit, increasing the DMO price, DMO holiday price, 
reducing tax rate and increasing the contractor production sharing split from the 
highest figures of the Fifth Incentives Package. For the oil field with production rate 
between 10 – 50 MBOPD, the recommended incentives are increasing contractor 
production sharing split, reducing the tax rate from the lowest figures of the Fifth 
Incentives Package and recovering the capital expenditures without depreciation 
method. The proposed respondents’ terms can be considered be applied. 
 
 
 
4.2.2.9. Impact of Increasing the Oil and Gas Prices, Increasing the 
Expenditures and Reducing the Production Size 
 
The impact of increasing the oil and gas prices by 25% over the base case is 
shown in Figure 4.22. The impact of increasing oil price was the highest in small 
(marginal) field case. It gave significant increased on both parties income.  The 
increases in both contractor’s IRR (134%) and NPV@25% (117%) were much 
higher, almost 3.7 times more than the increase in the total GOI Take (only 37%). 
The impacts on larger field cases were lower, but the trend was similar to the trend 
on small (marginal) oil case. The impacts on GOI income changes were always less 
 218
 
   
than the impacts on profitability of contractors. This fact shows that, in percentage 
basis, the contractor obtained more profit than GOI when oil price increased. It 
suggests that balancing the reward between contractor and GOI in case of high oil 
price is needed. The treatment of increasing oil prices clause should be included in 
the contract; we suggests the application of sliding method on production sharing 
split based on the oil and gas prices.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4.22: Impact of increasing oil & gas prices 
 
Figure 4.23 shows the impacts of increasing the expenditures by 25% to both 
contractor and GOI. Increase in expenditures resulted in significant reduction on both 
the profitability of contractor and GOI income. The two most sensitive variables 
were the NPV@25% and the IRR. The impact on the GOI income was lower than the 
impact on contractor’s profitability, i.e., the reduction on GOI income, in percentage 
basis, was lower than the reduction on contractor’s profitability.  There was also a 
trend showing that the impact in percentage basis became less, as the field size got 
larger. 
 
Impact of decreasing production by 25% below the base case is shown in 
Figure 4.24. The two most sensitive economic variables were similar, the 
NPV@25% and the Total GOI income. The trends of its impact were similar to the 
case of increasing the expenditures. In percentage basis, the impact affected the 
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contractor more than it affected the GOI, and the impact became less, as the field size 
got larger.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4.23: Impact of increasing expenditures   
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4.24: Impact of decreasing production   
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4.2.3. Impact of Tax Consolidation Application in Frontier Areas 
  
 4.2.3.1.   Single Commercial Contract Analysis Result 
 
To properly characterize the possible outcomes of the six scenarios, the 
simulations/trials were repeated 10,000 times. The results of the six scenarios are 
tabulated in Table 4.9 to Table 4.12 and Figures 4.25 to Figure 4.27. The histograms 
of the base case (65/35 production sharing split with tax consolidation) are presented 
in Figure 4.28. The histograms for other scenarios had similar shapes but with 
different values of parameters as described in Tables 4.9 to 4.12. These results then 
were analysed used the principal agent theory framework as described in section 
2.1.1, sub section 2.1.3 and subsection 3.1. 
 
The results show that all six scenarios gave negative mean and median 
NPV@25%, suggesting that they were not sufficient to pass the commercial 
performance. Table 4.10 shows that the mean and median of contractor’s IRR of 
65/35 production split with tax consolidation scenario were around 23% compared to 
22% in 55/45 production split without tax consolidation scenario. In comparison, the 
base case, 65/35 case without tax consolidation, the mean and median of contractor’s 
IRR were around 21%. This result shows that, from the financial aspect of the 
contractor, the application of tax consolidation was better than the improvement in 
production split term from 65/35 to 55/45. However, both incentives still could not 
raise the contractor’s IRR to above the minimum required rate of return of high risk 
investment suggested by Jones’s (over 30%). 
 
Also, as is shown in Figure 4.24 and Table 4.11, the application of tax 
consolidation reduced the values of mean NPV@25% for the GOI to 299 million 
USD, 313 million, and 327 million from 348 million USD, 361 million and 375 
million USD for production sharing split of 55/45, 60/40 and 65/35 respectively. The 
values of mean GOI’s IRR for the cases with tax consolidation were 74.31%, 75.03% 
and 75.75% for production sharing split of 55/45, 60/40 and 65/35 respectively as 
were seen Table 4.12. While in without tax consolidation cases, the IRR was 
undefined since there was no monetary cost for the GOI.  
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Table 4.9: Summary of contractor’s  NPV@25% for various scenarios 
Mean NPV-PSC 55/45 Mean NPV-PSC 60/40 Mean NPV-PSC 65/35 Statistics 
 Without Taxco With Taxco Without Taxco With Taxco Without Taxco With Taxco
Trials 10000 10000 10000 10000 10000 10000 
Mean (50,538,740) (1,359,937) (64,003,735) (15,305,696) (77,468,730) (29,251,456)
Median (60,669,483) (11,858,765) (72,099,710) (23,395,496) (83,660,081) (35,234,111)
Mode --- --- --- --- --- --- 
Standard Dev. 116,501,988 114,796,296 108,585,282 106,782,784 100,910,526 99,008,895 
Variance 13.5E+15 13.1E+15 11.7E+15 11.4E+15 10.2E+15  9.8 E+15 
Minimum (482,983,025) (431,172,119) (486,995,875) (435,414,513) (491,008,724) (439,656,908)
Maximum 950,331,015 989,719,243 849,567,083 888,363,590 748,803,152 787,007,937
Range Width 1,433,314,040 1,420,891,362 1,336,562,958 1,323,778,104 1,239,811,876 1,226,664,846
 
Table 4.10: Summary of contractor’s IRR for various scenarios 
 Statistics Mean IRR-PSC 55/45 Mean IRR-PSC 60/40 Mean IRR-PSC 65/35  
 Without Taxco With Taxco Without Taxco With Taxco Without Taxco With Taxco
Mean 22.32% 24.66% 21.67% 23.96% 20.99% 23.22% 
Median 21.98% 24.34% 21.35% 23.66% 20.67% 22.94% 
Mode --- --- --- --- --- --- 
Standard Dev. 4.79% 5.18% 4.61% 4.99% 4.42% 4.78% 
Variance 0.23% 0.27% 0.21% 0.25% 0.20% 0.23% 
Minimum 8.08% 9.03% 8.05% 8.98% 8.02% 8.92% 
Maximum 49.42% 52.57% 47.82% 50.89% 46.10% 49.08% 
Range Width 41.34% 43.54% 39.77% 41.91% 38.09% 40.16% 
 
Table 4.11: Summary of GOI-NPV@25% for various scenarios 
Mean NPV-GOI 55/45 Mean NPV-GOI 60/40 Mean NPV-GOI 65/35 Statistics 
 Without Taxco With Taxco Without Taxco With Taxco Without Taxco With Taxco
Mean 347,873,613  298,694,809  361,338,608  312,640,569  374,803,603  326,586,329 
Median 300,800,584  251,540,362  312,350,179  263,371,074  323,630,334  275,357,240 
Mode --- --- --- --- --- --- 
Standard Dev. 173,299,025  174,203,574  182,424,296  183,371,855  191,569,350  192,560,157 
Variance 30E+15  30.3E+15  33.3E+15  33.6E+15  36.7E+15  37,1E+15  
Minimum 109,275,647  54,578,535  108,428,683  53,997,262  107,581,719  53,415,990 
Maximum 1,776,562,849  1,737,174,621 1,877,326,780 1,838,530,274 1,978,090,712  1,939,885,926 
Range Width 1,667,287,202  1,682,596,086 1,768,898,098 1,784,533,011 1,870,508,993  1,886,469,937 
 
Table 4.12: Summary of GOI-IRR for tax consolidation scenarios 
Statistics   IRR-GOI – with Tax Consolidation  
 Split 55/45  Split 60/40  Split 65/35  
Mean 74.31% 75.03% 75.75% 
Median 71.40% 72.12% 72.85% 
Mode --- --- --- 
Standard Deviation 16.85% 17.00% 17.20% 
Variance 2.84% 2.89% 2.96% 
Minimum 39.71% 39.55% 39.38% 
Maximum 175.64% 180.73% 176.42% 
Range Width 135.93% 141.18% 137.04% 
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Figure 4.25: Mean NPV@25% of contractor 
    
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4.26: Mean IRR of contractor  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4.27: Mean NPV@25% of GOI 
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Compared to the base case, the application of tax consolidation increased 
contractor’s mean NPV@25% by 48 million USD. On the other hand, the 
improvement of production sharing split of 55/45 without tax consolidation increased 
contractor’s mean NPV25@% by 27 millions USD. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4.28: Histograms of 65/35 production sharing split with tax consolidation 
 
 
 
 
 224
 
  
From the GOI point of view, the application of tax consolidation reduced its 
mean GOI-NPV@25% by 13% from 375 million USD to 327 million USD in the 
base case, while the increase in production sharing split reduced it to 347 USD 
million, a reduction of around 7%.  The mean of GOI-IRR in production sharing split 
65/35 with tax consolidation case is 75.75%, a good and healthy value. However, this 
also meant some financial risk to the government, considering the fact that in the 
production split scenario, the GOI-IRR was undefined; there was no financial risk to 
the GOI. 
 
Table 4.13 and Figure 4.29 show probability distribution of the ratio of (Net 
Cash Flow/Exploration Cost) of the base case, 65/35 production sharing split with 
tax consolidation, and 55/45 production sharing split without tax consolidation to the 
base case (Net Cash Flow/Exploration Cost) from the Monte Carlo simulation. 
Naturally, the ratio for the base case was 1, while the ratio values of 65/35 
production sharing split with tax consolidation, and 55/45 production sharing split 
without tax consolidation were 1.63 and 1.17 respectively. This suggests that the 
application of tax consolidation will potentially give contractor 1.63 times more net 
cash flow for each dollar spent in exploration, on the other hand improvement in 
production sharing split to 55/45 will increase it by only 1.2 times. Direct 
comparison between the two cases also shows that tax consolidation case will 
potentially gave almost 1.4 times as much as the case with production sharing split 
increase for each dollar spent in exploration.  This value would be used to 
approximate the number of contracts signed in the aggregate contract analysis 
mentioned in the next section. 
 
With the assumptions as described above, on the basis of single commercial 
contract, the results suggest that from the point of view of contractor, tax 
consolidation application was more attractive incentive than progressive 
improvement in production sharing split from 65/35 to 55/45. Hence, it was more 
likely to increase the level of exploration investment. However, it came with more 
penalties, and more importantly, the tax consolidation application came with more 
risk to the GOI than the increasing production sharing split scenario. 
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Table 4.13: The ratio contractor’s NPV@25% to its exploration cost 
Statistics Split 65/35 Split 65/35 with Taxconso Split 5545 
Trials 10,000 10,000 10,000 
Mean 1.00 1.63 1.17 
Median 1.00 1.63 1.17 
Mode 1.00 --- --- 
Standard Deviation 0.00 0.02 0.02 
Variance 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Minimum 1.00 1.54 1.04 
Maximum 1.00 1.75 1.23 
Range Width 0.00 0.21 0.19 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4.29:  Histograms of ratio contractor’s net cash flow to its exploration cost 
for tax consolidation scenarios 
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4.2.3.2. Aggregate Combined Contracts Analysis Result  
 
The analysis in the previous section shows that tax consolidation can 
potentially be more attractive incentive to the contractor than progressive 
improvement in production sharing split to increase the level of E&P investment in 
Indonesia. However, it came at a price to the government, as it posed risk and 
reduced the NPV and cash flow share of GOI in a single contract basis. To assess 
whether the increase in exploration investment (thus more contracts signed) will 
eventually generate more aggregate NPV for the government, analysis on the 
aggregate level was performed by Monte Carlo simulation. 
 
As mentioned in Chapter 3, the aggregate combined contract analysis will be 
limited to only the additional areas signed during the first 10 years since tax 
consolidation (production sharing split 65/35 with tax consolidation) application or 
increase in production sharing split to 55/45 starts to be effective. While the number 
of contracts signed each year under tax consolidation scenario was assumed to have 
triangular probability distribution with, 
a) Tax consolidation case (production sharing split 65/35 with tax consolidation): 
most likely of 3 and minimum and maximum values of 0 and 6 respectively.   
b) Progressive improved production split case (production sharing split 55/45 
without tax consolidation): most likely value of 2 and minimum and maximum 
values of 0 and 4 respectively. 
 
The most likely value of 3 and 2 in cases a) and b) respectively were obtained 
based on the ratio of (Net Cash Flow/Exploration Cost) of the respective cases. As 
mentioned in the previous section, the ratio between the two cases from the single 
contract analysis was found to be around 1.4. This ratio was then used to 
approximate the ratio of likelihood of the number of contracts between the 2 cases (3 
and 2, or ratio of 1.5). 
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The simulation results after 10,000 trials are presented in Tables 4.14 to Table 
4.15. The results show that, under the assumption of the number of additional 
contracts mentioned above, tax consolidation application can potentially add more 
than 700 million STB of reserve, almost doubling the potential reserve addition from 
production split increase scenario (425 millions STB). However, the mean GOI IRR 
was only around 22%, less than the minimum required rate of return high-risk 
investment as suggested by Jones (30%). Consequently the mean and median of GOI 
NPV@25% were negative (minus 35 millions USD and minus 108 millions USD 
respectively. In contrast, in the production split improvement case, the mean and the 
median GOI NPV@25% were USD 252 and USD 185 millions respectively.  
 
Table 4.14: Aggregate Monte Carlo simulation summary for tax consolidation 
scenario 
Statistics Reserve NPV-GOI IRR-GOI NPV-PSC  IRR-PSC 
Mean 716,338,520  (34,824,952) 22.23% (613,898,134) 10.33% 
Median 665,356,438  (108,612,062) 21.89% (609,571,664) 10.70% 
Mode 0   0      
Standard Deviation 430,322,113  363,026,952 11.16% 170,609,668  5.49% 
Variance 2.E+17 1.E+17 1.25% 3.E+16 0.30% 
Minimum 0  (743,367,579) -6.25% (1,693,400,920) -9.90% 
Maximum 2,756,223,012 2,661,762,388 84.93% 390,092,512  31.14% 
Range Width 2,756,223,012 3,405,129,966 91.18% 2,083,493,431  41.04% 
 
Table 4.15: Aggregate Monte Carlo simulation summary for production sharing split 
increase scenario 
Statistics Reserve NPV-GOI  NPV-PSC  IRR-PSC 
Mean 426,604,047  252,004,050  (644,331,019)  7.92% 
Median 372,586,054  184,733,801  (644,746,388) 8.07% 
Mode 0  0      
Standard Deviation 332,825,229  260,633,272  169,762,552  5.84% 
Variance 1.11.E+17 6.78.E+16 2.88.E+16 0.34% 
Minimum 0  0  (1,487,165,140) -12.40% 
Maximum 2,381,082,061  2,573,900,429  289,158,210  29.47% 
Range Width 2,381,082,061  2,573,900,429  1,776,323,349  41.88% 
 
Figures 4.30 to 4.32 show the histograms and the cumulative distributions of 
the GOI’s NPV@25% and IRR. They show that in tax consolidation case, the 
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probability of the GOI’s NPV@25% lower than zero or equivalently the probability 
of the IRR to be lower than 25% was around 60%. This suggests that application of 
tax consolidation was a high-risk decision for the GOI 
 
From contractor’s views, the mean aggregate of NPV@25% in both tax 
consolidation and production split improvement scenarios were negative, while the 
mean aggregate IRR were 10.3% and 7.9% respectively. These suggest that the tax 
consolidation application could increase the contractor’s IRR, but the values still 
below the low risk investment that proposed by Jones. Moreover, the contractor’s 
IRR as an aggregate was relatively low, even with tax consolidation applied, 
indicating that the investment was not very attractive.  
 
It can be concluded that under the assumptions used in this study and the 
results were analysed used principal agent theory framework, the application of tax 
consolidation poses high risk to the GOI, therefore was not likely to be beneficial to 
GOI. While on the view of contractor, although tax consolidation application as 
incentive resulted better than increasing production split in single commercial 
contract analysis, but the IRR still below the low risk investment proposed by Jones 
and as an aggregate its value was relatively low, therefore this incentive was not 
sufficient to attract investment.   
 
The result of this study was different than the result of IPA study. Though in 
IPA study the number of trials was limited to only 10, the result seemed to suggest 
that the application of tax consolidation would have positive impact on GOI income. 
The difference in the conclusions of this study and IPA study can be attributed to the 
different assumption used, especially in the costs incurred (exploration, development 
and operating expenditures). The assumed costs used in this study were much more 
expensive than the ones used in IPA study. Under the significantly more stringent 
costs, more capitals was needed for exploration and development; hence much higher 
portion of the revenues were used to recover the cost, and less would be available to 
be shared between both parties. We think that the assumptions used in current study 
was more up to date than the assumptions used in IPA study, hence the result is more 
representative and relevant to current situation. 
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Figure 4.30:  Histogram and cumulative distribution of GOI’s NPV@25% of tax 
consolidation scenario 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4.31:  Histogram and cumulative distribution of GOI’s IRR of tax 
consolidation scenario 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4.32:  Histogram and cumulative distribution of GOI’s NPV@25% of 
production sharing split improvement case scenario 
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1) From contractor’s financial aspect, tax consolidation was more attractive 
incentive compared to increase in production sharing split. It did not only 
give higher NPV@25% but also reduced the exploration risk.   
2) Tax consolidation was less attractive to the GOI, not only it reduced GOI’s 
NPV@25% but it also posed financial risk to the GOI. 
3) The application of tax consolidation at the aggregate level posed high risk 
to the GOI; hence, unless, the potential additional reserves and potential 
effects to local economy development outweighed the risk, the application 
of tax consolidation is not likely to be beneficial.  
 
 
 
4.3. The Most Desirable Contract System for Indonesia on the view of 
Petroleum Company 
 
The Analytic Hierarchy Process (AHP) in the benefit-cost-risk framework 
analysis in this study was designed to understand the companies’ views with respect 
to the most desirable fiscal terms for petroleum E&P venture in Indonesia, given 
current Indonesia’s geological petroleum resource potential, economic, social and 
political conditions. Three alternative fiscal systems have been selected, namely the 
Modern Royalty and Tax (RAT), Risk Service Contract (RSC) and the existing PSC 
system. The theoretical and methodology framework foundations, model and 
assumptions used in this analysis and respondents’ profile are presented in Chapter 2 
sub section 2.3.2, Chapter 3 sub section 3.3 and Chapter 4 sub section 4.2.1.   The 
respondent’s judgment, opinion and pair wise comparisons between criteria and 
alternatives of petroleum contracts were collected through the same respondents and 
questionnaires as mentioned in sub section 3.2.1.1 and Appendix A.  
 
As already mentioned earlier, the questionnaires were sent to 24 petroleum 
companies presently active in petroleum E&P operation in Indonesia and five 
petroleum experts during 1st of March to 31st of August 2004. Besides two experts, 
eight (30% of total 24 companies) companies returned the questionnaires, and these 
eight had in total of 45 petroleum contracts in Indonesia. For more details, the profile 
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of respondents’ can be seen in section 4.2.1. The results of the questionnaires were 
processed with Expert Choice 2000 second edition software from Expert Choice, 
Pittsburgh PA. First for the benefit hierarchy structure, then the cost hierarchy and 
finally followed by risk hierarchy structure. The weighting of  benefit, cost and risk 
criteria for rating the vector of Benefits / (Costs x Risks) were calculated through the 
comparison of the mean score of combinations of the benefit criteria, cost criteria 
and the risk criteria. The rating vector of Benefits / (Costs x Risks) was used to 
weight the corresponding vectors of priorities among the alternatives and to obtain 
the overall ranking of the alternatives. The highest score of alternative contract 
system was the most desired contract system on the petroleum companies’ views. 
 
Figure 4.33 shows that the combination of all benefit criteria R, CP, TRA and 
R/P was given an overall mean score of 5.4 by companies’ respondents and of 5.6 by 
contracts’ respondents, it is suggested that on the view of entire respondents the 
geological potential gave over strong/important plus to very strong/important impact 
for  the size of benefit stream in investing money in a petroleum business in 
Indonesia. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
Figure 4.33: Mean Score of Benefit, Cost and Risk Criteria 
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respondents. It is suggested that on the view of the entire respondents the costs on 
doing petroleum E&P business in Indonesia were very costly.  
 
The four risk criteria had an overall mean score of 5.2 on the companies’ 
respondents, and on the view of contracts’ respondents those four risk criteria had an 
overall mean score slightly over the score of companies’ respondents with mean 
score of 5.5. It is suggested that the risks criteria in Indonesia valued were also very 
important variables in increasing the cost and reducing the revenues but slightly 
below the costs criteria.  
 
All of these mean scores mentioned above also show that the cost criteria got 
the highest score, it indicated that the cost in doing petroleum E&P business gave the 
highest impact in reducing revenues on the petroleum E&P operation in Indonesia. 
As a whole combination of the benefit, cost and risk criteria got mean score of 5.5 by 
companies’ respondents and 5.7 by contracts’ respondents. These facts indicated the 
entire criteria gave very strong impact on doing petroleum E&P business in 
Indonesia.  
 
From these score, we got the weighting score of combination of benefit 
criteria: combination of cost criteria: combination of risk criteria as follows. On the 
view of companies’ respondents we got of  5.4 : 6.0 : 5.2 =  1.1 : 1.2 : 1.0  that can be 
rounded into 1 : 1 : 1.  While on the view of contracts’ respondent we got = 1.0 : 1.1 : 
1.0 that can also be rounded into 1 : 1 : 1.  It can be concluded that the  benefit, the 
cost and the risk criteria had a similar weighting. This weighting was used in the 
calculation of the rating vector of Benefits / (Costs x Risks) as mentioned earlier. 
 
Perceptions, feelings, judgments and memories require both knowledge and 
experiences about the subjects. Different in knowledge and experiences may result in 
different perception, feeling, judgment and memories about them. Different location 
work area and different production profile may result different experiences and 
resulted in different in perception, judgment and memories about the petroleum 
operations. Subsequently, the analysis had been performed on the basis of the size of 
respondents’ production profile and the operating location. The petroleum company 
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had production rate less than 10 MBOEPD called the small company, while had 
production rate between 10 - 50 MBOEPD called the medium company and 
petroleum company had production rate over 50 MBOEPD called large company. 
 
The result and finding of this AHP analysis in the benefit cost risk framework 
are presented below. 
 
 
 
4.3.1. The Most Desirable Contract System on the View of Small Company 
operated in Eastern-part of Indonesia 
 
There were a total of 91 petroleum contracts operated in the eastern part of 
Indonesia during 1966 – 2003, eight contracts of which were producing, 30 contracts 
were in the exploration phase and 53 contracts had been terminated. Of the eight 
producing contracts, five were in the form of PSC, two were the TAC contracts and 
one was JOB contract. There was one company with production less than 10 
MBOPD returned the AHP questionnaire. This company had three PSC contracts and 
all were located onshore area in the eastern-part of Indonesia. The respondent was 
contributing 38% of total producing contract, 60% of producing PSC, or 8% of active 
contracts in the eastern-part of Indonesia, thereby could be considered as a 
representative sample of small company operates in the eastern-part of Indonesia. 
 
In determining the benefit hierarchy, the scope of analysis was used to 
determine which criteria and what impact does each criterion have on the benefits 
stream.  The benefit criteria were the Reserves (R), Total Reserves Addition in the 
last 5 years (TRA), Current Production (CP) and Reserve/Production Ratio (R/P) of a 
field, basin or country. 
 
The result shows that in the eye of small company all the four criteria would 
impact substantially the benefit stream. With the score of 7, CP gave the greatest 
benefit; followed by R/P (score 5), R and TRA, the last two have the same score of 4 
(Table 4.16). This was consistent with the fact that small company nature in focusing  
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on current production, due to needed a steady cash income from its production. 
Moreover the productivity of petroleum E&P activities in eastern-part of Indonesia 
had been only 2% of total producing contracts or 14% of total the producing PSC 
contracts. 
 
Table 4.16: Score of benefit, cost and risk criteria according to the small company 
 
1 Benefits  
    -  Current Production (CP) 7 
    -  Reserves/Production Ratio (R/P) 5 
    -  Reserves Potential (R)  4 
    -  Total Reserves Addition (TRA) 4 
2 Cost  
    -  Geological Risk (GR) 6 
    -  Cost Risk (CR) 5 
3 Risk  
    -  Price Risk (PR) 7 
    -  Fiscal Risk (FR) 7 
    -  Contract Risk (CoR) 5 
    -  Political Risk (PoR) 5 
 
Using the Expert Choice software, we have computed the paired comparisons 
of all four benefits criteria and the results are presented in Table 4.17. The results 
show that with overall inconsistency index of 0.00, PSC had the highest score 
(0.541), followed by RAT (0.412) and RSC (0.048). 
 
Table 4.17: Result of AHP: the view of the small company 
 
Alternatives Benefit Cost Risk Cost x Risk Benefit/(Cost x Risk) Rank 
PSC 0.541 0.627 0.361 0.226 2.390 2 
RAT 0.412 0.261 0.203 0.053 7.776 1 
RSC 0.048 0.112 0.437 0.049 0.981 3 
       
Sensitivity 1:  inconsistency index of benefit/CP was decreased from 0.28 to 0.05 
Alternatives Benefit Cost Risk Cost x Risk Benefit/(Cost x Risk) Rank 
PSC 0.462 0.627 0.361 0.226 2.041 2 
RAT 0.488 0.261 0.203 0.053 9.211 1 
RSC 0.05 0.112 0.437 0.049 1.022 3 
       
Sensitivity 2: inconsistency index cost/CR was decreased from 0.28 to 0.00  
Alternatives Benefit Cost Risk Cost x Risk Benefit/(Cost x Risk) Rank 
PSC 0.541 0.517 0.361 0.187 2.899 2 
RAT 0.412 0.371 0.203 0.075 5.471 1 
RSC 0.048 0.112 0.437 0.049 0.981 3 
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With respect to the cost hierarchy, criteria that gave negative impacts, as they 
tend to increase the cost were Geological Risk (GR) and Cost Risk (CR).  From the 
small production company perspective, with the score of 6 (very strong) the GR was 
more costly, as compared to CR (score 5 = strong plus).   
 
In summary, the result of AHP analysis on cost hierarchy structure was quite 
similar with the benefit hierarchy structure, in which PSC had the highest and 
significant score (0.627) as compared to RAT (0.261) and RSC (0.112), on the view 
small company. The overall inconsistency index in cost hierarchy was relatively high 
(0.28) but in the range could be tolerated.   
 
In addition to benefit and cost hierarchy analyses, we had also performed the 
risk hierarchy analysis. The four criteria considered were Price Risk (PR), Fiscal 
Risk (FR), Contract Risk (CoR) and Political Risk (PoR). With the score of 7 
(extremely significant), the Price Risk (PR) and Fiscal Risk (FR) were found to be 
the two most important parameters with respect to risk, followed by Contract Risk 
(CoR) and Political Risk (Score 5 = strong plus). The result of AHP analysis of risk 
hierarchy structure shows that with overall inconsistency index 0.00, RSC (0.437) 
had the highest score follows by PSC (0.361) and then RAT (0.203). 
 
As already calculated earlier, the benefit, the cost and the risk criteria had a 
similar weighting. With this similar weighting, then we computed for each 
alternative the ratio of Benefit to Cost times the Risk. As shown in Table 4.17, the 
results show that RAT had the highest score of 7.776, followed by the PSC (2.390) 
and RSC (0.981).  While it had the highest score in the benefit hierarchy structure 
analysis and was ranked as the first choice, the PSC had also the highest score in cost 
hierarchy and risk hierarchy. The end result was the PSC had a lower score as 
compared to the RAT system.  
 
To test the sensitivity of the results, two analyses were made involving 
changes of two parameters, named the CP and CR; both were aimed at reducing 
inconsistency index. The sample change in CP and CR would reduce the 
inconsistency index of Benefit/CP and Cost/CR, respectively, from 0.28 to 0.05 and 
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from 0.28 to 0.0, while keeping the other parameters constant.  The two sensitivity 
analyses show that the RAT was still the most desirable alternative as compared to 
RAT and RSC (Table 4.17 and Figure 4.34). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4.34: Result of AHP: the view of small company 
 
From the hierarchy structure analysis above, we can conclude that on the 
small company view’s, given Indonesia’s current condition, RAT system was the 
most desirable fiscal system. It was followed by the PSC and RSC system. The result 
of this analysis was consistent with the respondent’s statement by giving the answer 
no when asked on an open question: Is PSC still acceptable in attracting investor in 
Indonesia.  
 
 
 
4.3.2. The Most Desirable Contract System on the View of Medium Company 
operates in Western part of Indonesia 
 
Similar with situation in the eastern part of Indonesia, only one company 
having production between 10 and 50 MBOPD had completed and returned the 
questionnaires. This respondent had six PSC and one TAC contracts; all these 
contracts were operated in the western part of Indonesia some in onshore and some 
in offshore location. The respondent represented 14% of producing contracts or 5% 
of total contracts operated in the western part of Indonesia. 
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As shown in Table 4.18, the result of benefit hierarchy structure analysis 
shows that with the score of 7, the R criteria gave the highest impact on the benefit 
stream, it was followed by the CP and R/P (each score of 5), and TRA (score of 2). 
This result deviated from the previous finding involving small company view. The 
small company considered the CP would be the criteria that gave the most important 
impact on benefit stream.  Nonetheless, as shown in Table 4.19 the result of paired 
comparison suggested with overall inconsistency index 0.13, RAT (0.485) had the 
highest score; it was followed by PSC (0.329) and then RSC (0.187). 
 
Table 4.18 shows that in the cost hierarchy structure analysis, the result of 
analysis for medium company was consistent with that of small company, i.e. the GR 
was more costly parameter (score 6 = very strong) as compared to CR (score 5 = 
strong plus).  Also, the computed AHP on cost hierarchy structure shows with overall 
inconsistency index 0.00, the PSC had the highest score (0.503) and was followed by 
RAT (0.260) and RSC (0.237) (see Table 4.19).  
 
Table 4.18:  Score of benefit, cost and risk criteria according to medium company  
 
1 Benefits  
    -  Reserves Potential (R)  7 
    -  Current Production (CP) 5 
     -  Reserves/Production Ratio (R/P) 5 
     -  Total Reserves Addition (TRA) 2 
2 Cost  
     -  Geological Risk (GR) 6 
     -  Cost Risk (CR) 5 
3 Risk  
     -  Fiscal Risk (FR) 7 
     -  Price Risk (PR) 4 
     -  Contract Risk (CoR) 3 
     -  Political Risk (PoR) 2 
 
 In risk hierarchy analysis, the result of questionnaires indicated that the Fiscal 
Risk was extremely significant factors (score 7), was followed by Price Risk (score 
4), Contract Risk (score 3) and Political Risk (score 2). The AHP analysis on risk 
hierarchy structure (Table 4.19) shows that with overall consistency index 0.00, PSC 
had the highest score (0.407) and was followed by RSC (0.375) and RAT (0.216). 
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In terms of ratio of Benefit to Cost times Risk, with similar weighting of 
combination of benefit cost and risk criteria above, the computed results for each 
alternative (Table 4.19) shows that RAT had the highest score of 8.636, it was 
followed by the RSC (2.104) and PSC (1.607). The sensitivity analysis also provided 
similar conclusions.  Like the previous finding, the overall results involving medium 
company view, given current condition, the RAT was the most desirable choice of 
contract system for Indonesia compared to PSC and RSC (Figure 4.35). 
 
Table 4.19: Result of AHP: the view of medium company 
   
Alternatives Benefit Cost Risk Cost x Risk Benefit/(Cost x Risk) Rank 
PSC 0.329 0.503 0.407 0.205 1.607 3 
RAT 0.485 0.260 0.216 0.056 8.636 1 
RSC 0.187 0.237 0.375 0.089 2.104 2 
       
Sensitivity 1:  inconsistency index of benefit/CP is decreased from 0.69 to 0.00 
Alternatives Benefit Cost Risk Cost x Risk Benefit/(Cost x Risk) Rank 
PSC 0.239 0.503 0.407 0.205 1.167 3 
RAT 0.472 0.260 0.216 0.056 8.405 1 
RSC 0.289 0.237 0.375 0.089 3.252 2 
       
Sensitivity 2: inconsistency index cost/GR is decreased from 0.83 to 0.03 
Alternatives Benefit Cost Risk Cost x Risk Benefit/(Cost x Risk) Rank 
PSC 0.329 0.631 0.407 0.257 1.281 3 
RAT 0.485 0.179 0.216 0.039 12.544 1 
RSC 0.187 0.19 0.375 0.071 2.625 2 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4.35: Result of AHP: the view of medium company 
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4.3.3. The Most Desirable Contract System on the View of Large Company 
 
There were five companies having production over 50 MBOPD responded to 
the questionnaires.  However, only one company answered the question about AHP 
completely and consistently, so this company was taken as sample for the AHP 
analysis.  The company had nine PSC contracts, representing about 27% of the 32 
producing PSC contracts. All nine contracts operated in offshore area, some in 
western and some in eastern-part of Indonesia and had been operating more than 33 
years in Indonesia.  
 
Table 4.20 shows R was the extreme significant criteria, had the highest score 
of 7, followed by CP (score 6, TRA (score 5) and R/P (score 4). The result of paired 
comparison of all the four benefit criteria is presented in Table 4.21, showing that 
with overall inconsistency index 0.00, the PSC was the most preferable contract 
system (score of 0.493), it was followed by RSC (0.304) and then RSC (0.205). 
 
Table 4.20:  Score of benefit, cost and risk criteria according to large company  
 
1 Benefits   
    -  Reserves Potential (R)  7 
    -  Current Production (CP) 6 
    -  Total Reserves Addition (TRA) 5 
    -  Reserves/Production Ratio (R/P) 4 
2 Cost   
    -  Cost Risk (CR) 7 
    -  Geological Risk (GR) 6 
3 Risk   
    -  Price Risk (PR) 7 
    -  Political Risk (PoR) 6 
    -  Fiscal Risk (FR) 5 
    -  Contract Risk (CoR) 4 
 
Contrary to the two previous findings involving small and medium company 
views, the large company views gave the score of 7 to the CR, it was an extremely 
significant factor as compared to GR (score of 6 = very strong significant).  This was 
consistent with their better knowledge in the geology of the area, given their years of 
operation (over 33 years) in the area (Western-part of Indonesia).  Subsequently, the 
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result of AHP analysis on cost hierarchy structure (Table 4.21) shows that with 
overall inconsistency index 0.02, the RSC had the highest score (0.461), and then 
was followed by PSC (0.442) and RAT (0.097). 
 
In terms of risk, the PR (score 7) occupied the highest in the risk hierarchy 
structure, followed by PoR (score 6), FR (score 5) and CoR.  The result seemed to be 
consistent with their years of operating experiences in the area.  Subsequently, the 
large company in the western part of Indonesia view that with overall inconsistency 
index 0.01, the PSC had the highest score (score = 0.528) in hierarchy structure, then 
was followed by RSC (0.322), and then RAT (0.149). 
 
The computed result of ratio of Benefit to Cost times Risk for each alternative 
as presented in Table 4.21 and Figure 4.36 show that RAT (14.184) was the most 
desirable choice and it was followed by PSC (2.112) and then RSC (2.048). Note that 
the sensitivity analysis also shows similar conclusions.  
 
Table 4.21: Result of AHP: the view of large company 
  
Alternatives Benefit Cost Risk Cost x Risk Benefit/(Cost x Risk) Rank 
PSC 0.493 0.442 0.528 0.233 2.112 2 
RAT 0.205 0.097 0.149 0.014 14.184 1 
RSC 0.304 0.461 0.322 0.148 2.048 3 
       
Sensitivity: inconsistency index cost/GR is decreased from 0.02 to 0.00 
Alternatives Benefit Cost Risk Cost x Risk Benefit/(Cost x Risk) Rank 
PSC 0.493 0.418 0.528 0.221 2.234 2 
RAT 0.205 0.099 0.149 0.015 13.897 1 
RSC 0.304 0.484 0.322 0.156 1.951 3 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4.36: Result of AHP: the view of large company 
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The medium company and large company provided different answers 
between the result of the AHP analysis and their answers to the open question (in 
questionaire) “whether or not the PSC is still acceptable in attracting investor in 
Indonesia”.     
 
The values of Benefit / (Cost x Risk) of RAT system were much higher than 
other two systems and this values still consistent much higher after sensitivity 
analysis were done. Moreover the AHP has been developed based on some 
fundamental facts and thoughts that human mind is inconsistent but knowledgeable 
people will have a rationale mind and can value two different objects comparatively. 
Given that all of the steps have been taken, while all decision criteria have also been 
evaluated and scored, followed by paired comparisons based on the view of CEO’s 
petroleum company who has expertise and experiences with this subjects, the present 
result of AHP analysis should be more reliable as compared to the answer of the 
open question only. 
 
In brief, the result found that the respondents’ opinions and judgment were 
consistent with the respondents’ experiences. Consistent with the fact that small 
company focus on current production, due to he/she needed a steady cash-in come 
from its production, in evaluating the benefit parameters, the small company placed 
the current production as the most significant factor in impacting the benefit stream. 
Similarity medium company and large company, consistent with their better 
knowledge in the geology of the area, given their long years of operation (over 33 
years) in western-part of Indonesia, they considered the reserves potential was the 
most significant factor. If only benefits parameter were considered in decision-
making, small company and large company considered the PSC was the most 
desirable choice of contract, while the medium company preferred to choose the 
RAT. 
 
Moreover in the cost hierarchy structure analysis, small company and medium 
company considered that the geological risk was the most costly parameter; while the 
large company view the cost risk was more important parameter in decision process. 
This was consistent with the fact that given the years of operating experiences, the 
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geological risk in the western part of Indonesia area had been very well assessed, 
while with limited budget the small company and medium company operating in the 
eastern part of Indonesia had to be more selective in developing the exploration 
prospects. 
 
In the risk hierarchy analysis, small company and large company views 
placed the price risk above the fiscal risk, while the contract risk and political risk 
were considered to have less impact. In contrast the medium company view placed 
fiscal risk (score 7) far above price risk (score 4), while the contract risk and political 
risk were considered to have less impact.  
 
It can be concluded, the benefit cost risk analysis involving AHP could be 
used in identifying the most desirable petroleum contract system of petroleum E&P 
venture, and given recent Indonesia’s geological potential, economics, social and 
political condition, all respondents seemed to choose the Modern Concessionary or 
Royalty and Tax (RAT) system as the most desirable petroleum contract system for 
Indonesia compared to the existing Production Sharing Contract (PSC) and Risk 
Service Contract (RSC). 
 
 
 
4.4.   Investment Climate of the Petroleum Business in Indonesia 
 
As already noted in section 4.2.1.1 about respondent’s profile, there was eight 
(30%) companies returned the questionnaires, and these eight respondents had a total 
45 petroleum contracts in Indonesia, they were of 37% of the total active contracts 
and 122% of the total producing contracts. Each respondent hold varies number of 
contracts from two to as high as 13 contracts. Of the total 45 contracts, there were 37 
PSC, 4 JOB, 1 JOA and 3 TAC contracts. In addition, of the five retired executives 
two returned the questionnaires. Two analyses were drawn, first were analysed based 
on the view of company respondent and second were analysed based on the view of 
contract respondent used some principles of petroleum contract as shown on sub 
section 2.1.3 and sub section 3.4.  The result and finding are presented as follows. 
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4.4.1.   Investment Decision Variables  
 
Any decision would have several favourable or positive impact, unfavourable 
or negative impact and uncertain concerns to consider. The favourable impacts were 
called the benefits and the unfavourable impacts were called the costs. The uncertain 
concern of a decision was the negative risks that can entail. The cost was the 
uncertain/the negative impact would entail immediately and the risk was the negative 
impact that will be entailed in the future. 
 
As already mentioned earlier, the benefits that might be obtained when an 
investor invests in E&P venture in Indonesia could be realised from its geological 
potential, involving the reserves potential (R), total reserves addition in the last 
several years (TRA), current production (CP) and reserve/production ratio (R/P) of a 
field/basin/country. The benefit criteria above were scored based on the strength of 
their impact on the size of benefit stream that might be obtained, if a petroleum 
company would like to invest in petroleum E&P venture in Indonesia, with 
assumption that the four criteria above were current Indonesia’s conditions. The 
score was set up from 1 to the highest of 7. The mean score of benefit, cost and risk 
criteria could be seen in Figure 4.33 above.   
 
Around 80% of the company’s respondents gave score 7 of (most important) 
on Reserve Potential criteria in evaluating the benefit stream, while the remaining 
20% gave score 6 and below, then resulted an average score of 6.6 (see Figure 4.33 
above). While analysed based on contract’s respondents gave slightly above that 
figure an average score of 6.8, in which 91% of contract’s respondents gave score 7 
on reserves potential, and the remaining 6% gave score 4 and 2% gave score 6. 
Based on the results, all respondents valued the Reserve Potential was considered as 
the most important variable in evaluating the size of benefit stream in investing in a 
petroleum business in Indonesia. 
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The second important variable was the current production (CP), with an 
average score of 5.2, in which 90% of the company’s respondents gave score 5 
(strong/important plus) and over to CP. While on the view of contract’s respondents, 
CP had an average score slightly over of 5.4, in which 94% of contract’s respondents 
gave score 5 and over to CP. Based on the results, all respondents agreed the CP was 
considered as the strong/important plus variable in evaluating the benefit stream. 
 
The next important variable was the total reserves addition (TRA) with  mean 
score of 5.1 (strong/important plus), in which 70% of the company’s respondents 
gave score of 5 (strong/important plus). The TRA got similar mean score of 5.1 from 
the view of contract’s respondents. It was followed by reserves/production ratio 
(R/P) parameter, which valued by the company’s respondents mean score of 4.6, 
while the contract’s respondents gave slightly higher score of 5.2 (strong/important 
plus). 
 
The combination of all benefit variables R, CP, TRA and R/P was given an 
overall average score of 5.4 by company’s respondents and 5.6 by contract’s 
respondents, suggesting that on the view of entire respondents the geological 
potential was considered as over strong/important plus to very strong/important 
variable in evaluating the size of benefit stream in investing money in a petroleum 
business in Indonesia. 
 
When respondents were asked, which one was the most costly between 
geological risk and cost risk criteria in evaluating the size of cost of petroleum E&P 
investment in Indonesia, the company’s respondents scored an overall mean of 6 
(very strong), in which the geological risk was slightly more costly compared to cost 
risk with an overall mean score of 6.20. The contract’s respondents valued geological 
risk slightly over an average score of 6.23, which means it was slightly above very 
strong impact in evaluating the size of cost of petroleum E&P activity in Indonesia. 
Moreover, 40% of company’s respondents gave the geological risk a score of 7 (the 
most costly) and 40% gave a score of 6 (very strong) and the rest 20% respondents 
gave a score of 5 (strong plus). While 40% of contract’s respondents also gave a 
score 7 and 43% gave score 6 and the rest 17% gave score 5 to geological risk. 
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The cost risk mean score was slightly below the geological risk, an overall 
mean score of 5.7 on the view of company’s respondents and of 6.0 on the view of 
contract’s respondents. As a whole those two cost citeria was valued mean of 6.0 by 
company’s respondents and 6.1 by contract’s respondents (see Figure 4.33). It 
suggests on the view of entire respondents the costs criteria in Indonesia were very 
costly. 
 
Moreover, the respondents were also asked on which one of the following 
variables were the most risky, price risk (PR), fiscal risk (FR), contract risk (CoR) or 
political risk (PoR). Compared to other risk criteria, Figure 4.33 shows the 
company’s respondents valued the fiscal risk was the most risky criteria (score 5.6), 
it was followed by price risk, political risk and contract risk was the least among 
them. As a whole, those four risk criteria had an overall mean score of 5.2 (slightly 
above strong plus). While contract’s respondents valued the price risk (score 5.9) 
was the most risky criteria, it was followed by fiscal risk, contract risk, political risk 
and contract risk as the least risky criteria. As a whole, on the view of contract’s 
respondents those four risk criteria had an overall mean score slightly over the mean 
score of company’s respondents (score 5.5). It suggests the risks criteria in Indonesia 
valued also as very important citeria in increasing the cost and reducing the revenues 
but slightly below the costs criteria. 
 
In addition to those criteria above, the respondents also were asked about the 
strength of other criteria to be considered in decision-making process to enter the 
petroleum E&P venture. The four criteria asked were the geological petroleum 
resources potential, the existing PSC framework, “being an established operator”, 
and the regulatory framework. The questions also gave the opportunity to 
respondents to provide other criteria outside the above criteria being asked.   
 
Figure 4.37 shows that all respondents agreed that the geological potential 
was the first criteria to be considered in investment decision-making process 
compared to the other three criteria; the company’s respondents gave mean score of 
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6.3 and contract’s respondents of 6.6 (over very important/strong and slightly below 
the most important/strong parameter).  
 
The company’s respondents valued the existing PSC framework as the 
second ranked after geological potential with mean score of 5.1 (important /strong 
plus). Next important parameter was “being an established contractor” with mean 
score of 4.8 (slightly below important /strong plus), and the least was the regulatory 
framework with mean score of 4.6 (slightly below important/strong plus). While the 
contract’s respondents also valued the geological potential was the most important 
criteria with an average score of 6.6 (between the most and very important/strong), it 
was followed by “being an established contractor” with mean score of 5.5, the 
existing PSC framework with mean score of 4.8 and the least was regulatory 
framework with mean score of 4.4. To sum up, all four criteria above were valued as 
important /strong plus and over important/strong criteria to be considered in decision 
making process investing money in petroleum E&P venture in Indonesia. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4.37: Score of decision-making parameter 
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respondents and 36% of contract’s respondents added the sanctity of contract as an 
important issue to be considered.  
 
Finally, 88% of the respondents indicated that their view was independent on 
their present position, or their view will remained before and after securing the 
petroleum contract. The remaining 22% of the respondents increased their ranking on 
the regulatory framework and sanctity of contract after concluding the contract.  
 
 
 
4.4.2.   Operational Issues in Petroleum E&P Venture in Indonesia 
 
In their E&P operation, petroleum companies had experienced a number of 
operating problems. As the Figure 4.38 shows these issues vary from lack of 
infrastructure, government intervention, manpower regulation and relation, legal 
matters, security of the assets, and project approval process. The result of present 
survey indicated that all the above issues gave strong and over pressing on their 
operation in Indonesia that needs to be resolved in order to improve the Indonesia’s 
investment climate.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4.38: Score of Operational Issues 
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issue (score 4), it was followed by interference from other government agencies in 
the operation (strong plus pressing), manpower regulation and relation, legal issues, 
security assets, people and ownership and on the top of the list of pressing issues was 
the project approval process (very strong pressing issue). While on the view 
contract’s respondents, nearly similar the least operational issue was lack of 
infrastructure, which was classified as a strong pressing issue, it was followed by 
interference from other government agencies in the operation (strong plus pressing), 
security assets, people and ownership, manpower regulation and relation, the project 
approval process (very strong pressing issue), the project approval process (very 
strong pressing issue) and on the top of the list of pressing issues was legal issues 
(over very strong pressing issue). 
 
When they were asked about the pressing institutional relationship, they 
agreed central government relationship were the most pressing issue on their 
operation (score 6) in Indonesia (see Figure 4.39). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4.39: Score of pressing institutional relationship parameter 
 
Moreover when they were asked about the quality of relationship with key 
official of the government, respondents agreed that they had a very good relationship 
with key officials of provincial government (Gubernur), BP Migas and Ministry 
Energy and Mineral Resources.  They also had a good relationship with key officials 
of Ministry of Finance, Ministry of Manpower and the regional government (Bupati).  
Their relationship with the Parliament (DPR) was considered fair (Figure 4.40). 
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Compared with the result of the PriceWaterHouseCooper survey that was 
done in 2002 (see Chapter 2 section 2.4), although the scoring system was of the 
operation issues type and the ranked of operation issues pressing were also rather 
different, could be concluded that the Indonesian investment climate in year 2002 
and 2004 did not improve much. Some operation pressing issues and the institutional 
relationship issues still gave very strong and over pressure on their operation in 
Indonesia. These facts suggest of Indonesia’s operation pressing issues must be 
eliminated and the improvements of the quality of institutional relationship are 
needed as the first priority. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4.40:  Score of company’s relationship with key officials 
 
In searching whether the respondents have a clear understanding about Law 
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respondents already understood it. Clearly understanding of the content of the law is 
a must, without it the implementing of this law is wasted and does not give useful 
benefit; it is suggested the socialisation of those laws is needed.  
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understood it. However almost all of the respondents commented that the 
implementation of the law deviated from that stated in the law. The respondents 
believed that this was due to that lack of understanding on the relative roles of the 
central, provincial and regional governments. They commented that local 
governments had frequently acted like warlords and they levied regional taxes added 
to the tax burden of the PSC. In addition to lack of enforcement, the local and 
regional government seem were not aware that the policy on oil and gas industry was 
still handled by the central government. The local and regional governments often 
claimed that they also had the right to audit the contractor's book account. In October 
2004, the GOI finally issued the Government Regulation Number 35/2004, which 
provides the implementation rule for the Law Number 22/2002 on oil and gas.  It is 
hoped that the issuance of the implementation regulation will help in clarifying some 
of those operational issues. 
 
 
 
4.4.3. The Existing Indonesian Production Sharing Contract System 
 
In this section, the respondents were asked whether the existing Indonesian 
PSC type is still acceptable to attract investor to invest in E&P venture in Indonesia.  
They also were asked about the improved financial terms in the existing Indonesian 
PSC system that they like to see and their comments on the other types of contract, 
named Modern RAT and RSC. 
 
For the first question, 70% of the company’s respondents and 64% of the 
contract’s respondents agreed that PSC was still acceptable to attract investor to 
engage in E&P venture in Indonesia. PSC system already had been agreed by their 
home office were the reasons of their choices. They also said that PSC terms as 
stipulated in the existing contracts (pre Law no.22/2001) has provided a fair balance 
of risk and reward in most cases. However, certain clauses in Law no.22/2001 had 
reduced the PSC terms attractiveness and the problem laid in the implementation, 
which eliminate bureaucracy is needed as the first priority, in addition to the 
improving financial terms. 
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The respondents commented that the PSC had been working well in the first 
ten years of its introduction (1966-1976). Pertamina had acted a shield between the 
PSC and the bureaucrat in the government, allowing the contractors to focus in 
carrying the work program. Such a strong point of PSC had gone since the eighties 
and in fact it was getting worse. That being the case, the investors were better off 
being their own master in their contract area. They also commented that uncertainty 
of fiscal regime after Law No.22 must be eliminated and some improvement of 
financial terms were needed, such as improving terms for marginal field and the 
DMO price after 5 years DMO holiday price needed to be raised from the current 
figures. 
 
When they were asked about other types of contract, 30% of company’s 
respondents and 36% of contract’s respondents recommended the RAT system to 
replace the PSC system in making Indonesia more competitive internationally. This 
change may not be acceptable by the government, as it may violate the Constitution 
and due the fact that the PSC has been widely been accepted worldwide. We 
postulate that such recommendation had been triggered by frustration among the 
operators on the government intervention in the operation.   
 
Also, all the respondents said that the financial terms of the existing PSC 
were needed improvement. They suggested that improving the financial term above 
should be based on reasonable economic views. More over additional incentives and 
elimination of economic and political uncertainties were required to increase the 
exploration activities for higher risk prospects in the conventional and frontier areas, 
and development of small or marginal fields.  Frontier area was a moving target, and 
the risk was higher as the water depth and remoteness increases. 
 
The following lists the suggested improved terms for the PSC: 
1) Increasing production sharing split for contractor especially for marginal field, 
frontier and deep-water area. 
2) Increasing the investment credit both for the conventional and frontier areas 
and expanding the scope to include facilities cost and operating cost. 
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3) Extending time of the DMO holiday price from the existing 5 years to 10 years 
and eliminate the requirement for the frontier areas. 
4) In addition to increasing the price to 25% of the market price and revising 
computation method. Under the existing contract the 25% for DMO was 
computed based on total production, and the respondents recommended that the 
DMO be computed based on the production after cost recovery. 
5) Reducing the FTP for conventional areas and eliminate it for frontier. 
6) The VAT and import taxes and duties for capital and operation items during the 
exploration phase should continue to be borne by the state and the 
implementation of it need to be simplified. GOI already responded this issue. In 
March 2005, the Ministry of Finance issued the Ministry Finance Regulation 
Number 20/PMK.010/2005 dated March 3, 2005, which provided the 
“Pembebasan PPN, Pajak penjualan bea masuk dan pajak pasal 22 impor 
peralatan untuk explorasi” It is hoped it could resolve the problem. 
7) Tax on profit or dividend shall only be payable when it was actually paid and 
shall be reduced if the profits was reinvested. 
8) To increase the recoverable reserves, exploration activities need to be 
maintained and this could be accomplished by allowing the tax-consolidations 
between the contracts. It was particularly important for exploration in frontier, 
remote, deep-water areas and the development of marginal fields. The 
respondents stated that the stranded, small reserves must be addressed through 
incentives of existing terms or these reserves will lost forever.  
 
In addition to the financial terms, the respondent agreed that continueing 
improving the regulatory framework is a must. The measures include continuing 
observance of contract sanctity involving the improvements in regulatory system; 
stability and longevity of rules; clarification of the roles of MIGAS, BP Migas, 
BPKP and Ministry of Finance; to improve the coordination and allocation of 
responsibilities between central and regional authorities; and reduction of GOI 
involvement in micro management such tendering system, personnel issues and 
others. While recognizing the GOI sovereignty, the contractors basically like to see 
that the GOI limits its role to supervision and monitoring through a simpler and 
transparent approval process, in addition to guarantee the security of the investment.   
  
 
 
CHAPTER 5 
 
 
 
CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATION 
 
 
 
5.1. Conclusion 
 
The conclusions of the study are presented following the similar sequence of 
the objectives of the study mentioned in the Chapter 1. With the scenarios and 
assumptions applied in the study, the conclusion of the study can be reached are 
presented below. 
 
 
 
5.1.1. Commercial Performances of Indonesian Production Sharing Contracts  
 
The commercial performances of the PSC1 system during 1966 to 2003 
period were attractive on the contractor’s point of view and gave sufficient benefit 
for the GOI, but not appropriate to oil field with production rate below 50 MBOPD. 
The PSC1 not only had the highest number of contract signed, but also had the 
highest productivity and commercial performance than the other PSC types. 
However declining tendency on the productivity and commercial performances of 
the Indonesian PSC system applications occurred after the PSC1 time frame. These 
facts suggest that incentives are needed in order to increase the commercial 
performances, which hopefully increase the Indonesia’s petroleum E&P investment’s 
attractiveness. The conclusion is similar with the valuation of some investors and 
writers as mentioned in Chapter 1 and 2. 
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The commercial performances for any Indonesian locations (western-part, 
eastern-part, onshore, offshore) on average and as one field were attractive. 
Empirical evidence showed that western-part of Indonesia had become mature 
province. In contrast, the eastern-part had low number contracts signed and high 
number of unexplored basins. Moreover mostly of these unexplored basins were 
located in deep water and remote areas known as frontier areas. Evidently, petroleum 
E&P activities in these areas have higher risks and require higher expenditures than 
other areas. Therefore, more lenient petroleum contract terms and special incentives 
are needed to boost the exploration investment level, particularly in frontier areas, in 
order to increase the reserves size and production capacity. 
 
 
 
5.1.2. Some PSC Variables as Incentives  
 
Applying the principal agent theory model means acknowledging the 
reservation utility of the petroleum company that is replaceable by its rate of return 
expects from a comparable project elsewhere, and or, at least matched. At the same 
time the host government has to solve the incentive constraint since the host 
government wish for the guarantee on receiving maximum revenue from the venture. 
Therefore the utility of working hard (to perform the contract) should be higher than 
the utility of shirking. It can be understood that the profit of the first case has to be 
larger than the second case. For that reason the host government has to pay the 
petroleum company x units above his reservation utility for the contract to be 
optimal. Government must consider these principles in the decision-making policy in 
offering the petroleum contractual arrangement.   
 
Based on the premise, higher risk investments should be balanced with higher 
reward to the contractor. The host government must be aware and accepts that higher 
risks investments, might suggested GOI income expectation be lowered. Due to its 
nature, higher risk investment needs more incentives to raise the reward to the 
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petroleum company. Incentives given should be based on reasonable economic and 
given on the whole life cycle of the venture.  
 
Given the principles above, the analysis found that first the Fifth Incentives 
Package (IP5) that was offered by GOI in 2003 was commercially attractive for oil 
field with production rate over 50 MBOPD. However more incentives are needed for 
oil fields with production rate below 50 MBOPD.  
 
Secondly, improvements of some PSC variables, as incentives are needed, 
and should be offered based on its production rate profile. Incentives could be 
considered to attract investor for the field with production rate below 10 MBOPD, in 
order, of their impact strengths (from the strongest to the least impact) were: 
reducing the FTP size and shared between GOI and contractor as its production 
sharing split; recovering the capital expenditures without depreciation; increasing the 
investment credit; increasing the DMO price and DMO holiday price; reducing tax 
rate and increasing the contractor production sharing split from their highest figures 
of Fifth Incentives Package terms.  
 
For the oil field with production rate between 10 – 50 MBOPD, the 
recommended incentives, in order, of their impact strengths (from the strongest to the 
least impact) were increasing contractor production sharing split; reducing the tax 
rate; recovering the capital expenditures without depreciation method; reducing the 
FTP rate; increasing the DMO holiday price and the DMO holiday price from their 
lowest figures of the Fifth Incentives Package terms. The terms proposed by the 
respondents can be considered be applied.  
 
Thirdly, the FTP requirement is still needed; on the other hand the 
consistency of the main terms of PSC system must also be honoured. Moreover the 
result of simulation cash flow analysis of FTP’s impact has concluded that the 
provision of 100% FTP for GOI (as offered in IP5) would be a disincentive factor for 
the development of the entire field cases, it is contradicting with the objective of 
giving incentive by lowering the FTP under the IP5 (see subsection 4.2.2.1). 
Therefore, the FTP term, which is currently 100% for GOI under the IP5, is 
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suggested to be lowered and shared between the contractor and GOI, in proportion to 
the production sharing split as specified in the contract.  
 
Fourth, under the assumptions described in the study, as specified in Chapter 
3 section 3.2.3, Monte Carlo simulations concluded that from the contractor’s 
financial aspect, tax consolidation scheme was more attractive incentive compared to 
increase in production sharing split. It did not only give higher NPV@25% but also 
reduced the exploration risk. However tax consolidation idea was less attractive to 
the GOI, not only it reduced GOI’s NPV@25% but it also posed financial risk to the 
GOI. Unless securing additional reserves to supply the ever-increasing domestic 
energy need and developments of local economy due to multipliers effect of 
petroleum activity are deemed to be more important, the application of tax 
consolidation is not likely to be beneficial to GOI. 
 
 
 
5.1.3. The Most Desirable Petroleum Contract System for Indonesia on the 
View of Petroleum Company 
 
The analysis found that the respondents’ opinion and judgment were 
consistent with their experiences. Small company focus on current production 
because it is needed the steady cash income from its production. In evaluating the 
benefit criteria, the small company had placed the current production as the most 
significant criteria in impacting the benefit stream. On the other hand, consistent with 
their better knowledge in the geology of the area, given their long years of operation 
(over 33 years) in western-part of Indonesia, the medium company and large 
company considered the reserve as the most significant criteria.  
 
Similarly, in the cost hierarchy structure analysis, small company and medium 
company considered that the geological risk was the most costly criteria; while the 
large company view the cost risk was more important criteria in decision making 
process. This was consistent with the fact that given the years of operating 
experiences, the geological risk in the western part of Indonesia area had been very 
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well assessed, while with limited budget the small company and medium company 
operating in the eastern part of Indonesia had to be more selective in developing the 
exploration prospects. 
 
In the risk hierarchy analysis, small company and large company placed the 
price risk above the fiscal risk, while the contract risk and political risk were 
considered to have less impact. In contrast the medium company view placed fiscal 
risk (score 7) far above price risk (score 4), while the contract risk and political risk 
were considered to have less impact.  
 
It can be concluded, the benefit cost risk analysis involving AHP could be 
used in identifying the most desirable petroleum contract system of petroleum E&P 
venture. Given recent Indonesia’s geological potential, economics, social and 
political condition, all respondents seemed to choose the Modern Concessionary or 
Modern Royalty and Tax (RAT) system as the most desirable petroleum contract 
system for Indonesia compared to the existing Production Sharing Contract (PSC) 
and Risk Service Contract (RSC). 
 
 
 
5.1.4. Investment Climate of the Petroleum Business in Indonesia 
 
First, respondents rated geological potential, cost, risk, the existing PSC 
framework, being an established contractor, regulatory, contract sanctity criteria as 
strong plus or more to be considered in the decision making process of investing 
money in petroleum E&P venture in Indonesia.  
 
Second, the Indonesia’s cost risk, geological risk and the entire risk variables 
of Indonesia were very costly and were rated as very strong or more criteria in 
reducing the revenues.  
 
Third, the Indonesian investment climate during 2004 did not improve yet. 
Some operational issues were rated as strong or more pressing on the petroleum 
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companies operation in Indonesia. The following lists the operational issues in the 
order its pressing importance, from the least to the most pressing, lack of 
infrastructure; interference from other government agencies in the operation; security 
assets, people and ownership; manpower regulation and relation; the project approval 
process (very strong pressing issue); and on the top of the list of pressing issues was 
legal issues (over very strong pressing issue). 
 
Fourth, the existing Indonesian PSC framework was still favoured highly by 
respondents (70% of company’s and 64% of contract’s respondents), while the rest 
recommended that Indonesia should consider changing the PSC system to RAT 
system. The main problems were not on the PSC system, but on the implementation 
of the PSC system. Eliminating bureaucracy was needed as the first priority, in 
addition to improving the financial terms.   
 
Fifth, only 50% of company’s and 49% contract’s respondents had a clear 
understanding about the three new laws, Laws 22 and 25 on Regional autonomy and 
Oil and Gas Law number 22/2001, suggesting that socialisation of those laws was 
needed. In contrast, 80% of company’s respondents and 94% of contract’s 
respondents had clear understanding on the role of Pertamina, BP Migas and 
Ministry Energy and Mineral Resources according to the Law 22/2001. However, 
almost all of them commented that the implementation of the laws deviated from 
what stated in the laws. The respondents believed that this was due to that lack of 
understanding on the relative roles of the central, provincial and regional 
governments. It was hoped that the issuance of the Government Regulation Number 
35/2004, which provided the implementation rule for the Law Number 22/2001 on 
oil and gas sector would help in clarifying some of those operational issues. 
 
Sixth, the entire respondents agreed that the financial terms of the existing 
PSC needed improvement and suggested that the improvement on the financial term 
above should be based on reasonable economic views. More additional incentives 
and elimination of economic and political uncertainties were required not only to 
increase the exploration activities for higher risk prospects in the conventional and 
frontier areas, but also for development of small or marginal fields. This was 
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particularly important for exploration in remote or frontier areas and the development 
of marginal fields. Respondent said that the stranded, small reserves must be 
addressed through incentives of existing terms, or, these reserves will be lost forever. 
And seventh, in order to increase the recoverable reserves, exploration activities need 
to be maintained and these could be accomplished by allowing the tax-consolidations 
between the contracts.  
 
It can be concluded that Indonesia’s petroleum E&P business investment 
climate in 2004 still did not improve yet and need to be solved immediately.  
 
In addition to the conditions above, Ernst & Young’s study (2005) identified 
that the Indonesia’s investment climate in 2004, with score 48 and obtained red light, 
was the worst compared to ten oil- and gas-rich countries that were regarded as top 
prospects for energy investment included: Canada, China, India, Indonesia, Nigeria, 
Norway, Qatar, Russia, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates. The objective 
of the study was to examine the greatest areas of risk and reward for new U.S. 
exploration and production projects. A series of questions in the following 
categories: economic stability and tax administration, government structure and 
accessibility, legal and regulatory systems, the infrastructure in place to support oil 
and gas operations, and the availability of skilled workers. The questions were scored 
on a 100-point scale, and, based on these totals, were assigned a red, yellow, or green 
light. A score of 80% or better was considered green, with few barriers to foreign 
investment. A score of 60 to 79% was considered yellow, or proceed with caution. A 
score of less than 60% was considered red, and likely to involve challenges. The 
study found some of the common barriers in Indonesia include: an instable economy, 
a lack of channels for reporting unethical behaviour, complex or bureaucratic 
government that is difficult to navigate, and unreliable or under-developed electric, 
communications and information technology infrastructures. 
 
Many problems above need be resolved immediately in order to improve the 
investment climate in Indonesia. In improving the investment climate, in addition to 
contract sanctity, the four universal principles with respect to the contract law i.e. 
freedom of contract, pacta sunt servanda, good faith and consensualism must be 
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honoured in the entire process of petroleum E&P venture, from the regulatory 
framework and its implementation thru entire operations of the petroleum E&P 
venture. 
 
To achieve it, according to respondents, in addition to improve the PSC 
financial terms, the GOI should continue to improve the regulatory framework and 
its implementation. The measures include continuing observance of contract sanctity 
involving the improvements in regulatory system and its implementation; stability 
and longevity of rules; clarification of the roles of MIGAS, BP Migas, BPKP and 
Ministry of Finance; to improve the coordination and allocation of responsibilities 
between central and regional authorities; and reduction of GOI involvement in micro 
management such tendering system, personnel issues and others; and socialisation of 
the laws, government regulations, procedures to shareholders. While recognizing the 
GOI’s sovereignty, the contractors basically would like to see that the GOI limits its 
role to supervision and monitoring through a simpler and transparent approval 
process, in addition to guaranteeing the security of the investment.   
 
 
 
5.2.   Recommendation 
 
The role of Indonesia’s petroleum activities and revenues are very important 
for Indonesia, not only to supply energy and to support the GOI revenues, but also 
due to their multiplier effects on the development of other industries that support the 
petroleum E&P operation and creating work and job opportunities for the Indonesia’s 
community. Moreover the financial strength of GOI decreased significantly and the 
Indonesia’s net oil importer position must be halt. For that reason the direct private 
petroleum E&P investments in Indonesia are still needed and must be increased. The 
GOI must try to search for any possible way to achieve it.  
 
The results of the study show that the recent position of Indonesia’s E&P 
investment attractiveness in global competition to attract scarce fund investment was 
reduced. Furthermore exploration activities must be increased in frontier areas and 
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deep water. Consequently GOI must offer more lenient contract terms and more 
attractive incentives to increase the attractiveness of the Indonesia’s petroleum E&P 
investment.  In short term, the GOI revenues might decrease due to more lenient 
contract terms/incentives. However, if the lenient contract terms and incentives to 
offer was attractive enough to increase the petroleum E&P investment level in 
Indonesia, in the long run the reserves size and the production capacity most likely 
will increase, and as the result the GOI revenues will increase too. 
 
Therefore based on the results of the study, in order to increase the 
attractiveness of the Indonesia’s petroleum E&P investment, the study recommends 
as follows, 
(1) Improvements of some PSC variables as incentives should consider to be 
offered based on its production rate profile (detail see sub section 5.1.2). The 
proposed respondents terms can be considered be applied.  
(2) Since tax consolidation application in frontier areas posed financial risk to the 
GOI, hence it could not be used as incentives. In the meantime Indonesia needs 
to boost the exploration investments level in frontier areas. Consequently GOI 
should consider using the Modern RAT system strictly only for exploration 
investment in new and very high-risk areas and isolated frontier areas. 
(3) The most important aspect immediately needs to be put in effect is improving 
the Indonesia’s investment climate condition (see detail in section 5.1.4).  
 
For future research, the following studies are suggested: 
(1) A comprehensive comparative petroleum contract system study between 
Indonesia and other countries, not only from financial point view, but also 
involving other criteria such as geological potential, costs, price risk, market 
risk, fiscal risk, contract risk, political risk and others using AHP method. 
(2) A study to analyse the modern RAT system from legal point of view. On the 
view of investor, the RAT system was the most desirable petroleum contract 
system. On the other hand the traditional RAT system was regarded by the 
Indonesia as being far too generous to foreign companies at the expenses of the 
country. Meanwhile the current development of modern RAT system shows 
that this system can be modified to reduce its negative side.  
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Appendix A 
 
 
 
 
Through this questionnaire we would like to know your expert judgment and 
opinion about some parameters in petroleum E&P investment in Indonesia to gain a 
better sight of the issues in order to attract investors into petroleum E&P industry in 
Indonesia. Thank you very much for your cooperation and interest. 
 
Responses will be used solely for academic purposes and will be kept 
strictly confidential. 
 
 
For decades Indonesia’s upstream petroleum (E&P) venture has been viewed 
by international petroleum investor as an attractive destination for investment.  
However, the changes in the Indonesia’s petroleum resources potential, economical, 
social and political conditions seem to have made the existing Indonesia’s fiscal 
system Production Sharing Contract (PSC) look inefficient. 
The objectives of the study are to answer following questions:  Is the existing 
Indonesia’s PSC still efficient to attract investors in petroleum E&P industry in 
Indonesia?  Or does the existing fiscal system need to be changed? If the answer is 
that the existing Indonesia’s PSC is still attractive, then which terms must be 
enhanced to raise the attractiveness of the existing Indonesia’s PSC system? 
In this study, there are three fiscal systems that can be selected for petroleum 
investment, namely: the Royalty and Tax (RAT), Risk Service Contract (RSC) and 
the existing Indonesia’s Production Sharing Contract (PSC).   
In RAT system, the petroleum resources may be privately owned through 
government licensing. The government takes shares from only royalties, which are 
paid before production and taxes after production.  
In RSC system, the government retains ownership of petroleum resources, 
while the petroleum company will explore at its sole risk as the contractor of the 
government. In return, if exploration efforts are successful, the government allows 
the contractor to recover those costs through sale of the petroleum and pays the 
contractor a fee based on a percentage of the remaining revenues. 
In PSC system, the government retains ownership of petroleum resources, 
while the petroleum company will explore at its sole risk and, in the case of 
commercial discovery, develop and produce the resource. The contractor will recover 
its expenditures for exploration and production, and the remainder will be shared 
between the host government and the contractor and can be regarded as payment or 
compensation for the risk taken and service rented. In this study the PSC system is 
the existing or current Indonesia’s PSC.   
This study will be done in two approaches, economic analysis and holistic 
approach through benefit-cost-risk analysis with Analytic Hierarchy Process (AHP). 
 
QUESTIONNAIRE 
SECTION A:  BACKGROUND 
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B. 1.   COMPANY BACKGROUND INFORMATION 
 
If you are an Executive in Oil Company, please tick the appropriate boxes to describe 
your company. Others go to Section B.3. 
 
1) How long has your company been operating in Indonesian upstream petroleum 
operations? …………years. 
 
2) Please indicate the size of your company’s activities in terms of total Annual 
Expenditure for Exploration, Development and Production (average for the last 
five years). 
 
Less than US $ 20 million  
US$ 20  – 100 million  
Over US$ 100 million  
 
3) Please indicate the size of your company’s activities in terms of total annual Oil 
Production (average for the last five years) 
 
Less than 10 MBOPD  
10 – 50 MBOPD  
Over 50 MBOPD  
 
4) You describe your company as: 
 
A National Oil Company  
A Foreign Oil Company  
Other, please specify:…………  
 
5) Beside Indonesia, your other company’s operations are located in the following 
countries:  
……………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………………………………………………… 
 
6) Your present upstream activities in Indonesia include: 
 
Onshore  Frontier area  
Offshore  Deep water:  …………. m  
Both onshore-offshore  Other: specify…………  
 
SECTION B:  EXPERIENCES IN E&P OPERATION IN INDONESIA 
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7) Your present upstream activities are in: 
 
 Western part of Indonesia   
 Eastern part of Indonesia  
 
 
8) Your company has the following petroleum contractual agreements with 
Indonesia Government: 
  
Type of agreements How many 
Production Sharing Contract (PSC)  
Enhanced Oil Recovery Contract (EOR)  
Joint Operation Body (JOB)  
Technical Assistance Contract (TAC)  
Joint Operation Agreement (JOA)  
Other: specify…………..  
 
 
B. 2.   INVESTMENT DECISION 
 
1) Please give your score from 1 to 7 in the order of its significance the 
parameters that are considered in your decision to enter the petroleum venture 
in Indonesia (Note 7 = the most significant, 6 = very strong, 5= strong plus, 4 = 
strong, 3= moderate, 2= weak, and 1 is the least significant). 
 
Parameter Score 
 Geological Potential  
The existing PSC Framework  
Being an established operator  
Regulatory framework  
Other: please specify…………  
……………………………………………  
…………………………………………….  
 
 
2) After securing new petroleum contract and the operation commences, do you 
find the above ranking needs to be changed? 
 
 
YES    NO 
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3) If your answer in # 2 above is “Yes”, please make a new scoring from 1 to 7 in 
the order of its significance (Note 7 is the most significant and 1 is the least 
significant). 
 
Parameter Score 
 Geological Potential  
The existing PSC Framework  
Being an established operator  
Regulatory framework  
Other: please specify…………  
……………………………………………  
…………………………………………….  
 
 
 
B. 3.   OPERATIONAL ISSUES 
 
1) Please give your score from 1 to 7 in the order of its importance according your 
experience/opinion the strength of pressing operation issues that affect your 
company operation in Indonesia (Note 7 is the most pressing and 1 is the least 
pressing).   
 
Operation issues Score 
Legal issues  
Contract and project approval process  
Community Relations  
Central Government relations (BP-Migas, Ministry of Energy 
and Resources, Ministry of Finance, Ministry of Manpower, 
DPR etc.) 
 
Provincial government (Gubernur etc.)  
Regional/Local Government relations (Bupati etc.)  
Security of assets, people and ownership right  
Manpower regulations and relations  
Interference from other government agencies, such as tax 
authorities 
 
Infrastructure  
Other (specify):   
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2) Institutional Relationship: 
 
a) Do you have a clear understanding on the roles of central, provincial and 
regional governments under the Laws Number Law 22/1999 on Regional 
Autonomy and Law 25/1999 on Fiscal Decentralization  and the Oil and 
Gas Law Number 22/2001? 
 
 
YES    NO 
 
If your answer is “NO” please specify 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
a) Do you have a clear understanding on the roles of PERTAMINA, BP 
MIGAS and Ministry of Energy and Mineral Resources under the Oil 
and Gas Law Number 22/2001? 
 
 
YES    NO 
 
 
If your answer is “NO” please specify 
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3) Government – Company Relationship. 
 
If you are an executive in Petroleum Company, please give your experience on 
your company’s relationship with key officials. Others, according to your 
opinion, please give your opinion about company’s relationship with key 
officials.  (Note: 5 = excellent, 4 = very good, 3 = good, 2 = fair, and 1 = poor) 
 
Relationship with…. Score 
Regional government (Bupati)  
Provincial government (Gubernur)  
BP MIGAS  
Ministry of Energy and Mineral Resources  
Ministry of Finance  
Ministry of Manpower  
Parliament (DPR)  
 
 
 
B. 4.  INDONESIA’S  FISCAL SYSTEM 
 
1) If you are an executive in Petroleum Company, is the Existing Indonesia 
Production Sharing Contract system still acceptable to your company? Others, 
according your opinion, is the Existing Indonesia Production Sharing Contract 
type still acceptable to attract investor to invest in E&P industry in Indonesia? 
 
 
      YES    NO 
 
Your reasoning:  
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2) What are the improved financial terms in the existing Indonesia’s PSC system 
that you like to see, in order to attract investors to invest in Indonesia? 
 
 
Contract Terms Conventional Frontier Reason 
Oil Sharing 
formula 
 
 
 
   
Gas Sharing 
formula 
 
 
 
   
Investment Credit 
 
 
 
   
DMO 
 
 
 
   
FTP 
 
 
 
   
Tax 
 
 
 
   
Tax consolidation 
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Other: specify 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   
 
 
3) If your answer “NO”, what is the type of contract that you recommend along 
with your reasoning: 
 
       Royalty and Tax       Risk Service Contract 
 
       Other: specify: 
 
Your reasoning: 
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C. 1.  METHODOLOGY  
 
The Analytic Hierarchy Process (AHP) is a theory for priority measurement, 
developed by Saaty, which provides a framework of logic and problem solving 
which has been widely applied by organizations and business worldwide. It is a 
process for organizing perceptions, feelings, judgments, and memories into a 
hierarchy of forces that influences decision results. 
The AHP meets the steps in decision making which involves: structuring a 
problem, eliciting judgments, representing those judgments with meaningful 
numbers, using the numbers to calculate the priorities of the elements of the 
hierarchy, synthesizing the results to determine an overall outcome, and finally 
analysing the sensitivity to changes in judgments.  
Any investment decision has several favourable and unfavourable concerns. 
Some of them are certain; others are less certain and have a likelihood of 
materializing. The favourable certain concerns are identified as benefits while the 
unfavourable ones are identified as costs. The uncertain concern of a decision is 
negative risks that can entail. The difference between cost and risk is:  Cost is 
uncertain/negative impact that can entail immediately; meanwhile risk is negative 
impact that could entail in the future. 
In benefit-cost-risk analysis with AHP each of these concerns utilizes as a 
separate structure for decision.  The study starts with a benefit control structure, then 
a cost control structure and ends with a risk control structure. These three structures 
can be utilized to assess benefit / (cost x risk) outcome. Each parameter will be 
observed at a different threshold of intensity, and that such thresholds will be 
prioritised according to their importance.  Each alternative is evaluated only in terms 
of its highest-priority threshold level. 
Benefit-cost-risk analysis with AHP will be illustrated in this study to answer 
following questions:  Is the existing Indonesia’s PSC still efficient to attract investors 
in petroleum E&P industry in Indonesia?  Or does the existing fiscal system need to 
be changed? If the answer is that the existing Indonesia’s PSC is still attractive, then 
which terms must be enhanced to raise the attractiveness of the existing Indonesia’s 
PSC system? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
SECTION C:  BENEFIT-COST-RISK WITH ANALYTIC HIERARCHY 
PROCESS (AHP) 
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Parameters for comparison 
 
In the study, we will try compare various parameters that may be pertinent in 
investment decision process, in particular relates to reserves. The parameters would 
be compared are: 
(1) Reserves (R) proved and probable, represents the remaining discovered 
reserves that have not been produced yet plus the potential amount of 
undiscovered reserves in that area/field/basin/country. 
(2) Total Reserve Addition in the last 10 years (TRA) proved as well 
probable (P+P), will be considered to know not only the size of the basins 
but also its timing from discovery. In other words, a relatively new basin 
will not have added to many reserves in the last 10 years; however, an old 
one may have historically added an important amount of reserves, but not 
in the last 10 years since it may be a mature basin. 
(3) Current Production (CP) data refers to the latest available data of annual 
petroleum production.   
(4) Reserve/Production Ratio (R/P) shows the number of years of future 
production at current production rates and is defined as, 
Reserves/Annual Production 
The R/P ratio disregard production declines or any reserve growth.   
(5) Cost Risk (CR) occurs when costs vary irregularly due to unpredicted 
operational issues such as unexpected side effects that would evolve to 
decrease the quality of environment during operation; longer in contract 
and project approval process; legal issues; community relation; 
government relation; security of assets, people and ownership; manpower 
regulation and relation; interference from other government agencies; 
infrastructure, failure in technology might be chosen and others. 
(6) Geological Risk (GR) is the possibility of failure in exploration.  
(7) Price Risk (PR) occurs when price varies irregularly due to ups and 
downs in demand at some point in time either because of changes in 
demand behaviour or because of new sources of supply or others. 
(8) Fiscal Risk (FR) occurs due to changes in the fiscal terms such as tax, 
inflation, or others. 
(9) Contract Risk (CoR) happened when unpredicted revision in the 
contract element. 
(10) Political Risk (PoR) happens due to changes in the political condition, 
either by having a new party in power or by some type of coup, 
implementation of new regulation and others. 
 
The assumptions of this study are: 
(1) Indonesia is treated as one field of petroleum E&P operation. 
(2) The income/profit of three alternatives fiscal systems (RAT, RSC and 
PSC) have the same amount. 
(3) All parameters are in the current Indonesia condition. 
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C. 2.  PAIRED COMPARISON BETWEEN PARAMETERS 
 
1) While considering entering the petroleum venture in Indonesia, one of the 
parameter to be evaluated is what and how much the benefits that might be 
acquired if you invest in the petroleum E&P project. The benefits of the E&P 
venture could be known from their petroleum resources potential, involving the 
Reserves Potential, Total Reserves Addition in the last 10 years (TRA), Current 
Production (CP) and Reserve/Production Ratio (R/P) of a field/basin/country.  
 
Please give your score from 1 to 7 in order of its importance (Note 7 is the most 
important and 1 is the least important) of the parameters below in your 
evaluation the benefits that might be obtained if you invest in E&P venture in 
Indonesia, with the assumption that all parameters below are in the current 
Indonesia’s condition. 
 
Parameter Score 
Reserves Potential (R)   
Total Reserve Addition (TRA)  
Current Production (CP)  
Reserve/Production Ratio (R/P)  
 
 
2) In applying the cost for valuation, please give your score from 1 to 7 in order of 
its importance (Note 7 is the most important and 1 is the least important) of the 
parameters below that will be making additional cost or reducing the revenue. 
 
Parameter Score 
Cost Risk (CR)  
Geological Risk (GR)  
 
 
3) In applying the risk for valuation, please give your score from 1 to 7 in the 
order of its importance (Note 7 is the most important and 1 is the least 
important) of the parameters below that will be making additional cost or 
reducing the revenue. 
 
Parameter Score 
Price Risk (PR)  
Fiscal Risk (FR)  
Contract Risk (CoR)   
Political Risk (PoR)  
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C. 3.   PAIRED COMPARISON BETWEEN ALTERNATIVES 
 
We would like to know your paired comparison judgments to capture the 
relative dominance of one parameter above other parameter with respect to reach the 
objective of attracting investor to invest in E&P industry in Indonesia. The answer 
should be scored according to the fundamental scale that shown in Table 1 below.  
 
Table 1. The Fundamental Scale 
 
Intensity of 
Importance 
Definition 
 
Explanation 
 
1 Equal Importance/ 
Desirable 
Two element contribute equally to the 
objective 
2 Weak ….between Equal and Moderate 
3 Moderate Importance 
/Desirable 
Experience and judgment slightly favor 
one element over another 
4 Moderate plus ….between Moderate and Strong 
5 Strong 
Importance/Desirable 
Experience and judgment strongly favor 
one element over another 
6 Strong plus ….between  Strong and Very Strong 
7 Very Strong or 
demonstrated 
Importance/Desirable 
An element is favored very strongly 
over another; its dominance 
demonstrated in practice 
8 Very, very strong ….between Very Strong and Extreme 
9 Extreme 
Importance/Desirable 
The evidence favoring one element over 
another is of the highest possible order 
of affirmation 
Reciprocals 
of above 
 
 
 
 
Rationals 
 
If element i has one of 
the above nonzero 
numbers assigned to it 
when compared with 
activity j, then j has the 
reciprocal value when 
compared with i 
 
Ratios arising from the 
scale 
 
If x is 5 times j, i.e., x = 5y, then y = x/5 or 
y = 1/5 x. 
 
 
 
 
If consistency were to be forced by 
obtaining n numerical values to span the 
matrix. 
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Examples: 
 
Comparison judgment between RAT and RSC, under Indonesia’s Reserves (R) 
condition. 
 
Question 1: 
 
To reach the objective of attracting investor to invest in petroleum E&P industry in 
Indonesia, under Indonesia’s Reserves (R) condition, which is more important RAT 
or RSC system?  
 
Answer 1:    
¾ If your answer RAT is more important than RSC then cross the box on the 
left of box  at row for RAT. 
¾ If your answer RSC is more important than RAT then cross the box on the 
left of box at row for RSC. 
¾ If they are both "equally important", you cross the box "1".  
¾ Example answer 1: RSC is more important than RAT. 
 
 RAT 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
X RSC 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
 
 
 
Question 2.: 
 
Under Indonesia’s Reserves (R) condition, how much more important is RAT over 
RSC (or RSC over RAT)?  
 
Answer 2: 
 
¾ If in your opinion RSC is of "extreme importance" (number 9) compared 
to RAT, then cross the box "9" in the same row of box RSC.  
¾ If they are both "equally important", you cross the box  "1,".  
¾ If you are not sure with your choice between "extreme importance" (number 
9) or "very strongly more important" (number 7) you could choose number 
8 and cross the box   "8" in the same row of box RSC. 
¾ Example answer 2: RSC is “very strongly more importance” (number 7) 
compared to RAT. 
 
 
 RAT 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
X RSC 1 2 3 4 5 6 7X 8 9 
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PLEASE ANSWER THE QUESTIONS BELOW WITH THE SAME 
METHOD ABOVE. 
 
1) Comparison judgment under Indonesia’s Reserves (R) condition. 
a) Between RAT and RSC.   
Under Indonesia’s R condition, 
• Which is more important RAT or RSC? 
• How much more important is RAT over RSC (or RSC over RAT)?  
 
 RAT 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
 RSC 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
 
b) Between RAT and PSC. 
Under Indonesia’s R condition, 
• Which is more important RAT or existing PSC system? 
• How much more important is RAT over PSC (or PSC over RAT)? 
 
 RAT 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
 PSC 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
 
c) Between RSC and PSC. 
Under Indonesia’s R condition, 
• Which is more important RSC or existing PSC system? 
• How much more important is RSC over PSC (or PSC over RSC)? 
 
 RSC 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
 PSC 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
 
2) Comparison judgment under Indonesia’s Total Reserves Addition (TRA)  
a) Between RAT and RSC.   
Under Indonesia’s TRA condition, 
• Which is more important RAT or RSC? 
• How much more important is RAT over RSC (or RSC over RAT)?  
 
 RAT 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
 RSC 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
 
b) Between RAT and PSC. 
Under Indonesia’s TRA condition, 
• Which is more important RAT or existing PSC system? 
• How much more important is RAT over PSC (or PSC over RAT)? 
 
 RAT 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
 PSC 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
 
c) Between RSC and PSC. 
Under Indonesia’s TRA condition, 
• Which is more important RSC or Existing PSC system? 
• How much more important is RSC over PSC (or PSC over RSC)? 
 
 RSC 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
 PSC 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
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3) Comparison judgment under Indonesia’s Current Production (CP)  
a) Between RAT and RSC.   
Under Indonesia’s CP condition, 
• Which is more important RAT or RSC? 
• How much more important is RAT over RSC (or RSC over RAT)?  
 
 RAT 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
 RSC 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
 
b) Between RAT and PSC. 
Under Indonesia’s CP condition, 
• Which is more important RAT or existing PSC system? 
• How much more important is RAT over PSC (or PSC over RAT)? 
 
 RAT 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
 PSC 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
 
c) Between RSC and PSC. 
Under Indonesia’s CP condition, 
• Which is more important RSC or Existing PSC system? 
• How much more important is RSC over PSC (or PSC over RSC)? 
 
 RSC 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
 PSC 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
 
4) Comparison judgment under Indonesia’s Reserve/ Production Ratio (R/P) 
a) Between RAT and RSC.   
Under Indonesia’s R/P condition, 
• Which is more important RAT or RSC? 
• How much more important is RAT over RSC (or RSC over RAT)?  
 
 RAT 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
 RSC 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
 
b) Between RAT and PSC. 
Under Indonesia’s R/P condition, 
• Which is more important RAT or existing PSC system? 
• How much more important is RAT over PSC (or PSC over RAT)? 
 
 RAT 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
 PSC 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
 
c) Between RSC and PSC. 
Under Indonesia’s R/P condition, 
• Which is more important RSC or Existing PSC system? 
• How much more important is RSC over PSC (or PSC over RSC)? 
 
 RSC 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
 PSC 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
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5) Comparison judgment under Indonesia’s Cost Risk (CR) condition. 
a) Between RAT and RSC.   
Under Indonesia’s CR condition, 
• Which is more important RAT or RSC? 
• How much more important is RAT over RSC (or RSC over RAT)?  
 
 RAT 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
 RSC 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
 
b) Between RAT and PSC. 
Under Indonesia’s CR condition, 
• Which is more important RAT or existing PSC system? 
• How much more important is RAT over PSC (or PSC over RAT)? 
 
 RAT 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
 PSC 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
 
c) Between RSC and PSC. 
Under Indonesia’s CR condition, 
• Which is more important RSC or Existing PSC system? 
• How much more important is RSC over PSC (or PSC over RSC)? 
 
 RSC 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
 PSC 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
 
6) Comparison judgment  under Indonesia’s Geological Risk (GR) condition. 
a) Between RAT and RSC.   
Under Indonesia’s GR condition, 
• Which is more important RAT or RSC? 
• How much more important is RAT over RSC (or RSC over RAT)?  
 
 RAT 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
 RSC 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
 
b) Between RAT and PSC. 
Under Indonesia’s GR condition, 
• Which is more important RAT or existing PSC system? 
• How much more important is RAT over PSC (or PSC over RAT)? 
 
 RAT 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
 PSC 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
 
c) Between RSC and PSC. 
Under Indonesia’s GR condition, 
• Which is more important RSC or Existing PSC system? 
• How much more important is RSC over PSC (or PSC over RSC)? 
 
 RSC 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
 PSC 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
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7) Comparison judgment   under Indonesia’s Price Risk (PR) condition. 
a) Between RAT and RSC.   
Under Indonesia’s PR condition, 
• Which is more important RAT or RSC? 
• How much more important is RAT over RSC (or RSC over RAT)?  
 
 RAT 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
 RSC 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
 
b) Between RAT and PSC. 
Under Indonesia’s PR condition, 
• Which is more important RAT or existing PSC system? 
• How much more important is RAT over PSC (or PSC over RAT)? 
 
 RAT 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
 PSC 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
 
c) Between RSC and PSC. 
Under Indonesia’s PR condition, 
• Which is more important RSC or Existing PSC system? 
• How much more important is RSC over PSC (or PSC over RSC)? 
 
 RSC 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
 PSC 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
 
8) Comparison judgment  under Indonesia’s Fiscal Risk (FR) condition. 
a) Between RAT and RSC.   
Under Indonesia’s FR condition, 
• Which is more important RAT or RSC? 
• How much more important is RAT over RSC (or RSC over RAT)?  
 
 RAT 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
 RSC 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
 
b) Between RAT and PSC. 
Under Indonesia’s FR condition, 
• Which is more important RAT or existing PSC system? 
• How much more important is RAT over PSC (or PSC over RAT)? 
 
 RAT 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
 PSC 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
 
c) Between RSC and PSC. 
Under Indonesia’s FR condition, 
• Which is more important RSC or Existing PSC system? 
• How much more important is RSC over PSC (or PSC over RSC)? 
 
 RSC 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
 PSC 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
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9) Comparison judgment under Indonesia’s Contract Risk (CoR) condition. 
a) Between RAT and RSC.   
Under Indonesia’s CoR condition, 
• Which is more important RAT or RSC? 
• How much more important is RAT over RSC (or RSC over RAT)?  
 
 RAT 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
 RSC 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
 
b) Between RAT and PSC. 
Under Indonesia’s CoR condition, 
• Which is more important RAT or existing PSC system? 
• How much more important is RAT over PSC (or PSC over RAT)? 
 
 RAT 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
 PSC 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
 
c) Between RSC and PSC. 
Under Indonesia’s CoR condition, 
• Which is more important RSC or Existing PSC system? 
• How much more important is RSC over PSC (or PSC over RSC)? 
 
 RSC 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
 PSC 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
 
10) Comparison judgment under Indonesia’s Political Risk (PoR) condition. 
a) Between RAT and RSC.   
Under Indonesia’s PoR condition, 
• Which is more important RAT or RSC? 
• How much more important is RAT over RSC (or RSC over RAT)?  
 
 RAT 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
 RSC 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
 
b) Between RAT and PSC. 
Under Indonesia’s PoR condition, 
• Which is more important RAT or existing PSC system? 
• How much more important is RAT over PSC (or PSC over RAT)? 
 
 RAT 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
 PSC 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
 
c) Between RSC and PSC. 
Under Indonesia’s PoR condition, 
• Which is more important RSC or Existing PSC system? 
• How much more important is RSC over PSC (or PSC over RSC)? 
 
 RSC 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
 PSC 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
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Please give your suggestions, what and how does the Indonesian Government have to 
do, to reach the objective of attracting investor to invest in E&P industry in 
Indonesia. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
SECTION D:  SUGGESTION 
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1) Name: (optional) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2) Occupation (or former occupation) and title in the petroleum sector: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
3) Occupation (or former occupation) and title in non-petroleum sector: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
4) Please indicate your number of years of experiences in the petroleum sector. 
 
Less than 5 years   
5 – 10 years  
More than 10 years  
 
 
Date :        -          -  2004 
 
 
Signature: 
PERSONAL INFORMATION 
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Appendix B1 
 
Case A.base case: Cash flow simulation of small (marginal) oil field using IP5 figures 
                  1000USD 
      % 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 
1  Annual Expenditures (000 USD)                  
  a. Capital Expenditures 22.3% 557 638 628 639 586 592 468 398 581 683 542 868 1,114 1,110 1,469 1,171 
  b. Non Capital & operating expenditures  1,942 2,221 2,188 2,226 2,041 2,062 1,632 1,386 2,023 2,378 1,886 3,025 3,881 3,868 5,115 4,079 
  c. Total Expenditures  2,499 2,859 2,816 2,865 2,627 2,654 2,100 1,784 2,604 3,061 2,428 3,893 4,995 4,978 6,584 5,250 
2  Lifting                  
  a. Oil (000 BL)   547 522 471 529 431 427 365 357 329 312 259 203 235 272 322 
  b Oil Prices (USD/B)   1.89 1.93 3.02 10.06 10.29 10.24 12.29 10.99 16.20 27.26 35.13 35.63 24.66 27.25 25.37 
  c Gas (000 CFT)                  
  d. Gas Price(USD/CFT)                  
  e Oil/day (000 BL)   1.499 1.430 1.290 1.449 1.181 1.170 1.000 0.978 0.901 0.855 0.710 0.556 0.644 0.745 0.882 
3  Gross Revenues before FTP  0 1,035 1,009 1,423 5,324 4,435 4,374 4,487 3,923 5,329 8,504 9,099 7,232 5,795 7,411 8,169 
  a. FTP   10% 0 104 101 142 532 444 437 449 392 533 850 910 723 580 741 817 
4  Gross Revenue after FTP  0 932 908 1,281 4,792 3,992 3,937 4,038 3,531 4,796 7,654 8,189 6,509 5,216 6,670 7,352 
5  Cost Recovery                  
  a. Unrecovered cost  0 (1,942) (4,751) (7,053) (9,097) (7,426) (6,893) (5,643) (3,932) (3,551) (2,403) 0 0 0 (668) (1,609) 
  b. Current Year Operating Cost  1,942 2,221 2,188 2,226 2,041 2,062 1,632 1,386 2,023 2,378 1,886 3,025 3,881 3,868 5,115 4,079 
  c. Current Depreciation 5ys DDBL 0 299 381 446 481 792 577 535 534 572 535 602 773 882 995 1,117 
  d. Total Cost Recovery   1,942 4,462 7,320 9,725 11,619 10,280 9,101 7,564 6,489 6,502 4,825 3,626 4,654 4,749 6,778 6,804 
  e. Current Investment Credit 102.14% 0 1,221 642 653 599 605 478 406 593 697 553 887 1,138 1,134 1,500 1,196 
  f. Total Recoverable   1,942 5,682 7,962 10,378 12,217 10,885 9,580 7,970 7,082 7,199 5,378 4,513 5,792 5,884 8,279 8,000 
  g. Current Maximum cost recovery   0 932 908 1,281 4,792 3,992 3,937 4,038 3,531 4,796 7,654 8,189 6,509 5,216 6,670 7,352 
  h. Actual cost recoverable  0 932 908 1,281 4,792 3,992 3,937 4,038 3,531 4,796 5,378 4,513 5,792 5,216 6,670 7,352 
6  Equity to be split   0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2,275 3,676 717 0 0 0 
7  GOI Share                  
  a. GOI Equity share  37.5% 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 853 1,378 269 0 0 0 
  b. GOI share from FTP  100% 0 104 101 142 532 444 437 449 392 533 850 910 723 580 741 817 
  c. Domestic Requirement  0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 997 1,066 848 679 868 957 
  d. Gov.Tax Entitlement 44% 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 431 932 325 0 0 0 
  e. Total GOI Share   0 104 101 142 532 444 437 449 392 533 3,131 4,286 2,164 1,259 1,610 1,774 
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Case A.base case: Cash flow simulation of small (marginal) oil field using IP5 figures 
                  000USD 
      % 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 Total Mean 
1  Annual Expenditures (000 USD)                  
  a. Capital Expenditures 22.3% 1,188 835 1,303 1,177 1,353 1,645 1,428 1,283 1,213 788 998 891 584 642 27,374 912 
  b. Non Capital & operating expenditures  4,139 2,908 4,538 4,099 4,712 5,730 4,972 4,470 4,223 2,744 3,476 3,103 2,032 2,237 95,334 3,178 
  c. Total Expenditures  5,327 3,743 5,841 5,276 6,065 7,375 6,400 5,753 5,436 3,532 4,474 3,994 2,616 2,879 122,708 4,090 
2  Lifting                  
  a. Oil (000 BL)  308 474 412 479 456 442 407 382 384 326 288 294 240 202 10,675 368 
  b Oil Prices (USD/B)  18.57 15.61 13.90 15.05 18.99 15.97 14.88 14.18 13.45 15.34 18.23 16.85 11.13 16.49 16.24 16.24 
  c Gas (000 CFT)  0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
  d. Gas Price(USD/CFT)  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
  e Oil/day (000 BL)  0.844 1.299 1.129 1.312 1.249 1.211 1.115 1.047 1.052 0.893 0.789 0.805 0.658 0.553 1.009 1.009 
3  Gross Revenues before FTP  5,719 7,399 5,727 7,209 8,660 7,057 6,055 5,417 5,163 5,002 5,249 4,954 2,670 3,331 157,161 5,239 
  a. FTP   10% 572 740 573 721 866 706 606 542 516 500 525 495 267 333 15,716 524 
4  Gross Revenue after FTP    5,147 6,659 5,154 6,488 7,794 6,351 5,450 4,875 4,647 4,502 4,724 4,459 2,403 2,998 141,445 4,715 
5  Cost Recovery                  
  a. Unrecovered cost  (648) (2,047) (251) (2,203) (2,168) (1,674) (3,965) (6,339) (8,579) (10,740) (11,063) (11,989) (12,598) (13,744) (142,978) (4,766) 
  b. Current Year Operating Cost  4,139 2,908 4,538 4,099 4,712 5,730 4,972 4,470 4,223 2,744 3,476 3,103 2,032 2,237 95,334 3,178 
  c. Current Depreciation  5ys DDBL 1,193 1,103 1,238 1,152 1,206 1,232 1,392 1,335 1,346 1,276 1,155 1,055 920 2,251 27,374 912 
  d. Total Cost Recovery    5,980 6,057 6,027 7,454 8,086 8,636 10,330 12,143 14,148 14,760 15,694 16,147 15,551 18,232 265,686 8,856 
  e. Current Investment Credit 102.14% 1,214 853 1,331 1,202 1,382 1,680 1,458 1,311 1,239 805 1,019 910 596 656 27,960 932 
  f. Total Recoverable   7,194 6,910 7,357 8,656 9,468 10,317 11,788 13,454 15,387 15,565 16,713 17,057 16,147 18,888 293,645 9,788 
  g. Current Maximum cost recovery   5,147 6,659 5,154 6,488 7,794 6,351 5,450 4,875 4,647 4,502 4,724 4,459 2,403 2,998 141,445 4,715 
  h. Actual cost recoverable  5,147 6,659 5,154 6,488 7,794 6,351 5,450 4,875 4,647 4,502 4,724 4,459 2,403 2,998 134,777 4,493 
6  Equity to be split   0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 6,668 222 
7  GOI Share                  
  a. GOI Equity share  37.5% 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2,500 83 
  b. GOI share from FTP  100% 572 740 573 721 866 706 606 542 516 500 525 495 267 333 15,716 524 
  c. Domestic Requirement  670 867 671 845 1,015 827 710 635 605 586 615 581 313 390 14,745 491 
  d. Gov.Tax Entitlement 44% 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1,688 56 
  e. Total GOI Share   1,242 1,607 1,244 1,566 1,881 1,533 1,315 1,177 1,121 1,086 1,140 1,076 580 723 34,649 1,155 
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Case A.base case: Cash flow simulation of small (marginal) oil field using IP5 figures 
                 000USD 
      % 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 
8  Contractor Share                  
  a. Contractor Equity Share  62.5% 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1,422 2,297 448 0 0 0 
  b. Contractor Share from FTP  0% 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
  c. DMO first 5 prod.year  25% 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 997 1,066 848 679 868 957 
    after 5 prod-years   25%                 
  d. Taxable Share   0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 979 2,118 738 0 0 0 
  e Gov.Tax Entitlement  44% 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 431 932 325 0 0 0 
  f. Net Profit Contractor   0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 (5) 299 (725) (679) (868) (957) 
  g Total Contractor Share  0 932 908 1,281 4,792 3,992 3,937 4,038 3,531 4,796 5,373 4,813 5,068 4,536 5,801 6,395 
9  Party's Take                  
  a % GOI Take     10% 10% 10% 10% 10% 10% 10% 10% 10% 37% 47% 30% 22% 22% 22% 
  b % Contractor Take    90% 90% 90% 90% 90% 90% 90% 90% 90% 63% 53% 70% 78% 78% 78% 
10  Contractor Cash flow                   
  a Net Cash flow    (2,499) (1,928) (1,908) (1,584) 2,165 1,338 1,837 2,254 927 1,735 2,945 920 73 (442) (783) 1,145 
  b NPV @15%    (2,173) (3,631) (4,885) (5,791) (4,715) (4,136) (3,446) (2,709) (2,446) (2,017) (1,384) (1,212) (1,200) (1,262) (1,359) (1,236) 
  c NPV @15%/B   (6.64) (4.57) (3.76) (2.28) (1.65) (1.18) (0.82) (0.67) (0.51) (0.32) (0.27) (0.25) (0.25) (0.26) (0.22) 
  d. IRR                  
  e POT          8        
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Case A.base case: Cash flow simulation of small (marginal) oil field using IP5 figures 
                 000USD 
      % 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 Total Mean 
8  Contractor Share                  
  a. Contractor Equity Share 62.5% 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 4,167 139 
  b. Contractor Share from FTP 0% 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
  c. DMO first 5 prod.year 25% 670 867 671 845 1,015 827 710 635 605 586 615 581 313 390 14,745 491 
    after 5 prod-years   25%                 
  d. Taxable Share   0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3,835 128 
  e Gov.Tax Entitlement 44% 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1,688 56 
  f. Net Profit Contractor  (670) (867) (671) (845) (1,015) (827) (710) (635) (605) (586) (615) (581) (313) (390) (12,265) (409) 
  g Total Contractor Share   4,477 5,792 4,483 5,643 6,779 5,524 4,740 4,240 4,042 3,916 4,109 3,878 2,090 2,608 122,512 4,084 
9  Party's Take                  
  a % GOI Take  22% 22% 22% 22% 22% 22% 22% 22% 22% 22% 22% 22% 22% 22% 22% 20% 
  b % Contractor Take   78% 78% 78% 78% 78% 78% 78% 78% 78% 78% 78% 78% 78% 78% 78% 80% 
10  Contractor Cash flow                   
  a Net Cash flow  (850) 2,049 (1,358) 367 714 (1,851) (1,660) (1,513) (1,394) 384 (365) (116) (526) (271) (196) (7) 
  b NPV @15%   (1,315) (1,150) (1,245) (1,223) (1,185) (1,270) (1,337) (1,390) (1,432) (1,422) (1,430) (1,433) (1,442) (1,446) (1,446)  
  c NPV @15%/B  (0.22) (0.18) (0.18) (0.17) (0.15) (0.16) (0.16) (0.16) (0.15) (0.15) (0.14) (0.14) (0.14) (0.14) (0.14)  
  d. IRR   11% 10% 10% 11% 10% 9% 9% 8% 8% 8% 8% 7% 7% 7%  
  e POT                8  
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Case B1 base case: Cash flow simulation of medium oil field using IP5 figures 
                000USD 
    B1. base case % 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 
1  Annual Expenditures (000 USD)                  
  a. Capital Expenditures 22.3% 300 753 1,176 515 1,268 1,999 1,160 1,017 16 (2) 231 282 2,142 5,899 3,774 21,166 
  b. Non Capital & operating expenditures  1,047 2,622 4,097 1,794 4,416 6,960 4,038 3,543 57 (7) 806 982 7,459 20,545 13,145 73,714 
  c. Total Expenditures   1,347 3,375 5,273 2,309 5,684 8,959 5,198 4,560 73 (9) 1,037 1,264 9,601 26,444 16,919 94,880 
2  Lifting                  
  a. Oil (000 BL)                  
  b. Oil Prices (USD/B)                  
  c. Gas (000 CFT)                  
  d. Gas Price(USD/CFT)                  
  e. Oil/day                  
3  Gross Revenues before FTP  0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
  a. FTP   10% 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
4  Gross Revenue after FTP  0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
5  Cost Recovery                  
  a. Unrecovered cost   0 (1,047) (3,669) (7,765) (9,559) (13,975) (20,936) (24,974) (28,517) (28,574) (28,567) (29,372) (30,354) (37,813) (58,358) (71,503) 
  b. Current Year Operating Cost  1,047 2,622 4,097 1,794 4,416 6,960 4,038 3,543 57 (7) 806 982 7,459 20,545 13,145 73,714 
  c. Current Depreciation  5ys DDBL 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
  d. Total Cost Recovery  1,047 3,669 7,765 9,559 13,975 20,936 24,974 28,517 28,574 28,567 29,372 30,354 37,813 58,358 71,503 145,217 
  e. Current Investment Credit 15.78% 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
  f. Total Recoverable  1,047 3,669 7,765 9,559 13,975 20,936 24,974 28,517 28,574 28,567 29,372 30,354 37,813 58,358 71,503 145,217 
  g. Current Maximum cost recovery   0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
  h. Actual cost recoverable:   0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
6  Equity to be split   0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
7  GOI Share                  
  a. GOI Equity share 64.28% 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
  b. GOI share from FTP 100% 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
  c. Domestic Requirement  0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
  d. Gov.Tax Entitlement 44% 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
  e. Total GOI Share  0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
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Case B1 base case: Cash flow simulation of medium oil field using IP5 figures 
                 000USD 
    B1. base case % 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 Total Mean 
1  Annual Expenditures (000 USD)                  
  a. Capital Expenditures 22.3% 22,269 17,099 25,727 17,797 18,297 25,290 29,184 25,719 20,543 20,919 11,776 8,998 10,438 13,601 309,353 10,312 
  b. Non Capital & operating expenditures  77,554 59,548 89,598 61,982 63,724 88,078 101,640 89,571 71,543 72,853 41,012 31,336 36,353 47,366 1,077,376 35,913 
  c. Total Expenditures   99,823 76,647 115,325 79,779 82,021 113,368 130,824 115,290 92,086 93,772 52,788 40,334 46,791 60,967 1,386,729 46,224 
2  Lifting                  
  a. Oil (000 BL)  4,855 12,732 9,446 14,124 15,721 21,158 16,589 18,129 13,250 10,768 10,137 8,060 7,294 6,545 168,808 12,058 
  b. Oil Prices (USD/B)  27.69 27.10 14.48 17.68 17.32 17.71 22.57 19.93 19.10 17.68 16.20 17.35 20.41 19.02 19.59 19.59 
  c. Gas (000 CFT)  0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
  d. Gas Price(USD/CFT)  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
  e. Oil/day  13.301 34.882 25.879 38.696 43.071 57.967 45.449 49.668 36.301 29.501 27.773 22.082 19.984 17.932 33.035 33.035 
3  Gross Revenues before FTP  134,428 344,979 136,809 249,679 272,296 374,792 374,378 361,310 253,013 190,327 164,228 139,819 148,899 124,457 3,269,414 108,980 
  a. FTP   10% 13,443 34,498 13,681 24,968 27,230 37,479 37,438 36,131 25,301 19,033 16,423 13,982 14,890 12,446 326,941 10,898 
4  Gross Revenue after FTP  120,985 310,481 123,128 224,711 245,066 337,313 336,940 325,179 227,712 171,294 147,805 125,837 134,009 112,011 2,942,473 98,082 
5  Cost Recovery                  
  a. Unrecovered cost   (145,217) (127,871) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0   
  b. Current Year Operating Cost  77,554 59,548 89,598 61,982 63,724 88,078 101,640 89,571 71,543 72,853 41,012 31,336 36,353 47,366 1,077,376 35,913 
  c. Current Depreciation  5ys DDBL 15,991 16,268 18,631 18,426 33,571 20,380 24,628 23,019 22,519 23,778 21,702 17,703 14,659 38,077 309,353 10,312 
  d. Total Cost Recovery  238,763 203,688 108,229 80,407 97,295 108,457 126,268 112,590 94,062 96,632 62,714 49,040 51,012 85,444 2,054,800 68,493 
  e. Current Investment Credit 15.78% 10,094 2,698 4,060 2,808 2,887 3,991 4,605 4,058 3,242 3,301 1,858 1,420 1,647 2,146 48,816 1,627 
  f. Total Recoverable  248,857 206,386 112,289 83,216 100,182 112,448 130,873 116,648 97,304 99,933 64,572 50,459 52,659 87,590 2,103,616 70,121 
  g. Current Maximum cost recovery   120,985 310,481 123,128 224,711 245,066 337,313 336,940 325,179 227,712 171,294 147,805 125,837 134,009 112,011 2,942,473 98,082 
  h. Actual cost recoverable:   120,985 206,386 112,289 83,216 100,182 112,448 130,873 116,648 97,304 99,933 64,572 50,459 52,659 87,590 1,435,545 47,851 
6  Equity to be split   0 104,095 10,839 141,495 144,884 224,865 206,067 208,531 130,408 71,362 83,233 75,378 81,350 24,421 1,506,928 50,231 
7  GOI Share                  
  a. GOI Equity share 64.28% 0 66,918 6,968 90,961 93,140 144,556 132,472 134,055 83,834 45,875 53,507 48,457 52,297 15,699 968,739 32,291 
  b. GOI share from FTP 100% 13,443 34,498 13,681 24,968 27,230 37,479 37,438 36,131 25,301 19,033 16,423 13,982 14,890 12,446 326,941 10,898 
  c. Domestic Requirement  0 0 0 0 0 28,444 28,413 27,421 19,202 14,444 12,464 10,611 11,300 9,445 161,745 5,391 
  d. Gov.Tax Entitlement 44% 0 17,545 3,490 23,471 24,038 24,576 21,907 22,490 13,470 6,311 8,413 7,801 8,536 626 182,673 6,089 
  e. Total GOI Share  13,443 118,961 24,138 139,400 144,407 235,055 220,229 220,097 141,807 85,663 90,807 80,851 87,023 38,216 1,640,098 54,670 
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Case B1 base case: Cash flow simulation of medium oil field using IP5 figures 
                   
                  000USD 
  % 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 
8 Contractor Share                  
  a. Contractor Equity Share 35.71% 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
  b. Contractor Share from FTP  0% 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
  c. DMO first 5 prod.year  25% 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
    after 5 prod-years   15%                 
  d.. Taxable Share   0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
  e. Gov.Tax Entitlement  44% 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
  f. Net Profit Contractor   0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
  g Total Contractor Share   0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
9  Party's Take                  
  a % GOI Take                  
  b % Contractor Take                  
10  Contractor Cash flow                   
  a. Net Cash flow  (1,347) (3,375) (5,273) (2,309) (5,684) (8,959) (5,198) (4,560) (73) 9 (1,037) (1,264) (9,601) (26,444) (16,919) (94,880) 
  b. NPV @15%    (1,171) (3,723) (7,190) (8,511) (11,337) (15,210) (17,164) (18,655) (18,675) (18,673) (18,896) (19,132) (20,693) (24,430) (26,509) (36,648) 
  c. NPV @15% /B                  
  d. IRR                  
  e. POT                  
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Case B1 base case: Cash flow simulation of medium oil field using IP5 figures 
               000USD 
  17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 Total Mean 
8 Contractor Share                 
  a. Contractor Equity Share 0 37,177 3,871 50,534 51,744 80,309 73,595 74,475 46,574 25,486 29,726 26,921 29,054 8,722 538,189 17,940 
  b. Contractor Share from FTP  0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
  c. DMO first 5 prod.year  0 0 0 0 0 28,444 28,413 27,421 19,202 14,444 12,464 10,611 11,300 9,445 161,745 5,391 
    after 5 prod-years                   
  d.. Taxable Share  0 39,875 7,931 53,342 54,632 55,856 49,788 51,113 30,614 14,343 19,121 17,729 19,400 1,423 415,166 13,839 
  e. Gov.Tax Entitlement  0 17,545 3,490 23,471 24,038 24,576 21,907 22,490 13,470 6,311 8,413 7,801 8,536 626 182,673 6,089 
  f. Net Profit Contractor  0 19,632 382 27,063 27,706 27,288 23,276 24,565 13,902 4,731 8,849 8,508 9,217 (1,349) 193,771 6,459 
  g Total Contractor Share  120,985 226,018 112,671 110,279 127,889 139,737 154,149 141,213 111,206 104,664 73,421 58,968 61,876 86,241 1,629,316 54,311 
9  Party's Take                 
  a % GOI Take 10% 34% 18% 56% 53% 63% 59% 61% 56% 45% 55% 58% 58% 31% 50% 47% 
  b % Contractor Take 90% 66% 82% 44% 47% 37% 41% 39% 44% 55% 45% 42% 42% 69% 50% 53% 
10  Contractor Cash flow                  
  a. Net Cash flow 21,162 149,371 (2,654) 30,500 45,868 26,369 23,325 25,923 19,120 10,892 20,633 18,634 15,085 25,274 242,587 8,086 
  b. NPV @15%   (34,682) (22,612) (22,799) (20,935) (18,498) (17,280) (16,343) (15,437) (14,856) (14,569) (14,095) (13,722) (13,460) (13,079) (13,079)  
  c. NPV @15% /B (7.14) (1.29) (0.84) (0.51) (0.33) (0.22) (0.17) (0.14) (0.12) (0.11) (0.10) (0.09) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08)  
  d. IRR  -2% #DIV/0! 1% 5% 6% 7% 8% 8% 9% 9% 9% 10% 10% 10%  
  e. POT    19           19  
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Case B2.base case: Cash flow simulation of large oil field using IP5 figures 
 
                000USD 
      % 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 
1 Annual Expenditures (000 USD)                  
  a. Capital Expenditures 22.3% 102 235 3,195 5,617 6,403 15,283 14,308 24,189 27,043 15,474 18,484 24,079 41,594 92,770 134,100 85,136 
  b. Non Capital & operating expenditures  357 817 11,128 19,561 22,300 53,225 49,828 84,241 94,182 53,889 64,375 83,857 144,857 323,089 467,026 296,500 
  c. Total Expenditures   459 1,052 14,323 25,178 28,703 68,508 64,136 108,430 121,225 69,363 82,859 107,936 186,451 415,859 601,126 381,636 
2 Lifting     1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 
  a. Oil (000 BL)     3,408 13,369 13,640 19,787 15,434 34,334 41,473 30,774 32,731 30,079 40,884 40,458 36,419 
  b. Oil Prices (USD/B)     1.76 2.82 4.05 11.42 13.14 12.45 12.98 13.13 18.00 29.66 34.14 33.49 28.71 
  c. Gas (000 CFT)           0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
  d Gas Price(USD/CFT)           0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
  e Oil/day     9 37 37 54 42 94 114 84 90 82 112 111 100 
3 Gross Revenues before FTP      5,982 37,738 55,262 226,035 202,841 427,565 538,343 404,168 589,260 892,015 1,395,743 1,354,757 1,045,478 
  a. FTP   10% 0 0 0 598 3,774 5,526 22,604 20,284 42,757 53,834 40,417 58,926 89,202 139,574 135,476 104,548 
4 Gross Revenue after FTP  0 0 0 5,384 33,964 49,736 203,432 182,557 384,809 484,509 363,751 530,334 802,814 1,256,169 1,219,281 940,930 
5 Cost Recovery                  
  a. Unrecovered cost  0 (357) (1,174) (12,302) (29,653) (22,315) (34,524) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
  b. Current Year Operating Cost   357 817 11,128 19,561 22,300 53,225 49,828 84,241 94,182 53,889 64,375 83,857 144,857 323,089 467,026 296,500 
  c. Current Depreciation 5ys DDBL 0 0 0 2,287 3,316 6,308 8,308 14,449 16,946 18,685 18,403 22,167 27,701 41,223 65,156 71,478 
  d. Total Cost Recovery   357 1,174 12,302 34,150 55,269 81,848 92,660 98,690 111,128 72,574 82,778 106,025 172,558 364,311 532,182 367,978 
  e. Current Investment Credit 15.78% 0 0 0 886 1,010 2,412 2,258 3,817 4,267 2,442 2,917 3,800 6,563 14,639 21,161 13,434 
  f. Total Recoverable   357 1,174 12,302 35,037 56,279 84,260 94,918 102,507 115,395 75,016 85,695 109,824 179,122 378,951 553,343 381,412 
  g. Current Maximum cost recovery   0 0 0 5,384 33,964 49,736 203,432 182,557 384,809 484,509 363,751 530,334 802,814 1,256,169 1,219,281 940,930 
  h. Actual cost recoverable   0 0 0 5,384 33,964 49,736 94,918 102,507 115,395 75,016 85,695 109,824 179,122 378,951 553,343 381,412 
6 Equity to be split   0 0 0 0 0 0 108,514 80,050 269,413 409,493 278,056 420,510 623,692 877,218 665,938 559,518 
7 GOI Share                  
  a. GOI Equity share   64.28% 0 0 0 0 0 0 69,759 51,461 173,194 263,245 178,750 270,328 400,945 563,926 428,103 359,690 
  b. GOI share from FTP  100% 0 0 0 598 3,774 5,526 22,604 20,284 42,757 53,834 40,417 58,926 89,202 139,574 135,476 104,548 
  c. Domestic Requirement  0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 32,449 40,856 30,673 44,721 67,698 105,927 102,816 79,344 
  d. Gov.Tax Entitlement 44% 0 0 0 0 0 0 18,046 14,259 29,936 47,446 31,482 48,075 71,110 97,682 68,719 58,924 
  e. Total GOI Share  0 0 0 598 3,774 5,526 110,408 86,003 278,336 405,382 281,322 422,049 628,953 907,109 735,114 602,506 
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Case B2.base case: Cash flow simulation of large oil field using IP5 figures 
 
                 000USD 
      17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 Total Mean 
1 Annual Expenditures (000 USD)                 
  a. Capital Expenditures 52,386 35,284 25,871 15,414 18,203 31,088 78,534 53,642 49,181 56,726 53,749 56,379 56,042 66,968 1,157,478 38,583 
  b. Non Capital & operating expenditures 182,444 122,884 90,098 53,683 63,393 108,268 273,510 186,818 171,281 197,556 187,188 196,350 195,178 233,228 4,031,112 134,370 
  c. Total Expenditures  234,830 158,168 115,969 69,097 81,596 139,356 352,044 240,460 220,462 254,282 240,937 252,729 251,220 300,196 5,188,590 172,953 
2 Lifting 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27   
  a. Oil (000 BL) 32,753 28,768 29,453 21,897 20,258 25,408 31,676 75,251 62,896 51,935 55,334 50,358 50,867 50,782 940,426 34,831 
  b. Oil Prices (USD/B) 28.32 27.17 14.34 16.72 16.51 17.21 22.16 19.37 17.88 16.72 15.27 16.77 19.78 18.14 17.86 17.86 
  c. Gas (000 CFT) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
  d Gas Price(USD/CFT) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
  e Oil/day 90 79 81 60 56 70 87 206 172 142 152 138 139 139 95 95 
3 Gross Revenues before FTP  927,542 781,683 422,239 366,177 334,433 437,278 701,912 1,457,582 1,124,763 868,492 844,843 844,734 1,006,314 921,345 18,214,524 674,612 
  a. FTP   92,754 78,168 42,224 36,618 33,443 43,728 70,191 145,758 112,476 86,849 84,484 84,473 100,631 92,135 1,821,452 60,715 
4 Gross Revenue after FTP 834,788 703,515 380,015 329,559 300,990 393,550 631,721 1,311,824 1,012,287 781,643 760,359 760,261 905,683 829,211 16,393,072 546,436 
5 Cost Recovery                 
  a. Unrecovered cost 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0   
  b. Current Year Operating Cost  182,444 122,884 90,098 53,683 63,393 108,268 273,510 186,818 171,281 197,556 187,188 196,350 195,178 233,228 4,031,112 134,370 
  c. Current Depreciation 70,862 74,114 71,860 46,129 31,376 27,245 37,833 39,304 42,434 49,066 61,496 54,309 53,684 181,338 1,157,478 38,583 
  d. Total Cost Recovery   253,305 196,997 161,958 99,812 94,769 135,514 311,343 226,122 213,715 246,623 248,684 250,659 248,862 414,566 5,288,914 176,297 
  e. Current Investment Credit 8,267 5,568 4,082 2,432 2,872 4,906 12,393 8,465 7,761 8,951 8,482 8,897 8,844 10,568 182,093 6,070 
  f. Total Recoverable  261,572 202,565 166,041 102,244 97,642 140,419 323,736 234,587 221,476 255,574 257,166 259,556 257,705 425,133 5,471,006 182,367 
  g. Current Maximum cost recovery  834,788 703,515 380,015 329,559 300,990 393,550 631,721 1,311,824 1,012,287 781,643 760,359 760,261 905,683 829,211 16,393,072 546,436 
  h. Actual cost recoverable  261,572 202,565 166,041 102,244 97,642 140,419 323,736 234,587 221,476 255,574 257,166 259,556 257,705 425,133 5,370,683 179,023 
6 Equity to be split  573,216 500,949 213,974 227,315 203,348 253,131 307,985 1,077,237 790,811 526,069 503,193 500,705 647,977 404,077 11,022,389 367,413 
7 GOI Share                 
  a. GOI Equity share 368,496 322,039 137,555 146,131 130,724 162,727 197,990 692,509 508,378 338,187 323,481 321,882 416,557 259,764 7,085,820 236,194 
  b. GOI share from FTP  92,754 78,168 42,224 36,618 33,443 43,728 70,191 145,758 112,476 86,849 84,484 84,473 100,631 92,135 1,821,452 60,715 
  c. Domestic Requirement 70,394 59,324 32,045 27,790 25,381 33,186 53,270 110,620 85,362 65,912 64,118 64,109 76,372 69,924 1,342,292 44,743 
  d. Gov.Tax Entitlement 62,741 55,068 21,321 24,564 22,051 27,334 30,412 124,332 90,126 57,605 54,593 54,389 72,112 37,381 1,219,707 40,657 
  e. Total GOI Share 594,385 514,599 233,145 235,103 211,599 266,975 351,863 1,073,220 796,342 548,554 526,676 524,853 665,673 459,203 11,469,271 382,309 
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Case B2.base case: Cash flow simulation of large oil field using IP5 figures 
 
                  000USD 
  % 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 
8 Contractor Share                  
  a. Contractor Equity Share  35.71% 0 0 0 0 0 0 38,755 28,589 96,219 146,247 99,306 150,182 222,747 313,292 237,835 199,828 
  b. Contractor Share from FTP 0% 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
  c. DMO first 5 prod.year  25% 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 32,449 40,856 30,673 44,721 67,698 105,927 102,816 79,344 
    after 5 prod-years   15%                 
  e. Taxable Share   0 0 0 0 0 0 41,013 32,406 68,037 107,833 71,549 109,261 161,613 222,005 156,180 133,918 
  f. Gov.Tax Entitlement 44% 0 0 0 0 0 0 18,046 14,259 29,936 47,446 31,482 48,075 71,110 97,682 68,719 58,924 
  g Net Profit Contractor   0 0 0 0 0 0 20,709 14,330 33,833 57,945 37,151 57,387 83,940 109,683 66,300 61,560 
  I. Total Contractor Share   0 0 0 5,384 33,964 49,736 115,627 116,838 149,229 132,961 122,846 167,211 263,062 488,634 619,643 442,972 
9  Party's Take                  
  a % GOI Take     10% 10% 10% 49% 42% 65% 75% 70% 72% 71% 65% 54% 58% 
  b % Contractor Take     90% 90% 90% 51% 58% 35% 25% 30% 28% 29% 35% 46% 42% 
10  Contractor Cash flowanalysis                  
  a. Net Cash flow    (459) (1,052) (14,323) (19,794) 5,261 (18,772) 51,491 8,408 28,004 63,598 39,987 59,275 76,611 72,775 18,517 61,336 
  b. NPV @15%    (399) (1,195) (10,612) (21,930) (19,314) (27,430) (8,072) (5,324) 2,637 18,357 26,952 38,031 50,482 60,767 63,043 69,598 
  c. NPV @15% /B            0.16 0.19 0.21 0.22 0.20 0.20 
  d. IRR              38% 40% 40% 41% 
  e. POT        6          
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Case B2.base case: Cash flow simulation of large oil field using IP5 figures 
 
                 000USD 
  17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 Total Mean 
8 Contractor Share                 
  a. Contractor Equity Share  204,720 178,911 76,419 81,184 72,624 90,404 109,995 384,728 282,433 187,882 179,712 178,823 231,421 144,313 3,936,569 131,219 
  b. Contractor Share from FTP 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
  c. DMO first 5 prod.year  70,394 59,324 32,045 27,790 25,381 33,186 53,270 110,620 85,362 65,912 64,118 64,109 76,372 69,924 1,342,292 44,743 
    after 5 prod-years                   
  e. Taxable Share  142,593 125,154 48,457 55,826 50,116 62,123 69,117 282,572 204,832 130,921 124,076 123,611 163,892 84,957 2,772,061 92,402 
  f. Gov.Tax Entitlement 62,741 55,068 21,321 24,564 22,051 27,334 30,412 124,332 90,126 57,605 54,593 54,389 72,112 37,381 1,219,707 40,657 
  g Net Profit Contractor  71,585 64,519 23,053 28,830 25,192 29,883 26,313 149,776 106,945 64,364 61,001 60,325 82,936 37,009 1,374,570 45,819 
  I. Total Contractor Share  333,157 267,084 189,094 131,074 122,834 170,303 350,049 384,362 328,421 319,938 318,167 319,881 340,641 462,142 6,745,253 224,842 
9  Party's Take                 
  a % GOI Take   64% 66% 55% 64% 63% 61% 50% 74% 71% 63% 62% 62% 66% 50% 63% 56% 
  b % Contractor Take 36% 34% 45% 36% 37% 39% 50% 26% 29% 37% 38% 38% 34% 50% 37% 44% 
10  Contractor Cash flowanalysis                 
  a. Net Cash flow 98,327 108,916 73,125 61,977 41,238 30,947 (1,995) 143,902 107,959 65,656 77,230 67,152 89,421 161,946 1,556,663 51,889 
  b. NPV @15%   78,735 87,536 92,674 96,461 98,652 100,082 100,001 105,029 108,308 110,042 111,816 113,158 114,711 117,157 117,157  
  c. NPV @15% /B 0.20 0.21 0.21 0.21 0.20 0.20 0.18 0.17 0.16 0.15 0.14 0.13 0.13 0.12 0.12  
  d. IRR 41% 42% 42% 42% 42% 42% 42% 42% 42% 42% 42% 42% 42% 42% 42%  
  e. POT               6  
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Case C1 base case: Cash flow simulation of medium oil and gas field using IP5 figures 
                  000USD 
      % 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 
1  Annual Expenditures (000 USD)                  
  a. Capital Expenditures 22.3% 1 167 722 4,089 11,599 16,465 16,295 10,999 8,263 9,302 11,094 14,519 17,917 15,491 15,967 16,246 
  b. Non Capital & operating expenditures  2 580 2,514 14,239 40,395 57,344 56,751 38,304 28,779 32,396 38,638 50,565 62,398 53,951 55,606 56,580 
  c. Total Expenditures   3 747 3,236 18,328 51,994 73,809 73,046 49,303 37,042 41,698 49,732 65,084 80,315 69,442 71,573 72,826 
2  Lifting                  
  a. Oil (000 BL)     3,413 11,076 22,890 27,301 28,672 25,946 22,662 19,864 16,132 15,715 13,551 11,841 11,342 
  c. Oil Prices (USD/B)     5.69 10.61 10.61 11.99 12.90 13.10 18.21 29.98 34.93 34.01 29.60 32.55 28.28 
  d. Gas (000 CFT)                  
  e. Gas Price(USD/CFT)                  
  f Prod oil& gas (000BOE)     3,413 11,076 22,890 27,301 28,672 25,946 22,662 19,864 16,132 15,715 13,551 11,841 11,342 
  g Prod gas (000BOE)                   
  h Cum Oil & gas (000 BOE)      3,413 14,489 37,379 64,680 93,352 119,298 141,960 161,824 177,956 193,671 207,222 219,063 230,405 
   Oil & gas /day (000BOE)     9 30 63 75 79 71 62 54 44 43 37 32 31 
3  Gross Revenue before FTP                  
  a Gross Revenues oil       19,405 117,480 242,975 327,447 369,847 340,003 412,588 595,523 563,443 534,438 401,150 385,450 320,706 
  b Gross Revenues gas            0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
  c Gross Revenues oil&gas (000 USD)     19,405 117,480 242,975 327,447 369,847 340,003 412,588 595,523 563,443 534,438 401,150 385,450 320,706 
4  FTP                  
  a FTP oil  10%    1,941 11,748 24,298 32,745 36,985 34,000 41,259 59,552 56,344 53,444 40,115 38,545 32,071 
  b FTP gas            0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
  c FTP oil & gas     1,941 11,748 24,298 32,745 36,985 34,000 41,259 59,552 56,344 53,444 40,115 38,545 32,071 
5  Gross Revenue after FTP                   
  a Gross Revenue oil after FTP      17,465 105,732 218,678 294,702 332,862 306,003 371,329 535,971 507,099 480,994 361,035 346,905 288,635 
  b Gross Revenue gas after FTP            0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
  c Gross Revenue oil & gas after FTP      17,465 105,732 218,678 294,702 332,862 306,003 371,329 535,971 507,099 480,994 361,035 346,905 288,635 
6  Cost Recovery oil & gas                  
  a. Unrecovered cost   0 (2) (583) (3,097) (1,902) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
  b. Current Year Operating Cost   2 580 2,514 14,239 40,395 57,344 56,751 38,304 28,779 32,396 38,638 50,565 62,398 53,951 55,606 56,580 
  c. Current Depreciation  5ys DDBL 0 0 0 1,244 3,833 6,991 9,317 10,919 11,826 12,350 11,996 11,370 12,357 13,387 14,457 15,717 
  d. Total Cost Recovery   2 583 3,097 18,581 46,130 64,335 66,068 49,223 40,605 44,746 50,633 61,935 74,755 67,338 70,064 72,297 
  e. Current Investment Credit  15.78% 0 0 0 786 1,830 2,598 2,571 1,736 1,304 1,468 1,751 2,291 2,827 2,445 2,520 2,564 
 f. Total Recoverable  2 583 3,097 19,366 47,960 66,933 68,639 50,959 41,909 46,214 52,384 64,226 77,583 69,782 72,583 74,861 
  g. Current Maximum cost recovery   0 0 0 17,465 105,732 218,678 294,702 332,862 306,003 371,329 535,971 507,099 480,994 361,035 346,905 288,635 
  h. Actual cost recoverable   0 0 0 17,465 47,960 66,933 68,639 50,959 41,909 46,214 52,384 64,226 77,583 69,782 72,583 74,861 
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Case C1 base case: Cash flow simulation of medium oil and gas field using IP5 figures 
                 000USD 
      17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 Total Mean 
1  Annual Expenditures (000 USD)                 
  a. Capital Expenditures 13,902 11,082 12,312 10,791 12,143 14,497 11,337 10,445 9,251 8,467 6,713 7,178 3,455 4,785 305,492 10,183 
  b. Non Capital & operating expenditures 48,414 38,594 42,879 37,582 42,288 50,487 39,481 36,375 32,220 29,486 23,379 25,000 12,034 16,663 1,063,926 35,464 
  c. Total Expenditures  62,316 49,676 55,191 48,373 54,431 64,984 50,818 46,820 41,471 37,953 30,092 32,178 15,489 21,448 1,369,418 45,647 
2  Lifting                 
  a. Oil (000 BL) 10,150 9,954 7,979 7,363 6,519 5,920 5,774 5,017 4,904 4,216 3,776 3,673 3,540 2,924 312,114 11,560 
  c. Oil Prices (USD/B) 12.72 17.58 16.78 17.55 21.93 19.23 18.89 17.21 15.98 17.05 20.18 19.04 12.10 17.20 19.11 19.11 
  d. Gas (000 CFT)      243 679 845 737 764 751 714 620 307 5,660 629 
  e. Gas Price (USD/CFT)      2.27 2.04 1.70 1.76 1.80 2.04 2.22 1.96 3.88 2.18 2.18 
  f Prod oil& gas (000BOE) 10,150 9,954 7,979 7,363 6,519 5,973 5,922 5,201 5,064 4,382 3,939 3,828 3,675 2,991 313,344 11,605 
  g Prod gas (000BOE)       53 148 184 160 166 163 155 135 67 1,230 137 
  h Cum Oil & gas (000 BOE)  240,555 250,509 258,488 265,851 272,370 278,343 284,264 289,465 294,529 298,911 302,851 306,679 310,354 313,344 313,344  
   Oil & gas /day (000BOE) 28 27 22 20 18 16 16 14 14 12 11 10 10 8 32 32 
3  Gross Revenue before FTP                 
  a Gross Revenues oil   129,147 175,019 133,905 129,225 142,934 113,846 109,054 86,330 78,350 71,878 76,195 69,929 42,839 50,296 6,039,402 223,682 
  b Gross Revenues gas  0 0 0 0 0 552 1,384 1,438 1,295 1,374 1,529 1,582 1,216 1,191 11,561 551 
  c Gross Revenues oil&gas (000 USD) 129,147 175,019 133,905 129,225 142,934 114,398 110,438 87,768 79,645 73,252 77,724 71,511 44,055 51,487 6,050,963 224,110 
4  FTP                 
  a FTP oil  12,915 17,502 13,391 12,923 14,293 11,385 10,905 8,633 7,835 7,188 7,620 6,993 4,284 5,030 603,940 22,368 
  b FTP gas  0 0 0 0 0 55 138 144 130 137 153 158 122 119 1,156 55 
  c FTP oil & gas 12,915 17,502 13,391 12,923 14,293 11,440 11,044 8,777 7,965 7,325 7,772 7,151 4,406 5,149 605,096 22,411 
5  Gross Revenue after FTP                  
  a Gross Revenue oil after FTP  116,232 157,517 120,515 116,303 128,641 102,461 98,149 77,697 70,515 64,690 68,576 62,936 38,555 45,266 5,435,462 201,313 
  b Gross Revenue gas after FTP  0 0 0 0 0 497 1,246 1,294 1,166 1,237 1,376 1,424 1,094 1,072 10,405 495 
  c Gross Revenue oil & gas after FTP  116,232 157,517 120,515 116,303 128,641 102,958 99,394 78,991 71,681 65,927 69,952 64,360 39,650 46,338 5,445,867 201,699 
6  Cost Recovery oil & gas                 
  a. Unrecovered cost  0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0   
  b. Current Year Operating Cost  48,414 38,594 42,879 37,582 42,288 50,487 39,481 36,375 32,220 29,486 23,379 25,000 12,034 16,663 1,063,926 35,464 
  c. Current Depreciation  16,070 14,247 13,876 13,171 12,358 12,223 12,294 11,470 11,236 11,103 9,255 8,524 6,974 16,925 305,492 10,183 
  d. Total Cost Recovery  64,484 52,841 56,755 50,753 54,646 62,711 51,775 47,846 43,456 40,589 32,634 33,524 19,008 33,588 1,375,001 45,833 
  e. Current Investment Credit  2,194 1,749 1,943 1,703 1,916 2,288 1,789 1,648 1,460 1,336 1,059 1,133 545 755 48,207 1,607 
 f. Total Recoverable 66,678 54,590 58,698 52,456 56,562 64,998 53,564 49,494 44,916 41,925 33,694 34,657 19,553 34,343 1,423,208 47,440 
  g. Current Maximum cost recovery  116,232 157,517 120,515 116,303 128,641 102,958 99,394 78,991 71,681 65,927 69,952 64,360 39,650 46,338 5,445,867 181,529 
  h. Actual cost recoverable  66,678 54,590 58,698 52,456 56,562 64,998 53,564 49,494 44,916 41,925 33,694 34,657 19,553 34,343 1,417,625 47,254 
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Case C1 base case: Cash flow simulation of medium oil and gas field using IP5 figures 
                 000USD 
      % 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 
7 Equity to be split                  
  a Equity to be split oil & gas   0 0 0 0 57,772 151,745 226,063 281,904 264,094 325,115 483,587 442,873 403,411 291,253 274,322 213,775 
  b Equity to be split oil    0 0 0 0 57,772 151,745 226,063 281,904 264,094 325,115 483,587 442,873 403,411 291,253 274,322 213,775 
  c Equity to be split gas         0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
8  GOI Share                  
  a. GOI Equity share oil   64.28% 0 0 0 0 37,139 97,550 145,326 181,224 169,775 209,003 310,877 284,704 259,336 187,234 176,350 137,426 
  b. GOI Equity share gas  37.5% 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
  c GOI share from FTP oil  100% 0 0 0 1,941 11,748 24,298 32,745 36,985 34,000 41,259 59,552 56,344 53,444 40,115 38,545 32,071 
  d. GOI share from FTP gas  100% 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
  e. Domestic Requirement      0 0 0 0 0 25,804 31,312 45,196 42,761 40,560 30,444 29,253 24,339 
  f. Gov.Tax Entitlement  44%    0 9,884 24,989 36,656 45,063 30,721 37,958 56,876 51,787 46,791 33,448 31,345 24,012 
  g Total GOI Share   0 0 0 1,941 58,771 146,836 214,727 263,271 260,299 319,532 472,502 435,597 400,131 291,241 275,493 217,848 
9  Contractor Share                  
  a. Contractor Equity Share oil  35.71% 0 0 0 0 20,633 54,195 80,737 100,680 94,319 116,113 172,710 158,169 144,076 104,019 97,972 76,348 
  b. Contractor Equity Share gas  62.5% 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
  c Contractor Share from FTP oil  0% 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
  d. Contractor Share from FTP gas  0% 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
  e. DMO oil first 5 prod.year 25% 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 25,804 31,312 45,196 42,761 40,560 30,444 29,253 24,339 
    after 5 prod-years   15%                 
  f. Taxable Share   0 0 0 0 22,463 56,793 83,308 102,415 69,819 86,268 129,264 117,699 106,343 76,019 71,239 54,572 
  g Gov.Tax Entitlement 44% 0 0 0 0 9,884 24,989 36,656 45,063 30,721 37,958 56,876 51,787 46,791 33,448 31,345 24,012 
  h Net Profit Contractor  0 0 0 0 10,749 29,206 44,081 55,617 37,795 46,842 70,637 63,620 56,725 40,126 37,374 27,997 
  1 Total Contractor Share  0 0 0 17,465 58,709 96,139 112,720 106,576 79,704 93,056 123,021 127,846 134,307 109,909 109,957 102,858 
10  Party's Take                  
  a % GOI Take       10% 50% 60% 66% 71% 77% 77% 79% 77% 75% 73% 71% 68% 
  b % Contractor Take     90% 50% 40% 34% 29% 23% 23% 21% 23% 25% 27% 29% 32% 
11  Contractor Cash analysis                  
  a. Net Cash flow Contractor  (3) (747) (3,236) (864) 6,715 22,330 39,674 57,273 42,662 51,358 73,289 62,762 53,992 40,467 38,384 30,032 
  b. NPV @15%    (3) (567) (2,695) (3,189) 150 9,803 24,719 43,441 55,568 68,263 84,016 95,747 104,522 110,241 114,958 118,168 
  c NPV @15% /B      0.01 0.26 0.38 0.47 0.47 0.48 0.52 0.54 0.54 0.53 0.52 0.51 
  d. IRR        119% 131% 134% 136% 136% 137% 137% 137% 137% 137% 
  e. POT      4            
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Case C1 base case: Cash flow simulation of medium oil and gas field using IP5 figures 
                 000USD 
   17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 Total Mean 
7 Equity to be split                 
  a Equity to be split oil & gas  49,555 102,927 61,817 63,846 72,078 37,960 45,830 29,497 26,765 24,002 36,258 29,703 20,097 11,995 4,028,242 134,275 
  b Equity to be split oil  49,555 102,927 61,817 63,846 72,078 37,624 44,688 28,455 25,918 23,092 34,755 28,499 19,359  4,008,527 138,225 
  c Equity to be split gas  0 0 0 0 0 336 1,142 1,042 847 910 1,503 1,204 737 11,995 19,716 789 
8  GOI Share                 
  a. GOI Equity share oil  31,856 66,167 39,739 41,044 46,336 24,187 28,728 18,293 16,661 14,845 22,343 18,321 12,445 0 2,576,909 85,897 
  b. GOI Equity share gas  0 0 0 0 0 126 428 391 318 341 564 452 276 4,498 7,393  
  c GOI share from FTP oil  12,915 17,502 13,391 12,923 14,293 11,385 10,905 8,633 7,835 7,188 7,620 6,993 4,284 5,030 603,940 20,131 
  d. GOI share from FTP gas  0 0 0 0 0 55 138 144 130 137 153 158 122 119 1,156  
  e. Domestic Requirement  9,801 13,283 10,162 9,807 10,848 8,640 8,276 6,552 5,946 5,455 5,783 5,307 3,251 3,817 376,599 13,948 
  f. Gov.Tax Entitlement 4,440 11,099 6,097 6,467 7,397 3,210 4,482 2,600 2,332 2,067 3,797 2,973 2,054 1,951 490,495 18,166 
  g Total GOI Share  59,012 108,051 69,390 70,241 78,874 47,602 52,959 36,613 33,221 30,033 40,258 34,203 22,433 15,415 4,056,493 135,216 
9  Contractor Share                 
  a. Contractor Equity Share oil  17,698 36,760 22,077 22,802 25,742 13,437 15,960 10,163 9,256 8,247 12,413 10,178 6,914 0 1,431,617 47,721 
  b. Contractor Equity Share gas  0 0 0 0 0 210 714 651 529 569 939 753 461 7,497   
  c Contractor Share from FTP oil  0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
  d. Contractor Share from FTP gas  0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0   
  e. DMO oil first 5 prod.year  9,801 13,283 10,162 9,807 10,848 8,640 8,276 6,552 5,946 5,455 5,783 5,307 3,251 3,817 376,599 12,553 
    after 5 prod-years                   
  f. Taxable Share  10,090 25,226 13,858 14,698 16,811 7,295 10,186 5,910 5,299 4,697 8,628 6,756 4,669 4,435 1,114,761 37,159 
  g Gov.Tax Entitlement  4,440 11,099 6,097 6,467 7,397 3,210 4,482 2,600 2,332 2,067 3,797 2,973 2,054 1,951 490,495 16,350 
  h Net Profit Contractor  3,457 12,378 5,817 6,528 7,498 1,797 3,916 1,662 1,508 1,294 3,773 2,651 2,069 1,728 576,845 19,228 
  1  Total Contractor Share  70,135 66,968 64,515 58,984 64,060 66,796 57,479 51,155 46,424 43,219 37,466 37,308 21,622 36,072 1,994,470 66,482 
10  Party's Take                 
  a % GOI Take  46% 62% 52% 54% 55% 42% 48% 42% 42% 41% 52% 48% 51% 30% 67% 56% 
  b % Contractor Take  54% 38% 48% 46% 45% 58% 52% 58% 58% 59% 48% 52% 49% 70% 33% 44% 
11  Contractor Cash analysis                 
  a. Net Cash flow Contractor 7,819 17,292 9,324 10,611 9,629 1,812 6,661 4,335 4,953 5,266 7,374 5,130 6,133 14,624 625,052 20,835 
  b. NPV @15%   118,894 120,292 120,947 121,595 122,107 122,190 122,458 122,610 122,760 122,899 123,068 123,171 123,277 123,498 123,498  
  c NPV @15% /B 0.49 0.48 0.47 0.46 0.45 0.44 0.43 0.42 0.42 0.41 0.41 0.40 0.40 0.39 0.39  
  d. IRR 137% 137% 137% 137% 137% 137% 137% 137% 137% 137% 137% 137% 137% 137% 137%  
 e. POT               4  
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Case C2 base case: Cash flow simulation of large oil and gas field using IP5 figures 
                 000USD 
     % 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 
1  Annual Expenditures (000 USD)                  
  a. Capital Expenditures 22.3% 197 1,526 5,286 10,837 9,014 27,065 38,272 20,890 14,726 7,269 8,526 14,096 22,226 29,034 26,670 32,049 
  b. Non Capital & operating expenditures  688 5,315 18,411 37,742 31,392 94,259 133,290 72,751 51,285 25,315 29,694 49,091 77,408 101,116 92,881 111,614 
  c. Total Expenditures  885 6,841 23,697 48,579 40,406 121,324 171,562 93,641 66,011 32,584 38,220 63,187 99,634 130,150 119,551 143,663 
2  Lifting                  
  a. Oil (000 BL)      13,282 18,509 20,959 27,709 29,110 27,067 23,969 22,177 18,216 14,986 12,832 13,147 
  c. Oil Prices (USD/B)      4.07 12.00 11.72 12.65 13.93 14.66 20.00 32.49 36.67 36.35 29.04 28.68 
  d. Gas (000 CFT)           1,628 2,690 7,169 6,948 5,223 4,903 12,786 
  e. Gas Price (USD/CFT)           1.60 2.46 2.65 2.46 2.29 2.73 2.27 
  f Prod oil& gas (000BOE)        13,282 18,509 20,959 27,709 29,110 27,421 24,554 23,735 19,726 16,121 13,898 15,927 
  g Prod oil &gas (000BOE)       0 0 0 0 0 354 585 1,558 1,510 1,135 1,066 2,780 
  h Cum Oil & gas (000 BOE)        13,282 31,791 52,750 80,459 109,569 136,990 161,544 185,279 205,006 221,127 235,025 250,951 
3  Gross Revenue before FTP                  
  a Gross Revenues oil       54,051 222,092 245,634 350,649 405,638 396,670 479,354 720,607 667,979 544,813 372,580 376,997 
  b Gross Revenues gas            2,601 6,613 19,002 17,088 11,967 13,367 28,967 
  c Gross Revenues oil&gas (000 USD)      54,051 222,092 245,634 350,649 405,638 399,271 485,967 739,609 685,067 556,780 385,947 405,964 
4  FTP                  
  a FTP oil  10%     5,405 22,209 24,563 35,065 40,564 39,667 47,935 72,061 66,798 54,481 37,258 37,700 
  b FTP gas            260 661 1,900 1,709 1,197 1,337 2,897 
  c FTP oil & gas       5,405 22,209 24,563 35,065 40,564 39,927 48,597 73,961 68,507 55,678 38,595 40,596 
5  Gross Revenue after FTP                  
  a Gross Revenue oil after FTP       48,646 199,883 221,071 315,584 365,074 357,003 431,419 648,546 601,181 490,332 335,322 339,297 
  b Gross Revenue gas after FTP            2,341 5,952 17,102 15,379 10,770 12,030 26,070 
  c Gross Revenue oil & gas after FTP       48,646 199,883 221,071 315,584 365,074 359,344 437,370 665,648 616,560 501,102 347,352 365,368 
6  Cost Recovery oil & gas                  
  a. Unrecovered cost:   0 (688) (6,002) (24,413) (62,155) (55,855) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
  b. Current Year Operating Cost  688 5,315 18,411 37,742 31,392 94,259 133,290 72,751 51,285 25,315 29,694 49,091 77,408 101,116 92,881 111,614 
  c. Current Depreciation  5ys DDBL 0 0 0 0 6,715 11,803 18,419 19,038 24,333 20,117 19,878 14,308 14,824 16,607 19,421 23,900 
  d. Total Cost Recovery   688 6,002 24,413 62,155 100,262 161,917 151,709 91,789 75,619 45,432 49,572 63,399 92,232 117,723 112,303 135,514 
  e. Current Investment Credit 15.78% 0 0 0 0 4,239 4,271 6,039 3,296 2,324 1,147 1,345 2,224 3,507 4,582 4,208 5,057 
  f. Total Recoverable  688 6,002 24,413 62,155 104,501 166,188 157,748 95,085 77,942 46,579 50,917 65,623 95,739 122,305 116,511 140,571 
  g. Current Maximum cost recovery   0 0 0 0 48,646 199,883 221,071 315,584 365,074 359,344 437,370 665,648 616,560 501,102 347,352 365,368 
  h. Actual cost recoverable   0 0 0 0 48,646 166,188 157,748 95,085 77,942 46,579 50,917 65,623 95,739 122,305 116,511 140,571 
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Case C2 base case: Cash flow simulation of large oil and gas field using IP5 figures 
                 000USD 
     17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 Total Mean 
1  Annual Expenditures (000 USD)                 
  a. Capital Expenditures 26,986 23,912 15,103 13,735 18,094 23,540 32,923 27,652 38,623 36,435 37,117 48,956 54,461 59,502 724,723 24,157 
  b. Non Capital & operating expenditures 93,983 83,277 52,597 47,835 63,017 81,984 114,661 96,303 134,512 126,891 129,267 170,498 189,670 207,224 2,523,970 84,132 
  c. Total Expenditures  120,969 107,189 67,700 61,570 81,111 105,524 147,584 123,955 173,135 163,326 166,384 219,454 244,131 266,726 3,248,693 108,290 
2  Lifting                 
  a. Oil (000 BL) 16,400 16,409 14,770 14,397 15,559 17,473 18,786 18,741 18,210 25,281 24,607 23,661 26,516 21,401 514,174 19,776 
  c. Oil Prices (USD/B) 27.64 13.94 18.20 17.90 18.06 23.23 20.19 20.03 17.73 16.61 17.58 20.93 19.81 12.63 19.88 19.88 
  d. Gas (000 CFT) 12,117 13,336 23,473 35,344 23,699 36,220 41,006 46,314 45,421 55,201 53,993 48,163 63,888 53,360 592,882 28,232 
  e. Gas Price(USD/CFT) 2.54 1.96 1.17 1.08 1.84 2.36 2.20 2.02 2.04 2.35 2.31 3.62 2.95 2.62 2.26 2.26 
  f Prod oil& gas (000BOE)  19,034 19,308 19,873 22,080 20,711 25,347 27,700 28,809 28,084 37,281 36,345 34,131 40,405 33,001 643,061 24,733 
  g Prod oil &gas (000BOE)  2,634 2,899 5,103 7,683 5,152 7,874 8,914 10,068 9,874 12,000 11,738 10,470 13,889 11,600 128,887 4,957 
  h Cum Oil & gas (000 BOE) 269,986 289,294 309,167 331,247 351,958 377,305 405,005 433,815 461,899 499,180 535,524 569,656 610,060 643,061 643,061  
3  Gross Revenue before FTP                 
  a Gross Revenues oil   453,305 228,798 268,831 257,736 281,015 405,858 379,293 375,396 322,896 419,858 432,543 495,184 525,365 270,396 9,953,538 382,828 
  b Gross Revenues gas    30,790 26,116 27,463 38,297 43,693 85,376 90,198 93,677 92,677 129,607 124,767 174,514 188,592 139,892 1,385,264 65,965 
  c Gross Revenues oil&gas (000 USD) 484,095 254,914 296,294 296,033 324,708 491,234 469,491 469,073 415,573 549,465 557,310 669,698 713,957 410,288 11,338,802 436,108 
4  FTP                 
  a FTP oil  45,331 22,880 26,883 25,774 28,102 40,586 37,929 37,540 32,290 41,986 43,254 49,518 52,537 27,040 995,354 38,283 
  b FTP gas  3,079 2,612 2,746 3,830 4,369 8,538 9,020 9,368 9,268 12,961 12,477 17,451 18,859 13,989 138,526 6,596 
  c FTP oil & gas  48,410 25,491 29,629 29,603 32,471 49,123 46,949 46,907 41,557 54,947 55,731 66,970 71,396 41,029 1,133,880 43,611 
5  Gross Revenue after FTP                 
  a Gross Revenue oil after FTP 407,975 205,918 241,948 231,962 252,914 365,272 341,364 337,856 290,606 377,872 389,289 445,666 472,829 243,356 8,958,184 344,546 
  b Gross Revenue gas after FTP 27,711 23,504 24,717 34,467 39,324 76,838 81,178 84,309 83,409 116,646 112,290 157,063 169,733 125,903 1,246,738 59,368 
  c Gross Revenue oil & gas after FTP 435,686 229,423 266,665 266,430 292,237 442,111 422,542 422,166 374,016 494,519 501,579 602,728 642,561 369,259 10,204,922 392,497 
6  Cost Recovery oil & gas                 
  a. Unrecovered cost:  0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0   
  b. Current Year Operating Cost  93,983 83,277 52,597 47,835 63,017 81,984 114,661 96,303 134,512 126,891 129,267 170,498 189,670 207,224 2,523,970 84,132 
  c. Current Depreciation 26,601 27,544 23,873 22,615 20,283 20,368 21,416 22,651 27,678 31,160 34,875 37,145 44,077 155,073 724,723 24,157 
  d. Total Cost Recovery  120,584 110,821 76,470 70,450 83,300 102,352 136,077 118,954 162,190 158,051 164,142 207,643 233,747 362,297 3,397,806 113,260 
  e. Current Investment Credit 4,258 3,773 2,383 2,167 2,855 3,715 5,195 4,363 6,095 5,749 5,857 7,725 8,594 9,389 114,361 3,812 
  f. Total Recoverable 124,842 114,594 78,853 72,617 86,155 106,066 141,272 123,317 168,285 163,801 169,999 215,368 242,341 371,687 3,512,168 117,072 
  g. Current Maximum cost recovery  435,686 229,423 266,665 266,430 292,237 442,111 422,542 422,166 374,016 494,519 501,579 602,728 642,561 369,259 10,204,922 340,164 
  h. Actual cost recoverable  124,842 114,594 78,853 72,617 86,155 106,066 141,272 123,317 168,285 163,801 169,999 215,368 242,341 369,259 3,360,627 112,021 
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Case C2 base case: Cash flow simulation of large oil and gas field using IP5 figures 
                 000USD 
     % 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 
7  Equity to be split                   
  a Equity to be split oil & gas   0 0 0 0 0 33,695 63,322 220,499 287,132 312,765 386,453 600,025 520,821 378,797 230,841 224,796 
  b Equity to be split oil & gas   0 0 0 0 0 33,695 63,322 220,499 287,132 308,728 377,249 560,627 480,942 352,118 213,137 185,564 
  c Equity to be split gas       0 0 0 0 4,037 9,204 39,398 39,879 26,679 17,704 39,232 
8  GOI Share                  
  a. GOI Equity share oil 64.28% 0 0 0 0 0 21,661 40,707 141,749 184,585 198,468 242,517 360,403 309,177 226,362 137,017 119,291 
  b. GOI Equity share gas 37.5%  0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1,514 3,451 14,774 14,955 10,005 6,639 14,712 
  c GOI share from FTP oil 100% 0 0 0 0 5,405 22,209 24,563 35,065 40,564 39,667 47,935 72,061 66,798 54,481 37,258 37,700 
  d. GOI share from FTP gas 100% 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 260 661 1,900 1,709 1,197 1,337 2,897 
  e. Domestic Requirement      0 0 0 0 0 30,104 36,380 54,689 50,695 41,347 28,276 28,611 
  f. Gov.Tax Entitlement 44%     0 7,174 12,608 36,100 46,143 36,883 46,398 75,849 65,781 46,493 27,772 29,585 
  g Total GOI Share  0 0 0 0 5,405 51,045 77,878 212,914 271,292 306,897 377,343 579,676 509,114 379,884 238,299 232,796 
9  Contractor Share                  
  a. Contractor Equity Share oil  35.71% 0 0 0 0 0 12,034 22,615 78,750 102,547 110,260 134,732 200,224 171,765 125,757 76,121 66,273 
  b. Contractor Equity Share gas 62.5% 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2,523 5,752 24,624 24,924 16,674 11,065 24,520 
  c Contractor Share from FTP oil 0% 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
  d. Contractor Share from FTP gas 0% 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
  e. DMO oil first 5 prod.year  25% 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 30,104 36,380 54,689 50,695 41,347 28,276 28,611 
    after 5 prod-years   15%                 
  f. Taxable Share   0 0 0 0 0 16,305 28,654 82,046 104,871 83,826 105,450 172,383 149,502 105,665 63,118 67,239 
  g Gov.Tax Entitlement 44% 0 0 0 0 0 7,174 12,608 36,100 46,143 36,883 46,398 75,849 65,781 46,493 27,772 29,585 
  h Net Profit Contractor  0 0 0 0 0 4,860 10,007 42,649 56,404 45,795 57,707 94,310 80,214 54,591 31,137 32,597 
  1  Total Contractor Share  0 0 0 0 48,646 171,047 167,756 137,735 134,346 92,374 108,624 159,933 175,953 176,896 147,648 173,168 
10  Party's Take                  
  a % GOI Take        10% 23% 32% 61% 67% 77% 78% 78% 74% 68% 62% 57% 
  b % Contractor Take      90% 77% 68% 39% 33% 23% 22% 22% 26% 32% 38% 43% 
11  Contractor Cash analysis                  
  a. Net Cash flow Contractor  (885) (6,841) (23,697) (48,579) 8,240 49,723 (3,806) 44,094 68,335 59,790 70,404 96,746 76,319 46,746 28,097 29,505 
  b. NPV @15%    (770) (5,942) (21,524) (49,299) (45,202) (23,705) (25,136) (10,722) 8,703 23,483 38,615 56,698 69,102 75,708 79,161 82,314 
  c NPV @15% /B      (3.40) (0.75) (0.48) (0.13) 0.08 0.17 0.24 0.31 0.34 0.34 0.34 0.33 
  d. IRR         7% 20% 26% 30% 33% 34% 35% 35% 35% 
  e. POT         7         
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Case C2 base case: Cash flow simulation of large oil and gas field using IP5 figures 
                 000USD 
 
    17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 Total Mean 
7  Equity to be split                  
  a Equity to be split oil & gas  310,843 114,828 187,811 193,813 206,082 336,044 281,270 298,849 205,731 330,718 331,580 387,360 400,220 0 6,844,295 228,143 
  b Equity to be split oil & gas  267,826 97,587 139,586 126,371 154,818 231,654 190,753 194,407 133,398 224,265 224,495 268,532 262,648 0 5,599,354 186,645 
  c Equity to be split gas  43,018 17,242 48,225 67,442 51,264 104,391 90,516 104,442 72,333 106,453 107,085 118,828 137,571 0 1,244,941 49,798 
8  GOI Share                 
  a. GOI Equity share oil  172,174 62,734 89,734 81,238 99,526 148,920 122,627 124,976 85,756 144,170 144,318 172,628 168,845 0 3,599,584 119,986 
  b. GOI Equity share gas 16,132 6,466 18,084 25,291 19,224 39,147 33,944 39,166 27,125 39,920 40,157 44,560 51,589 0 466,853  
  c GOI share from FTP oil  45,331 22,880 26,883 25,774 28,102 40,586 37,929 37,540 32,290 41,986 43,254 49,518 52,537 27,040 995,354 33,178 
  d. GOI share from FTP gas  3,079 2,612 2,746 3,830 4,369 8,538 9,020 9,368 9,268 12,961 12,477 17,451 18,859 13,989 138,526  
  e. Domestic Requirement  34,403 17,364 20,402 19,560 21,327 30,802 28,786 28,490 24,506 31,864 32,827 37,581 39,871 20,521 658,407 25,323 
  f. Gov.Tax Entitlement 40,653 14,097 27,268 30,752 30,299 53,192 44,488 48,656 32,753 53,026 52,859 61,739 65,343 0 985,911 37,920 
  g Total GOI Share  311,771 126,152 185,119 186,445 202,846 321,184 276,793 288,194 211,697 323,927 325,892 383,478 397,045 61,550 6,844,634 228,154 
9  Contractor Share                 
  a. Contractor Equity Share oil  95,652 34,852 49,852 45,132 55,292 82,733 68,126 69,431 47,642 80,095 80,177 95,904 93,803 0 1,999,770 66,659 
  b. Contractor Equity Share gas  26,886 10,776 30,141 42,151 32,040 65,244 56,573 65,276 45,208 66,533 66,928 74,267 85,982 0   
  c Contractor Share from FTP oil  0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
  d. Contractor Share from FTP gas  0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0   
  e. DMO oil first 5 prod.year  34,403 17,364 20,402 19,560 21,327 30,802 28,786 28,490 24,506 31,864 32,827 37,581 39,871 20,521 658,407 21,947 
    after 5 prod-years                   
  f. Taxable Share  92,394 32,038 61,974 69,891 68,860 120,891 101,109 110,581 74,440 120,513 120,135 140,316 148,508 0 2,240,706 74,690 
  g Gov.Tax Entitlement  40,653 14,097 27,268 30,752 30,299 53,192 44,488 48,656 32,753 53,026 52,859 61,739 65,343 0 985,911 32,864 
  h Net Profit Contractor  47,482 14,168 32,322 36,971 35,707 63,984 51,426 57,562 35,591 61,738 61,418 70,852 74,570 (20,521) 1,133,541 37,785 
  1  Total Contractor Share  172,324 128,762 111,175 109,588 121,862 170,050 192,698 180,879 203,876 225,538 231,418 286,220 316,912 348,738 4,494,168 149,806 
10  Party's Take                 
  a % GOI Take 64% 49% 62% 63% 62% 65% 59% 61% 51% 59% 58% 57% 56% 15% 60% 57% 
  b % Contractor Take  36% 51% 38% 37% 38% 35% 41% 39% 49% 41% 42% 43% 44% 85% 40% 43% 
11  Contractor Cash analysis                 
  a. Net Cash flow Contractor 51,355 21,573 43,475 48,018 40,751 64,526 45,114 56,924 30,741 62,212 65,034 66,766 72,781 82,012 1,245,475 41,516 
  b. NPV @15%   87,087 88,830 91,885 94,819 96,984 99,965 101,777 103,766 104,700 106,343 107,837 109,171 110,435 111,673 111,673  
  c NPV @15% /B 0.32 0.31 0.30 0.29 0.28 0.26 0.25 0.24 0.23 0.21 0.20 0.19 0.18 0.17 0.17  
  d. IRR 36% 36% 36% 36% 36% 36% 36% 36% 36% 36% 36% 36% 36% 36% 36%  
  e. POT               7  
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Case C3 base case: Cash flow simulation of very large oil and gas field using IP5 figures 
000USD 
      % 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 
1  Annual Expenditures (000 USD)                  
  a. Capital Expenditures 22.3% 1,722 2,042 2,029 5,224 15,062 28,951 23,414 17,404 13,351 27,779 38,154 39,047 32,836 42,430 48,999 46,060 
  b. Non Capital & operating expenditures  5,997 7,111 7,065 18,194 52,454 100,828 81,542 60,613 46,495 96,744 132,879 135,988 114,359 147,768 170,649 160,414 
  c. Total Expenditures   7,719 9,153 9,094 23,418 67,516 129,779 104,956 78,017 59,846 124,523 171,033 175,035 147,195 190,198 219,648 206,474 
2  Lifting                  
  a. Oil (000 BL)     414 3,423 14,362 41,897 40,276 38,664 36,275 37,558 30,719 31,914 32,628 30,470 28,343 
  c. Oil Prices (USD/B)     12.18 12.07 12.26 13.27 13.51 18.83 31.03 21.03 20.44 30.23 29.60 28.43 14.26 
  d. Gas (000 CFT)         2,248 1,538 1,940 1,876 1,973 6,263 23,529 24,831 28,445 
  e. Gas Price(USD/CFT)         1.20 2.23 4.50 4.96 5.13 3.60 3.31 3.80 2.46 
  f Prod oil& gas (000BOE)       414 3,423 14,362 41,897 40,765 38,998 36,697 37,966 31,148 33,276 37,743 35,868 34,527 
  g Prod gas (000BOE)       0 0 0 489 334 422 408 429 1,362 5,115 5,398 6,184 
   Oil&gas/day     1 9 39 115 112 107 101 104 85 91 103 98 95 
3  Gross Revenue before FTP                  
  a Gross Revenues oil     5,044 41,310 176,102 555,770 544,062 728,111 1,125,759 789,968 627,851 964,692 965,941 866,192 404,042 
  b Gross Revenues gas         2,697 3,425 8,726 9,308 10,129 22,551 77,928 94,458 70,010 
  c Gross Revenues oil&gas (000 USD)     5,044 41,310 176,102 555,770 546,759 731,536 1,134,485 799,276 637,980 987,243 1,043,869 960,650 474,052 
4  FTP                  
  a FTP oil 10%    504 4,131 17,610 55,577 54,406 72,811 112,576 78,997 62,785 96,469 96,594 86,619 40,404 
  b FTP gas         270 343 873 931 1,013 2,255 7,793 9,446 7,001 
  c FTP oil & gas     504 4,131 17,610 55,577 54,676 73,154 113,449 79,928 63,798 98,724 104,387 96,065 47,405 
5  Gross Revenue after FTP                  
  a Gross Revenue oil after FTP      4,540 37,179 158,492 500,193 489,656 655,300 1,013,183 710,971 565,066 868,223 869,347 779,573 363,638 
  b Gross Revenue gas after FTP          2,427 3,083 7,853 8,377 9,116 20,296 70,135 85,012 63,009 
  c Gross Revenue oil & gas after FTP      4,540 37,179 158,492 500,193 492,083 658,382 1,021,037 719,348 574,182 888,519 939,482 864,585 426,647 
6  Cost Recovery oil & gas                  
  a. Unrecovered cost:   0 (5,997) (13,108) (20,173) (38,320) (61,804) (20,319) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
  b. Current Year Operating Cost  5,997 7,111 7,065 18,194 52,454 100,828 81,542 60,613 46,495 96,744 132,879 135,988 114,359 147,768 170,649 160,414 
  c. Current Depreciation 5ys DDBL 0 0 0 2,754 5,831 11,611 14,562 17,886 17,713 23,525 25,868 27,737 28,050 35,069 41,014 42,487 
  d. Total Cost Recovery   5,997 13,108 20,173 41,122 96,606 174,242 116,423 78,499 64,208 120,270 158,747 163,724 142,408 182,837 211,662 202,900 
  e. Current Investment Credit  15.78% 0 0 0 1,738 2,377 4,569 3,695 2,746 2,107 4,383 6,021 6,162 5,182 6,695 7,732 7,268 
  f. Total Recoverable   5,997 13,108 20,173 42,860 98,983 178,811 120,117 81,246 66,315 124,653 164,768 169,886 147,590 189,533 219,394 210,169 
  g. Current Maximum cost recovery   0 0 0 4,540 37,179 158,492 500,193 492,083 658,382 1,021,037 719,348 574,182 888,519 939,482 864,585 426,647 
  h. Actual cost recoverable:   0 0 0 4,540 37,179 158,492 120,117 81,246 66,315 124,653 164,768 169,886 147,590 189,533 219,394 210,169 
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Case C3 base case: Cash flow simulation of very large oil and gas field using IP5 figures 
000USD 
      17  18  19  20  21  22  23  24  25  26  27  28  29  30  Total Mean 
 1  Annual Expenditures (000 USD)                 
  a. Capital Expenditures 26,585 22,638 28,203 25,244 28,564 51,327 36,148 31,599 34,633 60,623 69,218 80,119 83,298 42,987 1,005,688 33,523 
  b. Non Capital & operating expenditures 92,585 78,840 98,221 87,915 99,477 178,753 125,891 110,050 120,615 211,129 241,063 279,028 290,098 149,711 3,502,478 116,749 
  c. Total Expenditures  119,170 101,478 126,424 113,159 128,041 230,080 162,039 141,649 155,248 271,752 310,281 359,147 373,396 192,698 4,508,166 150,272 
2  Lifting                 
  a. Oil (000 BL) 25,576 18,396 17,236 14,947 14,695 13,913 12,961 14,051 12,389 12,312 13,681 15,174 15,234 16,443 583,951 21,628 
  c. Oil Prices (USD/B) 17.58 17.19 17.65 22.50 19.99 19.34 17.79 16.06 17.23 17.31 19.40 13.14 16.61 28.57 19.17 19.17 
  d. Gas (000 CFT) 38,473 41,200 42,779 70,636 88,644 96,925 106,634 129,841 127,951 154,126 185,362 239,784 260,883 467,165 2,143,046 93,176 
  e. Gas Price(USD/CFT) 1.85 1.83 1.91 2.38 2.49 2.56 2.14 2.05 2.33 3.31 3.15 1.99 2.80 3.34 2.84 2.84 
  f Prod oil& gas (000BOE) 33,940 27,353 26,536 30,303 33,965 34,984 36,142 42,277 40,204 45,818 53,977 67,301 71,948 118,001 1,049,831 38,883 
  g Prod gas (000BOE)  8,364 8,957 9,300 15,356 19,270 21,071 23,181 28,226 27,815 33,506 40,296 52,127 56,714 101,558 465,880 17,918 
   Oil&gas/day 93 75 73 83 93 96 99 116 110 126 148 184 197 323 107 107 
3  Gross Revenue before FTP                 
  a Gross Revenues oil 449,686 316,190 304,221 336,369 293,818 269,056 230,541 225,679 213,473 213,104 265,407 199,440 252,990 469,765 11,834,583 438,318 
  b Gross Revenues gas 71,005 75,432 81,920 168,279 220,843 248,292 228,670 266,403 297,976 510,208 584,747 476,772 731,181 1,558,490 5,819,450 253,020 
  c Gross Revenues oil&gas (000 USD) 520,691 391,622 386,141 504,648 514,661 517,348 459,211 492,082 511,449 723,312 850,154 676,212 984,171 2,028,255 17,654,033 653,853 
4  FTP                 
  a FTP oil 44,969 31,619 30,422 33,637 29,382 26,906 23,054 22,568 21,347 21,310 26,541 19,944 25,299 46,977 1,183,458 43,832 
  b FTP gas 7,101 7,543 8,192 16,828 22,084 24,829 22,867 26,640 29,798 51,021 58,475 47,677 73,118 155,849 581,945 25,302 
  c FTP oil & gas 52,069 39,162 38,614 50,465 51,466 51,735 45,921 49,208 51,145 72,331 85,015 67,621 98,417 202,826 1,765,403 65,385 
5  Gross Revenue after FTP                 
  a Gross Revenue oil after FTP 404,717 284,571 273,799 302,732 264,436 242,150 207,487 203,111 192,126 191,794 238,866 179,496 227,691 422,789 10,651,125 394,486 
  b Gross Revenue gas after FTP 63,905 67,889 73,728 151,451 198,759 223,463 205,803 239,763 268,178 459,187 526,272 429,095 658,063 1,402,641 5,237,505 227,718 
  c Gross Revenue oil & gas after FTP 468,622 352,460 347,527 454,183 463,195 465,613 413,290 442,874 460,304 650,981 765,139 608,591 885,754 1,825,430 15,888,630 588,468 
6  Cost Recovery oil & gas                 
  a. Unrecovered cost:  0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0   
  b. Current Year Operating Cost 92,585 78,840 98,221 87,915 99,477 178,753 125,891 110,050 120,615 211,129 241,063 279,028 290,098 149,711 3,502,478 116,749 
  c. Current Depreciation  37,038 35,714 35,396 32,160 26,639 31,875 34,263 32,895 34,118 46,146 48,312 55,183 62,932 198,912 1,005,688 33,523 
  d. Total Cost Recovery  129,623 114,554 133,617 120,075 126,116 210,628 160,154 142,944 154,733 257,275 289,375 334,211 353,031 348,622 4,667,887 155,596 
  e. Current Investment Credit  4,195 3,572 4,450 3,983 4,507 8,099 5,704 4,986 5,465 9,566 10,923 12,643 13,144 6,783 158,698 5,290 
  f. Total Recoverable  133,818 118,127 138,067 124,059 130,624 218,727 165,859 147,931 160,198 266,841 300,297 346,854 366,175 355,406 4,826,585 160,886 
  g. Current Maximum cost recovery  468,622 352,460 347,527 454,183 463,195 465,613 413,290 442,874 460,304 650,981 765,139 608,591 885,754 1,825,430 15,888,630 529,621 
  h. Actual cost recoverable:  133,818 118,127 138,067 124,059 130,624 218,727 165,859 147,931 160,198 266,841 300,297 346,854 366,175 355,406 4,666,864 155,562 
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Case C3 base case: Cash flow simulation of very large oil and gas field using IP5 figures 
                  000USD 
      % 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 
7  Equity to be split                   
  a Equity to be split oil & gas   0 0 0 0 0 0 380,076 410,838 592,067 896,384 554,581 404,296 740,929 749,950 645,191 216,478 
  b Equity to be split oil  0 0 0 0 0 0 380,076 405,912 586,991 886,082 548,623 398,729 710,613 648,315 548,091 177,707 
  c Equity to be split gas       0 0 4,925 5,076 10,302 5,957 5,567 30,316 101,635 97,099 38,771 
8  GOI Share                  
  a. GOI Equity share oil 64.28% 0 0 0 0 0 0 244,334 260,944 377,352 569,624 352,686 256,326 456,822 416,774 352,344 114,240 
  b. GOI Equity share gas 37.5% 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1,847 1,904 3,863 2,234 2,088 11,369 38,113 36,412 14,539 
  c GOI share from FTP oil 100% 0 0 0 504 4,131 17,610 55,577 54,406 72,811 112,576 78,997 62,785 96,469 96,594 86,619 40,404 
  d. GOI share from FTP gas 100% 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 270 343 873 931 1,013 2,255 7,793 9,446 7,001 
  e. Domestic Requirement      0 0 0 0 55,258 85,437 59,953 47,649 73,213 73,308 65,738 30,664 
  f. Gov.Tax Entitlement 44%     0 0 61,352 66,349 70,251 106,411 64,120 45,934 90,071 100,518 87,308 28,293 
  g Total GOI Share  0 0 0 504 4,131 17,610 361,263 383,816 577,918 878,783 558,921 415,794 730,199 733,100 637,868 235,142 
9  Contractor Share                  
  a. Contractor Equity Share oil 35.71% 0 0 0 0 0 0 135,741 144,969 209,640 316,458 195,937 142,403 253,790 231,541 195,747 63,467 
  b. Contractor Equity Share gas 62.5% 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3,078 3,173 6,439 3,723 3,480 18,948 63,522 60,687 24,232 
  c Contractor Share from FTP oil  0% 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
  d. Contractor Share from FTP gas  0% 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
  e. DMO oil first 5 prod.year 25% 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 55,258 85,437 59,953 47,649 73,213 73,308 65,738 30,664 
  f. Taxable Share   0 0 0 0 0 0 139,436 150,793 159,661 241,843 145,728 104,395 204,706 228,450 198,428 64,303 
  g Gov.Tax Entitlement 44% 0 0 0 0 0 0 61,352 66,349 70,251 106,411 64,120 45,934 90,071 100,518 87,308 28,293 
  h Net Profit Contractor  0 0 0 0 0 0 74,389 81,698 87,303 131,049 75,587 52,300 109,454 121,237 103,388 28,741 
  1  Total Contractor Share  0 0 0 4,540 37,179 158,492 194,507 162,943 153,618 255,702 240,355 222,186 257,044 310,769 322,782 238,910 
9  Party's Take                  
  a % GOI Take       10% 10% 10% 65% 70% 79% 77% 70% 65% 74% 70% 66% 50% 
  b % Contractor Take     90% 90% 90% 35% 30% 21% 23% 30% 35% 26% 30% 34% 50% 
10  Contractor Cash analysis                  
  a. Net Cash flow Contractor  (7,719) (9,153) (9,094) (18,878) (30,337) 28,713 89,551 84,926 93,772 131,179 69,322 47,151 109,849 120,571 103,134 32,436 
  b. NPV @15%    (6,712) (13,633) (19,613) (30,406) (45,489) (33,076) 590 28,352 55,008 87,433 102,334 111,146 129,000 146,040 158,715 162,181 
  c NPV @15% /B     (73.45) (11.86) (1.82) 0.01 0.28 0.39 0.50 0.48 0.45 0.46 0.46 0.45 0.42 
  d. IRR       #NUM! 15% 30% 38% 43% 45% 46% 47% 48% 48% 48% 
  e. POT        6          
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Case C3 base case: Cash flow simulation of very large oil and gas field using IP5 figures 
                 000USD 
      17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 Total Mean 
7  Equity to be split                   
  a Equity to be split oil & gas  334,804 234,333 209,459 330,124 332,571 246,886 247,431 294,943 300,106 384,140 464,841 261,737 519,579 1,470,024 11,221,766 374,059 
  b Equity to be split oil   252,299 157,601 136,052 162,836 143,885 98,187 88,731 98,025 92,478 103,225 117,818 59,012 110,014 204,843 7,116,146 237,205 
  c Equity to be split gas  82,505 76,732 73,408 167,288 188,686 148,699 158,700 196,918 207,628 280,915 347,023 202,724 409,565 1,265,181 4,105,620 164,225 
8  GOI Share                 
  a. GOI Equity share oil  162,192 101,315 87,462 104,680 92,498 63,120 57,042 63,016 59,450 66,359 75,740 37,937 70,723 131,685 4,574,665 152,489 
  b. GOI Equity share gas  30,939 28,774 27,528 62,733 70,757 55,762 59,512 73,844 77,861 105,343 130,134 76,022 153,587 474,443 1,539,607 51,320 
  c GOI share from FTP oil  44,969 31,619 30,422 33,637 29,382 26,906 23,054 22,568 21,347 21,310 26,541 19,944 25,299 46,977 1,183,458 39,449 
  d. GOI share from FTP gas  7,101 7,543 8,192 16,828 22,084 24,829 22,867 26,640 29,798 51,021 58,475 47,677 73,118 155,849 581,945 19,398 
  e. Domestic Requirement  34,128 23,997 23,088 25,528 22,299 20,419 17,496 17,127 16,201 16,173 20,143 15,136 19,200 35,652 797,808 30,685 
  f. Gov.Tax Entitlement  49,165 36,880 33,366 62,113 66,671 50,901 52,397 64,214 66,906 90,566 109,889 63,925 127,254 367,412 1,962,268 75,472 
  g Total GOI Share  328,494 230,129 210,058 305,519 303,691 241,937 232,369 267,410 271,563 350,772 420,921 260,641 469,181 1,212,017 10,639,752 354,658 
9  Contractor Share                 
  a. Contractor Equity Share oil 90,107 56,286 48,590 58,156 51,388 35,067 31,690 35,009 33,028 36,866 42,078 21,076 39,291 73,158 2,541,482 84,716 
  b. Contractor Equity Share gas 51,566 47,957 45,880 104,555 117,929 92,937 99,187 123,074 129,768 175,572 216,889 126,703 255,978 790,738 2,566,012 85,534 
  c Contractor Share from FTP oil 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
  d. Contractor Share from FTP gas 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
  e. DMO oil first 5 prod.year 34,128 23,997 23,088 25,528 22,299 20,419 17,496 17,127 16,201 16,173 20,143 15,136 19,200 35,652 797,808 26,594 
  f. Taxable Share  111,740 83,819 75,832 141,166 151,525 115,684 119,085 145,942 152,059 205,831 249,747 145,285 289,213 835,028 4,459,700 148,657 
  g Gov.Tax Entitlement 49,165 36,880 33,366 62,113 66,671 50,901 52,397 64,214 66,906 90,566 109,889 63,925 127,254 367,412 1,962,268 65,409 
  h Net Profit Contractor 58,379 43,367 38,015 75,070 80,347 56,683 60,983 76,741 79,688 105,699 128,936 68,717 148,815 460,832 2,347,418 78,247 
  1  Total Contractor Share 192,197 161,493 176,083 199,129 210,970 275,411 226,842 224,672 239,886 372,540 429,233 415,571 514,990 816,238 7,014,281 233,809 
9  Party's Take                 
  a % GOI Take  63% 59% 54% 61% 59% 47% 51% 54% 53% 48% 50% 39% 48% 60% 60% 54% 
  b % Contractor Take  37% 41% 46% 39% 41% 53% 49% 46% 47% 52% 50% 61% 52% 40% 40% 46% 
10  Contractor Cash analysis                 
  a. Net Cash flow Contractor 73,027 60,015 49,659 85,970 82,929 45,331 64,803 83,023 84,638 100,788 118,952 56,424 141,594 623,540 2,506,115 83,537 
  b. NPV @15% 168,967 173,817 177,306 182,559 186,965 189,059 191,663 194,563 197,134 199,796 202,529 203,656 206,115 215,532 215,532  
  c NPV @15% /B 0.40 0.39 0.37 0.36 0.35 0.33 0.31 0.30 0.28 0.27 0.26 0.24 0.22 0.21 0.21  
  d. IRR 48% 48% 48% 48% 48% 48% 48% 48% 48% 48% 48% 48% 48% 48% 48%  
  e. POT               6  
 
 
 
 317 
  
Appendix B7 
 
Case C4 base case: Cash flow simulation of extra large oil and gas field using IP5 figures 
                  000USD 
    % 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 
1 Annual Expenditures (000 USD)                  
 a. Capital Expenditures 22.3% 76 370 625 1,191 2,482 4,984 6,075 16,523 31,880 29,608 41,857 30,191 40,228 60,482 67,814 43,160 
 b. 
Non Capital & operating 
expenditures  264 1,288 2,175 4,149 8,642 17,358 21,156 57,546 111,027 103,113 145,773 105,144 140,103 210,641 236,174 150,314 
 c. Total Expenditures  340 1,658 2,800 5,340 11,124 22,342 27,231 74,069 142,907 132,721 187,630 135,335 180,331 271,123 303,988 193,474 
2 Lifting                  
 a. Oil (000 BL)           1,985 9,581 20,789 22,454 27,037 27,717 29,203 
 c. Oil Prices (USD/B)           7.50 14.91 20.39 33.98 37.23 35.85 32.29 
 d. Gas (000 CFT)             141,541 203,380 210,786 215,545 241,459 
 e. Gas Price(USD/CFT)             1.60 4.19 4.77 5.01 4.48 
 f Prod oil& gas (000BOE)           1,985 9,581 51,559 66,667 72,860 74,575 81,694 
 g Prod gas (000BOE)             30,770 44,213 45,823 46,858 52,491 
 h. Oil&gas (000 BOEPD)           5.438 26.249 141.257 182.649 199.617 204.314 223.819 
3 Gross Revenue before FTP                  
 a Gross Revenues oil (000 USD)           14,891 142,886 423,990 763,054 1,006,666 993,782 942,835 
 b Gross Revenues gas (000 USD)           0 0 227,120 852,525 1,005,412 1,079,188 1,080,977 
 c Gross Revenues oil&gas (000 USD)           14,891 142,886 651,110 1,615,579 2,012,078 2,072,970 2,023,812 
4 FTP                   
 a FTP oil 10%          1,489 14,289 42,399 76,305 100,667 99,378 94,284 
 b FTP gas           0 0 22,712 85,253 100,541 107,919 108,098 
 c FTP oil & gas           1,489 14,289 65,111 161,558 201,208 207,297 202,381 
5 Gross Revenue after FTP                  
 a Gross Revenue oil after FTP           13,402 128,597 381,591 686,749 905,999 894,404 848,552 
 b Gross Revenue gas after FTP           0 0 204,408 767,273 904,871 971,269 972,879 
 c Gross Revenue oil & gas after FTP           13,402 128,597 585,999 1,454,021 1,810,870 1,865,673 1,821,431 
6 Cost Recovery oil & gas                  
 a. Unrecovered cost:  0 (264) (1,552) (3,728) (7,876) (16,519) (33,877) (55,033) (2,513) (108,515) (19,454) (32,381) 0 0 0 0 
 b. Current Year Operating Cost  264 1,288 2,175 4,149 8,642 17,358 21,156 57,546 111,027 103,113 145,773 105,144 140,103 210,641 236,174 150,314 
 c. Current Depreciation 5ysDDBL 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 23,453 28,054 28,586 31,500 61,007 50,379 45,806 
 d. Total Cost Recovery  264 1,552 3,728 7,876 16,519 33,877 55,033 2,513 108,515 18,052 154,374 101,349 171,603 271,647 286,553 196,119 
 e. Current Investment Credit 15.78% 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 14,804 6,605 4,764 6,348 9,544 10,701 6,811 
 f. Total Recoverable  264 1,552 3,728 7,876 16,519 33,877 55,033 2,513 108,515 32,856 160,979 106,113 177,951 281,191 297,254 202,930 
 g. Current Maximum cost recovery  0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 13,402 128,597 585,999 1,454,021 1,810,870 1,865,673 1,821,431 
 h. Actual cost recoverable:  0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 13,402 128,597 106,113 177,951 281,191 297,254 202,930 
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Case C4 base case: Cash flow simulation of extra large oil and gas field using IP5 figures 
                  000USD 
 
    17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 Total Mean 
1 Annual Expenditures (000 USD)                 
 a. Capital Expenditures 36,420 37,792 43,663 35,049 32,684 37,169 43,710 56,201 61,155 65,812 84,982 45,656 32,437 34,379 1,024,655 34,155 
 b. Non Capital & operating expenditures 126,837 131,619 152,065 122,063 113,828 129,448 152,229 195,731 212,981 229,203 295,963 159,005 112,967 119,730 3,568,536 118,951 
 c. Total Expenditures 163,257 169,411 195,728 157,112 146,512 166,617 195,939 251,932 274,136 295,015 380,945 204,661 145,404 154,109 4,593,191 153,106 
2 Lifting                 
 a. Oil (000 BL) 36,594 36,338 37,807 38,632 43,650 45,531 44,196 42,631 41,517 38,542 33,926 31,891 29,316 22,493 661,830 31,516 
 c. Oil Prices (USD/B) 28.91 27.94 13.38 18.09 15.07 17.92 22.41 19.92 19.84 17.80 16.35 17.32 20.20 19.48 21.75 21.75 
 d. Gas (000 CFT) 339,455 306,481 398,622 466,241 506,354 563,255 585,032 607,864 622,335 632,133 641,214 590,082 586,196 589,629 8,447,604 444,611 
 e. Gas Price(USD/CFT) 3.68 3.76 2.67 2.16 2.14 2.07 3.02 2.80 2.82 2.64 2.44 2.83 3.29 3.15 3.13 3.13 
 f Prod oil& gas (000BOE) 110,389 102,964 124,464 139,989 153,727 167,978 171,377 174,775 176,807 175,962 173,320 160,170 156,750 150,673 2,498,266 118,965 
 g Prod gas (000BOE) 73,795 66,626 86,657 101,357 110,077 122,447 127,181 132,144 135,290 137,420 139,394 128,279 127,434 128,180 1,836,436 96,655 
 h. Oil&gas (000 BOEPD) 302.434 282.094 340.997 383.531 421.170 460.213 469.526 478.837 484.403 482.088 474.850 438.821 429.452 412.803 325.932 325.932 
3 Gross Revenue before FTP                 
 a Gross Revenues oil (000 USD) 1,057,935 1,015,119 505,675 698,905 657,969 816,018 990,388 849,032 823,751 685,969 554,701 552,397 592,163 438,094 14,526,220 691,725 
 b Gross Revenues gas (000 USD) 1,249,615 1,152,452 1,064,192 1,008,622 1,081,883 1,165,585 1,767,801 1,704,111 1,755,656 1,666,065 1,565,795 1,670,235 1,930,632 1,856,844 24,884,710 1,184,986 
 c Gross Revenues oil&gas (000 USD) 2,307,550 2,167,571 1,569,867 1,707,527 1,739,852 1,981,603 2,758,189 2,553,143 2,579,407 2,352,034 2,120,496 2,222,632 2,522,795 2,294,938 39,410,930 1,876,711 
4 FTP                  
 a FTP oil 105,794 101,512 50,568 69,891 65,797 81,602 99,039 84,903 82,375 68,597 55,470 55,240 59,216 43,809 1,452,622 69,172 
 b FTP gas 124,962 115,245 106,419 100,862 108,188 116,559 176,780 170,411 175,566 166,607 156,580 167,024 193,063 185,684 2,488,471 118,499 
 c FTP oil & gas 230,755 216,757 156,987 170,753 173,985 198,160 275,819 255,314 257,941 235,203 212,050 222,263 252,280 229,494 3,941,093 187,671 
5 Gross Revenue after FTP                 
 a Gross Revenue oil after FTP 952,142 913,607 455,108 629,015 592,172 734,416 891,349 764,129 741,376 617,372 499,231 497,157 532,947 394,285 13,073,598 622,552 
 b Gross Revenue gas after FTP 1,124,654 1,037,207 957,773 907,760 973,695 1,049,027 1,591,021 1,533,700 1,580,090 1,499,459 1,409,216 1,503,212 1,737,569 1,671,160 22,396,239 1,066,488 
 c Gross Revenue oil & gas after FTP 2,076,795 1,950,814 1,412,880 1,536,774 1,565,867 1,783,443 2,482,370 2,297,829 2,321,466 2,116,831 1,908,446 2,000,369 2,270,516 2,065,444 35,469,837 1,689,040 
6 Cost Recovery oil & gas                 
 a. Unrecovered cost: 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0   
 b. Current Year Operating Cost 126,837 131,619 152,065 122,063 113,828 129,448 152,229 195,731 212,981 229,203 295,963 159,005 112,967 119,730 3,568,536 118,951 
 c. Current Depreciation 45,841 48,636 49,132 39,761 36,392 36,912 40,005 42,010 46,235 52,193 61,943 60,835 54,911 141,065 1,024,655 34,155 
 d. Total Cost Recovery 172,679 180,255 201,197 161,824 150,220 166,360 192,234 237,740 259,216 281,396 357,906 219,840 167,878 260,795 4,439,112 147,970 
 e. Current Investment Credit 5,747 5,964 6,890 5,531 5,158 5,865 6,897 8,869 9,650 10,385 13,410 7,205 5,119 5,425 161,691 5,390 
 f. Total Recoverable 178,426 186,218 208,087 167,355 155,377 172,226 199,131 246,609 268,866 291,781 371,316 227,045 172,996 266,220 4,600,803 153,360 
 g. Current Maximum cost recovery 2,076,795 1,950,814 1,412,880 1,536,774 1,565,867 1,783,443 2,482,370 2,297,829 2,321,466 2,116,831 1,908,446 2,000,369 2,270,516 2,065,444 35,469,837 1,182,328 
 h. Actual cost recoverable: 178,426 186,218 208,087 167,355 155,377 172,226 199,131 246,609 268,866 291,781 371,316 227,045 172,996 266,220 4,319,091 143,970 
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Case C4 base case: Cash flow simulation of extra large oil and gas field using IP5 figures 
                  000USD 
 
 
   % 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 
  a Equity to be split oil & gas   0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 479,886 1,276,070 1,529,679 1,568,419 1,618,501 
  b Equity to be split oil & gas   0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 193,495 429,791 567,635 582,931 578,562 
  c Equity to be split gas        0 0 0 0 0 0 286,391 846,280 962,044 985,488 1,039,939 
8  GOI Share                  
  a. GOI Equity share oil 64.29% 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 124,389 276,294 364,908 374,742 371,933 
  b. GOI Equity share gas 37.50% 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 107,397 317,355 360,766 369,558 389,977 
  c GOI share from FTP oil 100% 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1,489 14,289 42,399 76,305 100,667 99,378 94,284 
  d. GOI share from FTP gas 100% 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 22,712 85,253 100,541 107,919 108,098 
  e. Domestic Requirement      0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 75,421 71,554 
  f. Gov.Tax Entitlement 44%     0 0 0 0 0 0 0 111,260 303,059 357,961 334,136 348,413 
  g Total GOI Share  0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1,489 14,289 408,157 1,058,265 1,284,844 1,361,153 1,384,258 
9  Contractor Share                  
  a. Contractor Equity Share oil  35.71% 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 69,105 153,497 202,727 208,190 206,629 
  b. Contractor Equity Share gas  62.50% 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 178,995 528,925 601,277 615,930 649,962 
  c Contractor Share from FTP oil  0% 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
  d. Contractor Share from FTP gas  0% 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
  e. DMO oil first 5 prod.year  25% 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 75,421 71,554 
    after 5 prod-years   15%                 
  f. Taxable Share   0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 252,864 688,770 813,548 759,400 791,848 
  g Gov.Tax Entitlement  44% 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 111,260 303,059 357,961 334,136 348,413 
  h Net Profit Contractor   0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 136,840 379,363 446,043 414,563 436,624 
  1  Total Contractor Share   0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 13,402 128,597 242,953 557,314 727,234 711,817 639,554 
10  Party's Take                  
  a % GOI Take             10% 10% 63% 66% 64% 66% 68% 
  b % Contractor Take             90% 90% 37% 34% 36% 34% 32% 
11  Contractor Cash analysis                  
  a. Net Cash flow Contractor  (340) (1,658) (2,800) (5,340) (11,124) (22,342) (27,231) (74,069) (142,907) (119,319) (59,033) 107,618 376,983 456,111 407,829 446,080 
  b. NPV @15%    (296) (1,549) (3,390) (6,444) (11,974) (21,633) (31,870) (56,084) (96,707) (126,201) (138,889) (118,775) (57,504) 6,957 57,077 104,747 
  c NPV @15% /B           (63.58) (12.01) (1.88) (0.44) 0.03 0.21 0.29 
  d. IRR             #DIV/0! 1% 16% 23% 27% 
  e. POT              12    
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Appendix B7 
 
Case C4 base case: Cash flow simulation of extra large oil and gas field using IP5 figures 
000USD 
 
   17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 Total Mean 
  a Equity to be split oil & gas  1,898,369 1,764,596 1,204,793 1,369,419 1,410,489 1,611,217 2,283,239 2,051,220 2,052,600 1,825,050 1,537,130 1,773,324 2,097,519 1,799,224 31,150,746 1,038,358 
  b Equity to be split oil & gas  629,313 622,758 365,966 377,912 400,501 436,726 588,819 500,331 481,981 399,751 300,880 353,082 392,286 268,594 8,471,317 282,377 
  c Equity to be split gas  1,269,057 1,141,837 838,827 991,508 1,009,988 1,174,491 1,694,420 1,550,889 1,570,619 1,425,299 1,236,250 1,420,242 1,705,233 1,530,630 22,679,428 907,177 
8  GOI Share                 
  a. GOI Equity share oil  404,558 400,345 235,264 242,943 257,465 280,753 378,527 321,641 309,845 256,983 193,423 226,981 252,184 172,668 5,445,846 181,528 
  b. GOI Equity share gas  475,896 428,189 314,560 371,815 378,745 440,434 635,407 581,583 588,982 534,487 463,594 532,591 639,462 573,986 8,504,786  
  c GOI share from FTP oil  105,794 101,512 50,568 69,891 65,797 81,602 99,039 84,903 82,375 68,597 55,470 55,240 59,216 43,809 1,452,622 48,421 
  d. GOI share from FTP gas  124,962 115,245 106,419 100,862 108,188 116,559 176,780 170,411 175,566 166,607 156,580 167,024 193,063 185,684 2,488,471  
  e. Domestic Requirement  80,290 77,040 38,377 53,042 49,935 61,930 75,163 64,435 62,517 52,060 42,098 41,923 44,941 33,248 923,976 35,538 
  f. Gov.Tax Entitlement  415,084 380,594 274,332 311,146 320,980 366,945 528,457 480,668 484,399 436,438 374,627 430,775 513,062 450,889 7,223,225 277,816 
  g Total GOI Share 1,606,583 1,502,924 1,019,520 1,149,699 1,181,111 1,348,222 1,893,374 1,703,643 1,703,683 1,515,171 1,285,792 1,454,533 1,701,929 1,460,285 26,038,925 867,964 
9  Contractor Share                 
  a. Contractor Equity Share oil  224,755 222,414 130,702 134,969 143,036 155,974 210,293 178,690 172,136 142,768 107,457 126,101 140,102 95,927 3,025,472 100,849 
  b. Contractor Equity Share gas  793,160 713,648 524,267 619,692 631,242 734,057 1,059,012 969,305 981,637 890,812 772,656 887,651 1,065,770 956,644   
  c Contractor Share from FTP oil  0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
  d. Contractor Share from FTP gas  0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0   
  e. DMO oil first 5 prod.year  80,290 77,040 38,377 53,042 49,935 61,930 75,163 64,435 62,517 52,060 42,098 41,923 44,941 33,248 923,976 30,799 
    after 5 prod-years                   
  f. Taxable Share  943,372 864,985 623,482 707,150 729,501 833,966 1,201,039 1,092,428 1,100,906 991,905 851,426 979,034 1,166,050 1,024,747 16,416,421 547,214 
  g Gov.Tax Entitlement  415,084 380,594 274,332 311,146 320,980 366,945 528,457 480,668 484,399 436,438 374,627 430,775 513,062 450,889 7,223,225 240,774 
  h Net Profit Contractor  522,541 478,428 342,260 390,473 403,363 461,156 665,684 602,891 606,857 545,082 463,388 541,054 647,870 568,433 9,052,914 301,764 
  1  Total Contractor Share  700,967 664,647 550,347 557,828 558,741 633,381 864,815 849,500 875,724 836,863 834,704 768,099 820,866 834,653 13,372,005 445,734 
10  Party's Take                 
  a % GOI Take 70% 69% 65% 67% 68% 68% 69% 67% 66% 64% 61% 65% 67% 64% 66% 61% 
  b % Contractor Take  30% 31% 35% 33% 32% 32% 31% 33% 34% 36% 39% 35% 33% 36% 34% 39% 
11  Contractor Cash analysis                 
  a. Net Cash flow Contractor 537,710 495,236 354,619 400,716 412,229 466,764 668,876 597,568 601,588 541,848 453,759 563,438 675,462 680,544 8,778,814 292,627 
  b. NPV @15%   154,714 194,732 219,649 244,133 266,035 287,600 314,472 335,347 353,622 367,935 378,358 389,612 401,344 411,622 411,622  
  c NPV @15% /B 0.33 0.34 0.32 0.29 0.27 0.25 0.24 0.22 0.21 0.20 0.19 0.18 0.17 0.16 0.16  
  d. IRR 29% 31% 32% 33% 33% 33% 34% 34% 34% 34% 34% 34% 34% 35% 35%  
  e. POT               12  
